The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict XVI's social encyclical and the future of political economy by Pabst, Adrian
The Crisis of Global Capitalism

The Crisis of 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Pope Benedict XVI’s Social Encyclical  
and the Future of Political Economy
EDITED BY
A DR I A N  PA B S T
THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Pope Benedict XVI’s Social Encyclical and the Future of Political Economy
Copyright © 2011 Wipf and Stock Publishers. All rights reserved. Except for 
brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be 
reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. 
Write: Permissions, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, 
OR 97401.
Cascade Books
An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers





.e crisis of global capitalism : Pope Benedict XVI’s social encyclical and the future 
of political economy / Edited by Adrian Pabst.
xii + 278 p. ; 23 cm. — Includes bibliographical references and index(es).
isbn 13: 978-1-60899-368-0
1. 2. I. Pabst, Adrian. II. III. IV.
call number 2011





PART I: Christianity and Capitalism
1 A Real .ird Way / John Milbank 27
2 A Tale of a Duck-Billed Platypus Called Benedict and  
His Gold and Red Crayons / Tracey Rowland 71
PART II: Christianity and Socialism
3 “We Communists of the Old School” / Eugene 
McCarraher 89
4 Beyond the Culture of Cutthroat Competition /  
Mark and Louise Zwick 121
PART III: Civil and Political Economy
5 Fraternity, Gi6, and Reciprocity in Caritas in Veritate / 
Stefano Zamagni 155
6 .e Paradoxical Nature of the Good / Adrian Pabst 173
PART IV: Caritas in Veritate and Traditions of Christian  
Social Teaching
7 .e Anthropological Unity of Caritas in Veritate /  
David L. Schindler 209
Contentsvi
8 Integralism and Gi6 Exchange in the Anglican Social 
Tradition, or Avoiding Niebuhr in Ecclesiastical Drag / 
John Hughes 219
PART V: Distributism and Alternative Economies
9 Common Life / Jon Cruddas MP and Jonathan 
Rutherford 237




Jon Cruddas MP is Member of Parliament for Dagenham, London, UK. 
A member of Compass, he is a leading 8gure in the British Labour 
Party and a major voice on the political le6 in Europe.
John Hughes is Chaplain of Jesus College, University of Cambridge, 
where he obtained his PhD in Philosophy of Religion in the Faculty 
of Divinity. He is the author of !e End of Work: !eological Critiques 
of Capitalism (2007) and numerous articles in international journals, 
including Modern !eology and New Blackfriars.
Eugene McCarraher is Associate Professor of Humanities at Villanova 
University. His research is in the 8elds of cultural and intellectual his-
tory, social and economic theory, and political theology. In addition 
to numerous articles and essays, he is the author of Christian Critics: 
Religion and the Impasse in Modern American Social !ought (2000). 
Currently he is writing !e Enchantments of Mammon: Corporate 
Capitalism and the American Moral Imagination.
John C. Médaille is Adjunct Instructor of theology at the University 
of Dallas, Texas. He is the author of !e Vocation of Business: Social 
Justice in the Marketplace (2007) and the editor of Economic Liberty: 
A Profound Romanian Renaissance (2009). His latest book is Toward a 
Truly Free Market: A Distributist Perspective on the Role of Government, 
Taxes, Health Care, De"cits, and More (2010).
John Milbank is Research Professor of Religion, Politics and Ethics at the 
University of Nottingham and Director of the Centre of .eology and 
Philosophy. One of the world’s leading theologians, he is the author 
Contributorsviii
of !eology and Social !eory (1990), A Word Made Strange ( 1997), 
Truth in Aquinas (2001, with Catherine Pickstock), Being Reconciled 
(2003), !e Suspended Middle (2005), !e Future of Love (2008) 
and !e Monstrosity of Christ (with Slavoj Žižek, 2009). Together 
with Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, he is the co-editor of 
the Radical Orthodoxy volume (1999). He is currently completing 
Philosophy: A !eological Critique.
Adrian Pabst is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Kent, Canterbury, 
UK, and a Visiting Professor at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Lille 
(Sciences Po), France. Previously, he held a Leverhulme Early Career 
Fellowship at the University of Nottingham where he is a member of 
the Centre of .eology and Philosophy. He has published numer-
ous book chapters and articles in international journals, including 
Modern !eology, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Telos, 
and New Blackfriars. His 8rst monograph, Metaphysics: !e Creation 
of Hierarchy, will be published by Eerdmans in late 2011/early 2012. 
Currently, he is writing !e Politics of Paradox, a book on a new politi-
cal economy a6er the demise of le6/right and state/market that have 
been dominant since the secular settlement of the French Revolution.
Tracey Rowland is Associate Professor and Dean and Permanent Fellow 
of the John Paul II Institute, Melbourne, as well as a Fellow of the 
Centre of .eology and Philosophy in the University of Nottingham. 
She is the author of Culture and the !omist Tradition a#er Vatican II 
(2003), Ratzinger’s Faith: !e !eology of Pope Benedict XVI (2008) 
and Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed (2010).
Jonathan Rutherford is Professor in Cultural Studies in the School of 
Arts and Education at Middlesex University, and editor of Soundings 
Journal (http://www.soundings.org.uk). His latest book is A#er Identity 
(2007). He is chair of Compass’s Good Society working group and a 
frequent contributor to !e Guardian and !e New Statesman.
David L. Schindler is Edouard Cardinal Gagnon Professor of 
Fundamental .eology at the Ponti8cal John Paul II Institute and 
the Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. One of North 
America’s leading Catholic theologians, he is the author of numerous 
books and articles. He is also the editor of Communio: International 
Catholic Review that was co-founded by Joseph Ratzinger.
Contributors ix
Stefano Zamagni is Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna 
and Vice director of the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center 
where he is also Senior adjunct professor of International Economics. 
One of Europe’s leading political economists, he has published widely 
on capital theory, theory of consumer behavior, social choice theory, 
economic epistemology, ethics, economics, and civil economy. Among 
his most recent books are History of Economic !ought (co-written 
with E. Screpanti; Oxford University Press, 2005), Civil Economy (co-
authored with L. Bruni, 2007), L’ economia del bene comune (2007), 
Avarizia. La passione dell’avere (2009), Cooperative Enterprise: facing 
the challenge of globalization (co-written with V. Zamagni; 2010) and 
Dizionario di Economia Civile (co-edited with L. Bruni, 2010). He is 
a member of the Ponti8cal Council for Justice and Peace that advised 
Pope Benedict XVI on the encyclical Caritas in Veritate.
Mark and Louise Zwick are the Editors of the Houston Catholic Worker 
and founder of Casa Juan Diego Houses of Hospitality for Immigrants 
and Refugees in Houston, Texas. .ey are the authors of !e Catholic 




This collection is partly based on a conference held at the Centre of .eology and Philosophy in the University of Nottingham on 
July 9 and 10, 2009. .e conference was the 8rst extended theological 
discussion in the UK of Pope Benedict XVI’s social encyclical Caritas in 
Veritate (published just two days before, on July 7, 2009). With speak-
ers and participants from around Europe and the U.S.A., the engaging 
debates on the signi8cance of the encyclical persuaded me to publish 
parts of the proceedings as a book.
I am very grateful indeed to the speakers for making their papers 
available for publication. I would also like to thank those who did not 
participate in the conference for their contributions to this collection.
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my colleagues at the Centre of 
.eology and Philosophy and the Department of .eology and Religious 
Studies at Nottingham for their support, in particular Professor John 
Milbank and Dr. Conor Cunningham. It is with immense appreciation 
that I would like to acknowledge the extensive 8nancial support by both 
institutions that made this event possible.
Finally, I am most grateful to the publishers Wipf and Stock, in 
particular Charlie Collier for his immediate support and Diane Farley 
for her patience and assistance.
July 7, 2010, on the 8rst anniversary of the 




The Future of Political Economy
Adrian Pabst
“This Time Is Different”: Capitalism and  
Secular Modernity
In a sense, the global recession of 2007–2010 is just another remind-er that capitalist economies suAer periodic crises but that capitalism 
does not collapse under the weight of its own inner contradictions. 
Instead, it always reverts to the “normal” cycle of expansion, contrac-
tion, and recovery. .is reversion is linked to over-accumulation and 
falling pro8t rates that prompt capital owners to cut the real wages of la-
borers in order to generate new surplus value, as both Adam Smith and 
Karl Marx recognized.1 But whereas Smith evaded the issue of “primi-
tive accumulation,” Marx followed Sir James Steuart in arguing that this 
is the condition of possibility for the genesis of capitalism. What Rosa 
1. Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. I, chap. 9; Marx, Capital, vol. 3, ch. II and XIII. 
A contemporary example of this is “wage restraint” in Germany over the past decade. 
While it has signi8cantly improved the competitiveness of German exports, there can 
be no doubt that it has also magni8ed the unsustainable imbalances between surplus 
and de8cit countries within the eurozone and beyond.
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Luxembourg and Hannah Arendt later add to Marx’s account is the idea 
of the permanent need to renew this process of enrichment based on 
expropriation—hence their theory of imperialism.2
Neither Marx nor his disciples could however explain how and why 
the capitalist commodi8cation of land, labor, and social relations based 
on the repeated, cumulative process of “primitive accumulation” through 
dispossession requires a rede8nition of the sacred and the subordination 
of the sanctity of life and land to the quasi-sacrality of the market—aided 
and abetted by the state, as Karl Polanyi has shown.3 In this manner, 
free-market capitalism—increasingly unconstrained by the shared moral 
codes of civic culture and civil society—tends to exacerbate both income 
and asset inequality, as exempli8ed by advanced economies in the U.S. 
and the UK over the last thirty years or so.4 In diAerent ways, the gap 
between capital owners and wage laborers also widens in fast-growing, 
emerging markets like China and India where hundreds of millions have 
been li6ed out of abject rural poverty, only to join the new underclass of 
the “working poor” who face a lifetime of urban precariousness.
In the ongoing process of “primitive accumulation,” money and the 
everyday market economy are superseded by layers of 8nancial capi-
tal, which is marked by ever-greater abstraction from the real economy 
and makes money out of money—value in search of surplus value. At 
the top of this inverted pyramid sits global 8nance, seeking short-term 
returns that neither produce long-term prosperity nor trickle down 
to the masses. Instead, disembodied capital inBates and subsequently 
deBates the real value of physical assets by using them as collateral in 
credit-fuelled and debt-leveraged acts of speculation that assume ris-
ing asset prices which are in reality unsustainable. .at’s why recessions 
and depressions on Main Street only ever occur in the wake of 8nancial 
crises on Wall Street.5 Such crises are caused by careless lending, excess 
borrowing, debt default, and market panic—exactly the sequence of the 
2007–8 global “credit crunch.” One can say with the economists Carmen 
2. Marx, Capital, vol. 1, ch. XXXI, “Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist.” Cf. Perelman, 
Invention of Capitalism, 13–58, 92–195; Harvey, New Imperialism, 137–82.
3. Polanyi, Great Transformation.
4. .e negative impact of both income and asset inequality on economic growth and 
the well-being of societies (in terms of better physical and mental health, less crime, less 
family breakdown, higher educational levels, etc.) has been documented by Wilkinson 
and Pickett, Spirit Level; and Rajan, Fault Lines.
5. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes.
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Reinhart and Kenneth RogoA that this time seems no diAerent from the 
past “eight centuries of 8nancial folly.”6
In another sense, however, the current crisis is unprecedented in its 
magnitude, intensity, and nature. Not only is this the 8rst global reces-
sion that hit the developed economies at the core with greater severity 
than the emerging markets at the periphery. But compared even with 
the Great Depressions of 1873–1896 and 1929–1933, the extent to which 
8nance has pervaded and dislocated the real economy is unprecedented. 
Following President Nixon’s de facto abolition of capital controls and the 
end of managed exchange rates in the early 1970s,7 capital was globalized 
as international money markets sucked in savings from around the world 
and made bumper pro8ts on exchange rate speculation, culminating in 
a series of 8nancial crises and sovereign debt defaults (Mexico in 1994, 
East Asia in 1997, and Russia in 1998). Reinforced by successive waves 
of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, easy credit was increas-
ingly poured into new services such as 8nance, insurance, and real estate 
(or FIRE). .us the “new economy” was born. A6er the dot.com crash 
in 2000 when over 7 billion dollars was wiped oA technology shares, cen-
tral bankers across the globe opened the money tabs and injected mass 
liquidity into the 8nancial system in order to starve oA recession, paving 
the way for the global 8nancial bubble that burst in 2007 and plunged the 
world economy into the worst recession for at least seventy years.
Fuelled by the sovereign wealth and foreign exchange reserves 
of Asian countries and the Gulf States, private and corporate debt was 
secured almost exclusively against the increasingly inBated value of resi-
dential and commercial property. .at, in turn, provided the basis for the 
infamous instrument of “mortgage securitization” that encapsulates the 
concentration of capital and 8nancial speculation on short-term nominal 
exchange value—rather than long-term productive investment in the real 
economy that spreads wealth through income and asset distribution.
Crucially, stagnant or declining real wages in advanced economies 
like the U.S., the UK, and even Germany reduced the purchasing power 
of lower- and middle-income families at a time when the rise in the cost 
of living by far outstripped oCcial inBation rates of 2 percent per annum. 
.e fall in purchasing power not only exacerbated inequality but also 
generated a growing demand for consumer credit and home mortgages 
6. Reinhart and RogoA, !is Time Is Di$erent.
7. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital.
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that could only be met by new 8nancial vehicles speculating on asset 
inBation instead of monitoring the ability to repay debt. .us, credit-
fuelled and debt-leveraged consumption and speculation supplanted 
income-based saving and investment. Here one can suggest that the link 
between 8nancial abstraction from the material world and its necessary 
reconnection with the real economy constitutes a dialectic that is en-
tirely internal to the logic of late modern capitalism.
But given that the nominal value of capital must be reinvested in 
real material processes, the living universe is supplanted by a virtual 
reality that is grounded in a vacuous generality—the capitalist fetishiza-
tion of idealized commodities and the notion that the worth of material 
objects lies in their status as exchangeable commodities instead of being 
somehow both intrinsic to things and added to them by human labor. 
Like all ideologies and political economies, capitalism is predicated on 
an ontology that makes philosophical and theological claims about the 
nature of the shared world we inhabit. More than any other economic 
system, free-market capitalism weakens real relations among actually 
existing things because it privileges discrete, individual objects at the ex-
pense of the social, cultural, and religions structures and arrangements 
that bind them together, as R. H. Tawney and his Christian socialist 
friend Karl Polanyi 8rst argued.8
By separating materiality from symbolic meaning and subjecting 
everything to standards of abstract value, the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and exchange subordinates the sanctity of nature and human life to 
the secular sacrality of the free market and the sovereign central state 
that have colluded from the outset of the modern age.9 For just as the 
market requires state support to extend contractual proprietary relations 
and nominal exchange into ever more areas of public and private life, 
so the state needs the market to expand its powers of surveillance and 
enforcement to hitherto self-regulating organizations of civil society. 
For this reason, the birth of capitalism in early modern Europe is in-
extricably intertwined with the rise of the national state that subsumed 
civic culture and civil society under the central authority of the sover-
eign ruler.10
8. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism; Polanyi, Great Transformation.
9. Pabst, “Modern Sovereignty in Question,” 570–602.
10. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, esp. 147. Arrighi, Long 
Twentieth Century.
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Nevertheless, throughout the development of urban society and 
modern economic life in the long European transition from the late Middle 
Ages to the Enlightenment and beyond, the life of households, communi-
ties, and intermediary institutions was governed by principles and prac-
tices of reciprocity and mutuality as part of “economies of gi6-exchange” 
that were indissociable from the Church and Eucharistic celebrations.11 
Broadly speaking, medieval Christendom and its Renaissance-Byzantine 
legacy in East and West viewed both the economy and politics as penul-
timate, embedded in human and social relations, as well as regulated by 
civic virtues of sympathy and fraternity. .ose religious traditions that 
promoted or endorsed the increasingly disembedded capitalist mode 
of production and exchange were also those that deviated from creedal 
Christianity. .is applies to the Calvinist sundering of contract from gi6, 
as John Milbank argues in chapter 1, and to the Baroque scholastic sepa-
ration of “pure nature” from the supernatural, as Tracey Rowland shows 
in chapter 2. Since capitalism emerged with the approval and connivance 
of actual religion, it can only be fully understood as part of the theological 
shi6s that brought about modernity. By focusing on work ethic, Weber 
was less than half-right.
Religion is indispensable to political economy for another reason. 
In the past and the present, capitalism has faced resistance from more 
orthodox faith traditions (both within and across diAerent world re-
ligions) that defend strong notions of gi6 exchange, ethical limits on 
exchange (like anti-usury laws), and the sanctity of life against contrac-
tual-proprietary relations, capitalist commodi8cation, and bio-politics. 
As such, the capitalist system requires for its very operation (and not just 
as mere ideological obfuscation) the re-conception of the sacred and the 
institution of secular simulacra like fetishized commodities and market 
utopia—with the collusive complicity of religion.12
.e secular logic at the heart of capitalism is also the mark of the 
intellectual traditions that have been dominant in the modern age, chief 
of all political liberalism and its roots in late medieval nominalism and 
11. Bossy, “Mass as a Social Institution,” 29–61; Black, Guilds and Civil Society, esp. 
12–43 and 237–41. For a critique of Black’s de8nition of civil society, see Milbank, “Real 
.ird Way,” this volume, ch. 1.
12. On the complicit collusion of Protestant liberalism and unfettered capitalism 
in the U.S., see Frank, One Market Under God; Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, 
American Style. Cf. Pabst, “Modern Sovereignty in Question,” esp. 585 n. 60.
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voluntarism.13 .is late medieval legacy, which the Hobbesian-Humean 
and Lockean-Kantian strands of liberalism carry forward, translates into 
the modern univocal poles of le6 and right, the binary poles of indi-
vidual and collective sovereign volition as well as the institutional poles 
of state and market (as John Milbank suggests in his contribution to this 
collection). All three poles underpin liberal market democracy, which 
has conspicuously failed to deliver universal freedom and prosperity. 
It is therefore surely no coincidence that the crisis of global capitalism 
occurs at the same time as the crisis of secular modernity. .is time is 
diAerent a6er all.
In what follows, I will not summarize or assess each contribution to 
this collection of essays. Instead, my aim is to reBect more broadly on our 
present geo-economic predicament and on the contribution of Caritas 
in Veritate to contemporary debates on economics, politics, and society. 
.e account that is presented in this introduction in no way reBects the 
views of all the contributors, but I have drawn on their work in order to 
substantiate some of my own arguments. What I will suggest is that Pope 
Benedict’s call for a civil economy represents a radical “middle” position 
between an exclusively religious and a strictly secular perspective. His 
argument is that faith can lead to strong notions of the common good 
and a belief that human behavior, when disciplined and directed, can 
start to act more charitably. .ere can also be secular intimations of this: 
the more faith-inspired practices are successful even in secular terms 
(e.g., more economic security, more equality, more sustainability and 
greater civic participation), the easier it will be for secular institutions 
to adopt elements of such an overarching framework without however 
fully embracing its religious basis. Indeed, intellectuals and decision-
makers across the political spectrum have recognized that there is a 
clear convergence between visions for a progressive stakeholder society 
and Catholic alternatives to unbridled capitalism.14
13. See André de Muralt’s genealogy of modern philosophy and political thought 
from John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham via Suárez and Kant to John Rawls, in 
his seminal book L’unité de la philosophie politique.
14. See, for instance, Hutton, “What I Told the Pope.”
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The Specter of Depression and the Impasse  
of Secular Solutions
Both state and market responses to the global crisis show just how intel-
lectually defunct and morally bankrupt secular political economy now 
is. .ree years a6er the onset of the credit crunch that unleashed the big-
gest economic bust since 1929, the U.S. economy teeters on the brink of 
a double-dip recession that could not only drag down much of Europe, 
Latin America, and Africa but also mutate into a full-scale depression 
(similar to Japan’s lost “double decade” in the 1990s and 2000s). Even 
if the Bedgling recovery of the U.S. economy continues, austerity pro-
grams in the eurozone and the rest of the EU will for the foreseeable 
future have a strongly deBationary eAect beyond Europe’s borders that 
cannot be oAset by expansionary monetary policy, with baseline interest 
rates near 0.5 percent and central banks wary of the inBationary impli-
cations of further quantitative easing (increasing the money supply by 
printing money to purchase public bonds or private assets). Even if the 
worst-case scenario is averted, large parts of the world economy will face 
years of sluggish growth, mass unemployment, social dislocation and 
environmental degradation.15 Of course religion is no panacea, but the 
principles and practices of Christian social teaching (and cognate ideas 
in other religious traditions) oAer an alternative path that outBanks the 
binary logic of state and market and of le6 and right that has prevailed 
since the secular settlement of the French Revolution.
Secular solutions have failed to overcome the fractures of the world 
economy because they have treated the symptoms of the crisis rather 
than its causes. Following the disastrous decision on September 15, 
2008, to allow Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt, a concerted eAort to 
15. As a recent UN report documents, the escalating destruction of nature and 
the unprecedented decline in bio-diversity present a far greater risk than the excessive 
emission of carbon dioxide and climate change (though the latter have an impact on 
the former). On narrowly economic terms, the cost of mitigating climate change are ap-
proximately 1–2 percent of annual global output, with longer-term bene8ts of around 
8ve to twenty times that 8gure. By contrast, the value of saving “natural goods and 
services” such as crops, pollination, medicines, fertile soils as well as clean air and water 
will be 10 and 100 higher than the costs of saving the habitats and species which pro-
vide them. For example, establishing and operating a worldwide network of protected 
areas would cost 45 billion dollars a year, but the bene8ts of preserving the diversity 
of species and landscapes could amount to 4–5 trillion dollars per annum. See UNEP, 
“Dead Planet, Living Planet.”
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bail out banks and other systemically important institutions like AIG 
averted a meltdown of the international 8nancial system (with a total 
rescue package amounting to 9 trillion dollars in cash injections, lending 
guarantees, and funding lines, according to IMF estimates). But since 
then, the world’s leading economies have failed to reform global 8nance 
and reduce the 8scal imbalances that fuelled the credit and asset bubbles. 
Nor have political leaders taken action to reduce 8nancial speculation in 
commodities, which was responsible for the price hike in the 8rst half 
of 200816 and continues almost unabated. While the immediate panic 
that erupted in September 2008 has subsided, the near-meltdown of the 
world’s 8nancial system has bequeathed a loss of trust in the workings of 
markets themselves.17 Absent wholesale reforms, most of the conditions 
for another economic crisis are still 8rmly in place.
At the international level, the G20 is deeply divided between devel-
oped economies, emerging markets, and developing countries. Since it 
8rst met in November 2008, it has proven to be a useful instrument of 
crisis coordination (8nancial bail-out, monetary expansion, and 8scal 
stimulus). However, it has failed to bring about signi8cant changes to 
the global economy, let alone launch a process of systemic transforma-
tion. .e group has neither begun to implement basic 8nancial reform 
(capital requirements, bank levies, or transactional taxation) nor made 
progress on new growth models (re-localizing global capital, promoting 
green technologies, etc.). .e summit in Canada in June 2010 where 
the U.S. and Europe disagreed on austerity programs con8rms that the 
16. See UNCTAD, “Global Economic Crisis.” As with 8nancial services, the core 
problem of commodity trade is an unprecedented concentration of ownership and un-
der-regulated futures trade. At the height of the 2008 commodity bubble, the Chicago 
CME Group—itself the product of a merger of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with 
the Chicago Board of Trade—witnessed more than a million contracts per day. Hedge 
funds and other 8nancial institutions no only engage in future trading (involving, for 
example, the daily contracting of 30 million tons of soybeans for future delivery) but 
also acquire the companies that stock commodities. Such and similar speculation is 
highly distortive and destructive of the actual market precisely because these traders 
never take delivery. Instead, they make gigantic gains on both soaring and falling prices: 
futures contracts serve to drive up current prices and enable speculators to unload their 
holdings onto a distorted market, hurting both producers and consumers in the pro-
cess. Crucially, speculators bet that arti8cially inBated prices will eventually collapse, at 
which point they can once more snap up cheap assets and repeat the process.
17. .is is evinced, for example, by the “Bash crash” on May 6, 2010, when equity 
prices gyrated on an unprecedented scale—an unusual pattern of Buctuations that re-
mains unexplained by rival schools of economics.
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power of the G20 to modify the relations between states and markets has 
already peaked and is now waning.
At the national levels, governments and central banks have oAset 
some of the worst eAects of the recession through a combination of 8scal 
stimulus packages and unorthodox monetary expansion. But with both 
households and corporations de-leveraging, a recovery led predomi-
nantly by private sector investment and consumption looks increas-
ingly unlikely. Paradoxically, this is particularly true in countries like 
the UK where massive public spending cuts—coupled with a substantial 
increase in sales (or value-added) taxes—further depresses aggregate 
demand and private sector activity that is highly dependent on public 
sector contracts. Nor have parliaments or presidents had the courage 
either to enforce existing laws or to put in place new anti-monopoly 
legislation aimed at breaking up 8nancial and retail conglomerates that 
represent a form of casino-cum-cartel capitalism.18 Even banks that have 
had to be taken into part-public ownership have not restored lending 
to cash-strapped businesses or households. How in these circumstances 
the recovery can possibly be sustained by private sector spending has 
never been explained by the “de8cit hawks.” .us both globally and lo-
18. Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers. .e authors document how the assets of the six 
largest banks grew from 18 percent of national out put in 1995 to 60 percent in 2009 
at the height of the 8nancial crisis and that they have access to money at signi8cantly 
lower rates than smaller banks. .is con8rms once more that free-market capitalism 
does not avoid private cartels and monopolistic practices. While governments collude 
with banks that are “too-big-to-fail,” there is evidence that breaking up such conglom-
erates has economic bene8ts. When Standard Oil was broken up in 1911, for example, 
the individual parts became more valuable than the whole and no longer threatened 
to bring down the entire sector. Moreover, the objection that neither Lehman Brothers 
in the U.S. nor Northern Rock in the UK were universal, integrated banking conglom-
erates (the former was a pure investment bank and the latter a mortgage bank) but 
nevertheless went bankrupt is misguided because both were inextricably intertwined 
with the global 8nancial system. Lehman, in the form of counter-party, was deeply 
linked to mainstream banking, while Northern Rock could only leverage itself to a such 
an unsustainable degree because investment banks like Lehman bought its securitized 
mortgage packages and sold them on. A Glass-Steagall divide between commercial, 
retail banking, and investment banking would have allowed Lehman either to go into 
administration without bringing down the entire 8nancial edi8ce or to be taken over 
(like Bear Stearns). Likewise, Northern Rock could have been taken into public owner-
ship at a much lower cost to the taxpayer. Failure to ban certain speculative instruments 
enables both types of banks to engage in similar practices and thereby spread systemic 
risk throughout the world economy. .is undermines the argument that the uncor-
related and asymmetrical cycles of investment and retail banking serve to reduce risk 
and make a division of diAerent types of banking unnecessary.
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cally, the world economy remains fractured along the same pre-crisis 
fault lines and risks a repeat of the 8nancial crisis.19
Ideologically, neither the le6 nor the right has fully repudiated the 
shared neo-liberal consensus that prevailed for most of the post-Cold 
War period. .e le6 has bailed out global 8nance without reforming it, 
while the right has slashed public spending on which the private sec-
tor depends. Both have relied on central banks printing money to buy 
up the toxic debts of banks and corporations, but neither has helped 
individuals or households restructure their debt and thereby avoid per-
sonal bankruptcy and home foreclosures. Le6 and right argue over 8scal 
sustainability, but neither has developed a credible growth strategy that 
reduces debt while also creating employment.
By not breaking up banks “too-big-to-fail” and creating incentives 
linking 8nance to productive investment, both le6 and right are prop-
ping up a system that privatizes pro8ts, nationalizes losses and social-
izes systemic risk. Neither le6 nor right has so far launched a genuine 
redistribution of power and a re-balancing of wealth in favor of citizens, 
communities, intermediary associations, and small businesses. Both 
le6 and right are scaling back statist welfarism but fail to institute asset-
based welfare. As a result, bene8ts and other entitlements provide little 
more than income redistribution at the margin and some meager com-
pensation for the proletarianization and de-professionalization of the 
workforce that is denied mutual self-organization as part of corporate 
guilds. With widening asset and income inequality, the polarization and 
fragmentation of society will continue to proceed apace (as Jon Cruddas 
and Jonathan Rutherford argue in chapter 9). .is endangers the social 
bonds of trust and reciprocity on which vibrant democracies and market 
economies surely rely.20
Moral Sentiments and Political Economy:  
Keynes, Marx, and Smith
So what is to be done? Since 2007, critics of the neo-liberal “Washington 
consensus” and the underlying intellectual orthodoxy have looked to 
three diAerent traditions for alternatives: Keynes, Marx, and Smith. 
Keynes has inspired the 8scal stimulus packages to prevent the global 
19. Rajan, Fault Lines.
20. See Pabst, “Crisis of Capitalist Democracy,” 44–67.
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recession from turning into another Great Depression. Keynesian prin-
ciples are also shaping current eAorts to reform the international 8nan-
cial architecture centered on the Bretton Woods institutions which he 
helped design in 1944. According to this much-needed revisionist read-
ing, the contemporary return of Keynes is a late vindication for the most 
important economist of the twentieth century. Not only is his theory not 
to blame for the crisis of the post-war “Keynesian settlement” in the late 
1960s and 1970s. It was in fact the neo-classical, monetarist revolution 
that abolished Keynesian capital controls and thereby helped unleash 
the forces of global 8nance which condemned the world to the worst 
crisis since 1929–1932.21
Aspects of Marx have been rightly reclaimed, not just by sections 
of the secular le6 but also by religious thinkers—most prominently 
the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams. In particular, he has 
defended Marx’s critique of unbridled capitalism as a kind of mythol-
ogy that ascribes reality, power, and agency to money and commodities 
that have no life in themselves.22 .is has the eAect of turning such and 
similar fetishes into idols and transforming the unreality of debt into an 
independent force that is nevertheless increasingly abstracted from the 
real economy (as I have already indicated). Indeed, the global economy 
dominated by disembodied 8nance represents an edi8ce built on sand, 
as the patriarchs of Rome, Moscow, and Canterbury have consistently 
argued throughout the crisis (a theme to which I will return below).
.e legacy of Adam Smith has been championed by a number of 
economists and historians, chief of all, Amartya Sen. He hails Smith as 
a theorist of the market that is governed by non-pro8t values like pru-
dence and generosity that serve social justice rather than simply private 
pro8t.23 Read in conjunction with his !eory of Moral Sentiments, Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations seems to show that the “invisible hand of the market” 
is not in or of itself suCcient but requires mutual trust and con8dence in 
order to operate eCciently. Absent a shared framework of moral senti-
ments, human self-interest mutates into excessive risk-taking in search 
for pro8ts that turns the fellow feeling of responsible agents into the 
ruthless speculation of “prodigals and projectors.” Far from licensing the 
21. Skidelsky, Keynes; Clarke, Keynes; Davidson, Keynes Solution.
22. Williams, “Face it.”
23. Sen, “Open and Closed Impartiality”; Sen, “What Do We Want?”; Sen, “Adam 
Smith’s Market.”
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domination of capital, Smith’s morally embedded market economy—so 
Sen’s argument goes—uses production and exchange in order to foster 
intellectual emancipation, social progress, political enlightenment, and 
civil society.
.e ideas of Smith, Marx, and Keynes diAer signi8cantly from 
one another, but what they share in common is an attempt to overcome 
classical political economy (as developed by Mandeville, Hobbes, and 
Locke) in the direction of social philosophy and moral theory. In dif-
ferent ways, all three seek to replace the idea of private vice and arbi-
trary divine power with enlightened self-interest and human agency. 
(Indeed, Smith’s “invisible hand” involves the theologically dubious idea 
of human cooperation with the regular and immediate intervention 
of divine providence.24) However, the “progressive” moral economy of 
Smith, Marx, and Keynes is grounded in a shared denial that the ex-
ercise of virtues require a transcendent common good that alone can 
direct individual self-interest to communal, public well-being and bind 
together both moral and civic virtue. Linked to this is a divide between 
moral sentiments and virtues, on the one hand, and the operation of the 
market, on the other hand. Indeed, the logic of gratuitousness and the 
practice of reciprocal giving are sundered from the logic of contract and 
the processes of production and exchange. As such, none of these three 
intellectual traditions represents a compelling alternative to the prevail-
ing economic ideas and policies.
Skidelsky is right to credit Keynes with a “third way” beyond statist 
communism and free-market capitalism that is based on a critique of 
utilitarian-hedonistic ethics.25 Keynes’s critique does not just focus on 
economic aspects (for example, treating money as an end rather than a 
means) but also extends to moral questions like the nature of the good 
life. He rejects the acquisitive spirit of utilitarianism and argues for an 
economic system that is rooted in locality and serves human needs and 
desires: “So, in conclusion, ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel—
these are things which should in their nature be international. But let 
goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible 
and above all let 8nance be primarily national.”26
24. For a critique of recent attempts to rehabilitate Smith along these lines, see 
Pabst, “From Civil to Political Economy.”
25. Skidelsky, Keynes, 133–53.
26. Quoted in Skidelsky, Keynes, 187.
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However, Keynes never fully repudiated his earlier embrace of G. E. 
Moore’s Principia Ethica that shaped the moral thinking of the inBuen-
tial Bloomsbury circle of intellectuals and artists. Moore claims that the 
good is a “non-natural” and non-teleological property that escapes ra-
tional judgment and is best experienced through personal aAections and 
aesthetic enjoyments.27 As a result, friendship and the contemplation of 
beauty (whether in nature or in art) are the only morally justi8able ends 
of human action. .at sets Moore—and Keynes—apart from the hedo-
nistic utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. But by the same 
token, the individual pursuit of wealth (goods rather than money) is not 
framed by a substantive notion of the shared public good that can blend 
private prosperity with the public commonweal. For Keynes the good 
is a purely nominal property that is con8ned to the mind and has no 
discernible presence in the material world. As such, goods are nothing 
more than those things that provide us with some emotion, not simply 
pleasure (as Bentham and Mill claimed) but also pain (being in love 
always involves both). For all the talk about goodness rather than util-
ity, Keynes’s moral vision remains wedded to the utilitarian, nominalist 
denial that good things reBect and intimate a transcendent source that 
endows everything with a share of the good.
Unlike Keynes, Marx is no residual utilitarian but his social theory 
is caught in the irreconcilable, modern aporia between notions of un-
alterable nature and notions of human arti8ce.28 Accordingly, human 
behavior and collective action are best explained by law-like general-
izations whereby material conditions and class structures of power are 
the ultimate causes that bring about ideology and beliefs. But to reduce 
ideas and beliefs to mere immaterial eAects of material causes reveals 
a dualistic ontology that is both nominalist (denying the real existence 
of universals in things) and voluntarist (giving priority to the power of 
volition rather than ideas in the intellect). For Marx, the highest form of 
individual liberation and collective self-emancipation is the imprinting 
of individual will on society or nature. And by rejecting any teleological 
account in terms of a hierarchy of goods that provide the ends of human 
action, Marx’s social theory sunders facts from values and proposes an 
instrumentalist view that collapses “ought” into “is.”
27. MacIntyre, A#er Virtue, 6–21.
28. Latour, Nous n’avons jamais.
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Smith’s moral theory is neither proto-utilitarian nor non-teleolog-
ical, but his political economy is no less problematic than Keynes’s or 
Marx’s. His account of virtues and pre-rational, moral sentiments es-
chews the idea of private vice and arbitrary divine power in favor of no-
tions of enlightened self-interest and human agency (as I argue in chapter 
6). But for Smith, market production and exchange is not constrained by 
the strong bonds of moral virtue and interpersonal ties. .e only values 
that regulate the market are liberty (freedom from coercion) and equality 
before the law (absence of hereditary privileges, etc.). Since market rela-
tions are characterized by weak ties and serve self-interest rather than 
the common good, Smith divorces the quest for happiness that involves a 
hierarchy of goods from the exercise of civic virtue like justice.
By the same token, he also separates private, moral virtues such 
as love and benevolence from public, civic virtues like prudence or 
justice. As such, he departs from the emphasis in the Neapolitan and 
the Scottish Enlightenment (Paolo Mattia Doria, Antonio Genovesi, 
and David Hume) on the mutual sympathy that binds together what we 
now call civil society and the market—a civil economy wherein market 
exchange is embedded in relations of mutuality and reciprocity. It is pre-
cisely this tradition of civil economy that Pope Benedict XVI retrieves 
and extends in his encyclical Caritas in Veritate (as Stefano Zamagni 
shows in chapter 5).
Re-Imagining Political Economy
Building on Catholic social teaching since the groundbreaking encycli-
cal Rerum Novarum (1891), Benedict’s call for a civil economy is the 
most radical intervention in contemporary debates on the future of the 
economy, politics, and society. Against apologies of free-market funda-
mentalism or statist solutions to get us out of the recession, the Pope 
seeks to chart a Catholic “third way” that combines strict limits on state 
and market power with a civil economy centered on mutualist business-
es, cooperatives, credit unions, and other alternative models at the grass-
roots’ level, as chapter 4 by Mark and Louise Zwick vividly illustrates. 
By arguing for an economic and a political system that is re-embedded 
in the reciprocal relations and civic virtues of civil society, Benedict’s 
vision of political economy transcends the old secular dichotomies of 
state and market, le6 and right, and the secretly collusive voluntarism 
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of the individual and the collective. As such, Caritas in Veritate develops 
the Catholic Christian “third way” in the direction of a virtue economy 
that re-embeds not just the market but also the state within the bonds of 
society, as John Milbank argues in his wide-ranging chapter.
Like previous interventions on economics by Joseph Ratzinger,29 
Caritas in Veritate rejects the secular logic of separating the market from 
morality. .is would imply that only market freedom and the unfettered 
interplay of supply and demand can secure economic eCciency, social 
progress, and individual emancipation. But the sundering of ethics from 
economics opens the way for a crude deterministic utilitarianism that 
equates liberty with the negative freedom of negatively choosing indi-
viduals. Linked to this is a second secular illusion—that the natural laws 
of the market are good and work for the good of all, irrespective of the 
intentions of individuals in pursuit of their own self-interest.
In the light of these illusions and internal contradictions, the Pope 
deconstructs the foundational assumptions of modern economics. First 
of all, he rejects the idea of a “value-free” and pure science of economics 
with the argument that market production and exchange requires the so-
cial bonds of reciprocal trust in order to function eCciently—otherwise 
the costs of social control can outweigh the bene8ts of unconstrained 
market anarchy (even if the current system fails to price in these and 
other externalities). Here chapter 10 by John Médaille is key: he shows 
how economic eCciency depends on the equity of distributive justice, 
which in turn is largely determined by the distribution of assets (not just 
incomes). Médaille’s argument resonates with Pope Benedict’s concep-
tion of theology as the queen of all sciences that orders lower sciences 
to higher ends but also learns from them and speaks to each science in 
terms that are intelligible to it.
Second, Benedict opposes the secular logic of scarcity of resources 
with an alternative logic of producibility and creativity,30 whereby natu-
ral riches are multiplied by patience, human labor, and ingenuity. In 
such a supernaturally infused economy, scienti8c discoveries and tech-
nological innovation are at the service of enduring human needs and 
aspirations—rather than fabricating false desires that distort our natural 
outlook on the supernatural Good in God.
29. See Ratzinger, “Church and economy.”
30. .ese ideas have also been developed by economists, e.g., Baranzini and 
Scazzieri, Foundations of Economics.
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.ird, the Pope dismisses instrumental rationality, perfect and 
asymmetric information as well as rational expectations as question-
able conceptions of human knowledge that deny any mediation between 
a priori reason and a posteriori experience. On the contrary, Benedict 
views reason in terms of trust (pistis or faith) in the reasonableness of 
reality and in our ability to apprehend it both with our senses and with 
our mind. As such, reason is much broader than instrumental rational-
ity supposes. On this account, our faculty of reasoning is also linked to 
our pre-rational, moral sentiments in ways that Adam Smith failed to 
recognize—namely that our capacity for sympathy (rather than merely 
empathy) binds us to other individuals, society, and even the natural 
universe as a whole. .us, reason is far more embodied and related to 
our senses than empiricists (whether in economics or other disciplines) 
acknowledge. All this calls into questions the theoretical foundations 
and conceptual commitments of the “dismal science of economics.” By 
contrast, Stefano Zamagni explains in his chapter how Caritas in Veritate 
contains the seeds of an alternative conception of political economy 
wherein fraternity as the reciprocal giving and receiving of social ben-
e8ts replaces pure pro8t making. Zamagni also demonstrates the far-
reaching implications of the notion of fraternity not just for the science 
of economics but also for national and international policy-making.
In line with his entire theological œuvre, the Pope’s alternative 
to modern political economy blends the metaphysical theology and 
theological anthropology of the Church Fathers and Doctors with the 
Romantic Orthodoxy of nineteenth- and twentieth-century theology, 
notably nouvelle théologie.31 Central to his vision is the symphonic syn-
thesis of faith and reason (as outlined in the 2006 Regensburg address) 
and the Neo-Platonist account of natural law that is always already su-
pernaturally infused by divine grace. Taken together, these two elements 
of Ratzinger’s theology represent a powerful repudiation of the dualis-
tic separation of “pure nature” from the supernatural which we owe to 
both Calvinism and Baroque scholasticism and which underpins the 
modern capitalist economy: speci8cally, the twin assumption, 8rst of 
all, that markets are “value-free” and do not require the exercise of vir-
tue and, second, that contracts are sundered from gi6 (and works from 
faith, as the followers of Calvin wrongly claimed). Tracey Rowland’s 
chapter demolishes attempts by neo-liberal and neo-conservative U.S. 
31. Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith; Rowland, Benedict XVI.
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Catholics to dismiss the Pope’s critique of unbridled free markets and 
also social-democratic or Marxist Liberation voices to ignore Benedict’s 
repudiation of centralized statist solutions to the recession. 
.e Pope’s compelling critique of religious apologias for capitalism, 
coupled with an unequivocal indictment of the moral relativism that 
characterizes the late modern secular age, strongly resonates with the 
other Christian traditions, in particular Eastern Orthodoxy32 but also 
Anglicanism, as chapter 8 by John Hughes clearly shows. Anglican theo-
logians have indeed been at the forefront of recovering St. Augustine’s 
notion of charity as reciprocal gi6-exchange, most recently the work of 
Archbishop Rowan Williams. Likewise, contemporary Anglican reBec-
tions on Christian universalism in a world characterized by value-plu-
ralism holds many important insights on how to promote the Christian 
social and moral teaching that is shared by the episcopally based churches. 
.is pan-Christian consensus is certainly true of the current patriarchs 
of Rome, Moscow, and Canterbury who rightly associate the dominant 
forms of social and economic liberalism with aggressive secularism and 
militant atheism. All three are also critical of the hegemonic power of state 
and market and in its stead seek to aCrm the autonomy of civil society 
upheld by the Church and all the intermediary institutions it supports. 
By proposing an alternative modernity that combines a liturgi-
cally ordered high culture with gi6 economy, Caritas in Veritate has 
the potential to advance both the reuni8cation of the episcopally based 
churches and promote new economic models that transcend the old di-
vide between the purely religious and the exclusively secular. .e chosen 
ground for Benedict’s intervention is the twin thematic of humanism 
and anthropology. Against the ancient and modern focus on the indi-
vidual (whether 8xed substance or atoms in Bux), he contends that hu-
man beings stand in mutually irreducible relations with each other and 
their transcendent source in God, as David L. Schindler argues in chap-
ter 7 on the anthropological unity of Caritas in Veritate. Remarkably, 
the Pope’s most recent encyclical tackles head-on the common objection 
32. One indication of the growing convergence between Roman Catholicism and 
Eastern Orthodoxy on matters of social and moral teaching is the glowing endorsement 
of Cardinal Bertone’s book on the common good by the then Metropolitan Kirill. Since 
then Kirill has been elected the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia—the head of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. See his preface on the Christian notion of the common 
good as a corrective and alternative to economic globalization and the secular social 
consensus, in Bertone, Ethics of the Common Good.
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that Catholic social teaching is nostalgic and utopian, looking to a past 
golden age and ignoring the reality of human sinfulness. However, as 
Schindler demonstrates, Benedict’s theology is more orthodox than that 
of conservative traditionalists and more radical than that of modern 
progressives because he rejects their shared dualism in favor of an over-
arching unity—the universal human vocation to love that translates into 
practices of reciprocal giving. It is this logic of gratuitous gi6-exchange 
that is more fundamental to human nature and social life than either 
state law or market relations.
Compared with a centrally imposed social contract (Hobbes and 
Locke) or vague, pre-rational moral sentiments (Smith), the Pope argues 
for a more organic polity governed by bonds of reciprocal trust, mutual 
assistance, and gi6-exchange. Concretely, this is reBected in mutually 
intertwined networks of intermediary institutions and associations such 
as guilds, universities, and local “economies of communion,” with over-
lapping jurisdictions and multiple membership. As such, political and 
economic activity is re-embedded within the institutions and practices 
of civil society. In this manner, the social contract of the central state and 
proprietary relations in the marketplace are transformed and directed 
towards the common good in which all can share. Anthropologically and 
economically, the relational nature of human and social life cuts across 
the horizontal, binary poles of secularism upon which global capitalism 
is founded. .us, Caritas in Veritate is a quest for a virtue politics and 
economics that cannot be charted on our current conceptual map.
The Unfulfilled Promise of 1989: Associative 
Economy and Civil Democracy
Why does Pope Benedict’s call for a civil economy matter? Well, twenty 
years a6er the collapse of state communism, the ongoing crisis of “free-
market” capitalism provides a unique opportunity to chart an alterna-
tive path. Now that the dominant secular orthodoxy of neo-liberalism 
has been shown to be intellectually dead and morally bankrupt, both 
politics and business must look to genuinely fresh ideas and transfor-
mative policies.
While in some Western countries the center-right has switched from 
a neo-liberal to a more communitarian discourse, it is unclear whether 
ruling parties have either the political will to curb the power of global 
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8nance or the determination to improve the lot of workers, families, local 
communities, and underdeveloped regions. Meanwhile, the center-le6 
(both in Europe and the U.S.) looks to Keynesianism and Green move-
ments for new economic and political inspiration. Notwithstanding 
the important insights that the Keynesian and Green traditions oAer, 
both remain in the end wedded to a social-liberal, utilitarian creed that 
privileges personal choice and individual emancipation at the expense of 
communal interest and the wider public good.
.is ideology of social liberalism is entirely compatible with the ide-
ology of economic liberalism that has failed so spectacularly. Indeed, the 
dominant language of “choice” legitimates the extension of free-market 
mechanisms (aided and abetted by the regulatory state) into virtually all 
areas of socio-economic and cultural life—including education, health, 
the family, and sex. Today’s scale and intensity of commodi8ed labor, 
social relations, and our shared natural habitat is beyond Polanyi’s worst 
fears. .us, much of the contemporary le6 and right remains caught in 
a fundamental contradiction between calling for more economic egali-
tarianism, on the one hand, and advocating ever-greater social liberal-
ization, on the other hand.
Moreover, older civic virtues of justice, mutuality, and reciprocity 
have been sidelined and supplanted by the new economic values of fair-
ness and aspiration. Worse, these “progressive” values represent a new, 
cosy consensus that endorses the logic of capitalist democracy that tends 
towards an ever-greater centralization of power, concentration of wealth, 
and 8nancial abstraction from the real economy and the common natu-
ral universe on which we all depend, as I have already indicated.
.ese failures underscore the (unrealized) potential of Christian 
social teaching. Crucially, the principles and practices of Christian so-
cial teaching should not just be heeded by the churches and Christians at 
their workplace or in their communities. Much rather, these principles 
and practices have appeal for policy and decision makers as well as 
grassroots movements and community organizing (as illustrated in the 
chapters by Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford as well as Mark and 
Louise Zwick). 
Indeed, at a time of 8scal austerity, ageing populations, ballooning 
budget de8cits, and long-term unsustainable public 8nances (social se-
curity and pension systems), both politicians and business leaders must 
look beyond income redistribution to asset distribution, asset-based 
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welfare, and decentralized models that foster human relationships of 
communal care and mutual help—rather than state paternalism or 
private contract delivery. For example, there are successful examples 
that combine universal entitlement with localized and personalized 
provision, e.g., by fostering and extending grassroots’ initiatives like 
“Get Together” or “Southwark Circle” in London that blend individual, 
group, and state action. Both initiatives reject old schemes such as “be-
friending” or uniform bene8ts in favor of citizens’ activity and com-
munity organizing supported by local council—instead of central target 
and standards. .e overriding “logic” underpinning such and similar 
initiatives is that of mutualism, reciprocity, and civic participation in 
accordance with the twin Catholic Christian principles of solidarity and 
subsidiarity (action at the most appropriate level to protect and promote 
human dignity and Bourishing).
Likewise, Christian social teaching can help devise a series of 
economic reforms. Pope Benedict’s vision for an alternative economy, 
which is re-embedded in politics and social relations, oAers a refresh-
ing alternative to the residual market liberalism of both le6 and right. 
In practice, an embedded model means that elected governments re-
strict the free Bow of capital and create the civic space in which workers, 
businesses, and communities can regulate economic activity. Instead of 
free-market self-interest or central state paternalism, it is the individual 
and corporate members of civil society who collectively determine the 
norms and institutions governing production and exchange.
Concrete policies discussed in this collection include (in no par-
ticular order), 8rst of all, introducing anti-usury legislation and putting 
in place measures aimed at breaking up banking and other 8nancial 
conglomerates that are “too-big-to-fail.” As Mark and Louise Zwick 
document in their chapter, transforming the food industry is absolutely 
crucial to a civil economy. Second, neither prices nor wages should be 
determined by global capital or the iron law of international demand 
and supply. Instead, a combination of free guilds and political corporat-
ism can provide a more autonomous, stable framework within which 
workers are also stakeholders and owners look to their employees rather 
than the top management and shareholders.
.ird, policies that go beyond old-style income redistribution 
include, but should not be limited to, paying public-sector workers a 
“living wage” and opening up more areas of the entire economy to social 
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enterprise that reinvest private pro8ts in public-interest activities such 
as local regeneration, housing associations, and educational projects. 
Campaigns to implement such and similar measures can be led either by 
grassroots’ organizations like London Citizens (bringing together local 
communities and diAerent faith groups under the umbrella of Catholic 
social teaching)33 and the Chicago-based model of community organiz-
ing championed by Saul Alinsky or by governments in concert with 
other stakeholders. Linked to this is a greater emphasis on mutuality, 
reciprocity, and gi6-exchange in the running of welfare programs.
Fourth, greater civic participation in the decision making of busi-
ness and local politics, coupled with a wider distribution of assets, must 
be encouraged and promoted by national and global institutions. Fi6h, 
the world economy requires new forms of capital control and limits on 
certain speculative practices, otherwise banks and other institutions will 
continue to build up bubbles of fake 8nancial wealth that undermine 
and destroy real value in the economy. .e overriding aim must be to 
preserve the sanctity of natural and human life and to promote human 
associations that nurture the social bonds of trust and reciprocity on 
which both democracy and markets depend.
Finally, Pope Benedict debunks the dominant anthropological 
myth since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations that we are economic, “trad-
ing” animals with diAuse moral sentiments who follow their “propensity 
to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another,” as I have already 
hinted at. Instead, the pontiA contends that we are fundamentally gi6-
exchanging animals who primarily seek to protect and enhance the well 
being of ourselves and our neighbors in mutually augmenting ways 
instead of merely maximizing individual material gain. .roughout 
Caritas in Veritate, he contrasts the modern, secular idea of a univer-
sal commercial society dominated by abstract formal contracts and 
proprietary relations with a more Romantic vision that is neither nos-
talgic nor utopian but blends political idealism with economic realism. 
Fundamentally, he rejects both market liberalism and state socialism, 
arguing that both destroy the autonomy of civic culture and the free-
dom of civil society. By calling for a program of political and economic 
decentralization, Benedict’s civil economy is far more radical than right-
wing privatization and le6-wing nationalization.
33. Ivereigh, Faithful Citizens.
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Nor is Christian social teaching a nostalgic vision that is stuck in 
the past. In addition to the civil economy tradition of the Neapolitan 
Enlightenment or the English distributism of Hilaire Belloc and G. K. 
Chesterton, Christians should look to other 8gures, as Eugene McCarraher 
rightly suggests in chapter 3. His point that the pontiA does not go far 
enough in condemning capitalism is contestable, but his critique of the 
collusion between Christians and the capitalist system is as apposite as 
his reading of the long tradition of Catholic socialism—from the pre-
science of Carlyle via the radicalism of Ruskin to the eclecticism of E. F. 
Schumacher and the socialist Dominican theology of Herbert McCabe.
Moreover, all those currently interested in alternatives to global 
capitalism could also look to the more recent past, notably 1989. .e 
events of 1989 saw the triumph of civil society over totalitarian states. 
And behind civil society stood the churches and religious organizations 
that defended and promoted workers’ associations, professional guilds, 
intermediary associations, educational establishments, and communal 
welfare. As such, 1989 marked an unprecedented opportunity to over-
come the bipolar order of the communist East and the capitalist West, 
building a genuine “third way” beyond centralized, bureaucratic statism 
and unbridled, free-market capitalism.
We now know that the end of the Cold War was followed by a new 
unipolar world order based on essentially secular values of individual 
freedom, value-pluralism, and liberal democratic capitalism. Arguably, 
the parallel rise of religious fundamentalism is largely a reaction against 
the triumphalist arrogance of the secular West and the new ideology of 
militant atheism. However, the post-1989 secular consensus is already 
unraveling, as I have already suggested. .e ongoing economic crisis 
once again highlights that the primacy of individual freedom over com-
munal justice is undesirable and unsustainable. Similarly, value-plural-
ism alone can neither secure the integration of religious minorities nor 
solve ethical questions like assisted suicide because it negates universal 
principles such as cultural cohesion around religion or the sanctity 
of life. Finally, the spread of capitalism has produced regimes that are 
neither liberal nor democratic. In Central Europe and beyond, com-
munism mutated into ethno-nationalism, supported by fundamentalist 
Christians and Muslims on the Balkans and elsewhere. In countries as 
diAerent as Russia and China, global market democracy evolved into 
authoritarian state capitalism.
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Even in the West, we have entered a post-democratic phase where 
democracy remains formally in place even a6er actual democratic prac-
tices like voting and party membership dramatically decline and power 
reverts from the masses to small elites and new classes. A6er thirty years 
of neo-liberal capitalism, nominal diAerences remain in place but real 
distinctions between the secular categories of state and market, “le6” 
and “right” as well as democracy and authoritarianism have begun to 
dissolve. Indeed, we have seen the fusion of state and market at the ex-
pense of civil society autonomy, as more and more civic institutions are 
subject to the administrative and symbolic order of the post-democratic, 
authoritarian market-state.34 .at’s why religious support for civil soci-
ety is so crucial.
By emphasizing human relationships within the institutions and 
practices of civil society, Caritas in Veritate proposes a radically com-
munitarian and associative virtue politics and virtue economy that out-
Banks both the le6-wing adulation of the central state and the right-wing 
fetishization of free, unregulated markets. Since neither oAers a credible 
exit from the current crisis, what is required is a genuine “third way.” 
By oAering an account of political economy that cuts across the divide 
between purely religious and exclusively secular perspectives, Benedict 
is proposing a vision that has universal resonance.
34. Pabst, “Crisis of Capitalist Democracy,” 44–67.
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The Real Third Way
For a New Metanarrative of Capital and  
the Associationist Alternative
John Milbank
The Primacy of Mediation
A common view about Christianity and politics is that Christians divide up over politics in much the same way as other people. 
But this is only super8cially true and only true of Christians who have 
thought about politics super8cially and in disconnection from their faith. 
For if one examines the writings of Christian thinkers who have thought 
long, hard, and theologically about politics, then the consistency of their 
emphases ever since the dawn of the industrial age is extremely striking.
.is is most of all true of Catholic thinkers, but the conclusions of 
Anglican and Orthodox thinkers have been remarkably similar. With 
some quali8cation one can extend this consensus to Calvinist thinkers 
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also. Moreover, there are strong resonances with Christian conclusions 
in the ideas of some Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist social theo-
rists. If one can speak of a Christian political consensus, it is even pos-
sible to speak of a certain religious political consensus.
What is this consensus? It has to do with thirdness, or with media-
tion. .is takes two forms: 8rst of all, politically speaking, the modern 
doctrine of absolute sovereignty is rejected as linked both to secularity 
and to a perverse voluntarist theology.1 Instead, a “pluralist” distribution 
of sovereignty is recommended: a distribution which more respects both 
human fallibility and the mere penultimacy of political purposes. .is 
gives rise to the theme of the importance of civil society (meaning here 
the agglomerate of associations which are neither for economic contrac-
tual nor for state administrative purposes) and of “intermediate associa-
tions” which the current patriarchs of Rome, Moscow, and Canterbury 
would all endorse, along with so many of their predecessors stretching 
back over two hundred years.
Such a favoring of “group rights” renders Christians and other re-
ligious people suspicious at once of an idolatry of the State and of the 
absolute autonomy of the sovereign individual.2 Hence a “third way” is 
advocated between statisms of the far right or the far le6, on the one 
hand, and ultra-liberalism, on the other. Yet this is no mere matter of 
compromise. To the contrary, religious thinkers tend to diagnose a hid-
den mutual complicity and reinforcement between the voluntarism of 
the absolute state and the voluntarism of the self-governing, negatively 
choosing individual. .is gives rise to the thematic of the “radical center,” 
a three-dimensional exiting from the horizontal poles of le6 and right 
which belong to the secular consensus ever since the French Revolution, 
and a re-polarization along a vertical axis between the paradoxical “rule 
of the middle,” on the one hand, which is the rule of human relationships, 
and the le6/right rule of the secretly collusive collective and individual 
wills, on the other.
The Religious Nature of Association
.e “rule of human relationships” implies the primacy of the associative 
body in the most general sense over both state and market. Here one can 
1. See Elshtain, God, State and Self.
2. Milbank, “On Complex Space,” in Word Made Strange, 268–92.
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follow Augustine in de8ning the basic “political” body in terms of any 
sort of human association de8ned by “the object of its love.” .is per-
mits us to see (against the entire normal run of modern political theory) 
that any human association (including in reality the state and market) 
is always at once hierarchical and democratic, involving what antiquity 
referred to as a “mixed constitution” of the one, the few, and the many. 
For initially an association is in some historical fashion “set up” by the 
single force of one person or more likely many in combination. .is 
single force must then hierarchically instill the principles of the logic 
of the operation of the association through a “teaching process” that is 
the work of those “few” (however many they may be in reality) who 
understand this logic. But right from the outset, the association can only 
exist at all if it enjoys the “democratic” consent, however tacit or explicit, 
of the many who compose it.
But there is also one 8nal and crucial component. An association 
must “justify” its existence in order that it have some principles of “just 
ordering” which it can continuously eAect.3 And most naturally and 
fundamentally, this justi8cation must be in terms of how the associa-
tion is supposed to reBect some “given” cosmic order that precedes its 
composition. It is only modern liberal modernity that tries to evade this 
mode of justi8cation and discover one that is purely immanent either to 
mere material nature or to the association itself.
It follows that any human association naturally has a hierarchic 
component insofar as it continuously remembers and repeats its ori-
gins. It has a democratic component insofar as it continuously assents 
to these origins, thereby perhaps also continuously modifying its own 
constitution. Together, these two components compose the association 
as “traditioned,” as a passageway of “handing over” through time. And 
any association also has a third, religious component insofar as it must 
“justify itself ” in order to achieve either initial establishment or continu-
ing consent.
From these conclusions a further, seemingly astonishing one must 
follow. Modernity assumes that religions are mysti8catory and that sec-
ular liberalism is candid about itself. However, just because any natural 
human association, as religious, can and must own up to its “mixed” 
character, it is able to be honest about its own historical self-constitution. 
It can and will tell the story of its origins, even if this be taken as the story 
3. See Boltanski and .évenot, On Justi"cation. 
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of its initial subscription to its own myth. But by contrast secular liberal-
ism, because it pretends to be non-hierarchical, cannot tell the truth that 
the state was “once” set up in an inevitably hierarchical way. It commits a 
non-genetic fallacy, which tries to wipe out origins. It is for just this rea-
son that liberalism was from the outset linked to the necessary political 
"ction of original contract between equal parties. To sustain the illusion 
that a polity can be the sole and unique non-hierarchical result of equal 
individuals assembled in a perpetual present, liberalism requires some 
sort of “noble lie” regarding a primordial moment impossibly without a 
past, without inBuence, and so without the inevitable work of the one 
and the few. 
Secular liberalism and not religion is therefore necessarily mysti-
8catory and self-concealing, for it cannot tell the story of its own ori-
gins. .e price of refusing religious justi8cation because one pretends 
to non-hierarchy and formally immanent self-constitution is always 
subscription to a secular myth. And whereas religious mythology, since 
it regards the extra-temporal and must insist upon the historical event 
of the cultural imagination of the extra-temporal (as recorded in scrip-
tures, for example) need not obfuscate human processes in time, secular 
political mythology necessarily must do so, precisely because the object 
of its mythologization, being secular, must be human history itself.
.e same pattern of secular obfuscation applies to the form of as-
sociation which is contractualist market exchange, on the liberal model. 
.is also has to resort to 8ctions: of the “hidden hand,” of the perfect 
equilibrium of supply and demand, of perfect self-regulation in an eter-
nal present. In this case, what is concealed from view is that this market 
serves the hierarchical precedence of a social and economic inequality 
that inaugurates it and that is established by various modes of “primary 
accumulation.” Equally, this economy conceals from view its continuous 
repetition of this hierarchy in terms of the unequal bargaining posi-
tions of capital as compared to either the worker or the consumer that is 
rendered invisible by the 8ction of a supposedly free and equal contract. 
.e “justi8cations” oAered here, whether in terms of a supposedly pre-
associative natural humanity (another 8ction) or of the formal logic 
of association itself, that is supposed to permit the emergence of order 
despite the hopeless relativity of diAerent substantive opinion and so the 
apparent absence of “common love” (yet another 8ction, because some-
thing substantive will always secretly rule, even if this be mere arbitrary 
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power), necessarily preclude any telling the truth about actual histori-
cal origins. Hence it is the “enlightened” refusal of both religion and 
hierarchy that is inevitably obfuscatory and, for a certain vocabulary, 
“ideological.” And one can say that while Marx exposed the 8ctions of 
liberalism for what they were, he merely proposed instead the setting up 
of a more perfectly “emancipated” and so 8ctional and self-obscuring 
society in the future. In this respect “actual communism” ful8lled and 
did not betray Marxist logic.
One can conclude therefore that religions as they exist in the world 
today should regard themselves both as more basic and more honest 
modes of association than either the sovereign state or the liberal market. 
.is is rigorously to invert the existing dominant view that religions are 
both self-deluded and socially and rationally aberrant. On the contrary, 
religions need now to assert themselves as the primary “political” forces 
(in the broadest sense, going beyond the narrow concern of properly 
“secular” politics with coercive authority). As such they are able con-
tinuously to expose the 8ctions whereby merely secular state and market 
claim to be able to justify themselves in terms of a (usually aporetic) mix 
of appeal to nature and to collective arti8ce.
And because they understand that their apparent anomaly of be-
ing neither statist nor economic modes of association is in reality not 
anomalous but archetypal, they also understand that all other “mediat-
ing” associations between state center and market periphery are not re-
ally secondary but actually fundamental. It follows (and this could soon 
prove to be the crucial political factor of the new century) that there is a 
natural alliance between the quest of religious bodies to seek their own 
power and their support for a politics of the intermediary, or of the as-
sociation (the “big society” in a real and not party political sense).
And to protest here that religions should not be seeking power is to 
miss the point. For in the case of the Church supremely, what is in prin-
ciple sought is a space of peace and of the power of weakness, the kenotic 
power of non-power. Yet paradoxically to attempt to increase the scope 
of this space, to achieve more human “salvation,” is itself a war, a power-
struggle—as the New Testament so explicitly teaches, again and again. 
More power must be given to the space of powerlessness if there is to 
be peace and justice. So the 8ctional powers must be resisted and over-
come, and state and market (coercion and contractual consent) reduced 
to their more modest and properly secular roles of serving the good of 
Part I: Christianity and Capitalism32
society which is the good of association. For there is no secular without 
the sacred contrast: a purely self-referring secular has to sacralize itself 
according to the merely democratic 8ctions of immanent justi8cation.
.e implications of such “associationism,” which is as we have seen is 
necessarily “religious,” for political economy is the subject of this chapter. 
Bio-political Economy
As Michel Foucault argued, liberalism comes fully into being in the eigh-
teenth century with the invention of the science of political economy 
which proposes the novel idea that governments can rule more by ruling 
less.4 Instead of trying to “police” every aspect of their subjects’ lives, 
they can leave much to the operation of the market whose workings are 
seen as “natural.” In this way, through the supposedly natural balanc-
ing of supply and demand, wealth and population are more increased, 
while peace and order are spontaneously maintained. .e interests of a 
controlled and strong population, ready to 8ght wars, are achieved by 
stealth. It is for this reason that Foucault argued that we must understand 
liberalism to be the “biopolitical.” Apparently, and by its own lights, it re-
leases the economic sphere as natural, as biological. In reality, however, 
it politically produces this sphere and tries through the educative and 
cultural processes of “civil society” (in a new and speci8c sense) to create 
subjects who are negatively choosing and self-governing, relatively dis-
embedded from family, locality, tradition, and artisanal formation (and 
so from civil society in an older more generic sense).
In fact, such subjects could well be seen as less “natural,” but this is 
disguised from view by Adam Smith’s rede8nition of humanity as homo 
economicus, disposed mainly to truck and to barter. Karl Polanyi long 
ago pointed out how absurd this anthropology is and how exploded 
by, precisely, anthropologists.5 During most of human history human 
beings have been so radically and immediately dependent upon each 
other that the 8rst thing they have looked for is social recognition as 
the pre-condition of both status and security. For this reason they have 
usually been content with economic arrangements of reciprocal balance 
(whether these be egalitarian or hierarchical). For any too-marked seek-
ing of personal advantage has always risked ostracization. .e realism 
4. Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics.
5. Polanyi, Great Transformation; Glasman, Unnecessary Su$ering. 
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of the past was diAerent from the realism of the present which political 
economy has decisively shaped.
Once one has this bio-politics, there arises, nonetheless, a certain 
dualistic tension between the bio and the political. .e former factor is 
vastly accentuated in the course of the nineteenth century. As Polanyi 
also argued, when the economic sphere is sequestrated, it is bound to 
become fundamental, because it concerns our most vital human needs 
and functions. .e irony is that in all earlier human societies, including 
the most supposedly “primitive,” the biologically basic was not socially 
basic, because reciprocity and redistribution tended to guarantee the 
biological survival of the individual which was thereby subordinated to 
the biological survival of the social group. Hence the lower was mediated 
by the supplement of something higher, the economic was not so much 
“embedded” (to use Polanyi’s phrase) as planted upwards in the heavenly 
soil of social gi6-exchange, itself rooted in celestial sanctions of cosmic 
reciprocity and divine grace. Only modern political economy treats the 
biological as basic for human beings. And this was greatly accentuated 
in the nineteenth century through the view—entirely alien, it must be 
said, to Adam Smith—that only the threat of poverty and the spur of 
hunger will force people to work in a world of lazy sinfulness and consti-
tutive material scarcity. In point of fact, just as the idea of the supposedly 
“free market” is in reality politically produced, so, also, scarcity is nearly 
always something arti8cially engineered by both monopolization and 
the neoclassical assumption that all desires are equally valid and so with-
out limit. Indeed one should note here that ecological disaster results 
from both a fantasizing and an arti8cial production of scarcity and not 
at all from people imagining that the world’s resources are in8nite—as 
pseudo-pious, liberal politico-economic “ecologism” would have it. For 
the resources of nature really are in8nite, if we have patience, as religious 
people should know. .is applies also to the question of population—
demanding its limit is always an anti-human, anti-vitalist move, on the 
side of political economic technocracy and bio-political control. In op-
posing this mode of demographic fascism the papacy has always been 
radical and not conservative.
If, however, the nineteenth century accentuated the supposedly 
“natural” character of the economy, it also increased the supposedly “ar-
ti8cial” and “scienti8c” character of the political. .e “police” aspect of 
the pre-politico-economic mercantilist state did not a6er all go away, 
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even if it was now exercised with more subtlety. From Adam Ferguson 
onwards, political economy concluded that the state must continue to 
create an environment within which the market can Bourish by atten-
tion to education, the arts, sanitation, crime, poverty, and demography.6 
If the market was concerned with a supposed release of free choice, un-
dergirded by property rights, then the civil or political aspect of civil 
society had to do with material interests at the point where this is also 
an inescapable aspect of the economic sphere. As Foucault points out, 
an economic contract is free, but it is assumed that people enter into 
it in order to secure their material interests or welfare. .e freedom of 
the politically economic subject is indeed a spiritual freedom rooted in 
rights, but this is paradigmatically linked to the self-government of mere 
animality which takes into account only utility and sympathy for the 
material needs of others. Hence, as Foucault again puts it, “interest” in 
the liberal model always overBows rights.
Nevertheless, one must add in quali8cation here that Hume, Smith 
and Ferguson’s “utile,” a mere diAerent pronunciation of the Latin utile, 
was not as yet quite the reduced “utility” of Bentham and still had 
Ciceronian and Horatian overtones of the “convenient” and “8tting” that 
retained its ancient pairing with aesthetic dulce. Indeed for Ferguson 
especially (but in a Humean lineage), the cultivation of social civility 
helps to compensate for that destruction of familial, clan, local, and ar-
tisanal solidarity which he saw the market economy as undermining in 
ways which had dangerous implications for the cultivation of virtue.7 
In this way Scottish (and Italian) eighteenth century “civil society” still 
retained something of the sense of a “third space” which had earlier been 
supremely cultivated and sustained by the presence of the church.
Yet quickly, a6er Bentham, the notion of the cultivation of civility 
degenerated into a government-sponsored but socially diAuse promo-
tion of a sheerly sensory “greatest happiness of the greatest numbers” by 
educative and disciplinary programs more designed to induce a regular-
ity of behavior than any speci8c spiritual insights.8
So where it might appear that liberalism is primarily about indi-
vidual freedom, on account of its bio-political character it turns out in 
the long run that it is more fundamentally to do with material interest or 
6. Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society. 
7. See ibid. 
8. See Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, 68–80.
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with “welfare.” Indeed the duality between the political and the biological 
means that, in the end, it is the freedom of the state which is primary for 
liberalism, once it has been deconstructed. For the liberty of the subject 
is only allowed as a device of governmentality in order to increase the 
power of governance. .is liberty of the subject is then really, as far as 
the state is concerned, ironically an aspect of the animality of the subject. 
.e market promotes 8rst of all his welfare, and therefore secondarily 
the welfare of the entire political body. And so it is logical that later, with 
the advent of the economic doctrine of marginalism, the always latent 
assumption of political economy that the economic operator is a utilitar-
ian calculator is explicitly recognized, beyond even Bentham’s percep-
tion. Later still, with the neoclassical ideas of Kenneth Arrow and then 
the Chicago school in the twentieth century, this calculation is extended 
to the working of bureaucracies and 8nally even to things like sex and 
procreation—thereby economizing the entire social 8eld.9
At this point the overturning of all inherited human wisdom is 
complete. No longer is the economy embedded in society regarded as 
reciprocal gi6-exchange; instead, all of human life is supposedly natural 
or economic. But the economic concerns entirely material interest or 
welfare. It is this primacy of welfare which allows us better to understand 
and to deconstruct the duality of market and state. In a 8rst historical 
phase, a still mercantilist concern with the welfare of the entire body 
of the nation-state caused the deliberate construction through primary 
accumulation—via enclosures, abolition of guilds and privileged corpo-
rations at home, and colonization abroad—of the sphere of the “natural” 
market governed only by the price mechanism in the balance of supply 
and demand.10 And then a6er the interval of classical political economy 
which ostensibly stressed freedom, in a second historical phase during 
the 19th century, the still-lurking shadow of human freedom gives way 
more and more to the evolutionist fantasy of an animal humanity. But 
this means that it is “economism” itself (the doctrine of material accu-
mulation as the fundamental socio-political reality, rather than Polanyi’s 
seeking of social recognition) which returns us full-circle to the primacy 
of welfare and so to the primacy of the state as the creator of the capital-
ist market in the 8rst place.
9. See Screpanti and Zamagni, Outline of the History of Economic !ought, 380–455.
10. Perelman, Invention of Capitalism. 
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For if market choice is gradually acknowledged as utilitarian cal-
culation, it remains the case that the market cannot ful8ll the whole of 
utility or of welfare even from a dogmatically liberal point of view. .us 
we have already seen, with Adam Ferguson, that the Scots philosophers 
supplemented the free market with state attention to civil society. And 
as Polanyi notes, the arrival of an unlimited market in human labor, in 
land and in money in Britain in the 1830s coincided with an unprec-
edented extension of state power in terms of the collecting of statistics, 
of policing and of promotion of scienti8c education, civic sanitation, 
and national transportation.
At a later stage, as Polanyi further pointed out, the emergence of 
state welfare structures in the second half of the nineteenth century was 
not primarily a reaction against laissez-faire but rather an aporetic exten-
sion of it. First, the tendency of capitalism towards monopoly required 
either anti-monopoly legislation or else the quasi-institution of corpo-
rations in order to direct them towards the public good (or else both 
at once). .is shows that the state could not now entirely allow market 
processes to take their course, because what mattered to it was either the 
ultimate outcome of a free agon in terms of the generation of national 
wealth and strength, or else deliberate organization towards the same 
end (or else once more, both at once).
Secondly, an unrestricted market in labor implied that workers 
might logically persist in striking until the very interest of capital own-
ers as appropriators was undermined. .is capitalistic—because sheerly 
self-interested—aspect of trade unionism had then to be interrupted by 
a state socialism which balanced anti-strike or industrial relations legis-
lation with compensatory welfare measures intended to resign workers 
to a proletarian status and to inhibit their mutual organization which 
naturally tended to revert towards the human norm of reciprocal ben-
e8t. In this way the subversive thrust of mutualism was suppressed.
And as Polanyi remarked, resistance to capitalism has always come 
either from classes who sustain this more antique social habit—either 
semi-feudal classes or interdependent proletarians (besides intellectu-
als who support mutuality). Almost never does it come from the middle 
classes. For their support for state welfare on generally utilitarian grounds 
is in reality an endorsement of the principles that underlie the free mar-
ket which, as we have seen, are inseparable from the principles which 
undergird the modern secular state. As Anthony Giddens explicitly put 
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it in his book !e !ird Way, the crucial aim of welfare is to produce the 
freely-choosing reBexive and risking individual removed from the rela-
tional constraints of nature, family, and tradition.11 It would seem that the 
welfare state is generated by capitalism and only sub-serves capitalism.
State, Market, and the Origins of Capitalism
Yet that is an exaggeration. Polanyi is here more subtle. Crucial here is 
the fact that one cannot, a6er all, simply say that the state invented the 
market. A capitalist market has always hovered in the background and 
was prophesied by Aristotle. Within traditional localities, human beings 
exchange gi6s—even if this is eventually regularized in terms of money 
and commodities. With very remote strangers, with whom we share no 
common language, again the only language which they share in common 
is that of gi6—one strange thing exchanged for another strange thing: 
transistor radio for rare coral.12 But in the middle, with known strangers 
across the sea, as for example in the antique Mediterranean, humans 
tend to operate more in terms of contracts, loans, and mercantile self-
seeking. All maritime trade in the “mid-sea” has always approximated to 
a kind of piracy, as Polanyi and Maurice Glasman have emphasized.13 
Hence city-states at the margins of nations have tended to “diagonalize 
out” of those nations in a free-booting fashion.
However, Polanyi also argued that the function of maritime states 
was strangely to keep separate reciprocal inland trade from reciprocal 
remote trade as well as from more zero-sum accumulative overseas 
trade. An example of this is London in the seventeenth century. As 
Robert Brenner has shown, the London East India Company remained 
pro-monarchic and Cavalier because it engaged in a traditional remote 
reciprocalist trade.14 But the unoCcial and guild-excluded merchant class 
were Roundhead parliamentary supporters because they engaged in a 
more piratical mode of enterprise and furthermore joined this up with 
Calvinist agricultural capitalists who invested in it. .ereby, as o6en in 
the past, material landed assets tended to be subverted in their stability 
11. Giddens, !ird Way.
12. Seneca, “On Bene8ts,” III, xvii–xviii, 158–59.
13. Polanyi, Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies, esp. “Aristotle discovers the 
economy,” 78–115; Glasman, ‘Landed and Maritime Markets.’
14. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 3–37. 
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through their connection with a more abstract and (as it were literally) 
Buid form of maritime wealth linked to more speculative fortunes.
For the Marxist theoretical legacy, colonization and globalization 
are later extensions of capitalism: a response to falling rates of pro8ts 
leading to sagging demand; hence the need for further primary accu-
mulation.15 But Marx saw capitalism as inevitable, and so oAered an 
insuCcient explanation as to how primary accumulation permitting the 
absolute commodi8cation of land, labor, and money got going in the 
8rst place. Polanyi, Glasman, and Brenner by contrast see (from diverse 
theoretical perspectives) how it has to do with an always present diaboli-
cally “middle” sphere of relatively anarchic international relations escap-
ing the reach of any ius gentium. However, Brenner and others realize 
that the full incursion of the sea into the land engendering capitalism 
only occurred in England because of the unique capitalization of terri-
tory in terms of a free market in property and the establishment of the 
agricultural laborer as a dispossessed wage-laborer. Both of these things 
were consequent upon the disappearance of the English peasantry at the 
end of the Middle Ages and the later dissolution of the monasteries, both 
of which events vastly increased the amount of land held by the gentry 
in purely absolute, economic terms, with no social or political duties 
attached. .e gravitation of a segment of the English gentry towards 
Calvinism, which sharply separated human contract from the divine gi6 
of grace, is in this respect unsurprising.16
However, another dimension of the emergence of capitalism con-
cerns the break-up of Christendom. Once there exist competing nation-
states linked to diAerent religious bodies, then material organization for 
war and self-defense becomes a priority. Mercantilism is the inevitable 
consequence. So the complete invasion of the land by the sea in England 
produces also for the 8rst time a comprehensive internal market organized 
upon contractual and competitive rather than reciprocalist lines. .is 
internal agon is seen, in line with an economic version of Machiavelli’s 
martial logic for republics, as increasing internal power both through a 
trial of strength and through a resulting greater size of national wealth.
Yet at the same time Polanyi argued that the state was at once active 
and passive, encouraging and resisting in relation to these processes. It 
is at this point that one has to recognize, a6er his nuanced analyses, that 
15. Arendt, Imperialism, 3–37.
16. See HénaA, Le prix de la verité, 351–80. 
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state welfare is ambivalent. Yes it is utilitarian, but it is also conservative 
and humanitarian in purpose. Both in England and in France, with the 
decline of guild organization and local charity, the state tried to repro-
duce their functions at the national level with measures that survived up 
to the end of the eighteenth century. In England Elizabeth, the earlier 
Stuarts, and most notably the Laudians tried to resist enclosures and the 
humanist disciplining of the poor: the Commonwealth reversed these 
measures and Charles II and later kings continued this reversal—while 
the rebel Jacobite faction (as with Dr. Johnson’s political thinking) inten-
si8ed the radical dimension of earlier Stuart traditionalism. 
In the end though, Polanyi argues, welfare merely disembeds in-
dividuals and reinforces capitalism. .is happened most of all with the 
Tory socialism of the Speenhamland acts in the early nineteenth century. 
Here a living income was distributed to all regardless of labor. .e re-
sult was both a tendency to laziness amongst workers and a lowering of 
wages which led eventually to further impoverishment by letting em-
ployers oA the hook of their responsibilities for justice. So in relation to 
this crucial example Polanyi provides both liberal and radical arguments 
against welfare. Conservatively-speaking it is true that it undermines a 
society based on the market—even though he wants to oppose this foun-
dation. Hence he argues with remarkable balance that though the rise of 
the welfare state in the late nineteenth century was inevitable on market 
grounds themselves, that economic liberals are still right to argue that it 
tended to undermine the market by reducing the money available for 
consumption and investment and reducing the incentives for employers 
to provide work. .e most subversive aspect of !e Great Transformation 
for conventional social democracy is the way in which Polanyi admits a 
general “Speenhamland eAect” with respect to welfare.
He is even, at his rigorous best, prepared to apply this insight also 
to some forms of non-State socialism: arguing that attempts to orga-
nize industry on socialist lines, following the legacy of the Quaker John 
Bellers in the late seventeenth century, with his Baconian “colleges of 
industry,” also tended problematically to disturb market equilibrium 
of prices and wages because they did not question the operation of the 
capitalist market at the inter-business level. Moreover, all too o6en they 
were in eAect making money out of poverty itself, and still regarding dis-
possession as an economic resource of available labor. All this is true of 
Owenism, which furthermore espoused an essentially utilitarian attitude 
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towards human well-being. So despite Robert Owen’s explicit exaltation 
of the primacy of the social, this in the end comes down to a necessarily 
collectivist support for individual material well-being. And in general, 
except where it has espoused a religiously-grounded view of fraternity 
and solidarity, most socialisms, even most associationist socialisms, are at 
bottom liberalisms, because they give ontological status only to freedom 
and happiness—not to teleological human Bourishing. And as liberal-
isms they remain inadequate genealogies and critiques of capitalism.
Hence we can see that if, in modernity, the economy has replaced 
society as the basis of human existence, that nonetheless attempts to 
achieve a balance, to re-assert society by the state or even by socialist 
association of certain types, tend to disturb the operation of the market 
and 8nally to produce further impoverishment. .en we get extreme so-
lutions oAered instead: the total marketization of neo-liberalism or else 
total communist state control. .e latter ignores the Hayekian problem 
of the impossibility of perfect knowledge at the center, while the former 
runs into two aporias. First, one cannot really let economy undermine 
society entirely without resulting anarchy. Secondly, a purely competitive 
market in the long run, as we have seen, destroys competition. Hence 
even though social democracy tends to subvert the market, the dri6 of 
market capitalism towards social democracy is endlessly recurrent and 
not an aberration. .is is precisely where Polanyi outthinks Hayek. 
Towards a Real Third Way
At this point, we can say that most people are agreed in wanting some 
sort of “third way.” No one (save scoundrels) likes unlimited market greed 
and anarchy. No-one (save psychopaths) likes the prospect of total state 
control, mismanagement, and surveillance. .us secular solutions search 
either for a social democratic balance of state and market, or for an ordo-
liberal location of a pure and so eternally limited market, or yet again for 
a New Labour-style oligarchic fusion of state and market processes.
Christian economic thought would appear simply to go along with 
this modern secular desire. It too has tended to search for a “third way”—
not just, in the 8rst place politically, between state and individual in terms 
of group rights, but also, in the second place, politico-economically, be-
tween the dominance of state and the dominance of market in terms of 
the function of civil society, mutual, and non-pro8t organizations, as well 
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as the role of religious bodies themselves in the sphere of welfare. Yet 
does that simply mean that Christians agree as to principles but diAer as 
to means? Hence some will be social democrats, others will be Christian 
democratic supporters of the ordo-liberal “social market,” while others 
again will unrepentant New-Labourites?
I do not think so. .e Christian economic diAerence is not simply 
a matter of principles, though neither is it a matter of magical techni-
cal devices which will supposedly restore social reciprocity—like Major 
Douglas’s social credit or Henry George’s land tax beloved of old. It is 
rather a matter of diAerent virtuous practices, diAerent habits: something 
that hovers halfway between principle and structure but tends to gener-
ate all sorts of new reciprocalist structures in diAerent circumstances. 
However, this diAerent habit really can solve our politico-economic co-
nundrums, whereas the secular solutions cannot.
How can one make this claim? Well, as we have seen, the secular 
solutions are unable to unlock the aporia which results when one tries 
to found the society on the economy. .e economy cannot be allowed to 
destroy society and yet any re-assertion of society tends to undermine 
the economy. Hence the abandonment of reciprocity is inherently un-
stable. But as Pope Benedict XVI argued in his encyclical Caritas in veri-
tate, the point is not to modify an inherently immoral or amoral market 
through welfare measures, but rather to produce not merely a just but 
also a charitable market in the 8rst place.17
.is is then to re-invoke gi6 as both free gratuity and reciprocity. 
But it is also—in a way that might well have shocked Ratzinger’s still 
somewhat neo-scholastic predecessors and will also shock the conser-
vative Rahnerian neo-scholasticism of the liberation theologians—to 
invoke the supernatural virtue of charity within the supposedly secular 
sphere of the economy. Indeed it is to say that for Christians the material 
economy in the end belongs within the space of the theological econo-
mia of salvation. So instead of the economy being something produced 
by the state as pseudo-natural, one now has the idea that the entire 
“economy” of human give–and–take exceeds the political and belongs 
in the ecclesial sphere, because how we give and how we take eAects our 
supernatural destiny. .e material sphere does not lie beneath the will-
fulness of law and politics. Rather it trans8guratively exceeds them, just 
as our bodies which will be resurrected are also involved in dei8cation. 
17. Benedict, Caritas in Veritate. 
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Ratzinger, therefore, suggests that we must bring the economic back 
within the bounds of social reciprocity, which is ultimately the ecclesial 
sphere of charity. In this merely reactionary and nostalgic?
No, because he proposes a relatively more egalitarian mode of 
reciprocity—even if, as he knows (in accordance with the ontology of 
the association outlined in section 2 above) the hierarchy of educative 
guidance by virtue can never be expunged if democracy is to release peo-
ple’s best rather than their worst instincts. No again, because the forces 
tending to promote the mercantile were already emergent within the 
Middle Ages and were promoted by some canonists. Indeed the modern 
voluntarist oscillation between the collectivist and the individualistic 
was anticipated by some Franciscan theologians who promoted both a 
comfortable and somewhat hypocritical “communism” for themselves 
as university teachers and the beginnings of a non-reciprocal contrac-
tualism, forgetting the common good for society as a whole,18 as the fol-
lowing section suggests.
Excursus on some Medieval Antecedents of 
Capitalism: Franciscans vs. Dominicans
Despite my overall endorsement of their truly profound ideas about con-
tract and sympathy, I therefore somewhat dissent from Luigino Bruni 
and Stefano Zamagni’s tracing of a reciprocalist approach to the economy 
back to the Franciscans.19 To my mind such a stress is far more character-
istic of Aquinas and the Dominican tradition. .is is because, in general, 
the Franciscans saw love in unilateral disinterested terms which tended to 
separate agape from eros, whereas Aquinas saw love as always a reciprocal 
sharing between human beings as well as being a “participation” in the 
divine love. Here “interested” eros and “disinterested” agape are always 
fused, because this contrast is transcended in terms of mutual linkage: 
this is why Aquinas stressed that we must always love the “closest” most 
of all, reading “neighbor love” in a way that stresses our 8nitude.
.e Franciscan legacy, by emphasizing to the contrary disinter-
estedness, tended to render any mutual bonding merely a contractual 
guaranteeing of a mutual ful8llment of fundamentally separate interests. 
18. Villey, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, 202–19.
19. See Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 33–42; and Bruni, “Common Good and 
Economics.”
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In this manner ontological bonds are sundered in the economic sphere 
and the way is opened to an all–too–modern contrast between pure con-
tract on the one hand and sheer “altruism” on the other. Even the Monti 
di Pieta arguably too much tried to solve urban poverty by extracting a 
surplus value from it (somewhat anticipating Robert Owen) insofar as 
these institutions were in eAect “charitable” pawnbrokers. Hence Bruni 
and Zamagni underrate the degree to which the Franciscans really did 
pre-invent a (theologically dubious) capitalist notion of contract, as ar-
gued by Oreste Bazzichi (whom they nonetheless cite). And perhaps they 
overrate the continuity of the more reciprocalist currents in humanist 
economics with the Franciscan legacy. 
It follows that on my reading their own ideas are really far more 
“Dominican” than they allow, since they are so emphatically reciprocal-
ist. It is also perhaps the case that they fail to realize the degree to which 
the mutualism of agape is also “erotic.” (Bruni tends to line up the latter 
with “separate” ful8llment of needs, but such a gloomy post-Cartesian 
view of eros is not that of either Augustine or Aquinas.) In addition, their 
“distributism” as regards property also connects more to Aquinas, since 
the Franciscans tended to exalt a sheer “communist” non-ownership for 
themselves, which dialectically cast an aspersion on ownership as pure 
“domination”—whereas for Aquinas dominium could be good if linked 
to good usage and orientated towards common usage.
.is disagreement is nonetheless in a real sense trivial, because so 
purely historical in character. Perhaps, though, it makes a real diAerence 
when it comes to the question of usury, where I would tend to defend 
Aquinas’ greater caution in the face of this practice compared to the posi-
tion of Duns Scotus and other leading Franciscans. .e anti-Aristotelian 
Franciscan endorsement, in the case of Scotus and Peter John Olivi, of 
Lucrum Cessans, or compensation for pro8t foregone in terms of money 
lent, amounts to treating money unnaturally, not as a medium of ex-
change, but as a kind of pseudo-thing that has “fertility” in its own right. 
.us Olivi declared that “that which in the 8rm intention of its owner 
is ordained to some probable gain does not only possess the character 
of money or a thing straightforward, but beyond this a certain seminal 
reason of pro8tability which we usually call ‘capital.’”20 One theoretical 
building-block of “capitalism” is indeed in place here.
20. Olivi, De Usuris, Dubium 6.
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.is shi6 was compounded by the assertion of another fourteenth-
century Franciscan, Gerald Odonis, that the lender retains the abstract 
property ownership of the sum of money which he lends, rendering 
usurious interest a6er all a legitimate “rent.”21 .is further contradicts 
Aristotle and Aquinas by abandoning the distinction between use of 
things that are not used up by usage, like land, and things that are so 
used up, like food and money. .e crucial shi6 here is in terms of a 
disregard for qualitative diAerence of content between diAerent kinds of 
things and the beginning of the de8nition of an economic res in merely 
voluntaristic and nominalistic terms of subjective regard and subjective 
control.22 (On the defense of Aquinas’s position on usury, see below.)
Aquinas’s “distributism,” by contrast, ties property entitlement to 
good use. Linked to this is his limitation of the practice of money-lending 
to real proper interests foregone and to the bene8ts of investment, and 
also his promotion of the just price beyond the mere canonical market 
current price in terms of both the measure of labor and the comparative 
measure of right desire. As such, “distributism” for Aquinas was already 
an act of theoretical resistance to a pure market society, to the already 
faintly observable germs of a capitalistic practice.23
Here a further explication is required. As regards the just price, 
Aquinas assumes, 8rst of all—despite so many modern American denials 
of this reading—that things have a natural value in terms of their place 
in the scale of values of the usefulness of things for realizing true human 
ends and that economic value should have some relationship to this. 
One American theologian, Christopher A. Franks of Duke University, 
gets this exactly right: “.omas certainly relies on a common estimate 
[in the market] that is variable and based on appraisals of human useful-
ness. But the usefulness .omas envisions is not whatever usefulness 
buyers and sellers can agree to, but the true usefulness of things as such 
things are intended by God for the sake of human Bourishing.”24 In other 
words his “market value” is also a “moral value.”
21. Odonis, Tract. q. 13; f.91. v.
22. Bazzinchi, Alle Radice del Capitalismo; Rousselot, Problem of Love; O’Donovan, 
“.eological Economics,” 48–64; Belloc, Essay on the Restoration of Property.
23. Summa !eologiae II.II qq. 77-78; De Malo, q. 13 a. 4. See de Tarde, L’idée de 
juste prix.
24. Franks, He Became Poor, 93.
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Secondly and in addition, the just price takes desire into account 
in terms of the value of a thing to the seller and the general “going mar-
ket rate.” Statements by Aquinas to the eAect that there is “no usury” 
involved when this rate is charged do not at all prove that this is all he 
means by the justice of price: for, as Franks indicates, the market is itself 
“embedded” in social norms that establish the relative values in rela-
tion to human usage—such that, for example, the really important in the 
sense of “fundamental” like food, shelter and raiment should be readily 
aAordable, while the important in the sense of rare and exemplary, like 
an exceptional artifact, should properly be expensive.
.irdly, it is wrong to sell a thing for more than one has paid for it – 
though this does not apply to added value in terms of making, transport 
or convenience of rendering goods widely available, as with respectable 
shop-keeping. Fourth, all third-part mercantile trading tends to be mor-
ally tainted but is redeemable if directed towards the general human 
good and charity. Pro8ts must go to public bene8t apart from reasonable 
rewards to the merchant himself.
.e main points of Aquinas’s teaching on usury are in accordance 
with these general considerations on price: 8rst, money is a usufruct 
entirely “used up” in exchange and therefore one cannot charge rent 
on it. Second, Damnum Emergens is permitted, i.e. compensation if a 
loan is not paid up in time—for then the lender has suAered a mate-
rial inconvenience which he would not otherwise have undergone. .is 
contrasts with Lucrum Cessans (as discussed above) where he is com-
pensated for a possible pro8t through investment that he might have 
made out of the money lent. .e problem that Aquinas rightly sees with 
this is that it treats money as an abstract thing in itself and assumes that 
sheer pro8t-making (taken alone) is a valid activity outside the context 
of entering into a commercial association for the attainment of some 
speci8c economic and social good that in the end serves the common 
good. In this respect, Lucrum Cessans implicitly endorses mere private 
abstract gain (since the gain foregone is a totally abstract “any old gain”) 
and so breaks the circle of reciprocity in a way that Bruni and Zamagni 
fail to recognize—for all that the entire tenor of their thought runs in 
the direction of linking all lending back to investment and all pro8t to 
mutuality and conjunction of economic with social bene8t.
.ird, Aquinas defends investment in business and distinguishes 
this from usury. .e key here is that when you loan money you “transfer 
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ownership.” (.e sharp contrast with the Franciscan Olivi is evident.) 
But when you invest, you enter into a societas with business partners, 
such that the money invested remains yours, because it is connected to 
a shared purpose and thereby remains according to its nature a means. 
Hence on anything this money allows to be traded or made or sold you 
are entitled to reward for risk entered into, because you have actually 
used your money to buy something—a real product, a genuine good—
whereas, in the case of loaning money you have not bought anything 
and so money remains in the limbo of its unrealized exchange function. 
Fourth, a grateful borrower may add a gi6 to the loan repaid without 
interest, in an acknowledgement of the possibility of gain foregone by 
the lender which does not treat money as an abstract potential for sheer 
abstract and isolated personal gain, as implied by Lucrum Cessans. Later 
in Catholic countries, especially on the Iberian peninsular, the gi6 as-
sociated with return of a loan became semi-formalized.
All the same, in the 86h place, a lender can agree to receive a com-
pensatory interest from the borrower if (a) he has thereby undergone “a 
real loss,” i.e. if by lending he lacks for a time what he should have—this 
shows that Aquinas thinks in terms of what is owing to whatever social 
status in terms of natural justice; (b) if the borrower by borrowing avoids 
a loss greater than that undergone by the lender then here, too, interest 
should be paid. .is appears to be seen by Aquinas as an extension of 
the situation of investment in enterprise: the implication is that here the 
borrower has undergone such a big positive reversal of fortune through 
investment that the lender should in eAect be retrospectively regarded 
as a co-investor. One can note here that the justi8cation for lending at 
interest oAered by the Neapolitan political economist Antonio Genovesi 
in the eighteenth century, as cited by Bruni and Zamagni, would appear 
to be within this .omistic trajectory, since he declared that legitimate 
interest is “the price for the convenience and utility of the person who 
take the loan.” He explicitly refuses the “Franciscan” idea that it is a pay-
ment for the “use” of money regarded as still belonging to the lender.25
Hence to appeal back to these subtle considerations on price and 
money is not to appeal to an ideal previous social order free of the taint 
of usury, which in fact never existed. It is rather to appeal to a critique of 
a capitalistic market society already faintly emergent. Likewise, to appeal 
to guild organization or a medieval corporatist blending of the social, 
25. Cited in Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 38–39.
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economic and the political is not to appeal to a bygone feudal order—
which incidentally, historians tell us never existed in the contractual-
ist terms later fantasized, since it was rather a kind of hierarchized gi6 
exchange part-created by the Church in order to reign back knightly 
violence through a cult of knightly honor.26 It is rather, in parallel to 
the invocation of Aquinas, to appeal to past creative ecclesial eAorts to 
resist and qualify “free market” tendencies which were already emer-
gent. In this light, the considerable commercial success of the guild and 
corporate organization, and the medieval/renaissance civic humanist 
market spoken of by the Pope’s key advisors, Bruni and Zamagni, which 
assumed reciprocal balance as governing both contract and gi6—such 
that the market here required according to its own norms the material 
restoration of those who had sunk beneath the level of normal economic 
and social participation—remain as examples to us precisely because of 
their modernity.27
Capitalism as Desacralization
.is fact suggests that if one refuses to surrender to whiggish inevitab-
lism, then one cannot declare that a new re-plantation of the economy 
upwards in social transcendence is impossible. Perhaps the biggest prob-
lem here, as Ratzinger so astutely acknowledges, is the technological. In 
agreement again with Polanyi, one can say that there is a certain aCn-
ity between the market and the machine. .ere is something Faustian, 
diabolical about the released forces of electricity, the light-wave and the 
sound-wave, etc. whose possibilities seem to re-organize us rather than 
being subordinate to our social needs and aesthetic preferences. .is 
was already noted by Romano Guardini in his Letters from Lake Como 
where he rightly says that up to modern times there is an “organic” qual-
ity to human cultural construction even though this was always adding 
arti8ce and sign to nature.28
But like the Pope, Guardini was not engaging in mere nostalgia here. 
He refused to give up on the idea that we can 8nd a more organic, sustain-
able, human, and beautiful way to deploy the huge powers of technology. 
26. I am indebted to the ideas of my son Sebastian Milbank here. See also Reynolds, 
Fiefs and Vassals.
27. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 45–75.
28. Guardini, Letters from Lake Como. 
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But presumably the prime key here would be to unlock technology from 
the power of the economic regarded as foundational. .en we would 
start to see that most of the apparently “inevitable” uses of technology are 
not dictated by technology itself, but by market interests. But Ratzinger’s 
hope is realistic 8nally because it is a religious and not a secular hope. To 
allude to Polanyi once again: if the sea was 8rst capitalized, then this was 
because it was relatively unknown, and so unsacred, or if sacred, then 
demonic, as for the Hebrew Scriptures. .e enclosure of land and the 
commodi8cation of people are all to do with desacralization. One buys, 
sells, and exploits without reference to tradition, association, duty or end 
because things and people are now secular and neutral and so the objects 
of exploitation. But although Polanyi is basically right here, one does 
need to cut and paste him with Marx.29
Polanyi’s genealogy of capitalism is more searching than the latter’s 
insofar as he treats capitalism as ideological because it is the survival of 
religion, the scene of fetishization. In this way, though, he is himself the 
victim of a politically economic perspective and does not understand 
the contingent generation of this perspective itself. For, as Bruno Latour 
argues, humans cannot escape from fetishisms because we always give 
material content to signs and we always see material things as signify-
ing.30 .e politically economic idea of a dualistic sundering between 
merely “given” material things and equally “given” reasons or arti8cial 
constructions which we are supposed to be utterly in command of is a 
8ction—as the political economists themselves half saw by recognizing 
the heterogenesis of ends. All material things come marked and valued 
by us, while all our ideas are speci8cally embodied in ways that renders 
their import unpredictable. Hence we are always commanded by fetish-
es—or “factishes” to deploy Latour’s neologism—which remain in some 
sense “divine.”
So Marx was naïve in imagining a merely “given” use-value on the 
one hand and a truly demysti8ed rational control of things on the other. 
In reality we never step outside religion, and anti-religious structures are 
basely perverted cults. Secularism itself is such a cult, that is doomed to 
worship, as Marx saw, the most abstract fetish of all: money, which tends 
to run speculatively out of control and equally to worship purely physi-
cal power which we have now unleashed in such a fashion that we fear 
29. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Part I, chap. 1, 43–88.
30. Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 266–92. 
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its ultimately destructive powers for the whole planet. Sign as pure sign 
disconnected from matter threatens us as free-Boating 8nance; matter as 
pure matter disconnected from sacred signi8cation threatens us as pure 
force. At this point Marx is, like most socialists, as we have seen, only 
another liberal a6er all.
On the other hand, Polanyi’s apparent view that it is all right to 
commodify things in general, but not land or person, lags behind Marx’s 
denunciation of the fetishism of the commodity as such. For to some de-
gree persons and land must enter into exchange and so within exchange-
value in order that human society be constituted in the 8rst place. .e 
point is that these exchanges should respect true ends and true desires. 
Yet the same is true for every exchanged commodity. And since persons 
only exist at all in their use of many things and since land is useless apart 
from the things that it contains, we cannot abuse most things as com-
modities without also abusing both land and persons.
All this is to say that Polanyi fails to see that the sacredness of land 
and persons requires that they be seen in a certain sense as fetishes. He 
too much sees them in secular terms as a6er all merely “given.” As to his 
third insistence that money itself should not be commodi8ed, this again 
interestingly contrasts with Marx. Polanyi says that money as a pure 
means should not in itself be used to make a pro8t like a usufruct: here 
he agrees with the medieval critique of usury. He sees corruption as the 
reduction of exchange to use, where Marx in general sees corruption as 
the reduction of use to exchange—such that ideally the exchange func-
tion of money should disappear in favor of the individual and general 
technological satisfaction of supposedly given needs. Polanyi is more 
fundamentally right, and yet both are in a way right: we cannot abolish 
the exchange function of money, but this also means that we cannot avoid 
entirely its commodi8cation precisely insofar as it acts as an indispens-
able measure of the real worth of things which can only be comparative.
.is is exactly why the issues of just price and of usury are not for 
Aquinas 8xed norms but matters of prudential judgment, as D. Stephen 
Long has rightly stressed.31 In Aquinas, a6er Aristotle, money concerns 
the contrapassum of distributive geometric justice which compares like 
with unlike (via the measure of our rightly ordered desire) even though 
it apparently belongs to commutative justice which restitutes according 
31. Long, “Usury,” 133–57. 
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to a 8xed arithmetic scale, given pre-established distributive value.32 
(.ough one can recall from Dante’s Inferno that divine retributive 
justice is contrapassive.) Hence monetary exchange or chremastike for 
Aristotle (oikonomia meaning for him “household management” on 
any scale from literally domestic to civic) is precisely the process of re-
distributive justice which hovers between political distribution, on the 
one hand, and criminal or civil restitution, on the other.33 In this way, 
as Catholic social teaching sees, the economic is “the middle” between 
politics and the social because it is that space where we must continue 
to perform justice and to revise justice under the impulse of charity which 
looks for everyone’s well-being. .e state should not be the prime redis-
tributor because the economy should itself be precisely that. .is is why 
the Pope, a6er Bruni and Zamagni’s re-invocation of the medieval/re-
naissance civic humanist economy, calls for a new market that would 
somehow oAer a level playing-8eld between enterprises seeking reason-
able pro8ts, merely mutual-trading companies and entirely charitable 
but still reciprocalist enterprises.
Cynicism, Ethos, and History
.is is an astonishingly radical demand, but is it merely naïve and, as it 
were, modestly utopian? Bruni and Zamagni gloss papal teaching by sug-
gesting that we need an economic variant of subsidiarism which would 
demand that whatever can be achieved through non-pro8t organiza-
tion should be so achieved, and that this principle should be reapplied 
along the whole non-pro8t to shareholder pro8t spectrum: what can be 
achieved by the co-operative should be so achieved, with the average 
modern, pro8t-seeking company only performing tasks as pragmati-
cally necessary and even then only through the pursuit of a “reasonable” 
pro8t-share.34
One can basically endorse this principle, while remembering that 
subsidiarity implies “the lowest level that is most appropriate” rather than 
simply “the lowest possible lower level.” In the economic case this would 
suggest that sometimes it would be overly dogmatic to rule out a modest 
pursuit of pro8t as providing an additional level of spur to enterprise 
32. ST II.II QQ 77–78.
33. Aristotle, Ethics 1130b32–1134a6 
34. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Society, 231–32.
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and discrimination of eAort, alongside more purely social motivations 
and modes of assessment of working performance. It could be arguable 
on a case–by–case basis that some social enterprises would not be im-
paired in their primary goals if some pro8t-seeking was also involved. 
(Whether or not this is applicable to educational institutions remains, 
I think, debatable.) Moreover, the advantage of sometimes conjoining 
pro8t to social purpose is that one thereby prevents the operation of the 
dire “Franciscan” dialectic as already described. For just as a purism that 
refuses all ownership tends to leave behind a more sordid and negatively 
pure idea of ownership as a residue, so also an overly strict separation 
of charity from pro8t-seeking helps further to render pro8t-seeking an 
acceptably legitimate exercise in itself.
But Bruni and Zamagni are basically in accord with this point, 
since they insist on the bene8cial “leakage” of ethos that can occur 
between not-for-pro8t and for-pro8t enterprises. Indeed they argue 
that this is already occurring and, like many other commentators, give 
evidence for an increasing hybridization between the two sectors. It is 
this very hybridization which the Pope seeks to support and hopes can 
be taken further.
Yet this prompts the inevitable question: just why should hybridiza-
tion be taking place? What are the economic reasons for this? And surely, 
in order to be economic reasons, they must be cynical and not ethi-
cal ones? Answers here are very diCcult to supply, but one can suggest 
the following. Not exactly cynical but at least ethically neutral reasons 
for this increase in hybridization can be: 1. the problem of what to do 
with increasing excesses of unrealizable capital; 2. the relative security 
of investment in charitable enterprises; 3. the pro8table enhancement 
of one’s image through association with charity; 4. the informal and 
friendly contractual bonds which charitable activity involves tends to 
engender an increased making of formal and pro8table contracts.
Yet having admitted all that, it should also be allowed that the 
view that human beings, even as economic actors, are entirely or even 
primarily motivated by self-interest is an unwarranted dogmatism, for 
reasons already set out. And at this point the “cynical” and the “ethical” 
viewpoints can be mediated. Given the way in which, for a considerable 
segment of western society, material Bourishing can now be taken for 
granted, it becomes likely that other markers of prestige will have to be 
sought out by the relatively successful in order suCciently to establish 
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criteria for social success and social ranking (which can never conceiv-
ably be absent in any society whatsoever).35 And indeed there is some 
evidence for this taking place: witness at the trivial level, which is o6en 
indicatively crucial, the new “camping culture” or vogue for a rugged 
outdoor and ecological lifestyle amongst the British well-heeled. .e 
new predilection for charity and for volunteer work (exponentially in-
creasing) 8ts precisely with such a tendency.
To this set of hybrid “cynico-ethical” considerations can be added 
the way in which (as I shall describe below) an extreme level of erosion of 
trust is itself counter to a business ethos and therefore tends dialectically 
to encourage a compensatory bias towards activities purely dependent 
upon mutual trustworthiness.
Yet 8nally and most crucially it is indeed merely cynical to suppose 
that there can be no shi6, even within the economic realm, towards a dif-
ferent ethos for sheerly imponderable reasons of shi6 in moral climate. 
Clearly at present, we have no such decisive shi6, but we might have the 
beginnings of a certain contestation of ethos amongst businesspeople 
and 8nanciers themselves between a more neo-liberal and a more com-
munitarian mode of economic practice. In fact a struggle and a com-
petition between two diAerent conceptualizations of competition itself: 
the one purely for abstract wealth; the other also in moral excellence in 
terms of the production of high quality social goods of diverse sorts.
For no genuine historicism imagines that history is the history 
of cynical reason rather than the variety of ethical reasonings. Always 
the operation of both are in evidence, since humanity itself is a hybrid 
animal and characterized by the interweaving of the real with the ideal. 
.e relative dominance of material interest or spiritual ethos is itself a 
result of historical production. But today the problem with much of the 
le6 is its implicit ontological cynicism and consequent practical pathos. 
It is supposed to be the political right that is pessimistic about human 
nature, and yet because the political le6’s Rousseauist optimism has in-
deed been too merely naturalist, it has tended to be cynical about the 
“arti8cial” processes of history itself, imagining by contrast that an in-
nocent glory of true humanity will be unveiled once these processes have 
8nally unraveled. But today, when few of the le6 really preserve any faith 
in such ultimate unraveling, a cynicism about history amounts to cyni-
cism tout court. In consequence, social democratic thought, no longer 
35. I owe this point to my daughter, Arabella Milbank. 
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hoping to displace capitalism, assumes that the market must always take 
a sinisterly immoral and capitalist shape (meaning a market where the 
interests of capital are dominant over those of workers and consumers 
and so of most people, or even every person qua person). As a result, the 
bureaucratic state is seen as the only virtuous, qualifying factor, which 
o6en results in the ultra-cynicism of substituting regulation and surveil-
lance for the supposed naivety of trust in the worth of individual actors, 
thereby half-committing us all to the far greater naivety of imagining 
that we can dispense in such trust in virtue altogether.
And hence the extreme pathos of social democracy: all that can 
ever be achieved is some quali8ed defense against the economic and 
social ravages of the market. But as has been seen, this position cannot 
escape or resolve Polanyi’s aporia whereby such state interference on the 
one hand really does sometimes inhibit whatever human bene8ts the 
sheerly capitalist market might bring, and on the other hand only pro-
tects capitalism from the social protests to which its own excesses might 
give rise and therefore helps to sustain it in being, whilst preventing the 
emergence of an associationist alternative.
What the le6 now misses is therefore the possibility that today not 
the workers, nor the intellectuals (stuck in passive observational cyni-
cism) could potentially be the main agents of social justice, but rather 
businesspeople, the half-repentant villains themselves. (.e involvement 
of workers would also be crucial here, but given the level of disempow-
erment of the Proletariat achieved by late capitalism, it is hard to see how 
they could ever become again partially-prime social actors, as they were 
in an earlier industrial era.) Yet in the case of this possibility a priority 
to the ethical need not ideologically gloss over inherent diAerences of 
material interest, which should not, however, be ahistorically and cyni-
cally hypostasized.
To do the latter is indeed once more to commit to “le6 individual-
ism” and to suppose that individuals always 8nally act out of material and 
so lonely and private reasons—given that collective interests of a merely 
material sort, even if mutually sympathetic, can only ever be provisional 
and expedient. (A6er the revolution, we will all go our separate self-
satis8ed ways.) By contrast, the material interests of owners, managers, 
investors, and workers can truly be materially fused only when there is a 
common ethical commitment to certain social purposes of production 
and exchange and then a division of material spoils is re-organized in 
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accordance with that commitment. .is would generally involve a far 
greater overlapping of these diAerent economic roles in the future.
It should also be said that the appeal to business interests them-
selves by no means implies an end to all struggle against “cynical” in-
terests of dominant capital. Of course, realistically speaking this will 
remain until they are defeated by struggle. But the more plausibly eAec-
tive alliance against these interests is not now the mass of workers and 
the dispossessed, working through the agency of the “compensatory” 
state (the aporetic problems with this mode of resistance have been suf-
8ciently outlined) but rather the growing union of all ethical businesses 
and corporate bodies, uniting in shared purpose workers, managers 
and owners.
It can therefore be argued that the alternative to social demo-
cratic cynicism and pathos is an associationist advocacy of a “moral 
market.” .e arrival of the latter alone would free us from the political 
Manicheanism of cynical reason, which, needless to add, is theologically 
as well humanly unacceptable. Once we have identi8ed and genealogi-
cally accounted for the ontological cynicism of the current le6, it be-
comes clear that the real source of radical change today would be (and 
perhaps already is) “religious” repentance, and not yet more materialist 
“analysis,” however searching and sophisticated.
To gain greater clarity about this practical and theoretical demand 
for a just and charitable market, it is worth setting out a (a) a brief typol-
ogy, (b) a resumé of our current predicament and (c) a sketch of concrete 
proposals. 
A Typology of “Third Ways”
.e typology distinguishes between modernist (somewhat to be dis-
tinguished from “modern”), postmodern and religious variants of the 
third way.
!e Modernist Variant
We have already characterized the modern. In knowledge it involves 
a duality of given fact and equally given reason or arti8cial proposal. 
In political economy it involves the fantasizing of a natural economy 
supplemented by arti8cial political contract and promotion of utility. 
Modernism (in philosophy as in the arts) tried to mediate this gulf 
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through a nonetheless still modern and subjective given immediacy of 
reasoned identity. Husserl is here paradigmatic because of the way in 
which he argued that we have absolute intentional access to the essences 
of things. In his Krisis, he tried to root the scienti8c endeavor back in 
a real experienced intention and to show that it was but one of many 
authentically intentional relations to reality.36 Directly under Husserlian 
inBuence, the German architects of the post-war social market, the so-
called Ordo-Liberals, similarly tried to heal the breach between nature 
and reason through a better use of reason that would half-restore the 
organic past. Just as Husserl tried to authenticate and yet limit science, 
so Wilhelm Roepke tried to authenticate and yet to limit economics in 
his Husserl-echoing Social Crisis of Our Times. Written during the war 
almost at the same time as Polanyi’s !e Great Transformation, this book 
is asking the same question about why the long nineteenth century peace 
had led to twentieth century unprecedented mass war, and answering 
it like Polanyi by blaming nineteenth-century political economy.37 Like 
Polanyi also he wanted to re-embed the market in society, but unlike 
Polanyi he thought, following Husserlian phenomenological methods, 
that the market has a pure isolated essence. Hence while the state should 
prevent monopolies, promote cra6 guilds, and so forth, the price mech-
anism of the market merely le6 to itself will tend to generate local recip-
rocal exchanges which are not capitalist in character. A natural market 
will be a con8ned market—one can see why one should not confuse this 
with Hayek’s neo-liberalism, even though the latter itself never reached 
the egotistic extremities of the Chicago school.
But Roepke only thinks this for two reasons, theoretical and his-
torical. .eoretically, he sees the market as second-best to pure self-
suCciency, as if reciprocal exchange were historically secondary, which 
it is not. He is here all too Rousseauian. Historically, he argues with 
total implausibility that the main reason for monopoly is lingering feu-
dal inequality, rather than it being something which the market itself 
tends towards. Because he espouses a pure market, for all his admitted 
kinship with Catholic thought and with English Catholic distributism 
(a kinship also acknowledged, though far more onesidedly, by Hayek 
with respect to the way in which socialism can combine with capitalism 
36. Husserl, Crisis of the European Sciences. 
37. Roepke, Social Crisis of Our Times; see also Rüstow, Die Religion der 
Marktwirtscha#.
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to produce the monopolistic and oligarchic “servile state”),38 he rejects 
ideas of the just price, the just wage and any corporatist political role for 
the guilds.39 
!e Postmodern Variant
Roepke thus articulated the modernist third way imagined through a 
fantasized immediacy of essence. What is the postmodern third-way? 
First of all, what is the post-modern attitude to knowledge? It is one 
of admitted mediation, but of skeptical mediation. Against Husserl, 
Derrida said that there is no immediate grasp of essences because of 
the intervention of semioisis which is indeterminate. Historically speak-
ing, the algebraic forgetting of original intention in science—whereby 
we come to manipulate formulae without understanding how they were 
8rst produced—is inevitable and always already begun.40 Here, however, 
Derrida is far more Cartesian than Husserl, since he exalts a skeptical 
mathesis that itself forgets the mediation of subjective material constitu-
tion of signifying practices which Husserl was rightly anxious to disin-
ter. Real mediation would need to split the diAerence. Our knowledge is 
always intentional, but as it is also always signifying we never quite know 
what we intend and must always render a merely provisional judgment 
upon our own activity.
In political economic terms, it was New Labour which 8rst en-
acted the postmodern mathesis, the skeptical mediation. (In the U.S. 
this was 8rst done by Clinton and continued by George Bush Jr., but to 
a considerably lesser extent.) Under this continued regimen no longer 
are the political and the economic discrete, but they totally invade each 
other while yet only accentuating and not abolishing their separation. 
All businesses are to grow bigger and be more impersonally managed; 
government is to encourage an internal market in the public sphere and 
yet all the more to police these with targets and inspections.
Is this really for the sake of modern order? No, from the outset with 
Giddens’ manifesto !e !ird Way, it was for the sake of increasing post-
modern risk. Risk most of all encapsulates skeptical fusion: for risk is 
seen as positive: we must release the nihilistically dangerous, uncertain 
38. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 13n.1.
39. In these respects the criticisms of ordo-liberalism made by the Jesuit Oswald von 
Nell-Breuning are pertinent. See von Nell-Breuning, Kapitalismus—kritisch betrachtet.
40. Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry.
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and unknown, make everyone more aware of unlimited choice and their 
sophistic right to choose the uniquely and un-groundedly “diAerent.” 
.e market depends upon risk, not of course because of its moral re-
sponsibility (that rather accrues to the collective sharing of risks within 
8rms) but rather, from its eighteenth-century outset, because risk led to 
reward, deserved or not. On the other hand, the more risk increases then 
the more unacceptable risk is also engendered. Hence the ever-increased 
need for both governmental surveillance and business self-surveillance. 
.e new market state encourages us to be as dangerous to each other as 
possible, but then it also considers that almost everything we do might 
be excessively dangerous and so must be stopped. Belloc’s “servile state” 
has here already been reached.41 
!e Catholic Christian !ird Way
.e third possibility of a third way, is a religious and especially a Catholic 
Christian one. In terms of knowledge this means a faithful, participa-
tory mediation. As Edith Stein asserted against Husserl, only God enjoys 
completely immediate knowledge of anything.42 Any true knowledge that 
we have must be through faith that we remotely participate in this. Hence 
our knowledge is thrice mediated: by divine illumination, through the 
forms of material things that arrive by abstraction in our mind and in-
form our understanding (thereby allowing a relatively sure phenomeno-
logical intuition of essence, without either epoché or perfect reduction), 
and through our knowledge of one thing always in terms of another and 
so through signs ad in"nitum.
41. Belloc, Servile State. .e comment of the late Tony Judt in his book Ill Fares 
the Land that it was the old-fashioned “pure state” which had to come to the rescue of 
the banks a6er the recent crash and not the supposedly mythical “market state” totally 
misses the point that what is indeed the market state had to rescue the banks precisely 
because its own indebtedness was so tied up with theirs. .is was self-rescue by an 
oligopoly, not rescue of the banks by a political force transcendent to the economic. 
I would argue for the reasons set out in this chapter that Judt’s continued advocacy of 
social democracy does not sit coherently with his extremely accurate castigation of the 
le6 for under-appreciating the importance of conserving what is good in the past and 
so eAectively placing a modernist futurism before the quest for social justice and envi-
ronmental beauty. He correctly remarks that Burke’s political ontology, which stresses 
the primacy of the passage of time for human existence, should be taken as true by all 
sides of the political spectrum.
42. Stein, Knowledge and Faith.
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What then, is 8nally the Catholic “third way” in terms of political 
economy? I have already adverted to Guardini’s search for an organic 
use of technology and that must be our clue. Humans as natural beings 
use signs, yet remain entirely animals in doing that. It is crucial at this 
point to return to Aristotle and Aquinas: we are rational and political 
animals. Not, as for bio-politics, a bit animal with reason and politics 
tacked on, but entirely as animals rational and political and yet in our 
reason and “politicality” wholly still animal. Animals inconceivable to 
Darwinism who possess the telos of reason, politics and the paradoxical 
end of the reception of supernatural grace which causes us always to 
exceed the political and justice in the direction of the ecclesial meta-
space of charity.
So human beings always add the mediation of signs and the recip-
rocal exchange of gi6s to nature. But they do not thereby leave nature 
behind, nor is this grounded in a nature “before” our humanity, as for 
political economy. Nor also, are these additions merely random and sub-
ject to no judgment, as postmodern atheism must conclude. No, for hu-
man society to be possible we must trust in a paradoxically fundamental 
middle of habit, ungrounded in either nature or reason, which nonethe-
less we must believe conducts us towards our true telos. .is means that, 
in order to restore the primacy of society over the economy, we must 
have faith in God and in our participation in God and must be able to 
“read” certain habitual practices as truly tending in this direction.
Our Current Predicament
How does such a reading relate to the recent and ongoing 8nancial crisis 
(2007–)? Clearly the latter does not foreshadow the end of capitalism. 
However, it both reminds us of something and reveals something new. It 
reminds us that capitalism is subject to a peculiar sort of economic cri-
sis: a crisis of speculation, not of natural disaster or human ineptitude.43 
But it also reveals that globalization has so expanded and speeded up 
the processes of capitalist change as to engender something qualitatively 
diAerent. Unrestricted movements of international 8nance now severely 
curtail government freedom of action in a way that puts political democ-
racy itself into crisis. .e way in which excess capital from one part of 
43. See Harvey, Enigma of Capital.
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the world can be so quickly transferred to another has in part generated 
the recent severe economic destabilization. In response, governments 
had to bail out the banks by taking over their debts in a manner which 
locks politics itself yet more into a sheerly economic logic which has less 
and less regard for the speci8cally political ends of human well-being 
and interpersonal communication.
But this supposedly pure economic logic is not the logic of eco-
nomics as such; only of one particular economic system which acts 
out certain theoretical assumptions as already described, which can be 
summarized in the following way. First, there is the accepted dominance 
of material reality by abstraction: even the bankers themselves scarcely 
knew what was going on, because they were speculating in terms of 
ciphers about ciphers and of guesses about other people’s guesses con-
cerning the future. By these means they were increasingly entangling 
us all in the shi6ing rules of their own game. Secondly, there is the as-
sumption that the well-being of the 8rm takes second place to that of 
the individuals who run it, as best illustrated by the “bonus culture.” .e 
third assumption is the most fundamental. .is is that human beings 
are at bottom self-seeking animals and that a free market depends upon 
recognizing this reality.
.ese three assumptions demand the interrogation which I have 
already tried to undertake. .e dominance of abstraction is rooted in 
tearing material things apart into a sign-aspect on the one hand and 
an object-aspect on the other. .is is unnatural, because the house I 
live in, for example, aAords me at once material shelter and emotional 
signi8cance. We naturally see everything in this integrated way. Yet our 
inherited capitalism depends for its very operation upon the sundering 
of thing from sign. .us material things without meaning can be treated 
always as objects to be manipulated. When the land itself is treated like 
this, the surface of the earth threatens to become as naturally desolate 
as it is culturally desecrated. Equally, when human beings are reduced 
to bodies without souls, they can be regarded as simply sources of labor 
supply. Even money itself, as Polanyi realized, is treated over-abstractly. 
Instead of being regarded as an instrument of exchange that measures 
economic comparative value in accord with moral value, it is seen as 
something one should try to accumulate in its own right, and as some-
thing that can be validly bought and sold and used to constrain people’s 
natural freedom of choice. In this way, genuine meaning Boats oA into the 
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ether of sheer quanti8cation, while material reality is cruelly wrenched 
away from all aAective attachments.
However, the world goes round and round: if globalization encour-
ages this nomadic abstraction, it also increases the way in which abstrac-
tion must in the end to relate back to the real material economy. For 
if you live on one globe, there is eventually nowhere to hide and even 
Dubai aAords no refuge. .is is because the total sundering of sign from 
thing does not make sense even in market terms. Since we are embodied 
creatures, disembodied capital must in the end be securitized against 
material resources, else we have no way 8nally to guarantee its value, 
without which it loses its purpose.
If our current economic system divides sign from thing, it also, in 
the second place, tries to divide the individual from the group. But there 
are limits to this. A6er all, even bankers do not operate as lone rangers, 
but within 8rms. Why also 8rms and not just markets? Neo-classical eco-
nomics was simply about markets: it concerned market equilibrium and 
the idea that markets automatically record exact information. But today 
a more postmodern economics recognizes that no system is in the long 
run stable; that rational individual acting can sometimes produce irra-
tional general results, and that the feedback of market information o6en 
arrives too late for the bene8t of the individual speculator. .is is where 
the role of the 8rm comes into in to play. People have to get together and 
cooperate under both horizontal and hierarchical consensual norms, 
precisely because within a 8rm they can create for themselves a niche 
market that becomes relatively predictable and that supplies reasonably 
reliable information in suCcient time. Most economic activity operates 
in this institutional space and not through patterns of exchangist nego-
tiation. As Bruni and Zamagni put it, we work far more than we shop.44
Yet despite recognizing the necessity of collaboration, economics 
for a while tried perversely to understand even the 8rm in individualis-
tic terms. .is encouraged an appeal to “public choice theory,” (with its 
roots in Condorcet and advocacy by Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen 
in recent times) which has inBuenced New Labour and has been applied 
to governmental as well as private organizations. For the crudest version 
of this theory, employees and civil servants remain utility-maximizing 
creatures whose main aim is to cream-oA bene8ts of prestige and wealth 
44. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 159–252; Screpenti and Zamagni, Outline, 
456–519. 
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for themselves. But even in the subtler variants individual actors are seen 
as trying to realize their own goals in accordance with their own diverse 
capacities, no objective shared teleology being regarded as conceivable.45 
In consequence, 8rms cannot trust their employees, giving rise to our 
current culture of targets, incentives, bonuses and endlessly employing 
new employees to check up on other employees.
At the same time, an anti-corporatist theoretical individualism 
itself reBects the increased individualism in practice of “disorganized 
capitalism” or “neo-capitalism” ever since the 1970s. In this model, 
partly encouraged by new technologies and partly by a reinforcement of 
the inherently individualist logic of capitalism itself, an older manageri-
alist “Fordist” model of production has been replaced to a considerable 
degree by outsourcing from central to satellite companies and network-
ing between apparently more independent individuals and parties. Yet 
in reality, as analysts have shown, this has disguised an ever-increased 
agglomeration and dominance of monopolistic 8rms, o6en at the global 
level.46 .e apparent but actually super8cial disaggregation itself per-
mits a greater control by a center whose power bene8ts from the very 
Buidity and more evanescent nature of its parts. At the same time, the 
preponderance of “networking” ensures that a contractualist logic, fun-
damental to capitalism, increasingly operates at the intra-8rm as well as 
at the inter-8rm level, o6en with apparent interactions at the latter level 
being in reality covertly manipulated interactions within the former. 
And the supposedly greater scope for individual initiative which the 
new system seems both to encourage and to thrive upon is to a degree 
but another screen of delusion: for in reality what drives the system, and 
what it bene8ts from, is the attraction of the mere rhetoric of enterprise 
and the mere trappings of diAerence to the various players within the 
system. .eir greater energy and cooperation is recruited (as compared 
with Fordism) to the degree that they are manipulated through the en-
joyment of apparently greater scope for choice within an always severely 
restricted range of options which are more like “shopping selections” 
than genuine opportunities for creativity.
45. See Sen, Idea of Justice. In Sen’s variant, in which moral relativism is elevated 
into a kind of High-Table Hindu indiAerentism, a competitive logic within public in-
stitutions is balanced by a Statist concern to increase the ability of individuals to realise 
their “capacities” in both state and market sectors.
46. See Boltanski and Chiapello, New Spirit of Capitalism, 223.
Part I: Christianity and Capitalism62
In this way the “disorganization” of capitalism, by reducing the es-
prit de corps of the more organized 8rm of the past, decreases trust and 
security and reduces even productive decisions to simulacra of “con-
sumer choices”. In consequence, a capacity to innovate which capitalism 
itself requires, is in some measure compromised.
So the crucial irony here is that this sort of individualistic bias in 
both theory and practice is actually inimical to a genuinely free mar-
ket. A culture of pervasive mistrust inevitably inhibits those qualities of 
initiative, risk, and creativity on which competitive enterprise depends. 
Moreover, one can argue that an overly “liquid” capital, which moves so 
fast that it can be increasingly indiAerent to local limitations, is just as 
subject to the loss of “tacit knowledge” only available at the local level, 
as Hayek argued was the case for central state planning. If, for example, 
a speeded up economy requires that people frequently change jobs now 
become so automated (in every respect) that they are not diCcult to 
move in and out of, it must still pay the dialectical price of losing that 
patient slowness which real creative innovation and prudential skill re-
quire, even with respect to the process of generating abstract wealth.
Hence the restoration of trust, the relocalization of the economy, 
and the use of “lighter” technology to empower individuals and small 
groups, rather than to render them evermore replaceable (a kind of al-
ternative postmodern economy to that of post-Fordist disorganization), 
is actually in line with the logic of a free market, even though these things 
are also desirable in more properly social terms and it is impossible to 
gain the sheer economic bene8t without also gaining (or regaining) the 
social bene8t.47 .erefore at a new dialectical limit the market economy 
requires some re-embedding for purely market economic reasons, even 
though this re-embedding will paradoxically tend to remove the very 
idea of such “purely economic” reasons, which belong to a disembed-
ding that needs to be overcome. .is phenomenon is akin to “the cul-
tural contradictions of capitalism,” except that the culture of trust is here 
more seen as inherent to economic contract itself. But the proviso must 
be added that nothing dictates that even good economic logic will be 
followed: the swi6ness of late modern capitalism has an enormous mo-
47. See Blond, Red Tory, which is of general relevance for the theses of this chap-
ter, although my own political allegiance is to Maurice Glasman’s “Blue Labour”—a 
position theoretically anticipated by me as “Blue Socialism” in !e Radical Orthodoxy 
Reader, 401.
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mentum that establishes a habit which can o6en survive the evidence 
of its economic illogic. .e United States well illustrates the inertia of 
an extreme capitalist system which survives and dominates despite the 
fact that it tends to quash local enterprise in favor of sluggish monopoly 
and engenders much material squalor and absence of real choice (over 
transport, food and clothing for example) even for the supposed pos-
sessors of moderate wealth.48
In the face of this economic incapacity of the neo-liberal model, we 
need to learn, as Bruni and Zamagni have suggested, from those tradi-
tions of Italian political economy stretching back to eighteenth-century 
Naples which have always stressed that social sympathy and reciprocity 
belong to economic contract itself, and not simply to the “compensa-
tory” roles of civil society and governmental welfare as for the Scottish 
perspective, which was less authentically humanist.49 Indeed, the more 
that contracts between people are based on trust, the more they are rela-
tively informal, and the more that they embody a kind of gi6-exchange, 
then the less the less you need the intervention of state control. .e 
individualistic model of the market economy has (as Belloc correctly 
foresaw) paradoxically increased the power of the state, whose laws are 
required both to secure formal contract and to enforce marketization 
within the public sector, while also policing the resultant anarchy.
So a more moral market would also be a more genuinely free mar-
ket: morality need not be just an external corrective to the economic 
sphere, as social democratic pathos tends to assume. Another aspect of 
this moralization of the market would be the genuine sharing of risk, 
which would remove the relative protection against risk currently en-
joyed by the investor and money-lender as compared with both employ-
ees and consumers.
But if the economics of egoism do not work for the 8rm, then it 
turns out that they do not work at any level whatsoever. Here, as we have 
seen, anthropology refutes the third false assumption which derives from 
Adam Smith. We are not primarily a “trucking” animal seeking a good 
deal, but a gi6-exchanging animal. For what human beings most desire 
is not material wealth, but rather social recognition. But this is always 
a mutual aAair, and so we are rarely either purely interested or purely 
48. Every observant European who has lived in the USA for a while will attest these 
surprising phenomena.
49. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 45–75. 
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disinterested. Society is a spiral paradox of “non-compulsory compul-
sion,” in which the giving of gi6s (and every act and speech-act is a gi6) 
half-expects but cannot compel a return gi6. .is is the very glue of all 
human society. It is at once a political and an economic glue, so that 
when we try to base our economy on desacralization and individualism, 
society is gradually abolished and humanity starts to contradict itself.50
If social recognition is fundamental also for the economy, then trust 
is basic for the economic 8rm. One could say (in line with the thinking 
of the seventeenth-century English Levellers)51 that it should consti-
tute a sort of benign semi-monopoly which prevents the emergence of 
malign monopoly. How so? Well on the basis of naked individualism, 
people strive for monopoly in order to produce the shoddiest possible 
products, buy the materials for those products as cheaply as possible 
and sell them as dearly as possible. In this way they undermine competi-
tors and bad practice drives out good. But in the case of the 8rm that is 
a “civil enterprise” or partnership between owners, managers, workers, 
and consumers, good practice can drive out bad in a tendency that is 
actually more stable, as one can see for much of the history of a 8rm like 
the UK-based John Lewis partnership. Such 8rms will tend to thrive in 
the long term, not by driving out all other competitors, but rather by 
forcing other 8rms to compete in terms of quality of produce, fairness 
of pricing and humane treatment of workers and customers. And a cru-
cial aspect to “quality of produce” is the fact that real goods (including 
“relational goods” that we can only enjoy in common) are less subject to 
the law of diminishing returns. Habit dulls us to the appeal of the latest 
mutation of the chocolate bar from slender to chunky . . . But habitua-
tion only discovers ever more in the enjoyment of 8ne wines, beers, and 
ciders, and still more in the practice of 8ne cuisine and in all aesthetic 
and reciprocally enjoyed social goods in general.
It is perhaps at this point that ethical considerations about eco-
nomics most pass over into metaphysical or religious ones. For much 
of human existence, it can seem as if bad habits are more powerful than 
good ones. But in the end, we discover that the reverse is true, and that 
otherwise we could not survive as social and linguistic animals.
50. See Godbout and Caillé, World of the Gi#; Godbout, Ce Qui Circule Entre Nous.
51. See Black, Guilds and Civil Society, 126–27.
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Virtue and Economy
Where might one locate such self-sustaining and intensifying good 
habits? One thing we ignore is that many elements of Catholic social 
teaching—opposition to usury, the just price, the just wage, guilds, cor-
porations, distribution of assets, the primacy of land as sacred, solidar-
ity, and subsidiarity—exist in certain degrees in many parts of the world 
where they have been tried and successfully tested. (Germany, Austria, 
Italy, the Basque country, for example). So they are not mere medieval 
survivals or nostalgic throwbacks and, as Antony Black once argued, it is 
rather the case that both “liberal” freedom to choose (one’s career, living 
place, and marriage partner in particular) and the principle of mutual-
ity are both products of Christianity and both things which belong to 
“modernity” understood as the gradual emergence of a more economic 
and more urban society as opposed to a rural and military one from the 
twel6h century onwards.
As he also argued, while the seventeenth century and the Enlight-
enment saw the one-sided triumph of “liberalism,” mutualism and the 
advocacy of the constitutive political role of the corporate guild and other 
intermediary bodies (held together in the end by reciprocal ties of friend-
ship) persisted both in modern practice for a long time (for example in 
Germany and Italy) and in alternative but clearly modern theories like 
those of Althusius in the seventeenth century, Otto von Gierke in the 
nineteenth century and Emile Durkheim in the twentieth century.52
Let us consider brieBy certain of these elements of Catholic Social 
Teaching and how they might be extended:
(A) Anti-usury legislation. We need to tie as much lending of 
money as possible to real investment and to make banks stakeholders 
and therefore risk-carriers in the enterprises which they fund. At every 
level we need to reconnect 8nancial sign with material power in order to 
prevent the speculative and ecological threats of their disconnection.
(B) Just prices and just wages. At crucial de8ning limits as regards 
justice we cannot trust the market to deliver these and we need to make 
this matter something that comes 8rst within the advisory power of “free 
52. Black, Guilds and Civil Society, esp. 12–43 and 237–41. Black confusingly uses 
the term ‘civil society,’ following Hegel, to mean market liberalism. He does not discuss 
the Scottish use of the term, as in Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson which, as we have 
seen, referred to a realm which ambiguously replaced an older corporatism and yet also 
tried to compensate for its absence.
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guilds” or corporate bodies concerning diAerent regions of production 
and service which try to set standards for and oAer advice to those 8rms 
which voluntarily belong to them. (See C, below.) But to safeguard the 
public interest in the last analysis, the adjudication of prices and wages 
is also something that should come increasingly within the purview of 
courts of law. At the same time, the achieving of justice in these areas 
should more usually and eAectively be a matter of instilling a new sort of 
ethos in economic transactions, founded upon a new sense that a 8rm 
should not legitimately, as the Pope says, be pursuing pro8t alone, but 
ought to be pursuing some sort of publicly recognized social purpose. 
(Is not the opposite idea simply morally obscene?)
(C) Free Guilds. We need a general recreation and reinvigoration 
of professional associations, guilds or “corporations,” which still play 
a considerable role in Germany and Austria and which survive vesti-
gially or exist in an over interest-protecting and giant form (like the 
Confederation of British Industry) in the United Kingdom. It is these 
institutions alone that can instill an inter-8rm ethos based upon the 
idea that one achieves self-respect by making and trading something 
good and not by merely making money. Furthermore, it is the idea of 
the guild or corporation which truly resolves the aporia of monopoly 
whereby state anti-monopoly legislation is itself an unwarranted intru-
sion within market competition that can even help to further the rise of 
alternative monopolies. Here once more it is Polanyi who had the vital 
insight: monopolies tend to be generated by the most free-booting and 
egoistic participants in the market. Hence a guild-restriction of com-
petition to those signed-up to guild-principles actually tends to ensure 
competition by slightly restricting competition. It thereby achieves what 
the Ordo-Liberals desired, but failed to see required a greater role for the 
corporatist dimension.
However, to avoid monopolistic corruption consequent upon 
guild-operation itself, as has undoubtedly occurred in the past, we need 
a new idea of free guilds which enjoy no legally-established sole right to 
trade. Licensing by a guild-organization could then become economi-
cally advantageous in the way that a free trade label is today, because 
customers would receive thereby a certain guarantee of good quality of 
produce, fair treatment of all stakeholders in the enterprise, and of con-
sumers themselves. .is notion of a “free guild” also helps to meet the 
objection that guilds cannot cope with new trades and industries which 
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arise with ever increasing frequency. For the latter need not be inhib-
ited by the vested interests of established “corporations” yet at the same 
time are provided by them with a model of the bene8ts of submission to 
guild standards which they can then imitate. At the same time, a certain 
subordination of technology to relatively stable human ends might be 
served by bringing new technologies within the scope of existing guilds: 
we could then more easily ask for example, what social purposes do the 
mobile phone and the computer precisely serve? .is purposive conser-
vatism of guilds could also have a radically protective function.
(D) .e organization of welfare. As much of this as possible needs 
to be organized by state-aided voluntary bodies recognized as corporate 
economic actors in order to ensure that people understand that they are 
involved in a visible and comprehensible give–and–take and can them-
selves exercise a regular charity. Also pension provision needs on the 
whole to be organized within 8rms in order to ensure that the future 
needs of both employers and employees are as mutually bound-together 
and tied up with the destiny of the 8rm as possible. .is might help to 
inhibit our current anti-virtuous volatility of employment.
(E) Wider distribution of assets. Everything possible should be 
done through local banks, credit unions, mutual manufacturing invest-
ment funds, co-operative housing associations, worker share-ownership, 
and so forth to ensure a general de-proletarianization and re-profes-
sionalization of the population. National and local Government should 
deliberately encourage the emergence of such institutions by oAering tax 
advantages, privileged conditions of access to credit, and so forth. At the 
moment all is going in the reverse direction.
(F) A new political corporatism. If businesses and other corporate 
bodies (for example universities) are to be oCcially encouraged to take 
social responsibility, then reciprocally they should exercise a share in po-
litical governance. .is is a le6-wing theme all the way from Durkheim 
to Paul Hirst, as well as a right-wing one.53 It has been perverted into to-
talitarianism when (a) it has altogether displaced representative govern-
ment of individuals and localities and (b) it has been centrally directed 
and made compulsory and (c) has disguised a continued capitalist exac-
tion of surplus-value from workers. Here the current Pope’s support for 
stake-holding and share-distribution seems to indicate a break with the 
Germanic Catholic Ketteler legacy of reading “co-determination” as if 
53. Hirst, Associative Democracy; Hirst and Bader, Associative Democracy.
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capitalists were the authentic equivalents of feudal overlords rather than 
people whose wealth had mainly been acquired through unjust exploi-
tation (since many historical processes are, indeed “cynical”). One can 
add that these degenerations are discouraged if the churches and other 
religious bodies help to co-ordinate inter-corporate governance without 
this all this being rooted through the state. Christians should recom-
mend that the House of Lord be reformed as a representative body of 
corporations, businesses, religions, universities, trade unions, etc. and 
not as a second House of Commons, which would dangerously dilute 
the latter’s primary sovereignty.
(G) .e primacy of land. As asserted by Vincent McNabb and H. F. 
Massingham in the middle of the last century,54 Catholic Christians 
(Roman, Orthodox and Anglican) have always proclaimed that it is the 
countryside and the organic relation of the city to the countryside that 
most guarantees our animal rationality. .e countryside is basic in terms 
of food provision, ecology, and our sense of beauty—which concerns 
supremely how we 8t human with divine creative art: this is one crucial 
aspect of the Christians “pastoral.”
Yet failure to comprehend the primacy of the land threatens the 
integrity of cities most of all, because a false primacy of the urban has en-
couraged over-concentration of population and the rise of the sprawling 
mega-city which inevitably destroys its real function as the fulcrum of 
trade, philosophical discussion, and cra6 and artistic Bourishing, rather 
than as sites for debased modes of mass manufacture and monopolistic 
and self-serving 8nancial services. We need to revisit attempts like that of 
Glasgow at the turn of the 19th century to combine mass manufacturing 
with cra6 design, while at the same time grasping the ways in which new 
lighter and green technologies can permit once again a wider inhabitation 
of the surface of the globe. Rural and now remote areas can be brought 
to life once again, while cities can recover their functions as centers of 
human meeting, and concentrations of excellence and example. 
Spiritual failure with respect to our understanding of our place with-
in nature has also a physical equivalent. .e more that land is enclosed, 
then the more also local ecologies are destroyed, until the earth depends 
increasingly upon one fragile global ecology. But in the end of course, the 
global ecology of gaia depends itself upon the various local ecologies and 
with their evermore reduced functioning would eventually collapse.
54. McNabb, Church and the Land; Massingham, Tree of Life.
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It is arguable that the Latin Christian Middle Ages were unique, 
in contrast both to what went before and what came a6er, in shaping 
a civilization more on the basis of the countryside and the small towns 
than on the larger cities.55 Towns and cities served the rural economy 
rather than vice-versa; aristocrats based themselves in the rural hinter-
lands while investing in the towns and kings ruled through the balanc-
ing of rural interests, through endless travel and the exchange of gi6s 
and favors, rather than through the imposition of a central bureaucracy. 
Yet far from this ruralization being a regressive development as com-
pared to city-based antiquity, it was just this switch that allowed the so 
so-called “great in8lling” in the twel6h century, the almost continuous 
cultivation of land in many areas and the adoption of several crucial 
technological innovations. .is was moreover rendered possible by the 
gradual freeing of men from 8rst slavery and then serfdom, which in-
creased the appeal of staying on the land and developing it and released 
a cra6 creatvity.56 Such a gradually wider distribution of property also 
permitted the existence of intensive small-scale farming requiring crop 
rotation, common grazing and many practices of mutual assistance. 
All in all this bene8cial circulation allowed the emergence of a good 
natural and social ecology: a 8ne balance of interaction between person 
and person and between person and nature. It was within this cultural 
soil that later revolutionary Western advancements in technology and 
natural science were able to take root.
Of course the good Medieval features were accompanied by many 
that were horrendous and have fortunately vanished (though we tend to 
underrate how far the work of emancipation from overweening land-
based domination began within the Middle Ages themselves). Nor can 
we restore this degree of rural primacy. Yet it can be possible to restore 
it in the new sense of a primacy of nature as a whole, and of humanity 
taken as a part of nature, though as wisely governing over it in order 
to perfect it through further beauti8cation and intensi8ed Bourishing. 
Such a primacy would uniquely guard against the siphoning-oA of real 
bene8ts for overly abstract urban purposes with a consequent leaching 
away of the meaning of nature, which then remains as so much mere 
material terrain to be expropriated and exploited.
55. Again I have these ideas from my son Sebastian Milbank. One can note here that 
the Latin bias to the rural began with the Romans, for all their origin as a city-state.
56. See Belloc, Essay on the Restoration of Property. 
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Conclusion
In conclusion it can be asked, what does it portend when all the sea is an 
inland sea? Does this mean that we are doomed to the demonic middle 
of commercial, zero-sum trade now that there are no localities and no 
remote exotic places merely rumored? Now that the sea has totally in-
vaded the land—and could eventually do so literally?
Up till now it would seem so. But there is another possibility. .is 
is that transport and communications could have truly provided the pre-
conditions for the emergence of a global village. Globalization mostly 
destroys locality, but also renders it more and more possible for one 
locality to communicate directly with another in a totally distant part of 
the world. In this way it just could once more come to seem “common 
sense” that all the economy should be subordinate to social reciproc-
ity. As Paul Claudel suggested in his epic play Le Soulier de Satin, we 
must, as Catholic Christians, assume that the seas were not conquered 
by Western Christendom for the sake of the victory of chaos, but rather 
for the material baptism in loving justice of all of humanity.57
57. Claudel, Le Soulier de Satin.
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A Tale of a Duck-Billed Platypus 
Called Benedict and  
His Gold and Red Crayons
Tracey Rowland
A Tale of Two Readings
Caritas in Veritate is the most recent in a long list of papal  interventions in the territory of social justice, and for most com-
mentators there was nothing surprising in the document apart from its 
extraordinary length and the way in which it sought to oAer a compre-
hensive overview of the whole tradition rather than isolating a couple of 
issues and focusing upon them. It was as if Benedict XVI reviewed the 
tradition, made an executive summary of what he regards as its most 
signi8cant elements, and gave his papal stamp of approval to them, at 
the same time as enriching them with his own theological reBections. 
Caritas in Veritate can thus be read as a masterful synthesis of late twen-
tieth-century papal social justice theory, with a special emphasis on the 
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social implications of the Trinitarian anthropology of John Paul II. .e 
core theological ideas were all present in the young Professor Ratzinger’s 
essay on the treatment of human dignity in Gaudium et spes, as pub-
lished in the commentaries on the documents of the Second Vatican 
Council, edited by Herbert Vorgrimler in 1969.
.e intellectual center of the encyclical is that “A humanism which 
excludes God is an inhuman humanism.” .is was precisely the argu-
ment made by Pope Benedict’s fellow Conciliar peritus and co-founder 
of the Communio journal, Henri de Lubac, in the work 8rst published in 
1944 as Le drame de l’humanisme athée which oAered a survey of the hu-
manisms of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Comte. .is principle rests 
a notion of authentic human development upon the theological anthro-
pology enshrined in paragraph 22 of the Conciliar document Gaudium 
et spes—the idea that the human person only has self-understanding to 
the extent that he or she knows Christ and participates in the Trinitarian 
communion of love. As Pope Benedict says, “Life in Christ is the 8rst 
and principle factor of development,” and as John Paul II wrote in the 
very 8rst line of his 8rst encyclical Redemptor Hominis, “Jesus Christ, 
the Redeemer of man, is the centre and purpose of human history.” .e 
whole of Caritas in Veritate can therefore be read as a plea to understand 
the limitations of a secularist notion of development.
Not all commentators have however given the document such a 
reception. In “Caritas in Veritate in Gold and Red,”1 the American neo-
conservative political and ecclesial commentator George Weigel pro-
motes the idea that while some sections of the document appeared to 
be of papal provenance (those one might underline with a gold marker), 
others had clearly been dra6ed by members of the Ponti8cal Council for 
Justice and Peace, a body which has a long history of tension in its rela-
tions with the U.S. neo-conservatives, and these he suggested could be 
underlined with a red marker. According to Weigel, the “red” sections of 
Caritas in Veritate are “pay-back” for those sections of Centesimus Annus 
(the third social encyclical of John Paul II), which was championed by 
the neo-conservatives as a papal endorsement of the U.S. economic 
order—although other commentators did not see it as being nearly so 
broad in its aCrmation of the value of the market. .ere were thus two 
readings of Centesimus Annus, a U.S. neo-con reading, and a reading 
which read the aCrmation of the market passage within the context of 
1. Weigel, “Caritas in Veritate in Gold and Red.”
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the Church’s social teaching as a whole, with all the caveats about the 
need to regulate markets with reference to the common good. With 
Caritas in Veritate however, Weigel has not attempted to spin the “red” 
sections of the document to make them friendly to the U.S. economic 
order. He has had the intellectual honesty to acknowledge that some sec-
tions of the document do not sit comfortably with the kinds of policies 
espoused by the neo-conservatives. He concludes that the encyclical has 
the form of a “duck-billed platypus”—an Australian monotreme which 
looks like a baby otter at one end and a duck at the other. While the 
metaphor is a little opaque, one gets the general impression that one sec-
tion of the body of the platypus (encyclical) is vastly diAerent in shape 
and material from the other.
Leaving aside the source criticism issues of which papal advisor 
contributed which lines, one can argue that there is nothing in the pre-
papal works of Benedict XVI to suggest that he was ever likely to be 
sympathetic to the neo-conservative tradition, which is also described 
as the Whig tradition, or even by some commentators such as Michael 
Novak, its most well-known champion, as “Whig .omism.” One would 
not need to place Pope Benedict under political pressure to get him to 
endorse themes in Populorum Progressio—the encyclical of Paul VI most 
hostile to the Whigs—which Weigel described as the “odd duck” in the 
roll call of social encyclicals of the twentieth century. Ratzinger, like his 
papal predecessors going all the way back to Leo XIII, has been critical of 
both utopian socialist and laissez-faire liberal capitalist theory. In pre-pa-
pal essays he observed that while the lives of many people are completely 
controlled by the laws of the market so that they have few choices about 
their lifestyle, liberal theorists argue that the market is morally neutral 
and associated with the promotion of human freedom. He described as 
astounding this idea that the laws of the market are either neutral or in 
essence good.2 He believes that pre-existing values are always determi-
nants in making market decisions.
In the context of the problem of .ird World poverty, he even re-
ferred to the “tragic legacy” and “cruelty of the liberal capitalist system.”3 
In an interview with the Italian Catholic agency SIR given in 2004 he 
said that he believed that economic aAairs are o6en driven by a form of 
liberalism which ”speci8cally excludes the heart” and the “possibility of 
2. Ratzinger, “Church and Economics,” 199–204.
3. Ibid. and On the Way to Jesus, 121.
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seeing God, of introducing the light of moral responsibility, love and 
justice into the worlds of work, of commerce and of politics.”4 He argued 
that “if globalization in technology is not accompanied by a new open-
ness to an awareness of the God to whom we will all render an account, 
then it will end in catastrophe.”5 Although he was a staunch opponent of 
liberation theology, Ratzinger was never of the view that the economic 
order of the Latin American countries was unproblematic. He simply 
opposed solutions to their problems by reference to politics and eco-
nomics alone, and in particular, he opposed Marxist solutions which 
gave greater weight to sociology than to revelation and turned Christ 
into a revolutionary social worker.
Catholicism beyond Whig Liberalism  
and Marxist Liberation
While the Catholic political arena is popularly perceived as a contest 
between romantics who have been fed on a diet of liberation theol-
ogy mixed with movies about Gandhi, and pragmatic American Whigs 
blind to the fact that something which is good for middle class America 
might have a harmful eAect somewhere else in the world or on some 
other class within their own country, there is another position which is 
less well known, perhaps because many of those who occupy this posi-
tion are professional academics, rather than journalists or politicians or 
political activists working for Catholic agencies. .eir interventions are 
o6en highly academic and even incomprehensible to those unschooled 
in theology and social theory. .eir position is one of critical opposi-
tion to both the Whig and Marxist traditions and one which oAers a 
genealogy of the roots of contemporary social and economic problems 
which reaches all the way back to the sixteenth century or even earlier. 
.e leading contemporary names here are Alasdair MacIntyre, David L. 
Schindler, and William T. Cavanaugh. 
Each in their own way has been critical of what in Catholic social 
theory is described as “Americanism,” the idea that the U.S. political and 
economic order is not only consistent with Catholic teaching, but should 
provide a model for Catholics across the globe. .roughout the 1990s 
4. Ratzinger, “Interview.”
5. Ibid.
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the volumes of the English-language edition of Communio: International 
Catholic Review frequently featured debates between David L. Schindler 
and George Weigel about the culture of America, while the journal First 
!ings under the editorial guidance of the late Richard John Neuhaus 
ran a pro-Americanist agenda. Both groups claimed loyalty to the pa-
pacy of John Paul II.
Alasdair MacIntyre is a central 8gure in the sub-discipline of 
Catholic social theory both because of his life-long critique of the liberal 
tradition, (he claims that he has been opposed to liberalism since he was 
seventeen), and because of his early immersion in the Marxist tradition 
which, although he was later to describe it as “wrong-headed,” gave him 
an insider’s perspective on the attraction of Marxist ideas to several gen-
erations of intellectuals in the twentieth century. Where the Marxist and 
Catholic traditions diAer most fundamentally is at the level of philosoph-
ical anthropology. Marxist anthropology is a mixture of Enlightenment 
and Romantic elements—there is an Enlightenment concept of social 
progress and a Romantic belief in the perfectibility of human nature and 
when the two are taken together the vision is one of the perfectibility of 
human nature through scienti8cally driven social progress.
.is is in stark contrast to the Catholic perspective according to 
which perfection is the result of virtuous practices contending against 
the wounds of original sin. Political and economic institutions may in 
their structure and ethos either hinder or encourage virtuous practices, 
and thus there is a relationship between the nature of political institu-
tions and the practice of virtue. .e relationship operates both ways: 
virtuous practices encourage the establishment of healthy institutions 
and healthy institutions encourage virtuous practices, while pathologi-
cal practices (those which undermine the integrity of the self) give rise 
to pathological institutions, and pathological institutions discourage 
virtuous practices. However the development of a virtuous disposition 
is fundamentally a matter of self-mastery in accord with the work of 
grace and can never be achieved, as Marx hoped, by a reordering of the 
political and economic orders alone. It is precisely for this reason that 
MacIntyre holds the solution to the pathology of liberal modernity will 
not be found primarily in political action but rather in moral rejuvena-
tion. .e latter will, of course, have consequences for the former, but 
when it comes to the question of primacy, MacIntyre’s position is that 
the moral takes precedence.
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.is understanding of the nexus between virtuous dispositions and 
practices (or their opposite) and the character of political institutions, 
can be construed as a particular example of the Platonic insight that 
there is a relationship between order and disorder within the souls of 
citizens, and order and disorder within the culture of their polity. In 
his inaugural lecture as a member of the Académie française in the sec-
tion Sciences Morales et Politiques, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, as he was, 
summarized the Platonic understanding of this relationship thus:
[Plato] speaks of three parts of the soul of man, but we can instead 
speak simply of three fundamental modes of man’s integration 
or disintegration. .e form of the state will depend on which of 
these three fundamental anthropological forms wins the upper 
hand. We have the reign of that which is lowest in man—the reign 
of lust, the lust for possession, for power, for pleasure. Reason 
and heart become instruments to serve what is lower; man sees 
in another only a rival or an instrument for the extension of his 
own ego. Market forces and public opinion dominate man and 
become a caricature of freedom. All that stands above lust in 
Plato’s anthropological formula is the naked will, the audacity of 
daring and of undertaking; but this remains blind.6
In contradistinction to the Platonic and one might add Aristotelian 
and .omist positions, the post-Rousseauian belief that a certain kind of 
civilization is the cause of individual imperfection and consequently that 
there is a political solution to the human predicament has been described 
by Leszek Kołakowski as the “idolatry of politics.” Ratzinger’s position 
when he was the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
was very much that the liberation theologians were guilty of such a form 
of idolatry. .ey skirted around the problem of original sin, allowed their 
Christology to be informed by their sociology, and looked to the political 
and economic disciplines for a kind of this-worldly salvation.
The Legacy of Francisco Suárez
While various authors have located diAerent historical moments at which 
the Platonic and Aristotelian political traditions were decisively chal-
lenged, Francisco Suárez would seem to win the prize for having most ef-
fectively set Catholic social theory on its liberal trajectory. In !ree Rival 
6. Ratzinger, Turning Point for Europe, 131.
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Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre argued that Suárez was both in his 
preoccupations and his methods already a distinctively modern 8gure 
and is perhaps more authentically than Descartes the founder of mod-
ern philosophy. Indeed, he says that it was no accident that Descartes 
was taught by Jesuits inBuenced by Suárez. John Finnis, in Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, also identi8ed Suárez as a pivotal 8gure in Catholic 
political theory. One of his many signi8cant contributions was to foster 
the “two ends” theory of human nature by which the human being has a 
natural end separate from the supernatural end. Over time these two ends 
became equated with the secular and sacred orders, notwithstanding the 
fact that the notion of the saeculum was not initially spatialized at all—it 
was rather a reference to that period in history before the consummation 
of the world and the renewal of the cosmos. It initially referred to time, 
not to space. .e notion that there exists a “pure nature” unrelated to 
grace linked to a purely secular (non-sacred) social space, became known 
as the extrinsicist account of the relationship between nature and grace 
with their respective secular and sacred orders.
In Marxism: An Interpretation, MacIntyre wrote:
When the sacred and the secular are divided, then religion be-
comes one more department of human life, one activity among 
others . . . .is has in fact happened to bourgeois religion . . . 
Only a religion which is a way of living in every sphere either de-
serves to or can hope to survive. For the task of religion is to help 
see the secular as the sacred, the world as under God. When the 
sacred and the secular are separated, then the natural becomes an 
end, not the hallowing of the world, but in itself. Likewise if our 
religion is fundamentally irrelevant to our politics, then we are 
the political as a realm outside of God. To divide the sacred from 
the secular is to recognize God’s action only within the narrowest 
of limits. A religion which recognizes such a division, as does our 
own, is one on the point of dying.7
.e criticism of the extrinsicist account of nature and grace and 
its corresponding two ends theory of human nature was begun in the 
twentieth century in the work of Maurice Blondel and followed through 
in works of Henri de Lubac who described secularism as “simply a new 
name for a variety of atheistic humanism.”8 Peter Henrici has described 
the seminal inBuence of Blondel in the following terms:
7. MacIntyre, Marxism, 9.
8. de Lubac, Eternal Feminine, 180–81.
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Maurice Blondel 8rst rediscovered, on philosophical grounds, 
that human life is intrinsically oriented toward the longing for 
the supernatural gi6, and that this longing constitutes its real 
and unique meaning. Stimulated by Blondel’s impelling thought, 
.omists then rediscovered St. .omas’s teaching that man’s 
“natural desire for the vision of God” as the very constituent of 
our intellectual life (Pierre Rousselot, Joseph Maréchal) and from 
there they want on to a rediscovery of the true Augustinian the-
ology of grace (Henri de Lubac).9
Louis Dupré has argued that the validation of an autonomous “secu-
lar” order in late scholasticism by scholars preparing commentaries on the 
work of St. .omas was based on an unintentional failure to distinguish 
between “pure nature” as an object of philosophical speculation, and pure 
nature in the order of concrete reality. De Lubac argued that this failure 
opened the door to secularism within the theological tradition. As James 
V Schall has written: “If we treat man as only natural, he will no doubt 
end up being less than natural . . . the principle is not, get man’s natural 
end right and you will be happy, but get man’s supernatural end right or 
you will not be able to get his natural or this worldly end right.”10
As a theory, Suárez’s “two ends” was to have particular appeal in the 
twentieth century to Catholic Americans in a predominately Protestant 
culture deeply imbued with liberal values. By keeping the secular and the 
sacred in separate compartments, Catholics who wanted to baptize the 
liberal tradition could seek agreement with non-Catholics about public 
goods on the basis of a shared notion of “pure nature.” Matters pertain-
ing to the sacred were to be privately added on to the philosophically 
discernible purely natural goods and ends. .is became the basis of John 
Courtney Murray’s defense of Americanism, to which the contemporary 
Whig .omists are the intellectual heirs. 
.e diAerence this makes to the way that Catholics approach the 
realms of politics and economics is well presented in the works of David 
L Schindler. In the following paragraphs, he juxtaposes the Murrayite 
approach with that of de Lubac:
According to Murray: faith and grace do not determine the 
structures and processes of civil society: these are determined by 
reason, in the light of the lessons of experience . . . [.e Church] 
9. Henrici, “Response to Louis Dupré,” 76.
10. Schall, “Certain Fundamental Truths.”
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does not aim to alter the 8nality of the state, but to enable the 
state to achieve its own 8nality as determined by its own nature. 
Conversely, for de Lubac, the state occupies no special “secular” 
space beyond the operation of the law of the relations between 
nature and grace. It is from within that grace seizes nature . . . 
It is from within that faith transforms reason, that the Church 
inBuences the state. For Murray, grace’s inBuence on nature takes 
the form of assisting nature to realize its own 8nality; the ends 
proper to grace and nature otherwise remain each in its own 
sphere. For de Lubac, on the contrary, grace’s inBuence takes the 
form of directing nature from within to serve the end given in 
grace; the ends proper to grace and nature remain distinct, even 
as the natural end is placed within, internally subordinated to, 
the supernatural end. For Murray then, the result is an insistence 
on a dualism between citizen and believer, and on the sharpness 
of the distinction between eternal (ultimate) end and temporal 
(penultimate) ends. For de Lubac, on the contrary, the call to 
sanctity “comprehends” the call to citizenship and all the worldly 
tasks implied by citizenship. .e eternal end “comprehends” the 
temporal ends.11
In his essay on human dignity in Gaudium et spes, Ratzinger was 
highly critical of extrinsicism. He explicitly rejected the idea that it is 
possible to construct “a rational philosophical picture of man intelligible 
to all and on which all men of goodwill can agree, to which can be added 
the Christian doctrines as a sort of crowning conclusion.”12 He described 
such a theory as a “8ction,” while Karl Rahner described the extrinsicist 
account of nature and grace upon which it is based as the “original and 
mortal sin of Jesuit theology,” brought into the repertoire of Catholic 
theology by Francisco Suárez.13 In the same essay Ratzinger was also 
critical of the tendency to distinguish between the Church and the world 
as though the two occupied two distinct ontological spaces. Consistent 
with both the Augustinian and classical .omist tradition, he regards 
the Church as simply that part of the world which has been reconciled 
to Christ. As I. .. Eschmann noted, “however independent Church and 
State are [in classical .omism] they do not escape being parts of one res 
publica hominum sub Deo, principe universitatis.”14 
11. Schindler, “Religious Freedom,” 79.
12. Ratzinger, “Commentary on the Introduction and Chapter 1,” 119.
13. Rahner, Faith in a Wintry Season, 49.
14. I. T. Eschmann, “St .omas on the Two Powers,” 180.
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Against Extrinsicism
A new generation of Catholic political philosophers and theologians 
is emerging who prefer the Augustinian concept of the two cities to 
the Suárezian concept of the two ends and classical .omist political 
thought to its Suárezian mutation. As William T. Cavanaugh has ex-
pressed the idea:
Augustine does not map the two cities out in space, but rather 
projects them across time. .e reason that Augustine is com-
pelled to speak of two cities is not because there are some human 
pursuits that are properly terrestrial, and others that pertain to 
God, but simply because God saves in time. Salvation has a his-
tory, where climax is in the advent of Jesus Christ, but whose 
de8nitive closure remains in the future. Christ has triumphed 
over the principalities and powers, but there remains resistance 
to Christ’s saving action. .e two cities are not the sacred and 
profane sphere of life. .e two cities are the already and the not 
yet of the Kingdom of God.15
According to Cavanaugh’s reading of the intellectual and social 
history, the modern state arose not by secularizing politics but by sup-
planting the imagination of the body of Christ with a heretical theology 
of salvation through the state.16 While modernity represents salvation 
through the state, post-modernity is coming to represent salvation 
through globalization. Cavanaugh has described the Murrayite project 
as “the self-disciplining of the Church’s ability to make theological claims 
in public.” .e eAect of Murray’s extrinsicism is that “Christian symbols 
must be run through the sausage-grinder of social ethics before coming 
out on the other end as publicly digestible policy.”17
Pope Benedict is thus critical of the various attempts to carve out 
of the world a space that is impervious to the sovereignty of Christ and 
of the various projects to link human development to economics and 
politics without reference to the human person’s eternal destiny. To use 
the phrase of Robert Spaemann, he is not prepared for Christianity to 
become a “mere booth in the fairground of postmodernity.” He believes 
that the Incarnation is an event that really did occur in human history 
15. Cavanaugh, “From One City to Two.”
16. Cavanaugh, !eopolitical Imagination, 5.
17. Ibid., 81.
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and that it brought with it new prospects for human nature and society. 
It is not some Feuerbachian myth. In the collection of essays published 
in 1988 under the title !e Church, Ecumenism and Politics, he noted 
with approval that the early Christians would not allow Christ to be 
included in the pantheon alongside the pagan gods.18 .is is not to be 
taken as the suggestion that Pope Benedict believes that the Catholic hi-
erarchy should exercise any kind of juridical authority over the work of 
governments and their agencies, but it is to say that he believes that the 
sovereignty of Christ, in particular, the gi6s of His grace, are not limited 
to certain domains of private social life or certain private institutions.
Another relationship which has been the subject of extrinsicist 
constructions that foster secularism is that of faith and reason. In this 
context in paragraph 30 of Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict makes the 
claim that “knowledge is never purely the work of the intellect.” While 
“it can certainly be reduced to calculation and experiment,” if it “aspires 
to be wisdom capable of directing man in the light of his 8rst begin-
nings and his 8nal ends, it must be ‘seasoned’ with the ‘salt’ of charity.” 
Moreover, he emphasizes that Charity is not an added extra, like an ap-
pendix to work already concluded in each of the various disciplines: it 
engages them in dialogue from the very beginning. In eAect “this means 
that moral evaluation and scienti8c research must go hand in hand, 
and that charity must animate them in a harmonious interdisciplinary 
whole, marked by unity and distinction.”
.e work of the intellect is thus assisted by faith and love, and also 
by the theological virtue of hope. In paragraph 34 of the encyclical, Pope 
Benedict wrote:
Hope encourages reason and gives it the strength to direct the 
will. It is already present in faith, indeed it is called forth by faith. 
Charity in truth feeds on hope and, at the same time, manifests it. 
As the absolutely gratuitous gi6 of God, hope bursts into our lives 
as something not due to us, something that transcends every law 
of justice. Gi6 by its nature goes beyond merit, its rule is that of 
superabundance. It takes 8rst place in our souls as a sign of God’s 
presence in us, a sign of what he expects from us. Truth—which 
is itself gi6, in the same way as charity—is greater than we are, 
as Saint Augustine teaches. Likewise the truth of ourselves, of 
our personal conscience, is 8rst of all given to us. In every cogni-
tive process, truth is not something that we produce, it is always 
18. Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 213–14.
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found, or better, received. Truth, like love, “is neither planned 
nor willed, but somehow imposes itself upon human beings.”
In this context Scot Armstrong has drawn attention to the signi8-
cance of footnote 88 of Caritas in Veritate which expands on the above 
reference to St Augustine. In this footnote Pope Benedict wrote:
Saint Augustine expounds this teaching in detail in his dialogue 
on free will (De libero arbitrio, II, 3, 8A.). He indicates the exis-
tence within the human soul of an “internal sense.” .is sense 
consists in an act that is ful8lled outside the normal functions 
of reason, an act that is not the result of reBection, but is almost 
instinctive, through which reason, realizing its transient and fal-
lible nature, admits the existence of something eternal, higher 
than itself, something absolutely true and certain. .e name that 
Saint Augustine gives to this interior truth is at times the name 
of God (Confessions X, 24, 35; XII, 25, 35; De libero arbitrio II, 3, 
8), more o6en that of Christ (De magistro 11:38; Confessions VII, 
18, 24; XI, 2, 4).
Armstrong observes that in De libero arbitrio, Augustine seems 
to go so far as to say that the “sense” actually identi8es with the inner 
presence of the Logos! He concludes that “this would mean that the 
Logos/‘Light which enlightens every man’ (Jn1) is not just a capacity, but 
an initial presence destined to 8nd its fullness in the Logos/Sarx”; and 
he further notes that this con8rms not only the Nature-Grace position 
of Blondel and de Lubac, but provides an etsi Deus daretur approach to 
reason which would inevitably lead to the Reason in the light of which 
every reason operates. Such a Logos is already a personal presence, albeit 
radically in need of the fullness possible only through grace.19
Armstrong’s reading of these references of Benedict XVI to Augus-
tine is also consistent with the lecture Ratzinger delivered to the Bishops 
of Mexico in 1996 in which he explicitly rejected the Kantian idea of 
“pure reason” and with his commentary on Gaudium et spes in which he 
wrote that Augustine was well aware that the organ by which God can be 
seen cannot be a non-historical ratio naturalis which just does not exist, 
“but only the ratio pura, i.e. puri"cata [puri8ed reason] or, as Augustine 
expresses it echoing the Gospel, the cor purum [the pure heart].”20
19. Armstrong, “Truth and Freedom.”
20. Ratzinger, “Commentary on the Introduction and Chapter 1,” 155.
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.us those who wish to argue that the Catholic tradition can be 
synthesized with the liberal are right to 8nd this encyclical problem-
atic. If liberal means resting on a Kantian epistemology, or a Suárezian 
construction of the orders of nature and grace, or an aCrmation of the 
idea that the market is morally neutral, then Caritas in Veritate oAers 
another point of view. As stated above, this other perspective rests on 
the explicitly Trinitarian anthropology of Gaudium et spes 22, with all 
the anti-extrinsicist orientations embedded within it.
Conclusion
In conclusion, within the academic discipline of Catholic social theory 
one can identify at least three, possibly four, groups. .ey might be 
broadly described as: (i) the liberation theologians or those strongly in-
Buenced by liberation theology even if they do not buy the whole pack-
age; (ii) the American Whigs; (iii) the Communio types, and then within 
the Communio camp there are subtle distinctions between those who 
arrive at their positions with egalitarian pre-dispositions and those of a 
more aristocratic orientation. .e latter (one thinks of Aidan Nichols) 
combine the Tory sense of noblesse oblige with a reverence for the order 
of nature as a divine gi6. 
.is notion of the beauty of the gi6 of creation and our responsi-
bilities toward it is represented in the Catholic social justice tradition by 
the concept of the “stewardship of nature.” A sensitivity to this is strong 
in the Franciscan and Dominican Orders. It is also strong in Anglo-
Catholic spirituality with Prince Charles being an exemplary 8gure in 
this context. Indeed many of the Catholics who 8t into this category are 
also strong monarchists since they appreciate the role of a royal family 
and an aristocracy which has the social strength to cut through the lay-
ers of middle class pragmatism and reach the poor and those who are 
otherwise socially marginalized. In other words, the role of a Christian 
aristocracy such as it developed within Europe is primarily one of pro-
tecting and taking personal responsibility for the weak from a position 
of social privilege. Historically the middle classes have been too self-
interested to do this and the “nanny state” tries to do it on behalf of 
the middle classes by Beecing them of ever increasing amounts of their 
income through the system of taxation. .is system is notoriously im-
personal and ineAectual.
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.us, there are those who might be described as “Turquoise Tories” 
(to borrow a term associated with Roger Scruton) who support institu-
tions like the monarchy and aristocracy and combine this with a strong 
concern for the environment and a heavy personal involvement in 
charitable organizations, and there are those who are approaching social 
justice from a non-aristocratic position but who nonetheless reach very 
similar conclusions to the “Turquoise Tories” about the inadequacies of 
both the laissez-faire liberal and liberation theology alternatives. .ese 
two types have both published under the Communio banner. Regardless 
of where they stand on issues like the monarchy and the social value of 
a fully functional Christian aristocracy (which has its analogue in the 
American polity in groups such as the Knights of Columbus), they are in 
agreement that secularism arose from within the tradition of Christian 
theology itself, and that secularist approaches to welfare and social jus-
tice are ultimately inadequate and even sometimes inhumane.
It is precisely this last point that is so central to Caritas in Veritate 
and also the second half of Deus Caritas Est. Benedict XVI is trying to 
8ght secularism in all of its various manifestations including that of 
secularist conceptions of social welfare and to emphasize the important 
personalist dimensions of economic exchange. .is personalist dimen-
sion was strongly emphasized in the pre-papal writing of Karol Wojtyła 
and in his 8rst social encyclical Laborem Exercens.
.e task of translating such high-minded visions of human labor 
and social development into really existing social practices remains a 
challenge for the currently emerging post-Conciliar generations. It will 
require the courage to look for a better way from the practices that got 
the United States and the Western world in general into its current eco-
nomic crisis. Some people in the world of Catholic social welfare agencies 
will need to surrender their attachment to secular sociological theory, 
or at least enrich it with some theological anthropology; while others 
will need to learn that to take a critical look at the culture of America 
and its ideologies of development is not to be unpatriotic or impious. 
Some really great Americans have already had the courage to do this, 
including James Cardinal StaAord and Francis Cardinal George. While 
it is true that the Petrine oCce carries with it no particular expertise in 
the 8eld of economics and the enterprise of making money, Caritas in 
Veritate was largely an attempt to set the Catholic endeavors in this 8eld 
upon solid non-secularist anthropological foundations and to aCrm the 
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personalism of John Paul II in its application to the 8eld of social welfare 
and human development.
.e culture of America has been a liberal enterprise since its in-
ception, and one might sympathize with some elements of it, such as 
the opposition to a tax on tea, but as Frederick Wilhemsen wrote in 
Christianity and Political Philosophy: “.ere is another tradition (from 
the Whig) which runs back, like a narrow and straight road, through 
Chesterton and Belloc to the Tory-Radicalism of William Cobbett and 
beyond to the Cavaliers and to the King who died for England: there the 
road broadens into a great highway 8lled with the yeomen who rose in 
the Pilgrimage of Grace.”21 In addition to the gold and red crayons, one 
might also want to add a turquoise crayon. .e platypus called Benedict 
is famously adept at creating his own works of art by reference to the 
best that the various traditions have on oAer. Caritas in Veritate is such 
a synthetic work.








“We Communists of the Old School”
Benedict’s Encyclical and the Future  
of Christian Socialism
Eugene McCarraher
I know no previous instance in history of a nation’s establishing a 
systematic disobedience to the 8rst principles of its professed religion.
—John Ruksin, Unto !is Last (1862)
On “Christian Communism” and “Chrapitalism”
Thomas Carlyle once famously dubbed economics “the dismal science,” but Ruskin went his friend one better by denying that 
economics is a science at all. (.at whatever it is, is still dismal, went 
without saying.) With a 8ne contempt that we’ve lost in our deference 
to the clerisy of the business schools, Ruskin declared his utter indiAer-
ence to the banalities of the dismal science. “As in the case of alchemy, 
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astrology, witchcra6, and other such popular creeds,” Ruskin mused in 
Unto !is Last, “political economy has a plausible idea at the root of it”: 
that human beings are motivated by self-interest. True, he conceded, but 
also trite and misleading, for men and women were more than the sums 
of jostling, acquisitive appetites. A human being, Ruskin reminded his 
readers, was “an engine whose motive power is a Soul”; and “the force of 
this very peculiar agent . . . enters into all the political economist’s equa-
tions . . . and falsi8es every one of their results.” Because the humanism 
of “political economy” was so narrow and impoverished, Ruskin dis-
missed the discipline’s claims to moral and intellectual authority. “I nei-
ther impugn nor doubt the conclusions of the science if its assumptions 
are accepted. I am simply uninterested in them, as I should be in those of 
a science of gymnastics which assumed that men had no skeletons.”1
Restoring the soul to its rightful place at the heart of human iden-
tity, Ruskin envisioned a legitimate study of production, exchange, and 
consumption. Rooted in a genuine humanism, “the real science of politi-
cal economy” instructs us to “desire and labor for the things that lead 
to life” and to “scorn and destroy the things that lead to destruction.” 
Political economy was 8rst and foremost an education in desire, for, 
in Ruskin’s lovely and compelling phrase, “the desire of the heart is the 
light of the eyes.” With transformed desires and pellucid eyes, we could 
discern the diAerence between “wealth”—“the possession of the valu-
able by the valiant”—and what Ruskin called “illth,” that which wreaks 
“devastation and trouble in all directions.” Just as Carlyle had once rued 
the “Enchantments” of the “Gospel of Mammonism,” Ruskin aligned 
the deceptions of illth with the servility of “mammon service,” the “ac-
curate and irreconcilable opposite of God’s service.” Ruskin’s renowned 
dictum that “THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE” drew its force from 
this moral and ontological distinction. Wealth partook of a sacramental 
realism in which everything “reaches into the in8nite”; and as illth was, 
1. Portions of this essay 8rst appeared in a slightly diAerent form in Commonweal, 
August 14, 2009. I have also included remarks from “Small Is Not Enough: A Critique 
of ‘Sustainability,’” a talk given at Dominican University in Chicago in October 2008, 
and from the manuscript of a book I am completing, !e Enchantments of Mammon. 
.anks also to David Bentley Hart for recommending me as a contributor to this vol-
ume, and to Adrian Pabst for wisely taking his advice. For reading and commenting on 
dra6s, I’d like to thank Matt Boudway, Paul Baumann, and Anthony Godzieba.
 .e opening epigram is from Ruskin, Unto !is Lasts, 203. Ruskin, Unto !is Last, 
167–68, 170.
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by implication, the possession of the worthless by the fearful, then it 
represented “ruin in the Economy of Heaven.”2
A decade later, in open letters to industrial workers, Ruskin made 
unashamedly clear that this “Economy of Heaven” was communist. 
Calling himself “a Communist of the old school,” Ruskin took a cou-
rageous stand on the roiling “social question” and rejected the “new 
school” communism of Marx, Engels, and other secular revolutionaries. 
Alluding to the Paris Commune, Ruskin feared that because the new 
school communists were too concerned with acquisition, their social 
order would degenerate into confusion and terror. .eir attempt to cre-
ate a “Common-Wealth” would become a “Common-Illth.” Like the 8rst 
Christians depicted in the Book of Acts, “we Communists of the old 
school think that our property belongs to everybody, and everybody’s 
property belongs to us.” For the old school, charity as the form of the 
virtues coincided with gratuity as the form of economic life. Old-school 
communists thought of property in terms of self-expenditure, not accu-
mulation. “We dark-red Communists exist only in giving.”3 For Ruskin, 
the real science of political economy was Christian communism.
Communism has almost certainly been relegated to the dustbin of 
political vocabulary. And it certainly seems that Ruskin lost the battle 
to discredit the dismal science. As one of our culture’s “popular creeds,” 
economics comes close to being our most rigid and uncontested form 
of orthodoxy. Indeed, with the apparent success of the cult of economics 
over the last generation, Ruskin’s allusion to the spiritual arts seemed 
especially apt and portentous. During the belle époque of neo-liberalism 
that began in 1989, the sacra doctrina of the “Washington Consensus”—
privatization, 8scal austerity, and de-regulation of business—beguiled 
not only politicians but the Western intelligentsia. For the last thirty 
years—until the latest systemic crisis began in the fall of 2008—corpo-
rate business almost utterly monopolized the symbolic universe of life 
in the West, as the iconography of capital achieved an unprecedented 
level of omnipresence. In advertising, marketing, and public relations; 
in management-speak and 8nancial journalism; in the stream of stock 
prices that seemed to frame every image on cable news propaganda—
business inscribed its commands and desires in the 8rmament of popu-
lar culture. .e Market ascended into the ontological sublime; business 
2. Ruskin, Unto !is Last, 203, 209, 211, 222, 226; Carlyle, Past and Present, 144.
3. Ruskin, Fors Clavigera, “Letter Seven: Charitas,” in Unto !is Last, 294, 298, 301.
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leaders rose into the pantheon of divinity; economists came into their 
own as the clerisy of a pecuniary civilization. With stock prices up and 
portfolios burgeoning, economics came into its own as the ethics and 
cosmology of a new world order.4
.e market in cultural hegemony handled a brisk and voluminous 
trade, while the stalls abounded with entrepreneurs in the fashions of 
ideology, all hawking their wares in the rhetorical helium generated by 
the consciousness industries. .eir business model was simple: fear-
lessly defend the rich and powerful as tribunes of the people; portray 
themselves and their clients as mavericks beleaguered by tree-hugging 
le6ist throwbacks; pander to the info-glutted consumer of news and 
digitalized gadgetry. Dismissing opposition to business imperatives as 
the bray of losers or the economically illiterate, they celebrated corpo-
rate globalism as the hippest imperium in history. What millennium has 
ever been so cool? It was “the end of history,” we were assured by the 
upscale merchants in millennial futures.5 Bliss was it in that dawn to be 
start-up, and to go public was very heaven!
One might have thought that Christians would refrain from join-
ing this mercenary jubilee. But the reigning attitude, among American 
believers, was militant, euphoric boosterism. From megachurches, think 
tanks, and foundations funded by pious employers of the minimum-
waged, evangelical Protestants and Catholic conservatives rejoiced at 
the historic merger: “Chrapitalism,” one could felicitously call it, the 
amalgamation of the Gospel of Christ with the Gospel of Mammonism. 
Under the sacred canopy of the “prosperity gospel” or a “theology of 
democratic capitalism,” God and Mammon composed their diAerences 
and negotiated a lucrative partnership. Name it, claim it, God wants you 
to be rich! All those warnings about riches applied to the time before we 
knew how to get wealthy. (A6er all, He said poor in spirit, right? Wretched 
of the earth, I feel your pain.)6
4. Coming right in the middle of the latest Gilded Age, the 8nest account of these 
times is Frank, One Market Under God.
5. For examples, see Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree; Florida, Rise of the Creative 
Class; and anything by Malcolm Gladwell. .e “end of history” was famously (mis)re-
ported by Fukuyama, End of History.
6. On evangelical capitalism, see Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity; on the “the-
ology of democratic capitalism,” the classic statement is Novak, Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism, 333–60.
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Fearless defenders of the rich, well-armed, and incorporated sta-
tus quo, the Chrapitalist clerics were an ecumenical lot—Richard John 
Neuhaus, Ted Haggard, Pat Robertson, and a host of lesser shills. At the 
Acton Institute, where neo-classical economics and scholastic philoso-
phy enjoyed a closely chaperoned dalliance, Fr. Robert Sirico baptized 
the love child of Ayn Rand and St. .omas Aquinas. (Now there’s an ugly 
baby.) .e most proli8c cleric was Michael Novak, corporate theologian 
doing penance for his prodigal journey with the 60s le6. .e corpora-
tion, Novak informed us, is a “metaphor for the ecclesial community” 
and the “best secular analogue to the church.” As a knock-oA of the Body 
of Christ that’s buAeted by a resentful Cultural Elite, the corporation is a 
“SuAering Servant”—a poor oppressed creature who carries its cross all 
the way up the hill to the bank. And if you can’t think of stocking Wal-
Mart shelves as an imitatio Christi, you’re a snooty egghead disdainful of 
Real People with degrees from the School of Hard Knocks.7
Now that the “best secular analogue to the church” is laying oA pa-
rishioners, and now that Novak’s and other brands of capitalist apologia 
stand revealed as faith-based buncombe, Pope Benedict XVI issues his 
encyclical Caritas in Veritate. Coming at a moment when neo-liberal 
ideology is more vulnerable than ever, Benedict’s letter provides an op-
portunity to reissue Ruskin’s challenge. It has all the perennial problems 
of the “social encyclical” tradition: a penchant for rhetorical obscurity 
that’s rooted in political timidity; an apolitical and ahistorical approach 
to economics and technology; a reluctance to acknowledge the necessity 
of class conBict which issues in half-measures and compromises. But 
there’s more in the document than moralizing twaddle about the latest 
ruling-class crime wave. At its best, Caritas in Veritate is a patristic text 
for a political economy of life. Against the mangy orthodoxies of scar-
city and competition—“eternally, and in all things, the laws of death,” 
in Ruskin’s view—Benedict hints at abundance and friendship as the 
foundations of “the real science of political economy.”8
While many commentators have compared the letter to earlier “so-
cial encyclicals”—and especially to Populorum progressio (1967)—I want 
to suggest that if Caritas in Veritate is to have any lasting impact, it will be 
as a catalyst for a Christian socialist economics. If that economic theol-
ogy depends on a new ontology and humanism, we can do no better than 
7. Novak, Toward a !eology of the Corporation, 29, 39.
8. Ruskin, Unto !is Last, 202.
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to examine the work of E. F. Schumacher and Father Herbert McCabe. 
Inhabiting diAerent precincts of the intellectual world, the renegade 
economist and the socialist Dominican were not as far apart as their mi-
lieux may seem.
“Quotas of Gratuitousness and Communion”:  
The Ontology of Scarcity, Competitive Humanism, 
And the Blunted Challenges of Benedict’s Encyclical
!e Realism of Charity of Truth
.e title of Benedict’s encyclical is simple but signi8cant. .e virtue 
of charity, Benedict argues, is inseparable from an account of the real 
world, without which it becomes “a pool of good sentiments”: pleasant 
to wade in for a little while, but still shallow and ultimately stagnant. If 
love is a mere sentiment in a hardscrabble world of privation, then it’s 
easily dismissed as a virtue of the callow, of those saintly few who’ve 
never contended with payrolls, schedules, and cost-cutting measures. 
But a charity that dwells in truth is a formidable realism. And the truth, 
Benedict maintains, is that love leavens the very architecture of creation; 
that creation is a realm of abundance; and that humanity is the image 
and likeness of a triune and in8nitely loving God.9
By this standard of realism, “economics” stands exposed, not only 
as a dismal science, but as an insidious illusion, resting on a mangled 
metaphysics of scarcity and a humanism of belligerence. “Scarcity” is, of 
course, the ontological bedrock of conventional economics, and what a 
hard, implacable foundation it is. It’s on page one of every textbook, day 
one of any introductory course. It’s Genesis without the creation story—
beginning in chapter three with the Fall—and it serves an invaluable 
disciplinary function in the moral imagination of capitalism. According 
to the dogma of scarcity, the world is a parched abode of stinginess and 
in8nite want, and that harshness compels incessant labor that ceases 
only with death, retirement, or a killing in the market.
Scarcity has always been considered a curse of the human con-
dition, but it didn’t become an axiom of economic thinking until the 
eighteenth century, when its stony face appeared in the patristic texts of 
classical economics. In his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), 
9. See Benedict’s Deus Caritas Est for his reBections on the theology of charity.
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Rev. .omas Malthus deemed material scarcity one of God’s more in-
genious devices. Surveying the privation and struggle of the poor from 
the comfort of his vicarage, Malthus had received one of history’s nasti-
est epiphanies: “moral evil is absolutely necessary to the production of 
good.”10 Starvation, drought, and other natural calamities are “instru-
ments employed by the Deity” to promote hard work and ingenuity—
especially among the poor, whose taste for sexual delights struck the 
reverend as the source of their misery. .e reckless and improvident 
rabble produced too many children for the world to feed, Malthus 
reasoned; and since charity would sap initiative, and redistribution of 
property would disturb God’s wise arrangements of estate, the well-to-
do should resign themselves to the suAering of the lower orders. But 
what about those starving children, especially the helpless infants? “.e 
infant is, comparatively speaking, of little value to society, as others will 
immediately supply its place.” (As Auden’s Herod puts it, “really, the 
world is admirably arranged.”)
Malthus’ near-contemporary, the economist Nassau Senior, in-
sisted with even greater vehemence on the providential necessity of evil. 
Scourge of trade unions, opponent of child labor laws, and defender of 
the hungry from all misguided humanitarian measures, Senior lectured 
the bleeding hearts of his day with the eloquence of an executioner. 
“Nature has decreed that the road to good shall be through evil—that no 
improvement shall take place in which the general good shall not be ac-
companied by partial suAering.” As Boyd Hilton has documented, such 
hosannahs to scarcity had an enormous impact, not only on the nascent 
discipline of economics, but on the British evangelical social thought 
that shaped government policy toward the Irish famine of the 1840s.
As one might expect, Americans put a more positive spin on the 
dogma of scarcity. In !e Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982)—one 
of the ur-texts of contemporary Chrapitalism—Novak transforms the 
skinBint vision of life into a romantic religious quest. .e passage is 
worth quoting at length, as it captures the cruel and clueless nihilism at 
the core of establishment economics:
.e “wasteland” at the heart of capitalism is a 8eld of battle, on 
which individuals wander alone, in some confusion, amid many 
10. In this and the following paragraph, the quotes from Malthus and Senior can be 
found in McNally, Against the Market, 80–81, 85. On the Irish Famine, see Hilton, Age 
of Atonement, esp. 108–14, 248–50.
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casualties . . . like the dark night of the soul in the inner journey 
of the mystics, the desert has an indispensable purpose . . . [it is] 
the sphere of the transcendent, to which the individual has access 
through the self, beyond the mediations of social institutions.
.is is .omas Hobbes decked out as St. John of the Cross. It couldn’t be 
more apparent that capitalism rests on an ontology of violence, anomie, 
and death. As Kelly Johnson sharply observes, capitalism is a “just-war 
theory of economics”: every man and woman is a mercenary, a soldier of 
fortune hardened to the inexorable misery of collateral damage.11
Benedict implies that the dogma of scarcity is a calumny against 
creation. “Nature,” he writes in Caritas in Veritate, “speaks to us of the 
Creator and his love of humanity.” God is a spendthri6, supremely in-
diAerent to our fearful property lines. “Earth, water, and air [are] gi6s 
of creation that belong to everyone.” .is metaphysics of gi6 underlies 
Benedict’s endorsement of “economic activity marked by quotas of gratu-
itousness and communion.” No business school homilies about scarcity 
there, no Malthusian theodicy for a stingy world and its mean-spirited 
Deity. Since capitalist humanism is rooted in “scarcity,” it’s equally sinis-
ter and illusory. It’s the laborious cant of the Work Ethic, the sado-mor-
alism of management writers like Steven Covey and of preachers like 
Rick Warren, aiming to turn us into “eAective people” with “purpose-
driven lives.” In its anthropology of competition, economics enshrines 
Augustine’s restless heart as an ideal, not a malady; as an engine of la-
bor and accumulation, not a longing for contemplative peace. Benedict 
implicitly rejects this competitive humanism as a desecration of the 
human person. “.e human creature is de8ned through interpersonal 
relations,” he writes in Caritas in Veritate—not in the arena of clash-
ing autonomies that requires a “just-war theory of economics.” Against 
individualism—against what Charles Mathewes has called society “as a 
collection of solitudes”12—Benedict poses “a metaphysical interpretation 
of the ‘humanum’ in which relationality is an essential element.” To put it 
(I hope) more elegantly, the ever-Bowing love that enlivens the Trinity is 
the model of human life. No Trinitarian theology speaks of competition 
among the Persons—does the Spirit compete with the Father and Son 
to “improve” the “performance” of all three? Does each Person calculate 
the marginal utility of each procession in the divine economy? Here we 
11. Novak, Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, 348; Johnson, Fear of Beggars, 215.
12. Mathewes, !eology of Public Life, 120; Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity.
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should recall, not only Deus caritas est, but Introduction to Christianity 
(1968), in which then-Father Ratzinger wrote that “only the lover can 
understand the folly of a love to which prodigality is a law and excess 
alone is suCcient.”
.e triune God is not a miser, or a manager obsessed with eC-
ciency. Like an artist or a lover, God creates out of sheer delight, lavish-
ing abundance without regard for measure or repayment. God is not 
only proBigate, but utterly indiAerent to the equivalences demanded by 
bourgeois economic justice: return love for hatred, blessings for curses, 
prayers for indignity and mistreatment. Most le6-wing Christians will 
rightly welcome this riposte to competitive humanism, but it also con-
tains a challenge to one of the most precious progressive shibboleths: “if 
you want peace, work for justice.” .at’s a comforting cliché among the 
middlebrow le6, easily attachable to a bumper sticker in the interest of 
self-righteous display. But if love is the form of the virtues, and if love 
is nothing if not unmeasured, then that tiresome twaddle gets things 
exactly backwards. If you want justice, work for peace; or better, if you 
want peace and justice, love your neighbors.
Benedict’s peaceful ontology and humanism pervades the trenchant 
sections on the environment and technology. In Benedict’s view, charity 
must de8ne the necessarily but not exclusively technological relation-
ship between humanity and the rest of the natural world. Recalling the 
biblical charge given to humans to replenish the earth and subdue it, 
Benedict notes that technology cannot be a mere instrument of power. 
As an indispensable form of human action, technology should “enforce 
the covenant between human beings and the environment,” Benedict 
intones, but he reminds us that this covenant “should mirror God’s cre-
ative love.” If designed and employed in charity, technology will aAord, 
not only survival, comfort, and beauty, but also “an encounter with be-
ing and truth.” .ere can be, this implies, a sacramental technology, one 
that transforms labor into liturgy by enhancing knowledge, skill, and 
sensibility in the use of creation. Benedict’s remarks represent a welcome 
advance, I think, over John Paul II’s Laborem exercens (1987), in which 
nature is too o6en cast as humanity’s splendiferous workbench.
.ough Lynn White’s notorious thesis about the Christian origins 
of ecological destruction is now considered overwrought, its power and 
persistence owe much to the fact that “subduing the earth” has been one 
of the most aggressively misunderstood phrases in Genesis. Taken as a 
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license to plunder the planet—especially by evangelical Protestants fond 
of the Work Ethic and dubious about global warming—the charge to 
“subdue” has become a warrant for the most reckless and willfully igno-
rant sanctimony.13
.at shouldn’t surprise anyone, given that, as Benedict observes, 
“the way humanity treats the environment inBuences the way it treats 
itself, and vice-versa.” As our current and impending ecological turbu-
lence demonstrates, the nature of our technological mastery will always 
mirror the human condition, loving or exploitative. Echoing Marx’s 
reBections on work, nature, and objecti8cation in the “economic and 
philosophic manuscripts,” Benedict writes that “man recognizes himself 
and forges his own humanity” in part by technical means. If so, then 
what he recognizes in the mirror may well frighten him. Wherever 
technology embodies a sheer will-to-power—as it does, in Benedict’s 
opinion, in the realm of bio-technology—it will “Bounder in an illusion 
of its own omnipotence.”
!e Shortcomings of Benedict’s Social Encyclical 
As suggestive as Caritas in Veritate can be of a new, non-capitalist eco-
nomics, it falls short on several counts. Of course, papal encyclicals are 
not manifestos, and the Vicar of Christ is not God’s Policy Wonk. Still, 
like his predecessors in the social encyclical tradition, Benedict engages 
in too much euphemism and circumlocution. For one thing, such mealy-
mouthedness lays open Benedict to the charge, leveled by Slavoj Žižek, 
that the letter is “a disgusting spectacle of cheap moralization.” .at’s 
overwrought but not entirely oA-base, as it points to the murkiness of 
passages in which, for instance, the Pope muses that “the market can 
be a negative force, not because it is so by nature, but because a certain 
ideology can make it so.”
“Market” is one of those words that always requires an adjective in 
front of it, as Benedict seems to recognize when he adds “certain ideol-
ogy.” Why not just say capitalist? Clearly, the specter of Marxism still 
haunts the papal imagination. .at’s understandable, I suppose, but it’s 
also unfortunate, because the only way to dispel a specter is to bring it into 
the light of day. Despite all the controversies over “liberation theology” 
since the 1960s—controversies which, truth be told, the current Pope 
13. White, “Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis.”
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did his utmost to quash and not to resolve—Christian theology has yet 
to really confront and assimilate the Marxist tradition. .eologians and 
popes should take it as a sign of strength when Marxists such as Žižek, 
Alain Badiou, and Terry Eagleton are busy drawing upon theology.14
Benedict’s reluctance to call capitalism by its name is also evident 
in his call for a “new way of understanding business enterprise” that bal-
ances capital accumulation with “social responsibility.” .is is the palaver 
of Starbucks, NGOs, and Muhammed Yunus. It’s the bray of the Servant 
Leader, shepherding his Soulful Corporation into the valley of morally 
uncontaminated pro8ts. At the risk of saying I Wish He’d Consulted Me 
About .is, I could only say to Benedict that, as a historian, I’ve seen this 
movie before, and I know how it ends. In the 1920s, it was “Service”; in the 
1950s, it was “Social Responsibility”; now, it’s still “Social Responsibility,” 
aided by discursive attendants such as “Diversity,” “Sustainability,” or 
some future buzzword du jour.15 In one brand or other, “social respon-
sibility” has always been the highest form of professional and manage-
rial ideology, the noblesse oblige of the corporate elite, the opium of the 
bourgeoisie. Highlighting the policies of corporations rather than their 
governance and political structures, “social responsibility” distracts at-
tention from class relations and property forms. And because it leaves 
unaddressed what used to be called “the social question,” it obscures 
the object of “social responsibility” itself. Responsible, we should ask, 
to what kind of society? Benedict’s imaginative parsimony is even more 
painful when he hedges about gratuity. What’s that again about quotas of 
gratuitousness and communion? .at’s the one hand keeping constant 
surveillance on what the other is doing. When Benedict asserts that “the 
principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gi6” must “8nd their place 
within normal economic activity,” that “normal” signals a capitulation to 
the logic of incessant accumulation. Why not call for gi6 exchange as the 
new normal economic activity?
A similar shortcoming appears in the much-ballyhooed section on 
technology. Benedict’s salutary warning about the promethean temp-
tations of technological ingenuity can degenerate into a determinist 
form of obscurantism. “When technology is allowed to take over,” he 
14. Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf ; Žižek and Milbank, Monstrosity of Christ, 24–109; 
Badiou, Saint Paul; Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution.
15. I trace the evolution of what I call “corporate humanism” in my forthcoming !e 
Enchantments of Mammon.
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writes, “the result is confusion between means and ends, such that the 
sole criterion for action in business is thought to be the maximization 
of pro8t.” .e “confusion” there is, I think, in Benedict’s mind, and it’s 
a confusion that’s been endemic to critics of technology from Martin 
Heidegger and Jacques Ellul to deep ecologists and eco-feminists. As 
Lewis Mumford, Harry Braverman, David Dickson, David F. Noble, or 
many other scholars could point out, “technology” is never “allowed” to 
“take over”: rather, human beings use technology to further interests, 
and they can use it in such overweening and disastrous ways that the 
technology, and not the human interests, becomes the object of fear and 
obloquy.16 Moreover, pro8t maximization is not “thought” to be the “sole 
criterion for action in business”: under capitalism, it is the sole criterion, 
a fact underlined by the statutory mandate in U.S. law that requires cor-
porations to consider shareholder equity the only legitimate standard of 
business conduct. And to bring these objections together, the design and 
use of technology in capitalist settings is always for the purposes of pro8t 
maximization. Technology has never taken over; rather, capital has taken 
over the planning and implementation of technological development. 
Automation has been enforced, not by an army of wild machines, but 
by the echelons of corporate managers and professionals charged with 
expanding the accumulation of capital. It’s true, as many technophobic 
critics opine, that technology is “never neutral”; but to stop there is to 
abort the indispensable task of investigating whose interests it serves. 
.ose who blame “technology” for many of our woes only distract, al-
beit unwittingly, from the necessary political struggles over the ends and 
means of production, communication, and science.
But it’s painfully clear that this Pope, like his predecessors, rues the 
prospect of social and political conBict, and this reluctance to acknowl-
edge the necessity of struggle lames the impact of Caritas in Veritate. It’s 
not that Benedict doesn’t see the reality of antagonism, or that he wants 
the capitalists to win. He’s not the cheerfully odious Warren BuAett, who 
once observed when the economic crisis began, “Of course there’s a class 
struggle, and my side is winning.”17 Like earlier pontiAs, he insists on the 
need for labor unions to protect the rights of workers. He enjoins labor 
16. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 307–42; Ellul, Technological 
Society; Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital; Dickson, Politics of Alternative 
Technology; Noble, Progress Without People.
17. Warren BuAett quoted in Stein, “Class Warfare.”
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unions to be bastions of solidarity, and even implies that they should 
enlarge their ambitions beyond wages and bene8ts: unions, he writes, 
should address “wider concerns than the speci8c category of labor for 
which they were formed.” Protecting rights, fostering solidarity, and 
addressing “wider concerns” are inescapably matters of class conBict 
under capitalism; but like so many Catholic natural lawyers, Benedict is 
so committed to an ontology of harmony that he has a hard time taking 
history seriously. One of the persistent features of the social encyclical 
tradition has been blindness to the fact that class conBict is endemic to 
capitalism, or to any other class society, for that matter. Class struggle is 
not a product of envy, or a moral lapse, or a Big Misunderstanding; it’s 
the inexorable result of a society in which the means of production are 
owned and controlled by a few. Because it’s an indelible element of the 
system, class conBict can’t be resolved by prayer, or homilies, or sympa-
thetic understanding. With capitalism—as with feudalism and all previ-
ous class societies—class conBict will end only with the abolition of the 
system that makes such struggle inevitable.
Here again, the inability to confront the Marxist specter leads to a 
lack of political seriousness. Aside from Marxist atheism, the prospect 
of violent revolution and repression has bedeviled the papal economists. 
For all the indisputable historical reasons, this is not an irrational fear. 
But with the demise of Marxism, must the “utopian” imagination be 
suppressed? Do Christians in particular have nothing to oAer but a ho-
lier resignation? Is not a theory of peaceful revolution one of the urgent 
political assignments of our age? As rich as they are, neither Benedict’s 
letter nor the other papal epistles can deliver such a vision. For that, we 
must look elsewhere, to the more diAuse and motley lineage of Christian 
socialism.
“The Ultimate Revolution”: The Ontology  
of Abundance, The Humanism of Friendship,  
and the Promise of Christian Socialism
!e Long Tradition of Christian Socialism
While most commentators have compared Benedict’s letter to earlier 
“social encyclicals,” it should also be read in the light of a wider tradition 
in Christian economic thought. As John Milbank has demonstrated, 
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socialism—Ruskin’s communism of the old school—began as a Christian 
attempt to blend industrial modernity and workers’ democracy with the 
bonding element of agape. Far from being what Marx and Engels vili-
8ed as “the heartburn of the aristocrat,” what later had to be speci8ed as 
Christian socialism emerged from among threatened artisans, industrial 
workers, and dissident clergy, intellectuals, and professionals, many of 
whom looked to medieval guilds as models for a beloved community 
of production. O6en derided as tepid and reformist, Christian social-
ists were among the more visionary and thoroughgoing radicals of the 
le6, advocating direct worker control over production and technology; 
a recasting of unions as updated versions of medieval guilds; the decen-
tralization of state power; a more harmonious and ecologically sensible 
relationship between countryside and city; and an alignment of moral 
and aesthetic criteria for the just evaluation of goods and their distribu-
tion (“the possession of the valuable by the valiant”).18
As yet, no historian has attempted to rewrite the history of social-
ism in the light of this Christian origin. Milbank’s historical account of 
Christian socialism ends in the mid-nineteenth century with Ruskin, 
though he seems to want to include the “distributist” lineage of G. K. 
Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, and Eric Gill, among others. Yet the Christian 
socialist tradition extends right down through the twentieth century, 
and calls for its “renewal” must rest on a retrieval of that historical 
memory. .ere are threads that tie together, for instance, the distributist 
“religion of small property,” preached not only by the Chesterbelloc but 
by Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker movement; R. H. Tawney’s Anglican 
socialism; Simone Weil’s “eucharistic” anarcho-syndicalism; and E. 
F. Schumacher’s “Buddhist economics,” which was always (and not so 
covertly) Catholic. Schumacher’s work, especially, represents both a 
milestone in the history of Christian socialist thought and an invalu-
able complement to Caritas in Veritate. .e most important of all their 
aCnities were an ontology of peace and a humanism of friendship that 
rejected the dogmas of capitalist economics.
Today, cultural conservatives lay claim to the distributist estate, o6en 
aCrming its support for patriarchy, tradition, and a “romance of ortho-
doxy.” Together with paeans to C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkein, homage 
to the Chesterbelloc forms a repertoire of anti-modernism. When neo-
liberals such as Novak invoke the distributists, they invariably laud the 
18. Milbank, “Were the ‘Christian Socialists’ Socialists?” 63–74.
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movement’s aversion to the “servile”—read welfare—“state.” What’s lost 
in both of these readings (especially the latter) is the distributist opposi-
tion to capitalism, an inconvenient truth airbrushed out of history as 
eAectively as Trotsky from old Bolshevik photographs. For one thing, as 
even a cursory reading of Belloc or Chesterton reveals, the “servile state” 
referred, not just to “big government,” but to the entire corporate order 
of proletarianized labor, centralized production, and merely stockholder 
property. But more signi8cant for our purposes is that what Chesterton 
anointed as “the religion of small property” rested on a sacramental 
theology of economics that exposed the ontology of capitalism as fun-
damentally false and empty. Chesterton saw the illusory metaphysics of 
capitalism exempli8ed in the stockbroker. “A very poetical 8gure,” the 
broker composes his ethereal verse in the rhetoric and meter of money, 
which never quite sates the Beshly desire for the prosaic delights of mat-
ter. Reduced to ciphers in the poetry of avarice, material objects pass 
before brokers like “mere scrolls of symbols.” Matter does not matter 
for these rare8ed bards, so inaptly condemned as materialists. Turning 
things into airy and pro8table phantoms, stockbrokers were masters in 
the pecuniary transubstantiation of matter. Against these parts and wiz-
ards of Mammon, Chesterton defended the material world as a realm of 
sacramental goodness. Needing “something that is always on the spot,” 
they require, Chesterton wrote in sacramental fashion, “a real presence.” 
People who truly cherish the world revere it as a realm of “holy things,” 
in Eric Gill’s words, “things in which and by which God is manifest.” 
.us, “to labor is to pray,” Gill thought; labor is a “training of persons for 
the end envisaged by religion . . . to see all things in God.”19
.e English distributist religion of small property had American 
missionaries among the Catholic Workers. Led by Dorothy Day and Peter 
Maurin, the Catholic Workers appeared in the depths of the Depression, 
and still serve as holy fools of poverty and peace for an American 
Church now largely corrupted by middle-class nationalism. Aiming in 
part to undercut support for Communists among the urban working 
class, the Workers melded Catholic theology and anarcho-syndicalist 
demands for direct worker control of production and the eradication 
of wage labor. As Day, Maurin, and countless other writers maintained 
19. On the “servile state” as the corporate order, see Belloc, Servile State, 81–101; on 
the “religion of small property,” see Chesterton, Outline of Sanity, 184–93, esp. 188–90; 
Gill, Sacred and Secular, 39.
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in the movement’s periodical, the Catholic Worker, the restoration of a 
sacramental quality to work and technology was a religious as well as 
a political enterprise. “Using mind and brain to work on beautiful ob-
jects,” Day wrote, the artisan or farmer especially cultivated “a sense of 
the sacramentality of things, the holiness, the symbolism of things.” .e 
cra6sman’s loving proximity to matter fostered a deeper intimacy with 
the divine that partook of “God’s creative activity.”20
Unfortunately, the cra6 and farming communities that the Workers 
set up to live out their sacramentalist vision failed abysmally—mainly, 
I think, because of larger systemic forces that will overwhelm any lo-
calized attempt to escape the logic of the capitalist market. Still, their 
critique of secular radicalism and their decentralist alternative remain 
indispensable to any renovation of economics. Because, in the Workers’ 
view, Marxists accepted proletarianization as a painful but necessary 
stage in the historical trajectory toward communism, they practiced 
an “idolatry of the machine” which only further entrenched the alien-
ation that paralyzed radical political action. Since they based their own 
opposition to industrial capitalism on a conception of the person as a 
“Temple of the Holy Ghost,” it was “on these grounds,” Day explained, 
that personalists recoiled from the separation of mental and manual 
labor and called for a genuinely revolutionary transformation of the 
system. Indeed, the Workers’ sacramental theology of economics sanc-
tioned and even mandated a democratic trans8guration of production 
more thoroughgoing than Marxists could allow, given their commitment 
to the “inexorable” logic of capitalist development. .e Workers allowed 
for a variety of property forms; as Day summarized their program—a 
bricolage of distributist proprietorship and anarcho-syndicalist commu-
nism—the Workers advocated “ownership by the workers of the means 
of production, the abolition of the assembly line, decentralized factories, 
the restoration of cra6s, and ownership of property.”21
Although he placed more faith in conventional politics than the 
Chesterbelloc or the Catholic Workers, Tawney—a revered stalwart of 
the Labour Party—adhered to a similar theology of economics. Like 
the secular G. D. H. Cole, Tawney recoiled from the state centralization 
favored by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and others in the Fabian Society. 
Also like Cole, Tawney acknowledged debts to Ruskin; to the medieval-
20. Day, Long Loneliness, 191.
21. Ibid., 225.
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ism of William Morris; to the Christian Socialist League, the Guild of 
St. Matthew, and other Anglicans on the pre-World War I le6; and to 
the guild movement led by G. R. S. Taylor, Arthur Penty, and the New 
Age circle. A product of the Balliol-Toynbee Hall nexus that gave Britain 
many of its Christian socialists, Tawney maintained that the point of so-
cialism was, in Ruskin’s terms, valiance in wealth, not wallowing in illth. 
His deepest fear was that, bere6 of a religious spirit, socialism would end 
up being little more than the equitable distribution of illth. “As long as 
the working classes believe, and believe rightly, that their mentors rob 
them,” he wrote just a6er an upsurge of industrial unrest in 1912, “so 
long will they look on the restoration of the booty as the great reform, 
and will impatiently waive aside more fundamental issues.”22
Later, in his trilogy of Christian socialism—!e Acquisitive Society 
(1920), Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926), and Equality (1931) 
—Tawney made the case for a socialist democracy in which charity and 
justice were the leaven of industry. Like Gill, Tawney lauded the medieval 
economic imagination, in which work and goods were judged in the light 
of the beati8c vision. Surveying the wisdom of scholastic philosophers 
and canon lawyers, Tawney reclaimed their conviction that “the ideal—
if only man’s nature could rise to it—is communism,” since sharing in 
communion was the order of heaven. Seen in this light, corporate capi-
talist property and production were grotesque distortions of the divine 
economy. Against the corporate order which protected stockholders and 
other parasitic classes who merely owned and lived oA the labor of oth-
ers, modern Christian socialism would, Tawney hoped, revive an older 
conception of property as “an aid to creative work, not an alternative to 
it.” Artfully made and justly distributed, material goods could be tokens 
of beatitude, “aids to blessedness,” as Tawney put it.23
22. R. H. Tawney, R. H. Tawney’s Commonplace Book, 61. Tawney kept this journal 
from the spring of 1912 until shortly a6er Christmas 1914. While Ross Terrill suggested 
in his biography of Tawney that the historian’s Anglicanism was earnest but intellectu-
ally undeveloped, the Commonplace Book suggests theological acuity and depth.
23. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, 35; Acquisitive Society, 52–83 (59). 
O6en admired but now rarely consulted, Tawney’s work deserves a spirited revival. 
His historical account of religion and capitalism is richer and more astute than Max 
Weber’s, and his socialist vision is far more than the moralistic palaver that Raymond 
Williams and the young Alasdair MacIntyre thought it was. Williams judged Tawney 
venerable but analytically unsatisfying in Culture and Society 1780–1950, 216–26. In 
his youthful Marxist phase, Alasdair MacIntyre dismissed Tawney in Against the Self-
Images of the Age, 38–42. “Goodness is not enough,” MacIntyre concluded —a point 
that Tawney would have gladly aCrmed.
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Tawney’s aCrmation of the beati8c ideal was echoed by Simone 
Weil, the anarcho-syndicalist and spiritual nomad whose fascination 
never ceases to wane. Always a contrarian on the French le6, Weil was 
a brilliant and vociferous critic of Marxist progressivism and scientism, 
preferring a position on what Lenin had once denounced as the “in-
fantile le6” of anarchists and syndicalists. In the mid-1930s, Weil spent 
time working in the Paris Renault plant, where she encountered both 
the degradations of Fordist labor and the possibilities of working-class 
solidarity. Over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, she turned from sec-
ular radicalism to a theology of labor and technology, contending that, 
along with art and science, work and technics were sacramental points 
of “contact with the divine order of the universe.” When thought and 
action were united in the workplace, laborers touched “the reality, truth, 
and beauty of the universe and the eternal wisdom which is the order 
in it.” When skilled workers assembled to complete a task, it was “a 8ne 
sight,” she marveled, to see them assess the problem, make individual 
suggestions, and then “apply unanimously the method conceived by one 
of them, who may or may not have any oCcial authority over the rest.” 
In such free association, where mental and manual labor were wedded 
and no distinct managerial cadre reigned, a type of person emerged who 
could “see in every work-fellow another self occupying another post, 
and would love him in the way that the Gospel maxim enjoins.” While 
certain passages on agrarian life in !e Need for Roots (1943) would seem 
to align Weil with the distributists, she never believed that a sacramental 
humanism mandated any primacy of the rural. “A plant or factory could 
8ll the soul through a powerful awareness of collective life.”
Like the Chesterbelloc and the Catholic Workers, Weil exhibited a 
profoundly sacramental understanding of human labor, so deep that she 
compared its management and automation to the most horri8c act of 
blasphemy. “It is a sacrilege to degrade labor,” she wrote, “in exactly the 
same sense as it is sacrilege to trample upon the Eucharist.”24
Because of her unchurched Christianity, and thanks to the aura of 
her personal austerity, Weil gradually became an iconic spiritual 8gure 
among the Western literati a6er her death in 1943—“our kind of saint,” 
as the literary critic Leslie Fiedler dubbed her in 1952—and her social 
thought went into abeyance. Yet her thinking on work and technology, 
24. Weil, Oppression and Liberty, 101, 168; “Factory Work,” 369; “Human Personal-
ity,” 185.
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while obscured, was not entirely forgotten, and in conjunction with 
Day’s Catholic Workerism, it galvanized the postwar stage of religious 
personalism. Meanwhile, Weil also appealed to New Le6 students dis-
enchanted by the embrace of unbounded industrial development by 
Marxists and social democrats. .e English translation and publication 
in the early 1970s of Weil’s Depression-era writings was part of a wave of 
discontent with the social and ecological consequences of scienti8c and 
technological hubris. Many critics of industrial modernity who were 
popular at the time—Paul Goodman, Ivan Illich, Lewis Mumford, and 
.eodore Roszak, to name just a few—were also critics of the secular, 
technocratic, and managerial consciousness sponsored quite literally by 
corporate capitalism.25
!e Meta-Economic Revolution of E. F. Schumacher
.is movement helped to clear a path for the British economist E. F. 
Schumacher. O6en dismissed as a guru for the Birkenstock-and-granola 
set, Schumacher was, for much of his life, an impeccably Establishment 
8gure. Born in Germany, he studied economics at Berlin, Oxford, and 
Columbia. He was a protégé of John Maynard Keynes, who drew on 
Schumacher’s ideas for his own recommendations to the 1944 Bretton 
Woods 8nancial summit. A6er working on the British Control Com-
mission which guided German economic recovery, Schumacher became 
chief economist for the National Coal Board, a post he held until 1970.26
During his tenure at the Coal Board, Schumacher grew increasing-
ly disillusioned with conventional economic policy. While travelling to 
Burma and India several times during the 1950s and 1960s, Schumacher 
decided that Western-style “modernization” projects in “underdevel-
oped” countries were socially and ecologically destructive. In his view, 
enormous investments in advanced industrial technology not only 
perpetuated dependence on capitalist nations but also ruined the soil 
and desecrated the skills and dignity of ordinary people. At the same 
time, Schumacher came to see that Western nations themselves were 
reaping the harvest of their own industrialization: urban congestion, 
25. Fiedler, Waiting for God, ix; Goodman and Goodman, Communitas; Illich, 
Tools for Conviviality; Lewis Mumford, Myth of the Machine: Vol. I and !e Myth of the 
Machine, Vol. II; Rozsak, Where !e Wasteland Ends.
26. Wood, E. F. Schumacher: His Life and !ought, 1–104. Wood’s biography of her 
father is invaluable but, for obvious reasons, also largely uncritical.
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suburban ugliness, pollution, technological glut, anomie in the midst 
of consumer abundance. Although Schumacher had long been associ-
ated with the Labour Party, he recoiled from the technophilia of Harold 
Wilson’s government. Increasingly convinced that Wilson’s “white heat 
of technology” was melting down everything lovely and valuable in hu-
man life, Schumacher embarked on a new career as activist and seer. In 
1966, together with other disgruntled economists, technical specialists, 
and politicians, he founded the Intermediate Technology Development 
Group (ITDG, now Practical Action), dedicated to moving both under-
developed and eventually over-developed nations away from capital-in-
tensive, large-scale technologies toward smaller, human-scale technics. 
A6er leaving the Coal Board, he joined and later assumed the presidency 
of the Soil Association, the respected advocacy group for local organic 
farming. And he became a trustee of the Scott Bader Commonwealth, 
a cooperative enterprise set up on Quaker principles of equality and 
paci8sm. Established in 1921, the Commonwealth instituted employer-
employee common ownership and control; controlled the conditions 
of its own expansion; and prohibited the making or sale of any of its 
products for purposes of war.27
While Schumacher was pursuing this alternative path, he was read-
ing widely in Hindu, Buddhist, and Roman Catholic literature: Gandhi, 
Ananda Coomaraswamy, J. C. Kumarappa (a philosopher and econo-
mist), St. Teresa of Avila, and .omas Merton, as well as Chesterton, 
Belloc, and McNabb. Shortly before he brought together the reBections 
of a lifetime in his classic Small is Beautiful in 1973, Schumacher con-
verted to Catholicism. .is little-known piece of intellectual history puts 
the “Buddhist economics” for which he’s known in an entirely diAerent 
light. First, it shows that Schumacher’s spiritual pilgrimage was insepa-
rable from his in8delity to the canons of his discipline. When Schu-
macher blasphemed what he called “the religion of economics,” he was 
not engaging in mere rhetorical Bourish. But his conversion also suggests 
that a genuine albeit underdeveloped Catholic theology propelled Schu-
macher’s quest, cut short by his sudden death in 1977, for a new ontology 
and humanism of economics. .e term “Buddhist economics” obscured 
Schumacher’s numerous references to the Beatitudes, the Epistles, scho-
lastic philosophers, and papal encyclicals. Schumacher himself conceded 
that he‘d misrepresented his position, telling an interviewer shortly a6er 
27. Ibid., 120–35, 228–39.
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the book’s publication that “I might have called it ‘Christian Economics,’ 
but then no one would have read it.”28 Given the historical conBation of 
Christianity and capitalism, as well as the interest among youth in Asian 
religions as an alternative, that was a clever but too eAective ruse. But 
with the passage of almost forty years, it’s arguably well past time for us 
to highlight and learn from Schumacher’s Christian socialism.
Schumacher’s work was enlisted so quickly in debates about energy 
and ecology that its assault on economics was easily overlooked. To be 
sure, Schumacher did urge developed nations to drastically curtail their 
dependence on oil; he did campaign against nuclear power and other 
grandiose technologies; and he did advocate a “non-violent” approach to 
nature that echoed the rising “green” movements in the North Atlantic. 
On all of these issues, Schumacher proved prophetic, and the veracity 
of his foresight makes reclaiming his wisdom all the more urgent in the 
face of a discredited but still arrogant neo-liberalism. But if we do, it 
will be essential to recall that Schumacher’s concerns about fossil fuels 
and natural despoliation provoked him to denounce and reconstruct his 
discipline. More than any other danger facing humanity, environmental 
devastation called “the entire outlook and methodology of economics 
into question,” he asserted. .e “narrow and fragmentary” approach to 
reality inscribed in economics would prove catastrophic, Schumacher 
warned, unless it was “completed by a study of meta-economics.”29
.ough Schumacher never de8ned this term with any precision, 
“meta-economics” appeared to provide a sketch of the larger ontological 
and ethical framework within which an economics proper would make 
sense. As things currently stood, Schumacher explained, the “sort of 
meaning the method of economics actually produces” was wholly pecu-
niary: “something is uneconomic if it fails to earn an adequate pro8t in 
terms of money.” Really existing economics treats goods “in accordance 
with their market value and not in accordance with what they really are.” 
Yet what goods “really are” was determined by whether they are “man-
made or God-given . . . freely reproducible or not.” .e capitalist market 
must disregard these meta-economic distinctions as irrelevant and even 
28. Fager, “Small Is Beautiful, and So Is Rome,” 325; on “Buddhist economics,” 
see Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, 50–58. Schumacher himself told readers that “the 
choice of Buddhism for this purpose is purely incidental: the teachings of Christianity, 
Islam, or Judaism could have been used just as well” (49).
29. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful, 40, 49.
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as potential sources of ineCciency, as they might hinder the creation of 
exchange value essential to capital accumulation. Schumacher had no 
doubt that capitalist economics had its own brand of meta-economics: 
“western materialism,” as he dubbed it, the reduction of everything to 
manipulable, vendable matter. As Chesterton, Gill, or Day might object, 
a sacramental theology of economics should dispute the “materialism” 
of this so-called materialism. Still, this fundamentally “metaphysical 
position” provided the criterion for economic conduct, and determined 
that the natural world is nothing else but a “quarry for exploitation.” 
.us, Schumacher traced the ecological and economic crises of our 
time to metaphysical ignorance. .e West’s “absence of metaphysical 
awareness”—its blindness to the fundamental realities of the world—
enabled it to pursue unlimited economic growth at the literal expense of 
human and non-human nature. “We are suAering from a metaphysical 
disease,” Schumacher rued, and “the cure must therefore be metaphysi-
cal.” Without forsaking the indispensable projects of social and politi-
cal transformation, restive youth must undertake an even grander and 
deeper revolution. “.e task of our generation,” Schumacher declared, 
“is one of metaphysical reconstruction.”30
Sadly, Schumacher himself never completed this assignment, and 
we can only infer the import of his own attempts at the “metaphysical 
reconstruction” of economics. In my view, Schumacher was beckoning 
toward an economics based on an ontology of gi6, peace, and abun-
dance and on a humanism of friendship and charity. .e world itself was 
“God-given,” and one of the 8rst lessons we had to re-learn was that we 
are in8nite debtors: “we are poor, not demi-gods.” Bestowed on us by a 
loving God, nature, rather than being a quarry, was a nurturing and salu-
brious home, pervaded by the presence of divinity. In Small is Beautiful, 
for instance, Schumacher alluded to Paul’s eschatological remarks about 
nature in Romans when he observed that “the living environment . . . 
aches and groans and gives signs of partial breakdown” under pressure 
from our technological rapacity. By contrast, Schumacher praised the 
ITDG and the Soil Association for promoting manufacturing and agri-
cultural technologies that exhibited “non-violence and humility towards 
the in8nitely subtle system of natural harmony.” In Good Work (1979), 
a posthumously published collection of essays, Schumacher derided 
mechanized production for violating the transcendentals: mechanical 
30. Ibid., 29, 40, 46–47, 50, 86, 93–94.
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methods, he observed, bear “no element of Beauty, Truth, or Goodness.” 
Perhaps the most provocative and seminal mite of wisdom came at the 
conclusion of A Guide for the Perplexed (1977), which Schumacher 
8nished shortly before his death and which he considered his magnum 
opus. With its title borrowed from Maimonides’s twel6h-century treatise 
on philosophy and theology, it’s a wide-ranging and altogether magpie 
rumination, but it all converges in the end on a rejection of the onto-
logical basis of economics. Indeed, Schumacher’s declaration of apostasy 
from the “religion of economics” could not have been more lucid and 
forceful. “.e generosity of the Earth allows us to feed all mankind,” 
he wrote. “We know enough about ecology to keep the Earth a healthy 
place; there is enough room on the Earth, and there are enough materi-
als, so that everybody can have adequate shelter; we are quite competent 
enough to produce suCcient supplies of necessities so that no one need 
live in misery . . . we know how to provide enough and do not require any 
violent, inhuman, aggressive technologies to do so.” In fact, Schumacher 
stated boldly, “the economic problem has been solved already”; indeed, 
he added, “there is no economic problem and, in a sense, there never has 
been” (my italics).31 If “the economic problem” has been identi8ed in the 
capitalist tradition as scarcity, then Schumacher was calling for the end 
of economics as the dismal science.
Yet if there was no economic problem in the capitalist sense, there 
was, he continued, “a moral problem”: the avarice and powerlust that 
drove humanity to create and prolong the economic problem. What Marx 
had called the rage to accumulate stemmed, Schumacher implied, from 
the fear of scarcity that itself arose from a lack of faith in God’s bounty. 
By encouraging this distrust—especially by installing it at the concep-
tual core of economics—capitalism herded men and women into what 
Schumacher called “the people of the forward stampede.” Acquisitive, 
competitive, and convinced that every economic and ecological problem 
has a technological solution, the forward stampede destroys anything 
and anyone that stands in its way. If the advertising and technophilia of 
capitalism was relentlessly unctuous and optimistic, the humanism of 
the forward stampede was calculating, agonistic, and merciless. And as 
Schumacher summarized the political imagination of this more-or-less 
organized panic, “there is no alternative” to unfettered expansion—a 
31. Ibid., 139, 148; Schumacher, Good Work, 27; Schumacher, Guide for the Per-
plexed, 139–40.
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chilling anticipation of the dismissive and ominous dictum of neo-
liberalism.32
If Schumacher envisioned a metaphysics of gi6 and plentitude, he 
also gestured toward a recovery of Christian humanism—the other es-
sential feature of a new meta-economics. Schumacher propounded his 
Christian humanism most vividly in Small Is Beautiful, particularly in 
the chapter, only slightly less famous than “Buddhist economics,” on 
“technology with a human face.” Echoing the lineage of Ruskin, Morris, 
Mumford, and Illich, Schumacher lamented the technics of the forward 
stampede, epitomized in mass production, as “inherently violent, eco-
logically damaging . . . and stultifying for the human person.” Against 
this inhuman apparatus of illth, Schumacher called for a “gentle . . . non-
violent approach” to tools, machines, and methods, embodied in what he 
dubbed, by turns, “intermediate technology,” “self-help technology,” or 
“democratic, people’s technology”—“production by the masses” rather 
than “mass production.” Unlike the massive, centralized production 
systems of industrial modernity, this non-violent technology would be 
small-scale and artisanal, fostering human skill rather than seeking to 
degrade it in the interest of reducing costs. Such forms of technology, he 
insisted, could arise only from people who had escaped or been exiled 
from the forward stampede: “home-comers,” in his words, those who had, 
like prodigal children, returned to the estate a6er grabbing and wasting 
the wealth bestowed by their Father. Home-comers do not seek riches, or 
conquest, or promethean achievement; rather, they seek only, as Aquinas 
had advised, to “enjoy nothing more than to be creatively, usefully, pro-
ductively engaged with hands and brains.” Home-comers, Schumacher 
noted, “base themselves upon a diAerent picture of man from that which 
motivates the people of the forward stampede”:33 as gi6ed (in all senses), 
loving, and peaceful. For home-comers, the laws of economics were a 
joyful science, eternally inscribed in the Beatitudes.
To allow space for this beati8c humanism, Schumacher’s joyful 
science sanctioned a variety of property and organizational forms, al-
most all of which he included under the rubric of “socialism.” For all his 
concern with resource and ecological questions, Schumacher devoted a 
good quarter of Small Is Beautiful to issues of ownership and organization 
32. Schumacher, Guide for the Perplexed, 140; Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful, 
146–47.
33. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful, 138–51.
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which, in his view, had been poorly addressed in the mainstream socialist 
tradition. Schumacher’s Christian socialism rejected Marxist and social-
democratic orthodoxies about nationalization and centralized control. 
Most modern socialists, Schumacher thought, were themselves “devotees 
of the religion of economics”: because they accepted the necessity for 
unlimited growth and large-scale technology, they diAered little or not 
at all from the capitalists they hoped to dispossess. With his Coal Board 
experience no doubt in the background, Schumacher wondered if na-
tionalization was still a worthwhile strategy for socialists. Echoing Cole 
and Tawney—especially the latter, whom he quoted extensively and ven-
erated as “one of the greatest ethical thinkers of our time”—Schumacher 
distinguished between “property that is an aid to creative work and . . . 
property that is an alternative to it.” .e assignment of ownership hinged, 
he argued, on the delineation of “speci8c rights and responsibilities in the 
administration of assets.” For this reason, Schumacher introduced “the 
principle of subsidiary function,” the classic Catholic notion that large 
institutions should not, if possible, perform what smaller associations 
could do.34 .us, while subsidiarity served a crucial role in Schumacher’s 
social thought, “small is beautiful” was bound up with a socialist concep-
tion of work and property.
Schumacher’s moment in the 1970s was promising, but all too 
brief. For a few years a6er the appearance of Small is Beautiful, the 
quiet scholar became an unlikely celebrity, giving talks at universities, 
public meetings, academic conferences, and government agencies. (He 
even enjoyed a conversation with an admiring President Jimmy Carter.) 
Riding a wave of ecological concern among the North Atlantic middle 
classes, and calling for an end to reliance on oil as gasoline prices were 
rising dramatically, Schumacher assumed a role as prophet of the sim-
pler life to the West. But even before his death in 1977, forces had been 
gathering on the political right that would end the springtime of proph-
ecy. To Margaret .atcher, Ronald Reagan, and other spearheads of neo-
liberalism, Schumacher’s kind of in8delity to the religion of economics 
was intolerable. Condemning such lack of faith, the North Atlantic right 
summoned up the demons of venality, resentment, and credulity, and 
for the next thirty years the dreams of avarice overwhelmed the realities 
of economic and ecological crisis.
34. Ibid., 210–81 (230, 239, 247).
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Although Schumacher’s work has attracted a devoted following 
since the 1970s, its failure to make a deeper impact on the broader 
economic and ecological imagination stems in part, I think, from two 
signi8cant drawbacks. Despite his insistence on the need for social and 
political change, and despite his adherence to socialism, Schumacher had 
little conception of class struggle. As perhaps be8tted a self-proclaimed 
partisan of the “small” and local, Schumacher always appeared wary of 
large-scale projects of transformation. To the extent it can be discerned, 
Schumacher’s transformative vision was piecemeal and cumulative: his 
essays abound with references to local experiments in intermediate tech-
nology, organic farming, alternative currencies, etc., the eventual tally 
of which, one infers, would amount to a new political economy. .is 
politics of the local has clear aCnities with the lineage of utopian—now 
called “intentional”—communities, and it dovetails with admonitions 
to “think globally, act locally.” However clever a sound-bite that is, it 
obscures the fact that many of the structures of exploitation must be 
confronted, at the very least, at levels beyond the local. At the same time, 
“acting locally” has been almost entirely construed in terms of consumer 
politics—buying from local farmers, not buying from adolescent-ex-
ploiting corporations like Nike, researching commodities for pesticides 
or genetic modi8cation. Local action rarely involves producer politics—
in other words, the politics of workplace democracy and corporate 
power that inevitably requires organization along the non-local lines of 
class. Striking directly at the managerial and professional prerogatives 
of corporate capital, “intermediate technology” and “production by the 
masses” entail the revitalization of the labor movement, but the necessity 
for class politics is virtually absent from Schumacher’s work—just as it is 
virtually nowhere to be found in the papal social tradition. It should not 
surprise anyone that, lacking any anchorage in working-class concerns, 
Schumacher’s kind of eco-economics could be assimilated by middle-
class progressives to evoke a kinder, gentler capitalism—the politics of 
“bourgeois bohemians,” as they’re o6en called in America.35
.e popularity of a tepid, localist eco-economics among the “en-
lightened” middle classes coincides with the growing appeal of New Age 
spirituality. .us, we might want to revisit Schumacher’s decision to write 
about “Buddhist economics,” not as a necessary gambit in the cultural 
35. For a stringent critique of localist anti-capitalism, see Henwood, A#er the New 
Economy, 159–86; on “bourgeois bohemians,” see Brooks, Bobos in Paradise.
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politics of the 1960s, but as a reinforcement of new brands of corporate 
cultural hegemony. As Žižek has forcefully and courageously written of 
“Western Buddhism”—the Buddhism of Alan Watts, D. T. Suzuki, and 
others, which would have been the Buddhism known to Schumacher’s 
readers—it now represents, along with other New Age religions, one of 
the purest forms of capitalist ideology. A “pop-cultural phenomenon 
preaching inner distance and indiAerence toward the frantic pace of 
market competition,” Western Buddhism oAers middle-class profession-
als a way, Žižek argues, to “fully participate in capitalist dynamics” while 
maintaining a stance of condescending dismissal toward the tawdry 
spectacles of greed and consumerism. On the whole, Žižek contends, 
New Age enables well-educated and culturally liberal Western elites to 
maintain and embellish their moral authority.36 Certainly, Schumacher 
cannot be blamed for New Age ideology or saddled with the crimes of 
Buddhists. But just as the absence of class presents an obstacle to the 
realization of Schumacher’s political economy, the lack of an explicit 
theological underpinning for his joyful science is a problem.
!e Legacy of Herbert McCabe
On both scores, we might require the intervention of Father Herbert 
McCabe, the British Dominican whose essays and sermons are now 
8nding an enthusiastic audience in the United States. One of the 8nest 
.omist philosophers and theologians of the twentieth century, McCabe 
was a friend of and/or mentor to Terry Eagleton, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Denys Turner, Seamus Heaney, and Anthony Kenny, as well as to two 
generations of Dominicans at Blackfriars, Oxford, and elsewhere.37 A 
moving homilist, a lucid scholar, and formidable and witty controver-
sialist, McCabe was also a socialist, and his politics were rooted in and 
shaped by his fundamental 8delity to Christ. .ough a bit too indulgent 
toward revolutionary rhetoric, McCabe was a more subtle and gener-
ous thinker than many a tenured guerilla, and he oAers theological and 
spiritual discipline for a revitalized Christian socialism.
36. Žižek, “Self-Deceptions.” I plead agnosticism on the subject of whether or not 
Western Buddhism can be identi8ed with Asian Buddhism. For his part, Žižek main-
tains that Zen monks and writers have had a long history of militarism and repression, 
citing Suzuki’s support for Japanese imperialism in the 1930s.
37. McCabe, Law, Love, and Language; God Matters; God Still Matters; God, Christ, 
and Us; Good Life; Faith Within Reason; On Aquinas.
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McCabe 8rst addressed political issues in the late 1960s, when 
many of his students and friends—Eagleton, Turner, Father Laurence 
Bright, O.P., and others—were partisans of the British Catholic New 
Le6. Although the enrages published their own journal, Slant, out of 
Cambridge, McCabe opened the pages of New Blackfriars to their po-
litical theology. With myriad disquisitions on revolution, socialism, the 
Eucharist, the priesthood, the Incarnation, and other issues, Slant and 
New Blackfriars contained some of the most incisive and eAervescent 
theo-political writing of the Cold War era. Yet the Catholic New Le6, 
like Schumacher’s moment, faded in the late 1970s, and its adherents 
went their separate paths, into Marxism, Christianity, or some libera-
tionist hybrid of the two.38 Like Schumacher, McCabe never repudiated 
socialism; like Chesterton, Day, and Weil, he aCrmed a sacramental 
imagination; but like Tawney and Ruskin, he did persist in thinking that 
class struggle was indispensable to social transformation.
Unlike Schumacher and Benedict, McCabe never recoiled from the 
reality of social conBict. “.e class war is intrinsic to capitalism,” he re-
minded readers of God Matters (1987); “it is not something we are in a 
position to start” and “it is not something we are in a position to refrain 
from.”39 “It is just there,” McCabe asserted; “we are either on one side or 
the other.” .is kind of stark political realism isn’t favored much any-
more; it’s either vili8ed as Marxist doctrinal vulgarity, or slighted as the 
piety of 1960s dinosaurs by the acolytes of Blair, Clinton, and Obama. 
Hoping earnestly for “change they can believe in,” today’s “progressives” 
are virtuosi of political bathos; McCabe’s unsentimental sobriety is shared 
by con8dent combatants on the other side such as Warren BuAett. You 
know things are bad when we have to be reminded of class struggle by 
a billionaire.
By insisting on class struggle, McCabe opened himself to the criti-
cism that he was sanctioning a hatred and bloodshed diametrically op-
posed to the Gospel. McCabe’s reply to this objection was straightforward 
if not, I think, entirely convincing. “.e Christian demand for love and 
peace is precisely what motivates us to take part in the class struggle,” 
McCabe countered; if the struggle is already there, the questions are how 
38. On the British Catholic New Le6 in the 1960s and 1970s, one could peruse 
almost any issue of Slant or New Blackfriars; see also Wicker, “Justice, Peace, and 
Dominicans, 1216–1999: Viii-Slant, Marxism, and the English Dominicans,” 436–43.
39. McCabe, God Matters, 191–92.
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and for what you end it, not whether or not you end it. Once we decide 
to join the struggle for the sake of love and peace, then “the Sermon on 
the Mount provides us with the appropriate revolutionary discipline for 
eAective action.” Extending the just war tradition to include revolution-
ary violence, McCabe argued that the love manifested in the Beatitudes 
could justify the shedding of blood. Violence was “admittedly not a 
perspicuous manifestation of love,” McCabe conceded, but “that does 
not mean that it is a manifestation of a lack of love.”40 .at’s a lame argu-
ment, to say the least, and I can’t help thinking that McCabe himself was 
slightly embarrassed by it. Truer to the spirit of the Beatitudes would 
be Schumacher’s hero Gandhi: we must be the change we wish to see in 
the world. .e whole point of the Sermon is that the end of the struggle 
against the powers of the age is contained in the means we employ—that 
the poor and the meek and the charitable are already “blessed,” already 
residing in the Kingdom of God.
McCabe himself oAered reasons to forswear violence in the pursuit 
of socialism. Even in the heady days of 1960s revolutionary euphoria, 
McCabe admonished Christians that, however just and fraternal, social-
ism would not be the kingdom of God. .e Christian “cannot identify 
his Christianity with participation in the revolution,” he cautioned in 
1968, because there is “a fundamental disagreement between Christian 
and Marxist . . . about the nature of revolution.” While Marxist revolu-
tion sought to abolish the structures of injustice, what McCabe called 
“the Christian revolution” goes “to something deeper, to the ultimate 
alienation of man which is sin and the ultimate transformation which is 
death and resurrection.” Even though McCabe urged Christians to join 
in radical political struggle, he issued a salutary warning that “Christian 
belief . . . cannot be adequately stated in today’s political terms, for no 
revolutionary belief can be stated in the terms of the society it subverts 
and Christianity preaches the ultimate revolution” (my italics). .e good 
news of redemption is “not a programme for political action,” as McCabe 
explained in God Still Matters (2001); it is “a critique of action itself, a 
reminder that we must think on the end.” .is critical detachment par-
takes not of strategy but of eschatology; the “end” of political action was 
not only earthly justice but the kingdom of God. Because the Christian 
socialist trains her mind on ultimate things, she can be at once more 
impassioned and more detached—“more complex, more ironic”—than 
40. Ibid., 195–96.
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her secular comrades. Her eschatological conviction that history has al-
ready been made right enables her to be a diAerent kind of revolutionary 
warrior. When defeated, she recalls that Christ himself “accepts his fail-
ure and refuses to compromise his mission by using the weapons of the 
world against the world.” When granted any real but contingent success, 
she crowns it “not with triumphalism but with forgiveness and mercy, 
for only in this way can the victory won in the 8ght remain related to the 
kingdom of God.”41
If the love of the Kingdom could animate political commitment, 
then friendship could leaven economic life. As an exemplary .omist-
Aristotelian, McCabe held that “the good life for human animals is one 
in which friendship is fostered and preserved.” Friendship or philia was 
political as well as personal, and it thrived where friends shared the 
common task of building and maintaining a polis. Drawing on Aquinas, 
McCabe contended that the highest end of humanity, blessedness or be-
atitudo, entailed political life. “.e political virtues . . . take their place 
in . . . our vocation to the heavenly polis, the divine life.” McCabe even 
identi8ed philia with “agape or caritas, the friendship that God shares 
with us,” and warned that fraternity cannot survive unless it is rooted 
in this rapturous, immeasurable Love. “.ere is no way to build a hu-
man society that is really human unless it is more than human.” Like 
the triune God of loving processions, or like Christ whose cross “is the 
ultimate sign of God’s love for us,” human love is most itself when it is 
utterly open, unguarded, and vulnerable. “We are the kind of being that 
8nds its ful8llment, happiness and Bourishing only in giving itself up, 
in getting beyond itself.” But giving ourselves up is exactly what we fear; 
the loss of self-mastery, especially in capitalist society, is considered a 
nightmare rather than a glory. And so we seek to secure our lives in the 
makeshi6 and inevitably malevolent apparatus of property: title deeds, 
security systems, police departments, military-industrial complexes. 
.ese were the trophies of our damnation. With so profoundly sad a 
vision of the Fall, and with so bounteous a vision of love, McCabe never 
ceased to be astonished and appalled at the celebration of antagonism in 
capitalist culture. Indeed, writing at the zenith of neo-liberal hegemony, 
41. McCabe, Law, Love, and Language, 163, 166–67, 170, 172; God Matters, 99; God 
Still Matters, 90–91. If we follow McCabe, it would seem that Eagleton is not quite right 
to say, in his introduction to a recent edition of the Gospels, that Jesus was “both more 
and less” than a revolutionary: Eagleton, Terry Eagleton Presents Jesus Christ and the 
Gospels, xxx.
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McCabe thought it utterly “bizarre” that the competitive market had be-
come the paragon of human life. Not competition but “friendship is an 
illuminating image or metaphor for a human living which would be an 
imitation or reBection” of God.42
McCabe linked divine love and economics most clearly in one of his 
8nest homilies, “Poverty and God,” in which he brilliantly deconstructed 
the false opposition between abundance and poverty. Unlike the stan-
dard mythology of capitalist culture, “the success story for Christians is 
from riches to rags.” Recalling the tale of Jesus and the rich young man, 
McCabe implied that most Christians walk oA with the grieving play-
boy—while beating their breasts, of course. .ere’s nothing wrong with 
being rich, they reassure themselves, as long as you have poverty of spirit. 
McCabe rejected this self-serving twaddle and insisted that whole point 
of the story is that there is indeed “something wrong with being rich and 
something right with being poor.” “.ere is something less than human 
about needing to live with riches,” he asserted, and “there is something 
godlike about being able to live in poverty.” God has and can have no 
possessions, McCabe explained; since possessions are things used for 
some bene8t to the owner, and since nothing can bene8t God, then God 
can’t possibly own anything. .us, God is poor “because he simply and 
literally has no possessions.” But since God creates, He creates without 
owning; the only bene8ciary of God’s creation is creation itself. (As the 
unlikely theologian Henry Miller once remarked about creation, “God 
doesn’t make a cent on the deal.”) God creates for no reason other than 
sheer joy and delight; and as “God makes without becoming richer,” then 
His poverty and abundance are one. Since, as creatures, we must act for 
some bene8t to ourselves, we have need of possessions; but we can imi-
tate God’s poverty—and thus, help distribute His abundance—by living 
for others. Possessing as little as possible, we can nonetheless oAer our 
talents to others in joyous self-expenditure. As McCabe put it, “the one 
who aims at poverty knows that we can only live by throwing ourselves 
away”—an echo of Ruskin’s dark-red, old-school Communists who exist 
only in giving. “Human society Bourishes, not to the extent that it pos-
sesses riches, but to the extent that we give life to each other, to the extent 
that we imitate the creativity of God.”43
42. McCabe, Good Life, 52, 87–88; God Matters, 94, 98; God, Christ, and Us, 56–57.
43. McCabe, “Poverty and God,” in God, Christ, and Us, 53–57; see also “Mammon 
and .anksgiving,” God, Christ, and Us, 133–37.
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McCabe’s wisdom of poverty as abundance should be the founda-
tion of a joyful economics. Like Schumacher, McCabe declared “the 
economic problem” a false and sinister quandary; like Ruskin, he traced 
its origins to our sinful refusal of self-expenditure. And like both great 
“Communists of the old school,” McCabe knew that charity is not some 
treacly ideal but the very nature of the universe. Against the acquisitive 
fantasies enabled by the lies of the dismal science, we will need that kind 
of sacramental realism in the turbulence of the twenty-8rst century. .e 
real science of political economy provides an education in love, since 
its object is not accumulation but the holiest of dissipation. Out with 
widgets, units, and marginal utility; in with loaves and 8shes, birds and 
lilies, wine at wedding feasts!
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Beyond the Culture of  
Cutthroat Competition
The Pope Takes the World by Surprise
Mark and Louise Zwick
Introduction
Pope Benedict XVI’s social encyclical, Caritas in Veritate, took the economic world by surprise.1 While readers on both the right and 
the le6 were waiting for more statements about capitalism and socialism, 
they found instead a challenge to Catholics and other people of good 
will toward a profoundly new way of understanding business enterprise. 
.e Pope did not approve the status quo, but in what he called the so-
cial magisterium, addressed the global dimension of the social question 
in the midst of a very serious economic crisis, displaying a surprising 
1. All references to Caritas in Veritate will be given parenthetically in the text.
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understanding of what has been happening in the contemporary inter-
national economic scene.
Benedict recognizes the disconnect between the Word of the Gospel 
and the current economic culture. Jesus told us his Gospel is not about 
building bigger barns (or bigger banks). It is about giving rather than 
receiving. Speaking at the Synod of the Word in the fall of 2008 as he was 
preparing the encyclical, the Pope reminded us that the Word of God is 
the true reality and that the disappearance of hope along with the money 
in the crash of 2008–2009 was the result of building our lives on sand.
.e economy that collapsed was based on “barn-building,” on indi-
vidual and corporate self-interest. Its marks included a scandalous divide 
between salaries of CEOs and workers in their companies. Deregulation 
and privatization around the world le6 the market and human services 
to wolves. Hedge funds and other oddly named 8nancial institutions 
speculated in complex derivatives that not even the regulators who 
remained could understand. Banks pursued reckless policies and were 
saved by massive government bailouts. People were owned by their 
credit cards, by debt at exorbitant interest rates. Environmental concerns 
were sacri8ced. .ousands of people lost homes and jobs in the United 
States and the situation of people to the South became desperate. .e 
media, which might have informed the citizenry, were a part of the con-
glomerates. .e wild credit-card spending and shopping sprees among 
consumers led one commentator to say that men over 86y would never 
need to buy anything again except for fruits and vegetables, pasta and 
olive oil, underwear and socks.
.e government’s response to the 8nancial crisis, at least initially, 
was to enrich the very people and institutions that caused the problem 
in the 8rst place and to continue the same approach: “What is needed 
is more of the same, more free market, more free trade, more credit for 
lending at interest.” Not even mentioned was all the extra assistance to 
multinational corporations that they take for granted—more subsidized 
agriculture, more freedom and power for lobbyists to the U.S. Congress 
for corporate interests which o6en hurt the poor. It is hard to believe 
that, even today, politicians can get away with denigrating any reference 
to a better approach by crying, “Socialism! Communism!”
For believers, our economics has been upside down. More of the 
same is not the answer. According to the encyclical, we actually have to 
expect the business person, as well as the politician who must provide a 
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strong juridical framework for 8nance and economics, to live according 
to the Gospel. It may be very diCcult for the Catholic business man or 
woman who is accustomed to business as usual, where pro8t is king, 
to embrace the papal plan, but Benedict XVI insists that our vocation 
as persons even on a practical level is a transcendent one. In Caritas 
in Veritate, he reminds us that there is a link between the wild spend-
ing of some while others do not have enough. Quoting John Paul II in 
Centesimus Annus, he asks us again to change our life-styles: “What is 
needed is an eAective shi6 in mentality which can lead to the adoption 
of new life-styles in which the quest for truth, beauty, goodness and 
communion with others for the sake of common growth are the factors 
which determine consumer choices, savings and investments.” 
The Reception of Caritas in Veritate
As Catholic Workers in Houston we are sharply aware of international 
economics as we receive in hospitality the immigrants and refugees 
whom business rejects, those who have been uprooted from their homes 
by the extremes of the global market and the military defense of it. In 
addition to receiving the immigrants who leave their countries because 
they cannot 8nd work to sustain their families, we care for and help 
to support many people injured on the job, some completely paralyzed 
from falling from scaAolds, some in wheel chairs but with the use of 
their arms, some able to walk again but not able to work. At Casa Juan 
Diego we experience what the poor experience, as we feed the hungry, 
clothe the naked, give hospitality to the stranger, and care for the sick 
and injured in our two clinics with volunteer doctors. Our perspective 
on economics and politics is interwoven with the life and suAering of 
the migrant.
God brought Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin together to form the 
Catholic Worker movement at a time when the world was facing an eco-
nomic crash similar to today’s. As they received in hospitality and in 
soup kitchens the refugees from the economic system during the 1930s, 
in their newspaper they critiqued robber barons, banks, the 8nancial 
system, the free-market ideology known in their time as laissez-faire 
capitalism, and the state of constant preparation for war to protect the 
economic gains. Dorothy Day criticized the appeal to acquisitiveness 
that dominates advertisement. Dorothy and Peter endorsed subsidiarity 
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and quoted the papal encyclicals to do so. Peter Maurin tried to convince 
readers of !e Catholic Worker that it is more important for a person to 
become better than to become “better oA.” At a time when Communists 
were trying very hard to recruit all the workers to their cause, Dorothy 
and Peter presented their newspaper and their vision of the movement 
as an alternative to both capitalism and Communism, one based on the 
Gospel, on Catholic social teaching, and the lives of the saints.
Unlike Dorothy and Peter, who understood very well exactly what 
was going on in economics, some Christians have sadly been patriots-
in-arms in promoting the machinations of the worst of the “marketeers” 
in recent times, attempting to equate Catholic ethics with no-limits capi-
talism. It was really quite bold, fearless actually, of the Pope to speak so 
strongly against the powers that be, with so many Catholics involved in 
the market—what had become a greed operation. It will take courage and 
good research for those who will try to implement the ideas in Caritas in 
Veritate, as they face the monopoly of multinationals around the world. 
Some of these same patriots-in-arms for unfettered markets have come 
out strongly against Caritas in Veritate. .ey continued a tradition of 
a handful of prominent Catholic writers who have refused to accept 
Catholic social teaching. William Buckley made the 8rst famous public 
refusal with his “Mater, si, Magistra, no,” response to John XXIII’s Mater 
et Magistra, thus establishing the tradition of cafeteria Catholicism.
Some years ago Michael Novak, video-recorded on C-Span tele-
vision, remarked that those who objected to the enormous salaries of 
CEOs while the masses of workers in their companies received a pit-
tance should remember that the sin of envy was condemned in the Book 
of Deuteronomy. Given that perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Novak undermined Caritas in Veritate as soon as it came out in First 
!ings Online. He rather amazingly said that the encyclical lacked a de-
scription of capitalism’s “tangible bene8ts to the poor” and that therefore 
the work of the staA supporting the Pope was poor and inadequate. It 
has always been diCcult to see any tangible bene8ts for the poor fol-
lowing the theory of the economy of wealth raising all boats, as the rich 
got richer and more boats sank, but with the devastating eAect of the 
8nancial crisis around the world it is hard to fathom that anyone would 
want to enter the fray with the same failed system.
.ose who endorse what is known around the world as neo-
liberalism promote an economic ideology which advocates greed and 
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crushing others, all the while presenting that system as helping others. 
Chesterton once noted that it may be very diCcult for modern people to 
imagine a world in which men are not generally admired for covetous-
ness and crushing their neighbors, but he assured them that such strange 
patches of an earthly paradise do really remain on earth.
George Weigel claimed that half of the Caritas in Veritate was writ-
ten by someone else—he described the parts he did not like as out of 
tune like the warbling of an un-tuned piccolo. .is was an especially 
oAensive reference when describing the writing of an accomplished 
musician like Benedict. Perhaps Weigel’s contention that the bad half 
of the encyclical must have been written by the staAers at the Ponti8-
cal Council for Justice and Peace was related to statements from that 
Council in response to the 8nancial crisis. Not long before the encycli-
cal was published, Cardinal Renato Martino, president of that Ponti8cal 
Council was quoted as saying: “.e logic of the market up to now has 
been that of maximum earnings, of making investments to obtain the 
greatest possible pro8t. And this, according to the social teaching of 
the Church, is immoral.” .e Holy Father himself wrote: “Once pro8t 
becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and 
without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth 
and creating poverty” (Caritas, 21).
Another group, rather than confront the papacy, simply declares 
that the Pope agrees with them, that he loves unfettered 8nance, that 
even St. .omas Aquinas loved and promoted their type of econom-
ics. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Fr. Robert Sirico of the Acton 
Institute libertarian/Calvinist think-tank attempted in this way to ap-
propriate the Pope’s writing in Caritas in Veritate by claiming that it 
stood squarely in the “classical liberal tradition”—in other words along 
Sirico’s libertarian lines. He went so far as to insist that the Pope’s writing 
was similar even to the secular (neo-liberal/libertarian) F. A. Hayek of 
the Austrian school of economics. Sirico does not mention the Chicago 
School, perhaps because their professors and students, while promoting 
free capitalism, free markets, etc., endorsed regulation and pointed out 
before the current crisis that it was lacking. (We have always been aware 
of the Chicago school of economics because Mark attended classes in a 
building next to where Milton Friedman was teaching when he studied 
at the University of Chicago for his master’s degree in social work.)
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Neo-conservative refusers complained that Benedict didn’t say 
enough about the importance of wealth creation. .ose critics neglected 
to mention section 60 of the encyclical where he does speak of wealth 
creation, but a wealth creation which would help the poor, not just the 
rich: “In the search for solutions to the current economic crisis, develop-
ment aid for poor countries must be considered a valid means of creat-
ing wealth for all.” .ey didn’t, perhaps, understand or accept his words: 
“Without the perspective of eternal life, human progress in this world . . . 
runs the risk of being reduced to the mere accumulation of wealth.” He 
said the market is not, and must not become, the place where the strong 
subdue the weak and that the economy must not be seen as just an en-
gine for wealth creation but be directed toward the common good.
Upon reBection, one can understand why the “marketeers” are so 
much in opposition to the Pope, because their ideological approach to 
economics and politics is so diAerent from that of Church leadership and 
teaching. .ese men had been at the forefront of expanding and export-
ing an economics which sought ever more pro8t through lower wages, 
privatization of services, and lack of support for the local communities, 
all controlled by the corporations who fund their work in “think-tanks.”
With this encyclical, it becomes clear that the work in economics 
and politics of the refusers of Catholic social teaching was simply a part 
of the corporate culture. .eir chant that it is not necessary to listen to 
the Pope on questions of economics and war because they are covered 
under prudential judgment rather than faith and morals emphasizes 
the split between modern culture and the Gospel. .e publication in 
First !ings, of all places, of the ringing endorsement by 68 evangelicals 
of Caritas in Veritate gives hope that some Protestant economists, uni-
versity presidents, and professors at least will enthusiastically study and 
implement the social teaching of this outstanding encyclical.
What Do Gratuitousness, Gift, and Reciprocity  
Have to Do With Economics?
Benedict XVI endorses creative, alternative enterprises that have emerged 
in recent years beyond, as he says, the for-pro8t and non-pro8t methods 
that have been in existence, indicating that they can “no longer do full 
justice to reality or oAer practical direction for the future.” He mentions 
a number of types of enterprises as examples in a “broad new composite 
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reality embracing the private and public spheres, one which does not 
exclude pro8t, but instead considers it a means for achieving human and 
social ends.” He presents the idea that ideas like gi6 and reciprocity can 
be included within businesses.
Writing in the National Review, Weigel questioned the Pope’s pro-
posal that such kind words as “gi6” might be included in any discussion 
of economics, suggesting that the language in those sections of Caritas 
in Veritate is so “clotted and muddled” as to suggest a confused senti-
mentality of precisely the sort the encyclical deplores among those who 
detach charity from truth. It would appear from this comment that this 
group of refusers is so out of tune with Catholic social teaching that talk 
of social responsibility, of gi6, of gratuitousness, of reciprocity, of com-
munion in business and economics is incomprehensible.
Weigel’s response to Caritas in Veritate reminds us of an experience 
we had when we were giving a talk on Catholic social teaching to a study 
group at one of the parishes in Houston. Before the meeting started, 
we spoke to the leader about some options for people to live out their 
faith in areas regarding economics—ways to implement the preferential 
option for the poor. Presented with the option to buy a half-a-million-
dollar house or a one-million-dollar one (theirs is a rich parish!), we 
said, why couldn’t the Catholic believer stay in his quarter-of-a-million-
dollar house and use the extra money to buy houses for the poor in a 
low-income neighborhood? Or why couldn’t other Catholic believers 
purchase a 86een-thousand or twenty-thousand-dollar car instead of 
buying a thirty-, forty- or 86y-thousand-dollar car?
.e leader, while sympathetic, felt he had to explain. “Mark, you 
don’t understand! You don’t understand! .ey see this as virtue. .ese 
people have worked hard and prayed hard and lived right all their lives. 
.ey have a right to enjoy the fruit of their eAorts. God is rewarding 
them for faithfulness and hard work.” As for those who do not have 
the half-a-million-dollar choice in this scenario the clear implication is 
that there is something wrong. Why don’t they have the same blessings? 
What did they do wrong? Why are their lives 8lled with failures and 
poverty? .is Calvinistic thinking, combined with that of Adam Smith 
and his contemporary disciples, is very inBuential among Catholics to-
day. Cardinal Francis George of Chicago pointed out, although we may 
not be aware of it, all of us in the United States (and perhaps a few other 
countries as well) are Calvinists, including Catholics. 
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.e approach of Caritas in Veritate is very diAerent from an econ-
omy run on rugged individualism, cutthroat competition, self-interest, 
and consumers who feel they must at all costs purchase the latest fashion 
and style. Perhaps that is why George Weigel found it so diCcult to be in 
tune with the encyclical. Since it is so diCcult for you to imagine the use 
of the words gi6, gratuitousness, and reciprocity in the area of econom-
ics, Professor Weigel, let us explain what Pope Benedict is saying in one 
example he gives. When he says that the Church’s social doctrine holds 
that authentically human social relationships of friendship, solidarity, 
and reciprocity can also be conducted within economic activity, when he 
speaks of gratuitousness, of “gi6,” he mentions a speci8c economic model. 
.at practical example, developed in the Focolare movement throughout 
the world, is the Economy of Communion, which was launched in 1991 
when Focolare founder Chiara Lubich visited Focolare communities in 
Brazil. During that visit Chiara was disturbed to 8nd a whole ring of 
shantytowns in a circle surrounding the city, the favelas where people 
lived in abject poverty, “a crown of thorns” around the city. .ose in-
volved with the Focolare in Brazil included not only professionals and the 
middle class but many of these poor. A6er that visit, in order to help meet 
the material needs of that local community, Chiara Lubich proposed a 
new economic model in which for-pro8t businesses could generate ad-
ditional jobs and voluntarily share pro8ts in three ways. One third of the 
pro8ts would go to those in need, one third to build up the civilization of 
love, and one third into the business for continued development.
.e EoC spread throughout the globe through the Focolare Move-
ment. .e EoC has brought together seven hundred and 86y-four com-
panies worldwide that are committed to pursuing higher goals than just 
pro8t. .e authors came to know the Focolare movement in Texas and 
have interviewed people involved in Economy of Communion busi-
nesses. .ey are an inspiration. Presently there are businesses in various 
production and service sectors on every continent following this model, 
most of them small and medium sized, but some with more than one 
hundred employees.
EoC businesses commit themselves to building sound relationships 
with employees, customers, regulatory agencies, the general public, and 
the environment. .ese new relationships include those who receive 
aid, who are truly active participants in the project. Sharing one’s needs 
with dignity and sincerity is appreciated as a contribution to increase 
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the life of communion, and many renounce the help just as soon as 
they reach a bare minimum of economic independence. .e Economy 
of Communion is seen as an economic expression of the spirituality of 
communion of the Focolare Movement. .e Economy of Communion 
represents a very diAerent model and a very diAerent concept from what 
is commonly referred to as “business ethics.”
Not Just Any Ethics Whatsoever
When a local Catholic university invited one of the Catholic patriots-in-
arms of laissez-faire capitalism to speak at the opening of their business 
ethics center some years ago, we felt we had to speak. We could not stand 
by when the speaker represented the refusers or re-writers of Catholic 
social teaching. We wrote in the Houston Catholic Worker that inviting 
Michael Novak to speak on business ethics was like asking Hugh Hefner 
to speak in defense of marriage. Various professors at the university were 
quite surprised, but came to dialogue with us.
.e refusers have a number of think tanks that supposedly address 
“business ethics.” Weigel went so far as to call his corporation “.e Ethics 
and Public Policy Center.” .at center, the American Enterprise Institute 
that employs Michael Novak, and Fr. Sirico’s Acton Institute have orga-
nized seminars and “retreats” to present policies that favor large corpora-
tions and the wealthier few as “ethics.” .ese men’s public identi8cation 
as Catholics has led some to believe that their ideology represented the 
teaching of the Church. Nothing could be further from the truth.
.e Pope indicates that he is aware of much talk about ethics, that 
various centers for ethics and business, ethics and the economy, have 
been developed, but that the term ethics in some of these ventures has 
lost its meaning, or could mean almost anything—even decisions and 
choices contrary to justice and authentic human welfare. He insists that 
the economy needs ethics in order to function correctly—not, however, 
any ethics whatsoever, but rather an ethics that is “people-centered.”
In the majority of university economics classes, where what Pope 
Pius XII called the “superstition” of the invisible hand of the market has 
reigned, monopolistic business practices have not been challenged. Too 
o6en the invisible hand of the market has had a knife in it for the poor. 
.e knife, wielded around the world, is invisible until researchers expose 
corporations’ practices.
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Benedict XVI teaches that much in an authentic ethics depends on 
the underlying system of morality and that it is here that the Church’s 
social doctrine can make a speci8c contribution in economics. .e two 
pillars of this teaching, he says in Caritas in Veritate, are the inviolabil-
ity of the human person and the transcendent value of natural moral 
norms. He immediately and daringly applies these principles to business 
practices:
When business ethics prescinds from these two pillars, it inevi-
tably risks losing its distinctive nature and it falls prey to forms 
of exploitation; more speci8cally, it risks becoming subservient 
to existing economic and 8nancial systems rather than correct-
ing the dysfunctional aspects. Among other things, it risks being 
used to justify the 8nancing of projects that are in reality unethi-
cal. (Caritas, 45)
Benedict places the whole human project in the perspective of a pilgrim 
of the absolute living in this world working for justice and the devel-
opment of peoples without becoming ensnared by the fashions of the 
moment.
The Stakeholders, Not Just Stockholders
One of the “new” proposals in Caritas in Veritate would be a major 
change for 8rms on Wall Street. Businesses have a responsibility, says the 
Pope, to all the stakeholders who contribute to the life of the business, 
not simply to shareholders (those who buy stocks). .e stakeholders are 
the workers, the suppliers, the consumers, the natural environment, and 
the community of reference. In Western culture, the concept is strong 
that people who have done well and helped build our churches have a 
right to what they have earned or to their tremendous income from the 
stock market. .e idea of sharing with the other stakeholders is foreign 
to the way our business climate is oriented.
.e practice of basing all decisions on what will please the stock-
holders has caused immeasurable harm to stakeholders in various types 
of business and industries. Using only stock market indicators to run 
businesses that aAect the lives of human persons directly is, as the Pope 
said, unethical. Measuring everything by a related ambiguous 8gure 
called the Gross Domestic Product and “growth” is not a human mea-
sure at all.
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An outrageous example in recent decades of disregarding stake-
holders as the global market has expanded has been the massive devel-
opment of maquiladoras or outsourcing by multinational companies for 
cheap labor with no provision for helping the local community. Strict 
enforcement against labor organizing, what the Pope calls the deregu-
lation of the labor market, has created miserable working conditions 
and under-subsistence pay for poor workers in many countries. At the 
Houston Catholic Worker, speaking with the immigrants and refugees 
who come to our doors, we have been aware since the 1980s of the 
practices of the maquiladoras, where companies have ignored most of 
the stakeholders where the work is performed, with negative impacts 
not only on the workers, but on the local communities. .e workers, 
whose salaries did not provide enough to support their families, o6en 
have been forced to migrate, while the multinationals that operated the 
factories and their stockholders made unusually high pro8ts.
During the 1990s, for example, immigrants from Honduras who 
came to take refuge at Casa Juan Diego told us that they made $14.00 
a week in a maquiladora. .ey could not pay the rent and feed their 
families on that income. (One said that his father, in an older, more es-
tablished job, made $28.00 a week and he could survive.) Some workers 
who came to the United States could not believe the high prices here for 
the products they had sewn or assembled for a pittance. Less publicized 
than bank and business failures in the current crisis has been the human 
suAering that has come from turning everything into a for-pro8t busi-
ness, from the 8eld of medicine to privatized prisons, as stakeholders are 
disregarded.
Health care has been a scandalous example of this practice in the 
past decades as medicine has been transformed from a profession into a 
big business. Hospitals, health insurance companies, and pharmaceuti-
cal companies depend on the stock market. .e decisions based on their 
rating each day in the market—will people buy their stocks or dump 
them that day in favor of a more pro8table venture?—determine the 
practical life-and-death outcome for patients. When the encyclical es-
pecially mentions the rigid assertion of the right to intellectual property 
in the 8eld of health care, one immediately thinks of the pharmaceutical 
companies with their patented expensive medicines unavailable to the 
poor of the world. In the United States, however, it seems that even to 
mention that the development of medicines needed by everyone should 
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not even be on the stock market would lead to accusations of “Socialism! 
Communism!” and even political instability.
.e complaints and debates around health care reform regarding 
rationing health care o6en have neglected to point out that it is already 
rationed by insurance companies, hospitals, and pharmaceutical com-
panies. .e key stakeholders, the patients, seem to be the last to be con-
sidered. .is is especially true of the uninsured and the poor. Examples 
of suAering and human tragedy in the “business” of health care are ev-
erywhere. Houston, Texas, is home to one of the greatest medical centers 
in the world. One of the wealthiest hospitals with several major branches 
in Houston sends poor people to Casa Juan Diego, the Houston Catholic 
Worker, to have their prescriptions 8lled. When people go to the emer-
gency room, all hospitals are required by law to treat them for their 
illness. .e hospital staA examines them and makes a diagnosis, but 
apparently do not provide medicine for those who do not have insur-
ance. Even though in its original foundation this large hospital system 
is designated as a charity hospital, people frequently arrive at our door 
to bring us prescriptions from that hospital, begging for help with their 
medicine. .is is certainly one way for this major hospital to score well 
on the stock market. Can you imagine Casa Juan Diego, funded solely by 
donations, where we have to decide each day what help we can oAer the 
poor vs. massive hospital systems? We are fortunate in Houston, how-
ever, to also have a somewhat unique county health system that serves 
the poor, including immigrants. While it is o6en diCcult for people to 
navigate the paper work and documents proving their living situation 
and income, at least the possibility of care exists. 
One of the worst examples of the direct harmful eAect on people 
of running businesses on the basis of the stockholders without reference 
to the stakeholders is the for-pro8t business prison business. Here one 
8nds the very opposite of everything Benedict recommends in his en-
cyclical, but especially the violation of the dignity of the human person. 
More and more prisons across the United States are being run by private 
companies for pro8t, on the stock market. .ey provide a commercial 
motive for imprisoning more and more people. .is booming business 
has been a windfall for the stockholders, at the expense of poor people 
caught in this trap. .e huge expense for taxpayers of building prisons 
and keeping people in jail for extended periods of time has somehow 
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turned into pro8t for stockholders and their income on the stock market 
is counted as a part of the “growth” or GDP of the United States.
.e private prison business includes detention centers for immi-
grants, who are no longer jailed for a few days until they can be de-
ported, but rather for months and years. When the custom of releasing 
Central American immigrants on their own recognizance was ended in 
2005, the massive building program for prisons to detain them began. As 
prisons for immigrants grew rapidly, stockholders for detention centers 
were enriched greatly, and they became richer as more immigrants were 
arrested and jailed. .e more arrests, the richer stockholders became. 
.ose who are held because of not having proper documentation have 
broken the civil law, not the criminal law, but they are held in a punitive 
situation together with robbers and murderers, with windfall pro8ts on 
the stock market.
.e former Vice-President of the United States Dick Cheney was 
actually indicted by a grand jury in South Texas for conBict of inter-
est in having many millions invested in these prisons at the same time 
as he was pushing legislation for imprisoning more immigrants. .ese 
detention centers are promoted by Congressional representatives as sure 
money makers for local communities. Congress approved a budget for 
the 2008 8scal year, providing funding for a 4,500-bed increase in the 
immigration detention beds to 32,000 beds from the prior year’s 27,500. 
Private corporations, including the Corrections Corporation of America 
and the Geo Group, bid against each other to win contracts to operate 
new prisons.
.e same companies run the prisons and the detention centers. 
.ey have their own lobbyists to increase pro8ts and to ensure that the 
commercial prison system continues. .e Associated Press reported in 
2007 that the Corrections Corporation of America spent 2.5 million 
dollars lobbying the federal government. CCA’s lobbying of the govern-
ment that year focused on three major areas: 1) lobbying to privatize the 
Bureau of Indian AAairs prison system, 2) lobbying against the Public 
Safety Act that would outlaw private prisons, and 3) lobbying against 
the Private Prison Information Act that would give the public the same 
access to private prison information as public prisons. Some even speak 
of kickbacks to judges who imprison more and more people to 8ll the 
privatized jails.
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Benedict XVI and the Concept of Redistribution  
of Wealth and Usury
Some readers of Caritas in Veritate were startled, if not enraged, to 8nd 
that Benedict had gone so far in defending stakeholders that he recom-
mended a large-scale redistribution of wealth on a worldwide scale. Some 
feared that he would take what they had and give it to the poor. What the 
Pope has done is to make respectable the sharing of wealth, when in the 
past, attempts to do so were shouted down as Communism.
As the Holy Father speaks of redistribution of wealth, as he notes 
the grave imbalances in wealth and poverty around the world, however, 
he makes what seems at 8rst to be a strange request. Instead of sounding 
like a modern-day radical Robin Hood ready to swoop down on the rich, 
rob their wealth, and give it to the poor, he cautions us to be careful that 
the very important redistribution does not hurt the poor or redistribute 
poverty. He is aware that in the past several decades instead of following 
the recommendations of Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio to which 
this encyclical relates, the economic powers found a way to transfer the 
wealth of the Southern hemisphere to the countries in the North.
Much of this transfer of wealth from the developing South to the 
richer North was accomplished through the loans given by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund to the countries emerging 
from colonialism, supposedly to assist them. .e countries were re-
quired by the international 8nancial institutions to change the ways their 
economies were run in order to receive continuing assistance. When he 
asked in 2007 that the process of debt cancellation and reduction for 
the poorest countries be continued and accelerated, Pope Benedict XVI 
insisted that these processes must not be made conditional upon struc-
tural adjustments that are detrimental to the most vulnerable popula-
tions. Many asked in response, what are structural adjustments? 
Almost forty nations were coerced into participating in what were 
called Structural Adjustment Programs in order to reschedule payments 
on loans taken out more than three decades ago from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. .e focus was on debt reduc-
tion and repayment. Priority was given to exporting the products that 
brought in the most cash, even if it included paying slave wages, using 
environmentally destructive methods of production, exporting the best 
and most nutritious food, and devaluations, announcing that the value 
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of local money was not what it used to be. .ese pressures encouraged 
politicians to favor giant commercial farms and the takeover of local 
business by multinationals corporations. Financial dealings such as 
these hurt people on a massive scale.
In negotiating Structural Adjustment Programs since the 1980s, 
the IMF and/or the World Bank typically dictated privatization of basic 
services previously provided by the government and cuts in government 
services, along with currency devaluation. .is insistence on the privati-
zation of government services to put them in the hands of multinationals 
on the stock market is another example of stockholders vs. stakeholders. 
It is hard to imagine that the concerns and needs of the people were 
considered in the imposition of these harsh programs.
Pressure to privatize has included the sale of the most basic re-
sources necessary to human existence—such as the sale of water dis-
tribution centers of various countries to corporations seeking pro8ts. 
A prime example was the sale of much of the water supply of Argentina 
to Enron, and the giant Monsanto company expressed great interest in 
obtaining water resources in various countries.
Caritas in Veritate relates the powerless of citizens in many coun-
tries to exactly those “budgetary policies, with cuts in social spending 
o6en made under pressure from international 8nancial institutions.” As 
he notes that such “powerlessness is increased by the lack of eAective 
protection on the part of workers’ associations,” Benedict XVI encour-
ages labor organizing,
Friends from Latin America have told us how they begged some of 
the refusers of Catholic social teaching who were inBuential at the World 
Bank at the time, not to give usurious loans to their country when it 
was being run by repressive military dictators propped up by the United 
States, by those whose economic policies made the poor much poorer. 
During this period the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund were making huge loans to Latin American and African “leaders” 
who obviously did not have the welfare of the people of their country 
at heart. Our friends knew, as the 8nanciers who lent the money had to 
also know, that the money would not be used to help the people, but for 
the enrichment of national leaders in whose name the loans were made. 
Our friends’ pleas were not heard, their country became more and more 
indebted and more obligated to follow an economics that devastated 
their land while transferring their money to the North by demands for 
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always larger interest payments. .e country has become one of the 
Latin American countries that is hostile not only to the countries of the 
North, but is in conBict with the Church.
.e IMF and World Bank gave huge amounts of money to repressive 
military dictators in Latin America that were supported by the United 
States in the name of stopping Communism. As they have emerged 
from horrifying times with death squads and the disappearance of many 
citizens, the people are now expected to repay the loans the dictators 
arranged. Eduardo Galeano recently asked the question: How can they 
expect us to pay back the money given to these cruel dictators?
.e 8lm, Life or Debt, which was shown in Museums of Fine Arts 
across the United States, has been frequently used in university class-
rooms to explain what happened to the countries coming out of colo-
nialism. It dramatically illustrates the destruction caused in one country, 
Jamaica, by these policies which have created what Pope John Paul II 
called a new colonialism, a new serfdom. Usury is at the heart of these 
injustices. As the banks continued to increase the interest rates on loans 
already given, the countries were told that all that they had repaid had 
been applied only to the interest and that the whole loan was still owed. 
.is is the scandal and immorality of usury. Cardinal Bertone, Secretary 
of State of the Vatican called it by its name: “I’ve repeated many times the 
judgment of experts and entire bodies of bishops: the international loans 
made by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well 
as bilateral loans, are by now a form of usury and should be declared ille-
gal.” Usury is blamed by reasonable people for the 2008–2010 worldwide 
8nancial crisis. Although for many centuries usury was condemned by 
the Church, with the advent of capitalism, being against usury was con-
sidered unacceptable, even rather odd. What was considered extremist 
is now the diagnosis of the problem.
Peter Maurin, who so o6en spoke of living according to Gospel 
simplicity, also spoke of a philosophy of work, one opposed to usury 
and speculation: “Man should earn his living by the sweat of his brow, 
and a gentleman, truly speaking, is one who does not live on the sweat 
of someone else’s brow.”
Speaking of usury, not many have mentioned how the religious 
communities in the United States have been hurt by the 8nancial crisis, 
but even worse, how religious in developing countries were sometimes 
devastated when their investments turned out to be worth little. Some 
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missionaries who do most to help the poor lost much. While Pope 
Benedict XVI did not mention this tragedy in his encyclical, it would 
be a welcome change in canon law to not require religious to invest in 
the most lucrative, and therefore risky, sections of the stock market. In 
addition to the devastating usurious loans to developing countries that 
have resulted in transfers of large amounts of money to the North, inter-
national trade agreements have bene8tted the North, increased poverty 
in countries to the South and pushed people to migrate.
Agribusiness Corporations—Against the People  
and the Pope?
.e eAect of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) was to 
destroy the farms of the people of Mexico in favor of huge agribusi-
nesses. Mexican farmers were not able to compete with the lower prices 
of subsidized grains Booding their market from the United States. It is 
extensively documented that between 1.2 million and 2 million Mexican 
farmers lost their farms in the wake of NAFTA. In a move echoing the 
enclosure of the commons in England centuries ago, the traditional 
ejido lands which had belonged to the people in Mexico through the 
indigenous tradition and later blessed by Mexican law were broken up 
through NAFTA. Many of the landless people are now forced by neces-
sity to work for the new agribusiness owners of their lands or to work as 
migrant farm workers in the United States.
In El Salvador, the equitable land reform recommended in Caritas 
in Veritate has caused violent struggles for many years, even centuries. 
.ere, as in so many other countries, the land is owned by the few. .e 
authors lived in El Salvador at the beginning of the civil war in the late 
1970s. As Archbishop Oscar Romero said there in regard to agrarian re-
form, you can speak about anything in Latin America, propose all means 
of solutions in the 8ght for social justice, “but when you touch the land, 
it calls forth its martyrs.” Land reform will be even more complicated as 
multinational corporations have begun to purchase the arable land in 
the global South.
.e growth and processing of corn had traditionally been at the heart 
of local Mexican agriculture, and the government, through Conasupo, 
was the purchaser of last resort for those who might be unable to sell 
their crop. With the unbalanced provisions of NAFTA in agriculture, 
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the United States could continue subsidies to American farmers and 
agribusiness, but the Mexican government could not subsidize farmers. 
Companies like ADM and Cargill took control of the whole corn market 
in Mexico. .ese very large companies could set prices at will and they 
could hoard grains for price advantage and speculation. Costs of trans-
portation of grains for processing to a central location in Mexico and 
for staA from the United States were 8gured into the costs. .e price of 
staple foods in Mexico like tortillas rose astronomically.
Small businesses were also destroyed throughout Mexico, as Wal-
Mart moved in a6er the NAFTA agreements with hundreds of stores, of-
ten using diAerent names locally for their stores, using the old-fashioned 
method in the tradition of the robber barons. Wal-Mart was successful 
because they could undersell for a period of time until the local busi-
nesses had folded, and then become the local price-8xer, as they have 
done in small towns throughout the United States. We have received 
migrants uprooted by NAFTA in our Houses of Hospitality in Houston, 
including those who told us they used to have a small business, but were 
unable to compete when the multinationals came in.
.e Center for International Policy’s Americas Program described 
the eAect of this economic upheaval: “Since NAFTA, the Mexican econo-
my rests on four pillars: the informal economy, non-renewable resources 
(oil and gas), remittances from migrants in the United States, and drug 
traCcking.” To call that a shaky foundation, they said, would be an un-
derstatement. .e expansion of free trade agreements to other countries 
has had to be imposed by force, for example, in Central America. In 
Guatemala protesters against CAFTA were shot and killed.
What has been happening in agriculture in the decades since the 
publication of Paul VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio is at the heart of 
a new colonialism. In agriculture many of the stakeholders around the 
world are having their resources redistributed to the big agribusiness 
corporations, and as a result, food insecurity grows. Family farms have 
almost gone out of existence in the U.S. as agribusiness has taken over, 
but the problem has reached massive proportions in the global South, 
where for many centuries, thousands of years, small farmers produced 
the food needed for their families without making payments to multina-
tional corporations. Enter the “experts” of agribusiness with their claims 
of creating more food through chemicals, fertilizers, herbicides, pesti-
cides, and, of all things, seeds stolen and patented in the United States as 
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their own. In what was perhaps mistakenly called a Green Revolution, 
farmers have been told that the only way to avoid famine and starvation 
is to use chemicals and to buy all seeds from agribusiness companies. 
.e emphasis was on rice and soya beans and perhaps wheat, not rep-
resenting the diversity of crops raised, for example, in India, where the 
majority eat a vegetarian diet that includes lentils and a variety of oils, 
traditionally grown by their farmers. Later, farmers from the South were 
told to plant cash crops rather than food for their families, which would 
give them money to buy things. .ey could then import their food, 
which turned out to be more expensive.
Pope Benedict, following Populorum Progressio, makes important 
recommendations for agricultural development in poorer countries and 
for eliminating the structural causes that give rise to the problem of food 
insecurity. .is can be done, he says, “by investing in rural infrastruc-
tures, irrigation systems, transport, organization of markets, and in the 
development and dissemination of agricultural technology that can make 
the best use of the human, natural and socio-economic resources that are 
more readily available at the local level, while guaranteeing their sustain-
ability over the long term as well” (Caritas, 27; emphasis added).
Local peoples may rejoice that while advocating the above, he tells 
the powerful: “All this needs to be accomplished with the involvement 
of local communities in choices and decisions that aAect the use of agri-
cultural land.” .is is a radical and fearless stance in favor of local com-
munities and local agriculture in the face of the growing stranglehold of 
multinational agribusinesses on international agriculture: Most are not 
aware that the majority of the world’s farmers are women, o6en single 
women supporting their children through subsistence farming. In the 
8eld of agriculture Benedict turns out to be a champion for women and 
human rights.
.e Pope’s recommendations on ethics as applied to agriculture 
and subsidiarity, on traditional as well as innovative farming techniques 
and on local community choices are undermined by the power of mul-
tinational companies involved in agribusiness and the practice in recent 
decades of patenting life forms. A decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
laid the groundwork for multinational companies to copyright in the 
U.S. patent oCce plants and seeds which have been developed by farmers 
in developing countries for thousands of years—essentially robbing the 
intellectual property rights of farmers around the world. .is decision 
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began the dominance of patents within the food chain by companies that 
seek ever greater pro8t. .is concept of patenting life, which is sacred, is 
absurd. What will be on the selling block next?
Almost ten years ago Catholic Workers from Houston protested in 
Alvin, Texas, with scientist and environmentalist Vandana Shiva from 
India against biopiracy. .e Rice-Tec company in Alvin had attempted to 
copyright basmati rice, developed over thousands of years by farmers in 
India. .e protests helped to at least limit the extent of their copyrights. 
One of the companies that controls much of worldwide agriculture is 
Monsanto, notably the most powerful in thwarting local development, 
the subsidiarity in agriculture that the Pope recommends. Monsanto not 
only markets chemicals and discourages traditional agricultural meth-
ods, but entices people everywhere to use their genetically modi8ed, 
patented seeds. At 8rst they o6en give the seeds at no cost. In order to 
use Monsanto’s seeds, however, farmers must sign a contract not to save 
any seeds for the next year, but to always buy new seeds and herbicides 
from Monsanto. Local courts and even the World Trade Organization 
have upheld Monsanto’s right to prosecute any farmers who saved a few 
seeds for the following year. .ese prosecutions have included quite a 
number of those who did not sign a contract with the company, but 
whose 8elds were contaminated by genetically modi8ed seeds blown 
over from neighboring 8elds by the wind.
Investigative reporter Marie-Monique Robin, brought to public 
notice in her book !e World According to Monsanto, observes that 
Monsanto now owns 90 percent of genetically modi8ed food grown 
worldwide (mainly soy, corn, cotton, and canola). In an interview pub-
lished on the Irish Seed Saver Association Web site, she describes the ex-
tent of Monsanto’s control of seeds and plants from the countries of the 
South: “Between 1983 and 2005 Monsanto alone obtained 647 patents 
for plants, almost all originally from the Global South,” also purchasing 
more than 86y seed companies in various countries.
It is diCcult, if not impossible, for the small farmer to compete 
against a company with a $10 million budget and many investigators 
checking the 8elds. .e concern over Monsanto’s policies and policing 
and the toxicity of their pesticides is so great that organic farmers in the 
United States organized a campaign called “Millions Against Monsanto” 
in order to slow down the spread of toxic products through this company. 
.ey were successful in obtaining the support of major food distributors 
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and school districts in refusing to carry milk containing GBH hormones 
and antibiotics. .e organic farmers remind all that Monsanto is the 
company that sold Agent Orange during the Vietnam War and contin-
ues to deny that it caused any problems.
Attempts to blunt Vatican criticism and guidance in econom-
ics have o6en included lobbying in and conferences at universities in 
Rome by the refusers of Catholic social teaching. Not to be outdone, the 
supporters of monopoly in agriculture have been holding such confer-
ences where the inBuence of powerful companies like Monsanto can be 
felt. Two of these conferences, held in 2009, apparently were meant to 
inBuence the Synod of Bishops for Africa, whose working document 
contained critical language on corporate-controlled genetically modi-
8ed crops. Press reports indicated that the Synod’s document asserted 
that imposition of GMO (genetically modi8ed organisms) risks “ruining 
small landholders, abolishing traditional methods of seeding, and mak-
ing farmers dependent on production companies.”
Many who work in the global South were discouraged to learn of 
the conferences in Rome, at which basically all the papers presented 
Monsanto’s view that biotechnology is essential in order to have enough 
food in the world. !e National Catholic Reporter’s John Allen wrote 
about the spring 2009 conference: “in one sign of concern about the 
appearance of corporate inBuence, sources told NCR that plans for the 
study week originally called for a couple of Monsanto employees to 
discuss public/private partnerships in the delivery of GMO technology. 
Roughly a month ago, however, the Monsanto oCcials were quietly ad-
vised not to attend.”
Catholic News Service reported that Cardinal Renato Martino, the 
head of the Ponti8cal Council for Justice and Peace, addressing the scan-
dal of hunger in the world, declared that the responsibility for the food 
crisis “is in the hands of unscrupulous people who focus only on pro8t 
and certainly not on the well-being of all people. A more just system of 
distribution and not the manufacturing of genetically modi8ed foods is 
the key to addressing the problem,” he said, adding that, “If one wants to 
pursue GMOs one can freely do so, but without hiding that it’s a way to 
make more pro8ts.” 
Some who commented on Caritas in Veritate within a few days 
of its publication posited the idea that some well-known philanthropic 
foundations would have to be congratulated because they appeared to be 
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doing what the Pope recommended. .ey may not have had time to read 
the encyclical carefully or to analyze the multinational links that such 
foundations have in biotech areas such as large grants to Monsanto in 
Africa as well as aggressive population control programs in developing 
countries, before rushing to judgment. 
.e implementation of the Pope’s recommendations in agriculture 
and economics will be enormously diCcult because of the corporate 
political power and propaganda of the agri-industry and biotech indus-
tries, and the “free trade” agreements set up to protect their monopolis-
tic practices and the pro8ts they bring to their countries. Perhaps that is 
why he asks for a reform of the United Nations Organization, as well as 
reforming economic institutions and international 8nance (e.g., World 
Bank, IMF, WTO), so that the concept of the family of nations “can ac-
quire real teeth.” .e catch-22 here, of course, is that the WTO incorpo-
rates some of the worst legislation aAecting the developing nations, and 
the WTO regulations take precedence over some national laws.
Much could be done, however, with the common good of all in 
the global economy in mind. .e Supreme Court of the U.S., which 
can choose which cases to hear, and sometimes does choose cases that 
may aAect or change decisions made in previous decades, could change 
the decision approving patenting life forms developed in other coun-
tries. Local initiatives in states and counties against the authoritarian 
absolute control of one company may bring such cases to the court. A 
more nuanced approach—such as traditional laws in Canada where the 
patenting of higher life forms, including plants, could not be patented 
unless Parliament mandates it—would be a major improvement. With 
the unprecedented situation of six Catholics Justices sitting on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, there is a special opportunity to revisit this decision that 
has done much to promote a new colonialism. If those Catholic Justices 
as well as others of good will would carefully read Caritas in Veritate and 
apply its teaching, much could be done in the way of economic reform.
.e Pope’s recommendations for subsidiarity and support for lo-
cal agriculture support the concept of distributism, championed by 
Chesterton and Belloc and the Catholic Worker Movement. Distributism 
supports the idea of private property, but insists on private property for 
everyone, not just the wealthy few. .ese recommendations also support 
those from the global South who advocate small, independent farms 
with biologically diverse crops that would be more resistant to drought, 
disease, and Bood.
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Migration in Epochal Proportions
.e redistribution of wealth from the South to the North has pushed 
people to attempt to migrate to where their resources have been trans-
ferred, to a place where they could 8nd work for their families. People 
become desperate when they simply cannot compete on a local level 
with the products sold by the agro-industrial monopolies. A scene in 
the documentary 8lm “Wetback: .e Undocumented Documentary” 
brings to life the problem for the small grain processor. In the 8lm, a 
Nicaraguan who prepares to migrate to the United States explains that 
his little business is no longer viable because he cannot compete with the 
product from Mexico called Maseca, the already prepared masa for tor-
tillas. While the 8lm does not mention it, a little research quickly shows 
the connection of Maseca with ADM, which (a6er NAFTA) developed 
an enormous processing plant in Mexico. .e Nicaraguan whose at-
tempt to migrate is unsuccessful may not have known that Maseca is 
from a multinational that controls the market, but he did know that it 
put him out of business.
.e Merida Initiative, also known as Plan Merida, in 2008 began 
to provide millions of U.S. dollars to Mexico to militarize their southern 
border purportedly to control the importation of drugs. Like the mili-
tarization of the U.S.-Mexico border, however, the result is the massive 
deportation of migrants attempting to cross Mexico. .is plan continues 
and escalates payments of the United States to Mexico for capturing and 
deporting Central Americans who attempt to migrate. Even in the 1980s 
we were told by immigration agents in Mexico that their department 
was given between $50 and $100 per head to deport Central Americans 
before they got as far as the United States.
Immigrants have made a tremendous contribution to the U.S. econ-
omy over many years. .ey built the houses, cut down trees, cut people’s 
lawns, and cared for many of the children of Houston as live-in nannies. 
As the economy in the United States worsened in recent years, how-
ever, the migrants who had o6en been taken advantage of by businesses 
(sometimes not paid at all) were convenient scapegoats for economic 
problems in the North. We wrote in the Houston Catholic Worker in 2007: 
“.e animosity and hostility towards immigrants in today’s world is very 
hard to fathom, especially as U.S. foreign and economic policy forces im-
migration.” It is as if the Ku Klux Klan is in charge of Public Relations, 
spitting out untruths and half-truths about immigrants, as they did in 
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1927 ridiculing Slovaks, Italians, Catholics, Jews, and Chinese people, 
and insisting on legislation to limit immigration to Northern Europeans. 
We remember as yesterday our mother telling stories of the Klan warning 
our father against being Catholic at that time. It would have been better 
if he was not Catholic.
.e same negative campaign is being built up today against immi-
grants. One hears a barrage of comments scapegoating them for what-
ever diCculties the citizen writer or caller encounters. Economic woes 
are frequently laid at the feet of immigrants, accusing them of eating 
up all of our tax money with nothing le6 for citizens. No, it is the other 
way around. Money made from the undocumented immigrants’ cheap 
labor means more pro8ts, which goes to CEOs and stockholders, not to 
immigrants. A fact o6en forgotten is that immigrants are taxpayers in 
every sense of the word. If they use a false social security number, the 
owner of the number reaps the bene8ts upon retirement. .ey pay sales 
tax; they contribute to property tax when they rent. .ey are eliminated, 
however, from receiving bene8ts from the taxes—a pretty good invest-
ment for everyone else.
It is no wonder that those who call in to talk shows are upset. .e 
prevailing economics does not help the average citizen or poor person. 
CEOs and some stockholders do very well, but the so-called gains of the 
trickle down theory have never trickled down. .is is not the fault of 
the immigrant workers, but of an economics that is unjust. What trick-
les down is not bene8ts for the worker, but rather drops of blood. It is 
the height of duplicity to reject the immigrants a6er they have made a 
major contribution to our economy. To be in any way truthful, one sim-
ply cannot hire the undocumented at cheaper wages, longer hours, and 
harder work and then accuse them of being law breakers and potential 
terrorists, not to mention arresting them and deporting them or putting 
them in prison and breaking up their families. It almost appears that 
attacks on immigrants are promoted to make the immigrant more vul-
nerable and thus willing to work for less. .ey are treated as a disposable 
people—like disposable diapers.
Scaffolding Phobia
Every time we see new construction going up in our neighborhood with 
scaAolding arranged in front of the building, we suAer anxiety attacks 
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because we have seen what happens to construction workers who have 
fallen oA these scaAolds and ended up with broken backs in three places, 
not able to move a limb. .ey can receive nothing from the community. 
.ere is no disability or compensation for their work. .is is true of 
all the men and women injured or incapacitated for any reason. .ey 
are le6 to their own resources, which o6en do not exist. Harris County 
in Texas has the unusual possibility for them to receive eligibility for a 
short time for medical services, but strict rules for application or re-
application may eliminate large numbers. .ere is no disability to as-
sist with living, however, and no one to help with expenses for so many 
medical supplies needed. 
.e volunteer doctors of Casa Juan Diego assist when possible, al-
though it is impossible to address the numbers who are in need. One of 
the very important services of the Casa Juan Diego and Casa Maria clin-
ics is to help diabetic immigrants who otherwise become blind or lose a 
limb. Some 8nd us too late, when their sight is almost gone or they no 
longer have feeling in their feet. Casa Juan Diego assists badly wounded 
people when we can with diapers, supplies to care for tracheotomies, 
and catheters. So o6en people need wheelchairs; when wheelchairs are 
donated, we pass them along to those in need. Imagine the government 
money saved by the refusal to aid the sick and injured immigrant. It 
would be in the billions—what a contribution to the economy! Hospital 
social workers call and ask for help because the person has no family 
here. If the person is alone here, the only real possibility is to make ar-
rangements with a personal care home, a small business operated for the 
purpose of receiving ill people. In many cases, however, there is family, 
and the family struggles with what to do in a terrible crisis.
One of the saddest moments at Casa Juan Diego occurs when a 
family arrives saying that the private or public hospital had sent them to 
us to help them survive with a seriously injured family member. .e hos-
pital has no resources for follow-up a6er the emergency room. .e ritual 
begins with tears in Casa Juan Diego’s library where the family members 
narrate the awful accident or illness that has le6 a family member in se-
rious physical condition and totally handicapped. Some have been sent 
home in a coma for the family to care for. .e whole family is in crisis, 
and the employer of the paralyzed person will not help. .e government 
will not help. .e driver who injured the person in an accident ran away 
and cannot be found. .e thief who shot the person cannot be found or 
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has no resources to help. Someone supports the family, but another fam-
ily member cannot work because someone must be available to take care 
of a very sick person, not to mention caring for their children. .e ambi-
ence of a morgue lightens when we mention that Casa Juan Diego can 
help with some of the expenses. We can testify that the attacks in recent 
years blaming immigrants for our economic problems not only were un-
true, but outright calumny. .e raids on businesses, the imprisonment 
of immigrants, and the cruel, hurtful laws against them passed in many 
states have destroyed lives and families, not helped the economy.
Caritas in Veritate addresses the migration question directly, 
describing it as a striking phenomenon of epoch-making proportions 
because of the sheer numbers of people involved, the social, economic, 
political, cultural, and religious problems it raises, and the dramatic 
challenges it poses to nations and the international community. Benedict 
recommends bold, forward-looking policies of international coopera-
tion to handle migration, policies that would safeguard the needs and 
rights of individual migrants and their families, and at the same time, 
those of the countries to which they go seeking work:
.e phenomenon, as everyone knows, is diCcult to manage; but 
there is no doubt that foreign workers, despite any diCculties 
concerning integration, make a signi8cant contribution to the 
economic development of the host country through their labor, 
besides that which they make to their country of origin through 
the money they send home. Obviously, these laborers cannot be 
considered as a commodity or a mere workforce. .ey must not, 
therefore, be treated like any other factor of production. Every 
migrant is a human person who, as such, possesses fundamen-
tal, inalienable rights that must be respected by everyone and in 
every circumstance. (Caritas, 62)
Consistent Ethic of Life
A major theme of Caritas in Veritate is the unity of social justice, devel-
opment of peoples, and respect for life. .ose who denigrate the idea of 
a consistent ethic of life will not 8nd support in this document where 
Benedict XVI states:
.e Church forcefully maintains this link between life ethics and 
social ethics, fully aware that a society lacks solid foundations 
Zwick | Beyond the Culture of Cutthroat Competition 147
when, on the one hand, it asserts values such as the dignity of the 
person, justice and peace, but then, on the other hand, radically 
acts to the contrary by allowing or tolerating a variety of ways in 
which human life is devalued and violated, especially where it is 
weak or marginalized. (Caritas, 15)
Rugged individualism does not 8nd support here. .e Pope spe-
ci8cally repudiates the claim of some that they owe nothing to anyone, 
except to themselves. When he speaks of rights, he reminds us that 
rights presuppose duties and responsibilities to and solidarity with oth-
ers, and that elementary and basic rights remain unacknowledged and 
are violated in much of the world. .e Holy Father puts together the 
right to life, the right to food, the right to water, the necessity to protect 
the environment, and the development of peoples. A special concern 
is infant mortality indicating that concern for life includes concern for 
small babies.
Benedict XVI emphasizes the importance of the family and speaks 
of responsible procreation as making a positive contribution to integral 
human development, as opposed to state-mandated “family planning” 
and forced sterilizations in which poor women may not even be in-
formed of what is happening to them. He also points out the diCculties 
countries are having where birth rates are very low.
While Natural Family Planning (NFP) is not mentioned in the en-
cyclical, it is a practical response to the idea of responsible procreation. 
.e secular world is generally unaware of NFP, sometimes equating it 
with the old rhythm method that did not work. Critics of the Church 
might take note of the Pope’s commitment to life here in his words of 
responsible procreation. He is not suggesting that everyone have twelve 
children, but to be open to life and to caring for young children.
Some years ago it was widely reported that a third of the women of 
Brazil had been sterilized so that their factory work would not be inter-
rupted. Because of our work with immigrants, we have been aware of the 
demands of corporations, especially foreign or multinational corpora-
tions, on women in developing countries regarding pregnancies. Many 
maquiladoras (outsourced factories) require proof that women are not 
pregnant and not likely to become pregnant in order to be given or to 
continue employment. Foundations and NGOs whose role is ostensi-
bly to help people o6en insist on contraception and sterilization, and 
governments in developing countries are pressured to mandate “family 
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planning,” at times a euphemism for forced procedures. Women some-
times come to our clinics, for example, to have Intra-Uterine Devices 
removed. .ey had been under extreme pressure to accept their place-
ment in their bodies, but they had found no clinic willing to remove 
them.
An important part of our work in Houston is receiving pregnant 
immigrant women who may have no one to help them, giving them hos-
pitality during their pregnancy and a6erward to help them get started 
again with their lives. We also receive pregnant women who are being 
asked to leave their homes by family members if they refuse to have an 
abortion. Generally, immigrant women are seeking not abortions but 
help during these few months and to get on their feet a6er the child’s 
birth. Discussions of life issues in the United States are controversial. 
It is not always recognized that the decision a woman makes to have 
an abortion may not be unrelated to economics and the pressures of a 
consumer culture that countenances every form of self-indulgence. In 
that environment it is harder to expect average people to practice heroic 
virtue in carrying a child through a diCcult pregnancy, or a pregnancy 
that will aAect a family’s lifestyle or a woman’s work in a profession.
When everything is based on pro8t, the protection of life, food, and 
water that the Holy Father advocates is obviously not the priority. He 
asks for solidarity, sharing, in the protection of the environment and the 
conservation and development of energy resources, so that all might live:
.e technologically advanced societies can and must lower their 
domestic energy consumption, either through an evolution in 
manufacturing methods or through greater ecological sensitiv-
ity among their citizens. It should be added that at present it is 
possible to achieve improved energy eCciency while at the same 
time encouraging research into alternative forms of energy. What 
is also needed, though, is a worldwide redistribution of energy 
resources, so that countries lacking those resources can have ac-
cess to them. !e fate of those countries cannot be le# in the hands 
of whoever is "rst to claim the spoils, or whoever is able to prevail 
over the rest. (Caritas, 49; emphasis added)
Conclusion
It is unusual to begin a study of economics, as Benedict XVI has done, 
with an insistence on truth in addition to the standard elements of 
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Catholic social teaching such as solidarity, subsidiarity, and respect for 
workers. A closer look reveals that truth is o6en exactly what has been 
missing in discussions of business and economics, whether within a 
company, in reports to regulatory agencies, in advertising and public 
relations, or in presentations to stockholders or stakeholders. It is some-
what like the recent invention of government, what they call “truthi-
ness,” which may be only distantly related to the truth. .e words used 
by economists sometimes seem to convey the opposite of their true 
meaning. .is is especially noticeable in words related to freedom—for 
example, free trade, or free market, which is only free for huge monopo-
listic corporations or governments of wealthy nations. Statistics are used 
to disguise harsh realities in glowing terms. It is also true of the word 
“gi6,” as used by U.S. foundations linked with multinational corpora-
tions. .e “gi6” o6en has so many strings attached to it in relation to 
seeking future markets for the companies that it could hardly be called 
a gi6 in the true sense of the word.
We have wondered for years and written in the Houston Catholic 
Worker about why it might be that the economics and business depart-
ments of most Catholic colleges have adopted the same economics as 
their secular counterparts, seemingly without reference to what is taught 
in theology departments. In Caritas in Veritate Benedict XVI attributes 
many of the problems that limit success in the development of peoples 
to the rejection of metaphysics by the human sciences, what he calls the 
excessive segmentation and fragmentation of knowledge. .is echoes 
Peter Maurin’s writing about responses in his time to the encyclicals of 
Pius XI, who asked Catholics to transform the social order. Peter went to 
Catholic universities to ask Catholic professors what they were going to 
do about the social order. .eir excuse for not addressing the question 
was the fragmentation of knowledge: “.at’s not my 8eld!” Caritas in 
Veritate teaches that philosophy, theology, and socio-economic concerns 
cannot be separated, that “the broadening of our concept of reason and 
its application is indispensable if we are to succeed in adequately weigh-
ing all the elements involved in the question of development and in the 
solution of socio-economic problems” (Caritas, 31). Benedict insists 
that we must apply reason and a person-centered ethics to the powerful 
new forces of globalization, “animating them within the perspective of 
that ‘civilization of love’ whose seed God has planted in every people, in 
every culture” (Caritas, 33).
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When we examine what Benedict means by integral human devel-
opment in charity in truth and compare it with global realities of power, 
dominance, materialism, and cutthroat competition, the task of chang-
ing the economic system seems an enormous, almost impossible task. 
.e Pope frames his argument, however, full of hope and trust that a 
new way is possible, if approached through truth and charity and joy: 
Only if we are aware of our calling, as individuals and as a com-
munity, to be part of God’s family as his sons and daughters, will 
we be able to generate a new vision and muster new energy in the 
service of a truly integral humanism. .e greatest service to de-
velopment, then, is a Christian humanism that enkindles charity 
and takes its lead from truth, accepting both as a lasting gi6 from 
God. Openness to God makes us open towards our brothers and 
sisters and towards an understanding of life as a joyful task to be 
accomplished in a spirit of solidarity. (Caritas, 78)
Benedict also refuses to separate social ethics from spirituality. 
“Development requires attention to the spiritual life, a serious consider-
ation of the experiences of trust in God, spiritual fellowship in Christ, reli-
ance upon God’s providence and mercy, love and forgiveness, self-denial, 
acceptance of others, justice and peace” (Caritas, 79). All this is essential, 
he says, if hearts of stone are to be transformed into hearts of Besh.
When Dorothy Day’s cause for sainthood was introduced in Rome 
by Cardinal John O’Connor of New York, he said that “much of what she 
spoke of in terms of social justice anticipated the thought of John Paul 
II”—and that is true of Benedict XVI as well. Dorothy spoke about the 
need for a revolution—a revolution of the heart—to break away from 
the grip of materialism that tries to replace our values and take pos-
session of our souls. Dorothy and Peter Maurin not only endorsed and 
taught Catholic social teaching as presented in the papal encyclicals and 
the practical implications of it, but also lived it, caring for those who 
were refugees from the economic system. .eir views on economics and 
on the social order Bowed from Church teaching on the common good, 
the universal destination of goods, the dignity of the human person, and 
the responsibility for God’s creation held in trust for future generations. 
.e very name Catholic Worker reBected their understanding that the 
concept of the common good must include the good of the masses who 
worked. Were Dorothy to be canonized, the reception and implementa-
tion of Catholic social teaching and speci8cally this encyclical would be 
encouraged.
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Caritas in Veritate says: “God gives us the strength to 8ght and to 
suAer for love of the common good, because he is our All, our greatest 
hope.” Given the machinations of the marketeers supported by theories 
taught in most universities and the suAering of the people around the 
world because of it, we will need all that strength to 8ght and suAer for 
the common good in our time and for an economics of communion and 
a civilization of love.
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Fraternity, Gift, and Reciprocity  
in “Caritas in Veritate”
Stefano Zamagni
Introduction
One of the marks of our time is a constant call for ethics, which has progressively replaced, over the past quarter of a century, the 
persistent call for politics typical of the 1960s, when it was imagined that 
“everything was politics.” But this agreement on the primacy of ethics 
ceases when it comes to tangible moral issues. As Alasdair McIntyre ob-
served in A#er Virtue, the apodictic use of moral principles serves only 
to put an end to the ethical dialogue itself. In other words, the broad 
convergence on ethics in public debate almost never translates into ethi-
cal consensus.
.e teaching of Pope John Paul II insisted constantly on this as-
pect. In his speech to the United Nations on October 5, 1995, the pontiA 
stressed that it is possible to reach an agreement on social and political 
issues on a shared common basis since “the universal moral law written 
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in the heart of man is a sort of ‘grammar’ which helps the world face the 
debate over its future.”1 In February 2004, in his address to the members 
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, John Paul II—a6er re-
calling that the natural moral law can be a dialogical tool for everyone—
said that the main obstacle to this was “the diAusion among faithful of 
an ethics based on 8deism,” hence the lack of “an objective benchmark 
for laws, which are o6en based on social consensus alone.” .is line of 
thought—embraced, even more strongly, also by Benedict XVI—has in 
Caritas in Veritate its 8rst complete theorization. For that matter, before 
becoming Pope, Cardinal Ratzinger wrote the following: “Natural law 
reveals to us that even nature contains a moral message. .e spiritual 
content of creation is not only mechanical or mathematical . . . .ere is a 
surplus of spirit, of ‘natural laws’ in the universe, which is imprinted with 
and which reveals to us an inner order.”2
.at said, in this essay I will discuss the manifestation of the princi-
ple of fraternity in economics. More speci8cally, I will try to answer this 
question: What does it mean and what does it imply, in today’s economic 
systems, to embrace the fraternal principle, that is to say, the principle of 
reciprocity, as interpreted in Chapter 3 of Caritas in Veritate? But 8rst it 
is necessary to explain properly what the principle of reciprocity is. .e 
simplest way to do that is to compare the principle of exchange of equiv-
alent values with that of reciprocity. .e former states that whatever A 
does or gives to B, with whom he freely chose to start a relationship of 
exchange, must be counterbalanced by B doing or giving something of 
equal value to A. .is “something,” in our market economies, is nothing 
but the market price.
.is principle is subject to two main quali8cations. First of all, es-
tablishing the market price logically precedes the transfer of property 
right from A to B. (If A wants to sell his/her house to B, they must 8rst 
of all reach an agreement on the price, and only a6erwards can they go 
on to transfer the property right). Secondly, the transfer from B to A is 
not a free one; on the contrary, it depends on the transfer from A to B. In 
fact if B refused to ful8ll the agreement, he/she would be compelled to 
do so by law. .is means that in the exchange of equivalent values there 
is freedom ex ante, since the parties to the agreement are not forced to 
negotiate among themselves, but there is no freedom ex post.
1. John Paull II, Teachings of John Paul II, 732.
2. Ratzinger, God and the World, 142.
Zamagni | Fraternity, Gift, and Reciprocity in “Caritas in Veritate” 157
In reciprocity, by contrast, neither of these two features exists: A 
acts freely to help B in some way based on the expectation that B will do 
the same, eventually, for him/her or, even better, for C. In reciprocity 
there is no previous agreement on price, nor is B obliged to repay A. 
A simply forms an expectation, and if that expectation is disappointed, 
what happens is that A puts an end to (or changes) the relationship with 
B. .is is why reciprocity is a fragile interpersonal relationship. .e per-
son who initiates the relationship always runs the risk of running into 
some opportunist fellow who only takes and never gives.
.e two principles also diAer in two other respects. First, the value 
of what B will give to (or do for) A or C need not be equivalent to what 
A gave to B. Reciprocity, in fact, is based on proportionality, not equiva-
lence, as Aristotle understood perfectly: each gives according to his/her 
real possibilities. Second, while the primum movens of the exchange of 
equivalent values is to pursue a (legitimate) interest, reciprocity always 
starts as a free gi6: A approaches B with the attitude of someone who 
wants to make a gi6, not to make a deal.
Transcending Old, Outdated Dichotomies
.e 8rst important message we 8nd in the encyclical Caritas in Veritate 
is the call to overcome the now outdated dichotomy between the eco-
nomic and the social sphere. Modernity le6 us as a legacy the idea that 
setting pro8t as one’s main goal and being moved by self-interest alone 
is a prerequisite to access the economy’s club; which is the same as say-
ing that one cannot be a true entrepreneur if one does not pursue pro8t 
maximization. Otherwise, one should be satis8ed with belonging to 
the social sphere. .is absurd idea—deriving from the theoretical error 
which confuses the market economy, a genus, with one of its particular 
species, namely capitalism—led us to identify the economy as the place 
where wealth (or income) is produced and whose basic principle is ef-
8ciency, and the social sphere as the place where wealth is distributed 
and solidarity is put into practice.
.e encyclical, on the contrary, tells us that it is possible to do busi-
ness even while pursuing socially useful goals and acting for pro-social 
reasons. .is is one of the possible tangible ways to bridge the gap be-
tween the economic and the social sphere—a gap which is all the more 
dangerous considering that while it is true that an economy that simply 
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leaves out the social dimension is not morally acceptable, it is also true 
that a social sphere consisting solely in redistribution, completely ignor-
ing the resource constraint, would not be sustainable in the long run: 
one can only distribute what has been already produced.
In his document, the pontiA challenges the well-rooted common-
place that economic activity is too serious and diCcult an activity to 
allow it not to be inBuenced by the four cardinal principles of the social 
teaching of the Church, namely: the centrality of the human person; 
solidarity; subsidiarity; and the common good. From this same com-
monplace comes the practical implication that the values of the social 
teaching only apply to works of a social nature, since the task of lead-
ing the economy must be le6 to those who are capable to guarantee the 
pursuit of eCciency.
Yet, contrary to what people commonly think, the fundamentum 
divisionis for telling what is an enterprise and what is not is not eCciency, 
for the simple reason that eCciency belongs to the order of means and 
not of ends. Indeed, one must be eCcient in order to attain in the best 
possible way the end that one has freely chosen. However, the choice of 
ends has nothing to do with eCciency per se. Only a6er the end has been 
chosen can the entrepreneur act eCciently. ECciency as an end to itself 
would become an ideology (the “eCciency ethos”), which today is one 
of the most frequent causes of the destruction of wealth, as the current 
economic-8nancial crisis sadly con8rms.
Generalizing a moment the argument, it is certainly true that the 
market economy presupposes competition, since there cannot be a mar-
ket where there is no competition (although the opposite is not true). 
And no one can ignore that the fruitfulness of competition lies in its im-
plying a tension, which presupposes the presence of a third party and the 
relationship with a third party. Without tension there is no movement, 
although such movement—and this is the point—can also be lethal, it can 
cause death. .is form of competition is called positional. It is a relatively 
new form of competition, rare in the past, and particularly dangerous, 
for it tends to destroy the bond with others. In positional competition, 
economic activity does not strive towards a common goal—as should 
be clear from the etymology, competition deriving from the Latin cum-
petere—but follows Hobbes’s “mors tua, vita mea.” And it is precisely here 
that we see the foolishness of positional competition, which selects the 
best, giving victory to those who arrive 8rst, but eliminates or neutralizes 
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those who come in “second,” the losers. Under positional competition, 
the social bond turns into a mere trade relationship and economic action 
tends to become inhuman, therefore ineCcient.
Now, the advantage—and not a minor one—that Caritas in Veritate 
oAers us is to stand for a concept of market, typical of the tradition of 
the school of thought of civil economy, according to which one can live 
the experience of human sociality inside a regular economic life, and 
not outside or beside it, as the dichotomous model of society suggests. 
.is point of view is an alternative both to the idea of the market as the 
locus of exploitation, domination of the strong over the weak and to the 
anarcho-liberal idea of the market as the place where all the problems of 
society can be solved by using its proper mechanisms.
Civil economy becomes an alternative to the tradition descending 
from Adam Smith, which seems to see the market as the only institution 
that democracy and freedom really need. .e Church’s social teaching, 
instead, reminds us that of course a good society is the fruit of the mar-
ket and of freedom, but also that there are needs, which can be reduced 
to the fraternity principle, that cannot be ignored, nor le6 to the private 
sphere or to philanthropy. At the same time, Catholic social teaching 
does not side with those who 8ght against the markets and who see eco-
nomic action as in endemic and natural conBict with the good life, who 
cry out for less growth and for the retreat of the economy from life in 
common. Rather, what the encyclical proposes is a multi-faceted hu-
manism where the market is neither resisted nor “controlled,” but con-
sidered as an important moment for the public sphere—much broader 
than the sphere of the State—which, when conceived and experienced 
as a place open also to the reciprocity principle and to gi6, can build the 
“city”—the civitas.
From Fraternity, The Common Good
.e key word expressing this need better than any other, today, is “fra-
ternity,” a word enshrined also in the motto of the French Revolution but 
that was then dropped by the post-revolutionary order—for well known 
reasons—and eventually cancelled from the political and economic 
lexicon. It was the Franciscan school of thought that attributed to the 
word fraternity the meaning it has kept over time. An important point 
should be stressed right away: not to confuse solidarity with fraternity. 
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For as solidarity is the principle of social organization that enables un-
equals to become equals, fraternity is the principle that allows equals 
to be diverse. Fraternity allows people who are equal in dignity and in 
their fundamental rights to make diAerent life plans, or to express their 
charisma in diAerent ways. .e centuries we have le6 behind, the nine-
teenth and even more the twentieth century, were characterized by huge 
battles, both cultural and political, in the name of solidarity, and this was 
certainly positive; just think of the history of labor unions or the struggle 
for civil rights. .e point is that the good society in which to live cannot 
be satis8ed with the perspective of solidarity alone, because a society 
based only on solidarity and not on fraternity would be a society that 
everyone would try to get away from. .e truth is that while a fraternal 
society is also one where solidarity is put into practice, the reverse is not 
necessarily true.
Having forgotten that a society of human beings without frater-
nity—where everything comes down to improving transactions based 
on the exchange of equivalent values on the one hand, and to increas-
ing transfer from public welfare structure on the other hand—cannot 
be sustainable explains why, despite the quality of intellectual resources 
deployed, we have not yet found a credible solution to the famous trade-
oA between eCciency and equity. A society from which the principle of 
fraternity has faded is not capable of generating a future; a society where 
there exists only the idea of “giving to get” or else “giving out of duty” is 
not capable of progress. .is is why neither the liberal and individualist 
idea of the world, where nearly everything is exchange, nor the state-
centered idea of society, where nearly everything is due is a safe path out 
of the shallows in which our modern societies are mired.
.e question is as follows: why is it that over the past quarter of a 
century the perspective of the discourse on the common good, following 
the de8nition of the social teaching of the Church—a6er at least two 
centuries in which it had le6 the scene—is now coming to the surface 
again, like a subterranean river? Why is the shi6 from national to inter-
national markets over the last twenty-8ve years now lending new life 
to the discourse on the common good? At a glance I can observe that 
what is happening is part of a broader movement of ideas in economics, 
a school of thought focusing on the relationship between religion and 
economic performance. Starting with the idea that religious beliefs play 
a fundamental role in shaping the cognitive maps of individuals and in 
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molding the rules of social behavior, this school wants to study to what 
extent the predominance in a given country (or area) of a particular re-
ligion inBuences the emergence of categories of economic thought, wel-
fare programs, educational policy, and so on. A6er a protracted period 
when it had seemed that secularization had settled the religious question 
once and for all, at least in the economic sphere, what we are experienc-
ing is truly paradoxical.
It is not too hard, actually, to 8nd a reason for the resurgence of the 
standpoint of the common good, the distinctive feature of the Catholic 
ethic in social and economic issues, in the contemporary cultural dis-
cussion. As John Paul II clearly pointed out on several occasions, the 
social teaching of the Church is not to be interpreted as one more ethical 
theory in addition to the many already available in the literature, but as a 
“common grammar” for them, for it is based on a speci8c idea, the idea 
of caring for the human good. Indeed, while the various ethical theories 
have their foundations in the search for rules (as is the case of positivist 
natural law doctrine, under which ethics derives from law) or in men’s 
actions (as with Rawlsian neo-contractualism or neo-utilitarianism), 
the fulcrum of the social teaching of the Church is “being together.” .e 
meaning of the ethics of the common good is that “[i]n order to be able 
to grasp the object of an act which speci8es that act morally, it is . . . nec-
essary to place oneself ‘in the perspective of the acting person’”3—and 
not that of a third party (as in natural law) or (as Adam Smith suggested) 
a neutral spectator. As a matter of fact, as the moral good is a practi-
cal thing, it is known mainly not by those who theorize about it but by 
those who practice it: these are the people who can spot it and therefore 
choose it with certainty any time the moral good is under discussion.
The Principle of Gift in the Economy
What does embracing gratuitousness in economic action practically en-
tail? I would like here to brieBy discuss two of the many consequences. 
.e 8rst concerns the way we look at the relation between economic 
growth and welfare programs. Which comes 8rst, economic growth or 
welfare? In other words, is welfare expenditure to be considered social 
consumption or social investment? .e thesis sustained in Caritas in 
3. Veritatis Splendor, 78.
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Veritate is that, in the current historical situation, it is far more credible 
and justi8able to see welfare as a factor of economic growth, rather than 
seeing growth as the cause generating welfare.
It is well known that in the second half of the twentieth century the 
Welfare State had two main goals: reducing poverty and social exclu-
sion by redistributing, through taxes, income and wealth (the “Robin 
Hood” function) and providing social insurance services to foster ef-
8cient resource allocation over time (the “piggy-bank” function). .e ad 
hoc strategy adopted was, basically, the following: governments should 
use the dividend of the economic growth to improve the relative po-
sition of the worst-oA without worsening the absolute position of the 
better-oA. But a series of circumstances—globalization and the new 
technologies—caused, in Western developed countries starting from the 
1980s, a slowdown in potential growth. .is eventually fueled the idea, 
in the last decade, that the cause of the slowdown was taxation and social 
insurance redistribution, which were consequently blamed for a scarcity 
of resources for government social action.
Where this way of interpreting welfare has led is now clear to all. 
Not only is the old Welfare State today incapable of dealing with the new 
poverty; but it is also helpless in front of rapidly worsening social in-
equalities in Europe. For instance, over the last quarter-century in Italy 
the pro8t share of GDP has risen from 23 to 30 percent, while that of 
labor has fallen from 77 to 70 percent. As the last CENSIS survey shows, 
Italy is by now a country with “narrow gauge mobility:” people on the 
bottom of the social ladder today 8nd it more diCcult than in the past 
to move up to higher rungs. .is is eloquent evidence that there are real 
poverty traps: once you fall in, you cannot 8nd the way out. Today, the 
ineCcient person is cut oA from full citizenship, because no one rec-
ognizes the proportionality of resources. In other words, the ineCcient 
people (or those less eCcient than average) don’t qualify to take part 
in the production process; they are inexorably excluded because decent 
work is only for the eCcient guys. For the others there is indecent work 
or public (or private) compassion.
What is to be done, then, if one takes seriously the message of the 
Caritas in Veritate? .e 8rst step is to transcend the outdated concepts 
of equality of outcomes (cherished by the social-democratic political 
position) and equality of starting positions (the approach favored by 
the liberal line of thought). Rather, we should conjugate the concept 
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of equality of capabilities (in Amartya Sen’s sense) by interventions to 
distribute resources (monetary and other) to people so that they can 
improve the quality of their life. Sen’s approach to well-being suggests 
shi6ing our focus from the goods and services we intend to make avail-
able to people in need to these people’s actual ability to function thanks 
to those goods and services. .is is why the new welfare must overcome 
the self-referential distortion of the old welfare. When health services, 
public assistance, education and so on, even if of high quality technically, 
do not enhance their bene8ciaries’ capability to function, they reveal 
themselves to be ineAective, or even harmful, because certainly they do 
not foster development. In practice, this means that we must quickly 
abandon the mistaken idea that individual human rights (life, liberty, 
property) and social citizenship rights (dealt with by the Welfare State) 
are mutually incompatible and that one can only protect social rights 
at the expense of individual rights. As we are well aware, in Europe this 
idea was at the origin of pointless ideological battles and signi8cant 
waste of productive resources.
.ere is also a second step to be taken. .e new welfare must be 
subsidiary, that is to say, it must use public resources coming mainly 
from general taxation not to 8nance—as is currently the case—the sup-
ply side, but the demand side of the welfare system. .is is because when 
the State directly funds the various supply agencies, it alters the nature of 
the services they provide and makes their costs rise. Not only that, but 
funding the needy increases their responsibility and self-reliance and 
mobilizes organized civil society to take action. Let us not forget that 
direct funding of supply tends to alter the nature of the identity of the 
entities within civil society through follow red tape that tends to cancel 
the peculiarities of each one—the very peculiarities on which the cre-
ation of social capital depends.
My conclusion is that the arguments for the trade-oA between 
social security and economic growth are far less plausible than those 
against it. It is simply not true that strengthening social security con-
demns us to lower growth, making it unsustainable. On the contrary, 
a post-Hobbesian welfare system, mainly based on policies promoting 
individual capabilities, in the current post-industrial era—marked by 
the emergence of new social risks—is the most eAective antidote against 
possible antidemocratic temptations and therefore the decisive factor 
for economic progress.
Part III: Civil and Political Economy164
.e second consequence of assigning the principle of gratuitous-
ness a key role in the economy has to do with the diAusion of the culture 
and the practice of reciprocity. Reciprocity, together with democracy, 
is one of the founding values of our society. Indeed, it is precisely in 
reciprocity, one could say, that democracy 8nds its ultimate meaning.
In what “places” does reciprocity reside; where, that is, is it prac-
ticed and nourished? .e 8rst such place is the family: just think of the 
relationship between parents and children, brothers and sisters. .en 
there come cooperatives, social enterprises and the many forms of as-
sociation. Is it not true that the relationships between the members of 
a family or between the members of a cooperative are relationships of 
reciprocity? Now we know that the civil and economic development of a 
country basically depends on how widespread the practice of reciprocity 
is among its citizens. Without mutual acknowledgement of a common 
belonging, no eCciency, no economic growth can survive. Today, there 
is a desperate need for cooperation: this is why we must develop new 
forms of gratuitousness and strengthen the existing ones. .ose societ-
ies that uproot the tree of reciprocity are doomed to decline, as history 
has taught us over the centuries.
What is the function of the gi6? It is to make people understand 
that besides the goods of justice, there are also gratuitous goods, and 
therefore that a society which is satis8ed with only the goods of justice 
is not genuinely human. What is the diAerence? Justice goods are those 
originating in a duty; gratuitousness goods are those arising out of an 
obligatio. In other words these goods derive from the realization that 
one is tied to someone else and that, in a certain sense, this someone 
else is a part of me. .is is why the logic of gratuitousness cannot be 
simplistically reduced to a purely ethical dimension; gratuitousness is 
not a moral virtue. Justice, as Plato once taught us, is a moral virtue, 
and we all agree on the importance of justice, but gratuitousness rather 
deals with the supra-ethical dimension of human actions since its logic 
is superabundance, while the logic of justice is equivalence. Caritas in 
Veritate tells us that in order for a society to function and progress, its 
economic activity needs to involve people who understand what the 
goods of gratuitousness are; in other words, that it is clear to all that we 
need to bring the gratuitousness principle back into our society.
Benedict XVI encourages us to accept the challenge and 8ght to re-
store the gi6 principle to the public sphere. Genuine gi6, by establishing 
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the primacy of the relationship over its exemption, of personal identity 
over pro8t, must 8nd a way to express itself everywhere, in whatever 
8eld of human action, economy included. .e message of the encyclical 
is to think of gratuitousness, and consequently of fraternity, as a mark 
of the human condition, thus looking at gi6 as the necessary prerequi-
site for the State and the market to function for the common good. Of 
course there can be an eCcient market and an authoritative State (even 
a just State) even without gi6, but people will not be helped to attain joie 
de vivre. In fact eCciency and justice, even together, are not enough to 
ensure people’s happiness.
On the Remote Causes of the Financial Crisis
Caritas in Veritate does not fail—how could it?—to “read” the current 
economic and 8nancial crisis. It does so by dwelling on the remote 
(and not the proximate) causes of the crisis. .e encyclical points out 
three main factors of the crisis that it analyses in depth. .e 8rst cause 
concerns the radical change in the relationship between 8nance and the 
production of goods and services that has taken place over the last thirty 
years. Starting in the mid-1970s most Western countries linked their re-
tirement commitments to investments that depended on the sustainable 
pro8tability of new 8nancial instruments. At the same time, the creation 
of these new instruments has progressively exposed the real economy 
to the caprices of 8nance, therefore necessitating the allocation of an 
ever-growing share of value added to the remuneration of the savings 
thus invested. Pressure on businesses from the stock exchange market 
and from private equity funds translated into even greater pressures 
elsewhere: on managers, who are obsessively driven to continuously 
enhance their performance in order to pro8t by their stock options; on 
consumers to persuade them, through sophisticated marketing strate-
gies, to buy more and more even when they have no purchasing power; 
on businesses in the real economy to persuade them to increase share-
holder value. And so it happened that the persistent demand for ever 
more brilliant 8nancial results started to have an impact, with a typical 
trickle-down mechanism, on the economy as a whole, until it became an 
authentic cultural model. In pursuit of an ever more radiant future, we 
forgot about the present.
Part III: Civil and Political Economy166
.e second major cause of the crisis is the diAusion at the level of 
popular culture of the eCciency ethos as ultimate yardstick and justi-
8cation of the economy. On the one hand, this ultimately legitimated 
greed—the best-known and most widespread form of avarice—as some 
sort of civic virtue: the greed market that supplants the free market. “Greed 
is good, greed is right,” said Gordon Gekko, the hero of the movie Wall 
Street (1987). On the other hand, the ethos of eCciency is what caused 
the now systematic alternation between greed and panic. It is not true, as 
more than once commentators tried to explain, that panic is the conse-
quence of irrational behavior by market agents. .at is, panic is nothing 
but euphoria with the minus sign in front of it, and since euphoria is 
irrational, according to the dominant theory, so is panic.
Finally, Caritas in Veritate addresses the cause of the causes of the 
crisis: the speci8c cultural matrix that was consolidated over the past 
decades on the wave of globalization on the one side and of the third 
industrial revolution on the other. It is worth analyzing one particular 
aspect of this cultural phenomenon: namely, the more and more com-
mon dissatisfaction with the way the principle of freedom is inter-
preted. As we know, freedom is made up of three constituent aspects: 
autonomy, immunity, empowerment. Autonomy is about freedom of 
choice: you are only free if you can choose, i.e. if you enjoy positive 
freedom in Isaiah Berlin’s sense. Immunity rather concerns the absence 
of coercion by external subjects. In other words, it is basically negative 
freedom (that is to say, “freedom from”). Finally, empowerment means 
the capacity to choose, to attain the objectives that the individual sets 
himself, at least to some extent. We are not free if we never realize our 
life plan, at least in part.
It is a fact that while the anarcho-liberal approach ensures the 8rst 
and second of these dimensions of freedom at the expense of the third, 
the State-centered approach, whether in the mixed economy version 
or in the social democratic version, tends to give the second and third 
precedence over the 8rst. .e free-market approach can indeed serve as 
the motor of change, but it is not equally capable of managing the nega-
tive consequences, due to the substantial temporal asymmetry between 
the distribution of the costs of change and the sharing of its bene8ts. 
.e costs are immediate and tend to be levied on the weakest members 
of the population. .e bene8ts arrive with time and tend to go to the 
most talented. Yet the social market economy—in all its versions—
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while proposing the State as the subject in charge of coping with this 
asynchrony, does not weaken the logic of the Darwinian market; it only 
narrows the area of its operation and impact. .e challenge that Caritas 
in Veritate invites to meet is to keep—at least ideally—all three dimen-
sions of freedom together.
We can see, in the light of the foregoing, why the 8nancial crisis 
cannot be called either unexpected or inexplicable. .is is why, taking 
nothing away from all the fundamental regulatory actions and the neces-
sary new forms of control, we will not be able to prevent other similar 
events from happening in the future unless we attack the root of the evil, 
unless we intervene on the cultural background underpinning the econ-
omy. .is crisis sends a double message to the government authorities. 
First of all, it says that in no way can the more-than-justi8ed critique of 
the “interventionist State” delegitimize the central role of the “regulatory 
State.” Secondly, it says that public authorities at diAerent government 
levels must allow, even encourage, the creation and the strengthening 
of a pluralist 8nancial market, a market where diAerent subjects can 
operate on a level playing 8eld with regards to the speci8c objective of 
their activity. I am here thinking of mutual banks, ethical banks, ethical 
investment funds, etc. .ese are all institutions that not only do not oAer 
their customers “creative 8nance” but that also play a complementary 
role, therefore also a balancing role, with the agents of speculative 8-
nance. Had the 8nancial authorities loosened, over the past decades, all 
the regulatory constraints binding the agents of alternative 8nance, the 
current crisis would not have been as devastating as it has proved to be.
Towards Global Governance
.e encyclical Caritas in Veritate deals powerfully with one extremely 
topical issue: the link between peace and integral human development. 
Paul VI popularized this topic in his Populorum progressio (1967) with 
the famous dictum: “Development is the new name of peace.” In full 
agreement, Benedict XVI formulates a systematic argument that I here 
summarize as follows: a) peace is possible, because war is an event, not 
a state of things. War is therefore a transitory emergency, however long 
it may last, and not a permanent condition of human society; b) none-
theless, peace must be built, because it is not something spontaneous, 
rather it is the fruit of work aimed at creating institutions of peace; c) in 
Part III: Civil and Political Economy168
this historical period, the most urgent institutions of peace are those that 
involve human development.
What are the institutions of peace deserving top priority today? To 
sketch out an answer, it is better to focus on some stylized fact of our 
age. .e 8rst is the scandal of hunger. It is well known that hunger is not 
a tragic novelty of our time; what makes it scandalous today, and thus 
intolerable, is that it is not the result of a “production failure” at global 
level, that is to say of the incapacity of the economy to produce enough 
food for each and all. It is therefore not a scarcity of resources, at global 
level, that is causing hunger and deprivation. Rather, the main cause is 
“institutional failure,” that is to say the lack of adequate economic and 
legal institutions.
Just consider the following events. .e extraordinary increase in 
economic interdependence over the past quarter-century means that 
a substantial part of the world population may be adversely aAected, 
in their living conditions, by events in places far removed from where 
they live and about which they cannot do anything. .us, today the well 
known “depression famine” is coupled by “boom famine,” as Sen has so 
abundantly demonstrated. Furthermore, the expansion of the market ar-
ea—a phenomenon which is per se positive—means that a social group’s 
access to food depends crucially on the decisions of other social groups. 
For instance, the price of a commodity (coAee, cocoa, etc.) that is the 
main source of revenue for a given community, can depend on what 
happens to the prices of other products, independently of any change in 
the conditions of production of the 8rst good.
A second stylized fact is the changed nature of trade and compe-
tition between rich and poor countries. In recent decades the growth 
rate of the poorest countries has been higher than that of the richest 
countries: around 4 percent compared to 1.7 percent per year in the 
period 1980–2000. .is is unprecedented, since in the past it had never 
happened that the poor countries had grown faster than the rich. .is 
explains why, in the same period of time, there was for the 8rst time 
in history a decrease in the number of absolutely poor people (people 
living with less than two dollars a day, taking into account purchasing 
power parities). Allowing for the increase in population, we can say 
that absolute poverty rate in the world fell from 62 percent in 1978 to 
29 percent in 1998. (Needless to say, this remarkable achievement did 
not involve the various regions of the world equally. For example, in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa the number of absolute poor people went up from 
217 million in 1987 to 301 million in 1998). At the same time, however, 
relative poverty, meaning inequality—according to such yardsticks as 
the Gini coeCcient or of the .eil index—has increased strikingly since 
1980. It is well known that the total inequality index is given by the sum 
of two components: inequality between countries and inequality within 
countries. As the important work by P. Lindert and J. Williamson points 
out, a good part of the increase in total inequality can be attributed to 
the increase in the second component both in populous countries with 
high economic growth rates (China, India and Brazil), and in the ad-
vanced Western countries.4 .is means that the redistribution eAects of 
globalization are not univocal: not always do the rich bene8t (be they 
countries or social groups) nor do the poor always lose out.
I also want to brieBy address a third stylized fact. .e link between 
people’s nutrition and their capacity for work aAects both the way food 
is distributed among family members—more speci8cally between male 
and female—and the way in which the job market works. Poor people 
possess only the potential for work; in order for this potential to be 
translated into actual labor power, the individual needs adequate nour-
ishment. Now, undernourished people, when not appropriately helped, 
are not able to satisfy this condition in a free market economy. .e rea-
son is simple: the quality of the labor that a poor person can oAer on the 
job market is not enough to “command” the food he or she needs for a 
decent standard of living. As modern nutritional science has shown, 60 
percent to 75 percent of the energy an individual gets from food is used 
to keep the body alive; only the rest of that energy can be used to work or 
to carry out other activities. .is is why in poor societies “true poverty 
traps” can emerge, destined to last for long periods of time.
What is even worse is that the economy can continue to feed those 
poverty traps even as aggregate income rises. For instance, it can—and 
does—happen that economic development, measured in terms of per 
capita GDP, encourages peasants to shi6 from growing grain to produc-
ing meat, raising more livestock, as the pro8t from the latter are higher 
than for the former. However, the consequent rise in the price of grain 
will worsen the nutritional levels of the poor, who have no access to 
meat anyway. .e point is that an increase in the number of low-income 
individuals can aggravate the malnutrition of the poorest because of a 
4. Lindert and Williamson, Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal?
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change in the composition of the demand for 8nal goods. Let us observe, 
8nally, that the link between state of nutrition and labor productivity 
can be “dynastic:” once a family or social group falls into the poverty 
trap, it is truly diCcult for their descendants to get out of it, even when 
the economy as a whole is growing.
What conclusions should then be drawn? .at awareness of a close 
linkage between “institutional failures” and the scandal of hunger and 
worsening global inequality reminds us that institutions are not—like 
natural resources—a natural fact, but instead the rules of the economic 
game 8xed at political level. If—as was the case at the beginning of the 
twentieth century—hunger depended on a situation of absolute short-
age of resources, there would be nothing to do but encourage fraternal 
sympathy and solidarity. Knowing, on the contrary, that it depends on 
the rules, that is to say on the institutions, which are in part outdated and 
in part wrong, cannot but drive us to intervene on the mechanisms and 
on the procedures for setting 8xing and implementing those rules. .e 
urgency of action in this direction is stressed in a passage from Norberto 
Bobbio showing, with rare eCcacy, the link between liberty, equality and 
the struggle for power: “In human history, battles for supremacy alternate 
with struggles for equality. .is alternation is absolutely natural since the 
8ght for supremacy presupposes that there are two individuals or groups 
that have achieved a certain equality. .e struggle for equality usually 
precedes the 8ght for supremacy . . . Before 8ghting for dominance, each 
social group must conquer a certain degree of parity with its rivals.”5
.e diCculty in carrying out institutional actions such as this is 
clear to everyone. .is is precisely why the encyclical speaks of the ur-
gency to give birth to a global political Authority, which must however 
be subsidiary and polyarchical. .is implies, on the one hand, opposition 
to some kind of super state and, on the other hand, the political will to 
radically update the conclusions of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, 
where the new international economic order was shaped a6er a long 
period of wars.
En guise de conclusion
In Weddings, Albert Camus wrote the following: “If there is a sin against 
life, perhaps it is not so much to despair of it as to hope in another life and 
5. Bobbio, Destra e Sinistra, 164.
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so Bee from the implacable grandeur of this one.”6 Camus did not believe 
in God, but he teaches us a truth: you must not sin against this life by 
discrediting and humiliating it. One must not, therefore, shi6 the centre 
of his/her faith beyond the grave so that the present becomes meaning-
less; it would mean to sin against the Incarnation. It is an ancient option 
going back to the Fathers of the Church who called the Incarnation a 
Sacrum Commercium to highlight the relationship of profound reciproc-
ity between the human and the divine and above all to underscore the 
fact that the Christian God is a God of men who live in history and who 
cares about, and is even moved by, their human condition. To love life 
is thus an act of faith and not only of personal pleasure. .is opens us 
to hope, which concerns not only the future but also the present, since 
we need to know that our actions, besides a destination, have a meaning 
and a value here and now too.
.e 86eenth century was the century of the 8rst Humanism, a typi-
cally European phenomenon. .e twenty-8rst century, from the very 
outset, powerfully demonstrates the need for a new Humanism. .en, the 
shi6 from feudalism to modernity was the decisive factor which pushed 
in this direction. Today, it is an equally radical epochal transition—from 
industrial society to post-industrial society, i.e. from modernity to post 
modernity—that shows us the need for a new Humanism. Globalization, 
the 8nancialization of the economy, new technologies, migration, the 
increase in social inequality, identity conBicts, the environmental ques-
tion, international debt, are only a few of the keywords telling us about 
the “discontents” of today’s “civilization,” to cite Freud’s seminal essay. 
In facing these new challenges, merely updating our old categories of 
thought or resorting to collective decision techniques, however re8ned, 
is not suitable for the purpose. We must have the courage to walk on new 





The Paradoxical Nature of the Good 
Relationality, Sympathy, and Mutuality  
in Rival Traditions of Civil Economy
Adrian Pabst
Paradigmatic Shifts
Across different academic disciplines, we are witnessing a  fundamental and perhaps paradigmatic shi6 away from indi-
viduality towards relationality. Both natural sciences and humanities 
are seeing the emergence of diAerent relational models that attempt to 
theorize the widespread recognition that reality cannot be reduced to 
self-generating, individual beings and that the outcome of interactions 
between various entities is more than the sum of parts (whether these 
be more atomistic or more collectivist). For instance, in particle physics 
it has been suggested that there are “things” such as quarks (subatomic 
particles) which cannot be measured individually because they are con-
8ned by force 8elds and only exist inside certain particles (hadrons) that 
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are themselves bound together by a strong “substantial” interplay with 
other hadrons.1
Likewise, recent evidence from research in 8elds such as evolution-
ary biology and neuroscience shows that modern ontological atomism 
and the spontaneous spirit of possessive acquisitiveness are at odds with 
more holistic models of human nature. Indeed, the human brain is in 
some important sense organically connected to the world and responds 
unconsciously to the social environment within which it is embedded. 
Such an account of selIood contrasts sharply with the dominant mod-
ern conception that the self is a separate, self-standing agent that makes 
conscious, rational decisions based on individual volition.2 Linked to 
the naturally given social embeddedness of the self is the argument 
(substantiated by 8ndings from a comprehensive, global survey) that 
fundamental moral distinctions are somehow “hard-wired” in human 
beings and that virtuous habits such as cooperative trust or mutual sym-
pathy precede the exercise of instrumental reason or the interplay of 
sentimental emotions.3
Relational patterns and structures are also moving to the fore in 
a growing number of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. 
For example, in anthropology it is argued that the idea of a purely self-
interested homo oeconomicus in pursuit of material wealth (central to 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations) reduces the natural desire for good-
ness to a series of vague, pre-rational moral feelings (as set out in his 
!eory of Moral Sentiments). As such, it marks a radical departure from 
older ideas of man as a “political animal” in search of mutual social rec-
ognition through the exercise of virtues embodied in practices and the 
exchange of gi6s—instead of a mechanical application of abstract values 
1. .e emphasis on relationality in particle physics can be traced to nineteenth-
century “8eld theorist” like Michael Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell whose research 
shaped Einstein’s theory of relativity. See Einstein, Relativity, Appendix V. Cf. Einstein, 
“.e Mechanics of Newton,” in Ideas and Opinions.
2. Hauser, Moral Minds. .is needs to be complemented by the argument that a 
proper ethics surpasses the classically modern dichotomy between “right” and “wrong” 
in the direction of an outlook towards the virtue of justice and the transcendent reality 
of goodness. Such an outlook is a fusion of natural desire and supernaturally infused 
habit, as Christian Neo-Platonists in East and West have tended to argue.
3. In this context, Matt Ridley’s claim in his inBuential book Origins of Virtue that 
human virtue is driven by self-interest and closely connected to the division of labor 
uncritically accepts the modern dualism of egoism and altruism and also the premise 
that morality is grounded in a purely immanent account of human nature.
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and the trading of pure commodities.4 For these (and other) reasons, 
individuals cannot be properly understood as separate from the rela-
tions that bring them into existence and sustain them in being. Instead, 
individuals are best conceived in terms of personhood, de8ned as the 
plural and composite locus of relationships and the conBuence of diAer-
ent microcosms. 
Similarly, in sociology, cultural studies, and cognate 8elds, the past 
decade or so has seen a growing body of research on human coopera-
tion, creativity, and connectedness.5 Closely related to these themes is 
a renewed interest in rival conceptions of ontology. Here the focus on 
social relationality in the social sciences coincides with a growing em-
phasis on metaphysical relationality in philosophy and theology. In turn, 
this is linked to a fresh concern with a theological metaphysics that re-
jects the late medieval and modern primacy of individual substance over 
ontological relation.6
Crucially for the present essay, the most innovative research in 
contemporary economics repudiates the modern, liberal separation of 
private and public goods in favor of relational goods and a renewed 
emphasis on the reciprocal bonds of sympathy that always already tie 
individuals together.7 Closely tied to this is a critique of methodologi-
cal individualism and a total mapping of individual preferences. Since 
neither is theoretically and empirically warranted, the entire edi8ce of 
modern political economy (a6er Adam Smith) and modern economic 
science (a6er Carl Menger) becomes unhinged. .is cast doubt over 
key premises and concepts such as economics as a “value-free” and 
pure science, instrumental rationality, perfect information, the “rational 
4. Polanyi, Great Transformation, 45–70; HénaA, Le prix de la vérité, 351–80.
5. Donati, Relational Sociology; Shirky’s books Here Comes Everybody and Cognitive 
Surplus suggest that contemporary social activity linked to the internet and telecom-
munications refutes the modern idea that man is a utility-maximizing rational actor. 
Shirky also argues that technological innovation that harness human communication 
is in part a sign that the natural desire for relationality also shapes economic activity 
and political processes.
6. E.g. Desmond, God and the Between; Pabst, Metaphysics; Shults, Reforming 
!eological Anthropology.
7. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 45–99; Halpern, Hidden Wealth of Nations, 
56–123. .e emphasis on relationality and sympathy develops ongoing research on the 
cooperative instincts of humans and (other) animals in a stronger metaphysical and 
political direction. It also quali8es cruder distinctions between ‘bonding’ and “bridg-
ing” in the work of Robert Putnam and others.
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expectations” hypothesis as well as the “eCcient market” theory.8 All 
this calls into question the conceptual foundations and empirical con-
clusions of both classical and neo-classical economics.
It is true that Smith himself sought to overcome the atomism of ear-
ly modern political economy (as developed by Mandeville, Hobbes, and 
Locke) in the direction of a social philosophy and moral theory that ac-
centuates universal moral sentiments of benevolence and fellow-feeling. 
His account replaces the idea of private vice and arbitrary divine power 
with the rival idea of enlightened self-interest and human agency. But he 
views the market as unconstrained by the strong bonds of interpersonal 
ties and in some sense prior to the sociality which market relations make 
possible. Only the liberty and equality of commercial society generates 
the trust on which fellow-feeling and social bonds depend.
In this manner, Smith introduces a double split: 8rst, between the 
quest for happiness and the exercise of virtue; second, between pri-
vate, moral virtues such as love and benevolence, on the one hand, and 
public, civic virtues such as prudence or justice, on the other hand. As 
such, he departs from the emphasis in the Neapolitan Enlightenment of 
Giambattista Vico, Paolo Mattia Doria, and Antonio Genovesi on the 
mutual sympathy that binds together what we now call civil society and 
the market—a civic economy wherein market exchange is embedded in 
relations of mutuality and reciprocity. For instance, Doria de8nes “com-
merce as ‘mutuo soccorso’, mutual assistance [ . . . that] requires both 
liberty and security of contracts, which in turn depend on trust ( fede) 
and justice.”9
By contrast with the Neapolitan School and his friend Hume, 
Smith argues that the virtues of sympathy and benevolence only oper-
ate at the micro level of interpersonal relations, producing strong, thick 
bonds between individuals bound together by personal ties of family 
or friendship. Unlike the Neapolitan and Humean accounts,10 sympathy 
and benevolence are absent from the macro level of weaker, thinner ties 
among individuals who are not bound together by personal bonds: “Men, 
8. Screpanti and Zamagni, Outline of the History of Economic !ought, 43–71, 
145–211.
9. Robertson, Case for the Enlightenment, 201–405 (quote at 334).
10. Hume’s account of sympathy is not limited to the interpersonal and the social 
but encompasses the cosmic and metaphysical—“the coherence and apparent sympa-
thy in all the parts of this world,” as he writes in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
XII, 86. On this reading of Hume, see John Milbank, “Hume versus Kant.”
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though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for one another, withwhom 
they have no particular connection, in comparison of what they feel for 
themselves; the misery of one, who is merely their fellow-creature, is 
of so little importance to them in comparison even of a small inconve-
niency of their own.”11
Crucially, Smith is adamant that sympathy and benevolence are not 
important at all for the market; on the contrary, Bruni and Zamagni are 
right to conclude that for the Glaswegian professor of moral philosophy, 
“the market itself doesn’t require them, and works even better without 
them (hence the praise of weak ties).”12 Economic production and trade 
based on contract is sundered from mutual sympathy and concern for 
the personal well-being of fellow “economic actors” such as our butcher, 
brewer or baker. In turn, this gives rise to the notion of “cooperation 
without benevolence” that links Smith’s moral philosophy in !e !eory 
of Moral Sentiments to his political economy in !e Wealth of Nations.13
As a result, exchanges in the marketplace are divorced from the 
practice of virtues, and agents treat economic relations as an instrument 
to attain self-interested objectives. Only God’s intervention—the divine 
“invisible hand of the market”—can providentially blend self-interest 
and instrumental market relations with the pursuit of eCciency and 
public happiness.14 Moreover, market relations are now seen as the pre-
condition rather than the outcome of sociality: Smith writes that
society may subsist among diAerent men, as among diAerent 
merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love 
or aAection; and though no man in it should owe any obliga-
tion, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld 
by a mercenary exchange of good oCces according to an agreed 
valuation.15
.us, Smith’s anthropology hovers halfway between Bernard 
Mandeville’s dubious claim that public virtue is somehow the unintend-
ed consequence of private vice, on the one hand, and the Neapolitan 
insistence that the civic institutions and virtuous practices of civil life 
11. Smith, !eory of Moral Sentiments, part II, sec. 2, ch. 3, 125.
12. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 106 (emphasis original).
13. Smith, !eory of Moral Sentiments, part II, sec. 2, ch. 1-3, 112–32 and part VI, 
sec. 1-2, 307–48; Smith, Wealth of Nations, part I, sec. 2, ch. 2.
14. I have argued this at greater length in my “From Civil to Political Economy.”
15. Smith, !eory of Moral Sentiments, part II, sec. 2, chap. 3, 124.
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are indispensable for transforming the individual pursuit of self-interest 
into public happiness, on the other hand.
Contrary to the civic humanism of the Neapolitan Enlightenment, 
Smith severs the eighteenth-century link between material and spiritual 
well-being and rede8nes political economy away from the “science” of 
happiness towards the science of wealth. Indeed, the key shi6 in Smith 
is the argument that only the providential market order directs the pur-
suit of self-interest to the maximization of material welfare and public 
happiness. Once the market mechanism is stripped of the disciplining 
habit of practicing the virtues and equated with pure instrumentality, 
political economy becomes the science of individual, rational choice in 
conditions of resources scarcity (as the economists Menger, Marshall 
and Pigou saw it). On this account, the “doctrine” of marginal utility 
breaks any remaining link between economics, virtue and happiness. As 
such, the instrumentality of trading ties is enthroned as the norm that 
recon8gures all human relationships merely as means to maximize util-
ity (a project already delineated by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill).16 
Just as human relationships are no longer seen as part of the diAusely 
distributed “common good,” so economic goods are no longer viewed as 
“relational goods” but instead reduced to commodities that satisfy needs 
—rather than goods that help attain personal Bourishing.
.ese theoretical transformations shaped the conception and insti-
tution of modern capitalism, just as changes in political and economic 
conditions led to new conceptual developments in modern economics. 
Smith’s account of the market as the unique locus of human cooperation 
with divine providence serves to illustrate, 8rst of all, the importance 
of theological structures of thought and practice for modern political 
economy, and, secondly, the mutual, inextricable interaction of ide-
ational and material factors in explaining historical and contemporary 
transformations of politics and economics. .e current crisis of global 
capitalism, coupled with the paradigmatic shi6 from the priority of indi-
vidual to the primacy of relational ideas and practices, provides a unique 
opportunity to chart an alternative to the complicit collusion of sovereign 
individuals in the marketplace and the sovereign state that characterizes 
liberalism and modern political economy. In this perspective, the shi6 of 
16. J. S. Mill’s emphasis on cooperative structures in his Principles of Political 
Economy provides a corrective to the impoverished utilitarian primacy of market rela-
tions and the state in Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.
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focus from individuality to relationality opens the way for transforming 
modern economics by reconnecting the post-Smithian legacy of political 
economy with the pre-Smithian tradition of civil economy. .at is one of 
the main perspectives opened up by Pope Benedict’s social encyclical.
No Humanism Without God: Pope Benedict’s 
Theological Metaphysics
In Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI deploys a pre-secular metaphys-
ics and anthropology in order to develop a post-secular humanism and 
political economy.17 At the heart of the theological vision underpinning 
this remarkable document lies the uniquely Christian idea that human, 
social, and natural reality is irreducibly relational and that all is ordered 
by the divine “economy of charity” to the highest Good in God. In line 
with Deus Caritas Est, Pope Benedict argues in his social encyclical for 
a comprehensive new model of “integral human development” based 
on “charity in truth”—the recognition that “[e]verything has its origin 
in God’s love, everything is shaped by it, everything is directed towards 
it.” .e call to love, for Benedict, is at the heart of human nature, “the 
vocation planted by God in the heart and mind of every human person.” 
18 In other words, love is a deep anthropological desire to enter into an 
economy of gi6-exchange where gi6-giving occurs in the real hope of a 
gi6-return. So con8gured, love translates into practices of mutual help 
and reciprocal giving, thereby shi6ing the emphasis from the false dual-
ism between egoism and altruism to the “radical middle” of trust, caring, 
and cooperation. Building on Balthasar’s conception of love as the form 
of all virtues, the Pope views love as that which infuses all other virtues—
theological and “classical,” moral and civic. Without love, moral and civic 
virtues are de8cient and lack ordering to their 8nal end in God.
Drawing on Henri de Lubac’s work, Joseph Ratzinger develops in 
his pre-papal and papal writings an integral humanism that underpins 
his call for a civil economy in Caritas in Veritate. At the heart of this 
humanism lies a theological anthropology that centers on the idea of 
relationality—the idea that human beings stand in mutually irreduc-
ible relations with each other and their transcendent source in God. By 
17. Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate. Henceforth, references to the encyclical will 
be given parenthetically in the text.
18. Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 1. 
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contrast with Balthasar’s focus on beauty, Benedict shi6s the emphasis 
towards goodness, both at the level of philosophical theology and civil 
economy. .is shi6 brings to the fore notions such as, 8rst of all, the 
natural desire for the supernatural Good in God; secondly, the conBict 
between modern market capitalism and the natural law tradition; thirdly, 
the new theological imperative to view all production and exchange ul-
timately in terms of the idea of relational goods that outwits in advance 
the false, modern liberal dichotomy between private, individual goods, 
on the one hand, and public, social goods, on the other hand.
Crucially, Pope Benedict locates the logic of gratuitous gi6-ex-
change and inter-personal trust at the heart of the economic system. 
Since Smith, the economy represents an increasingly autonomous and 
abstract space, consisting in market exchange based on formal contracts 
policed and enforced by the state and functioning according to the prin-
ciple of “cooperation without benevolence,” as I have already indicated. 
Benedict’s insistence that the logic of contract cannot function properly 
without the logic of gratuitousness marks a radical departure from the 
legacy of Smith and his followers and a renewed engagement with the 
civil economy tradition of the Neapolitan Enlightenment.
Far from simply restoring this tradition, the Pope blends the 
Neapolitan Enlightenment with the Christian Neo-Platonism of the 
Church Fathers and Doctors and the Romantic Orthodoxy of nineteenth-
century theology.19 Central to Benedict’s vision is the “re-hellenization” 
of Christianity, which he delineated in his groundbreaking Regensburg 
address.20 In the context of Caritas in Veritate, “re-hellenizing” Christian 
theology serves to break with the dualism between “natural” contract and 
“supernatural” gi6 that is at the origin of both modern capitalism and 
modern economics. Indeed, the Pope eschews the Baroque scholasticism 
of Francisco Suárez in favor of the patristic and medieval synthesis of 
Augustine and Aquinas.21 .e latter two envision the ecclesial corpus 
mysticum as the highest community on earth, a profound and perma-
nent spiritual union within the Church in the reciprocal love of the Holy 
Spirit, as Saint Paul wrote in the Letter to the Corinthians.
By contrast, Suárez contends that the mystical body refers to the 
sacraments and that the primary community is the nation or population 
19. Rowland, Pope Benedict XVI, 9–47.
20. Pabst, “Sovereign Reason Unbound,” 135–66.
21. Cf. Pabst, Metaphysics, ch. 7.
Pabst | The Paradoxical Nature of the Good 181
regulated by abstract, formal standards of rights and contracts—not the 
universal brotherhood of the Church governed by liturgical practices and 
the exercise of virtue. Linked to this is the Baroque scholastic separation 
of “pure nature” (pura natura) from the supernatural and the concomi-
tant relegation of divine grace to an extrinsic principle that is superadded 
to the natural realm, rather than a supernaturally infused gi6 that dei8es 
nature from within. Against Suárez’s Baroque scholasticism, Benedict 
contends that love is received and returned through our participation 
in the universal Eucharistic community of the Church that enfolds the 
social-political body of human society and directs it to the supernatural 
Good in God. Beyond the Old Testament, the New Testament fuses the 
commandment to love God with the commandment to love our neigh-
bor. What underpins this is the mystical union with God as revealed in 
the Eucharistic mystery that is both sacramental and social; the celebra-
tion of the Eucharist has traditionally been intimately linked to public 
processions and integral to the life of local communities and guilds.22
In turn, the Pope links this patristic and medieval legacy to modern 
Romanticism, notably their shared emphasis on natural intimations of 
the divine and human, artistic activity. It is this Romantic tradition that 
has helped sustain and create the high culture which Benedict champi-
ons and upholds against capitalist commodi8cation that is predicated 
on the Baroque separation of supernatural grace from “natural,” human 
culture:
Let it not be forgotten that the increased commercialization of 
cultural exchange today leads to a twofold danger. First, one may 
observe a cultural eclecticism that is o6en assumed uncritically: 
cultures are simply placed alongside one another and viewed as 
substantially equivalent and interchangeable. .is easily yields to 
a relativism that does not serve true intercultural dialogue; on the 
social plane, cultural relativism has the eAect that cultural groups 
coexist side by side, but remain separate, with no authentic dia-
logue and therefore with no true integration. Secondly, the op-
posite danger exists, that of cultural levelling and indiscriminate 
acceptance of types of conduct and life-styles. In this way one 
loses sight of the profound signi8cance of the culture of diAerent 
nations, of the traditions of the various peoples, by which the 
individual de8nes himself in relation to life’s fundamental ques-
tions. What eclecticism and cultural levelling have in common 
22. Milbank, “Future of Love,” 368–74; Bossy, “Mass as a Social Institution,” 29–61.
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is the separation of culture from human nature. .us, cultures 
can no longer de8ne themselves within a nature that transcends 
them, and man ends up being reduced to a mere cultural statistic. 
When this happens, humanity runs new risks of enslavement and 
manipulation (Caritas, 26; emphasis original)
Here the pontiA is much closer to the Christian socialism of Karl 
Polanyi and his Anglican friend R.H. Tawney than to the Marxism of 
Liberation theology. .e same vision also underpins his defense of tra-
ditional liturgy (including the Tridentine Mass) against the onslaught of 
“sacro-pop”—“parish tea party liturgies and banal ‘cuddle me Jesus’ pop 
songs,” as Tracey Rowland puts it so aptly in her book Ratzinger’s Faith. 
In this manner, Benedict retrieves and extends the patristic and medi-
eval vision of the Church as the corpus mysticum which he has inherited 
from the nouvelle théologie of Henri de Lubac.
Beyond the liturgy, the pope’s defense of Romanticism is also key 
to saving secular culture from itself. By rejecting both absolute instru-
mental reason and blind emotional faith, the Romantic tradition outwits 
the contemporary convergence of soulless technological progress and an 
impoverished culture dominated by sexualization and violence. More 
fundamentally, it opposes the complicit collusion of boundless economic 
and social liberalization that has produced laissez-faire sex and an obses-
sion with personal choice rather than objective (yet contested) standards 
of truth, beauty and goodness—a concern shared by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury Rowan Williams in his seminal work Lost Icons on our cul-
tural bereavement.
All this runs counter to the tradition of Baroque scholasticism. By 
divorcing “pure nature” from the supernatural, this tradition introduces 
a series of dualisms into theory and practice such as faith and reason, 
grace and nature or transcendence and immanence. Such and similar 
dualisms are incompatible with the (theo)-logic of the Incarnation 
and undermine the continuous link between Creator and creation. 
Speci8cally, the idea that “pure nature” correlates with a purely secu-
lar (non-sacred) social space unaAected by divine grace is linked to the 
“two ends” account of human nature. According to this theory, human 
beings have a natural end separate from their supernatural end. Instead 
of participating in the Trinitarian communion of love by which we are 
perfected, human society and the economy operate independently and 
are ordered towards a diAerent 8nality.
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Concretely, this means that the market is viewed as morally neutral 
and committed to the promotion of human freedom—exactly the neo-
Baroque position of inBuential contemporary Catholic commentators 
such as George Weigel and Michael Novak who unsurprisingly oppose 
those sections of the encyclical most critical about the unbridled “free 
market.”23 However, this is merely the laissez-faire liberal side of the 
modern coin whose reverse face is the socialist utopia of statism and 
collectivism. How so? Both uproot the market and the state from the 
communal and associationist networks of civil society, thereby severing 
production as well as exchange from the civic virtues that are embodied 
in intermediary institutions and from the moral sentiments that govern 
interpersonal relations. As such, Baroque Catholic scholasticism and 
Smith’s Calvinist dualism of grace and contract are mutually reinforcing 
apologias for the primacy of commercial society over against political 
authority and civil autonomy.
For Benedict, by contrast, neither politics nor the economy are 
purely self-governing or self-suCcient realities. Instead, they either 
reBect some revealed cosmic order, like Augustine’s Civitas Dei that 
is governed by theological virtues embodied in real, primary relations 
among its members (self-organized within communities, localities, and 
associations). Or else political and economic arrangements represent 
a human arti8ce built over against the inalterability of “given” nature, 
like the modern tradition of the social contract where ties between the 
state and the individual and also among individuals are determined by 
abstract standards like formal rights and proprietary relations (a vision 
which 8nds its original expression in the works of Hobbes and Locke). 
.e aim of Catholic social teaching is to transform humanly devised po-
litical and socio-economic arrangements such that they ever more mir-
ror the divinely created cosmic ordering towards the supernatural Good 
in God. As the universal community and sociality, the Church embodies 
this promise and through the Eucharistic celebration oAers a foretaste of 
the heavenly banquet in anticipation of the beati8c vision.
23. Rowland, “A Tale of a Duck-Billed Platypus Called Benedict and His Gold and 
Red Crayons,” this volume, ch. 2.
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Mutuality and Sympathy: The “Metaphysical” 
Economy of Christian Neo-Platonism
By appealing to the Neapolitan tradition of civil economy, Benedict shi6s 
the emphasis away from a more Aristotelian concern for individual sub-
stance towards a more Christian Neo-Platonist focus (in Augustine and 
Aquinas) on the self-diAusive Good that endows all things with good-
ness and makes them relational. In turn, this draws on Plato’s argument 
that we have a natural desire for the transcendent Good that “lures” us 
erotically—the Meno paradox of desiring to know that which we do not 
as yet understand. It is the presence of the transcendent Good in imma-
nent nature that directs human activity to the common good in which 
all can share. Concretely, the common good is neither purely publicly 
provided nor exclusively privately owned but instead distributed com-
munally across the whole of societies and embodied in intermediary 
institutions and structures such as cooperatives, employee-owned part-
nerships, community banks, and civil welfare. For unlike the collectivist 
state or the unbridled free market, such and similar structures work for 
the social good open to all rather than exclusively nationalized owner-
ship or purely private pro8t, as Caritas in Veritate reaCrms.
Benedict’s appeal to Christian Neo-Platonism is signi8cant for a re-
lational politics and economics on (at least) seven accounts. First of all, it 
modi8es existing genealogical accounts of the tradition of civil economy 
in the direction of a stronger recognition of the central signi8cance of 
the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality. .e opposition 
between an active, civic Aristotelian and Ciceronian humanism (associ-
ated with Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni), on the one hand, and 
an individualistic, contemplative Neo-Platonist and Epicurean human-
ism (wrongly ascribed to Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino), on 
the other hand,24 must be quali8ed by linking the heritage of Dominicans 
like St. .omas Aquinas (and his Neo-Platonist reading of Augustine) 
to the Neapolitan tradition of civil economy. Here the conceptual link 
is the idea of horizontal and vertical relationality of human beings. 
Metaphysically, patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonists reject 
the earlier radical Aristotelian idea of autonomous individual substance 
disconnected from the eCcient causality of the Prime Mover by argu-
ing that we are created in the image and likeness of the Trinitarian God 
whose creative activity sustains us in actuality. As such, being is situated 
24. Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 27–99, esp. 45–57.
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in the intermediary realm of “the between” (Plato’s metaxu) where the 
original relation among the divine persons and the participatory rela-
tion between creation and creator intersect without however collapsing 
into one another. Humans can thus be described as relational substances 
participating in the substantive relationality of the triune Godhead.
Second, this vision resonates with Salutati’s civic humanism and his 
vision of a horizontal, relational orientation of humanity that is never-
theless always already linked to its transcendent source in God: “.e two 
sweetest things on earth are the homeland and friends [. . .]. Providing, 
serving, caring for the family, the children, relatives, friends, and the 
homeland which embraces all, you cannot fail to li6 your heart to heaven 
and be pleasing to God.”25 .is is also reBected in Genovesi’s relational 
anthropology and “musical metaphysics,” for example in his 1766 treatise 
!e Philosophy of the Just and Honest where he writes that “[we are] cre-
ated in such a way as to be touched necessarily, by a musical sympathy, 
by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as soon as we meet another man; no 
human being not even the most cruel and hardened can enjoy pleasures 
in which no one else participates.”26 Likewise, in his Lectures on Civil 
Economy (1765–67), he links the social nature of human animals to the 
principle and practice of reciprocity: “How is man more sociable than 
other animals? [ . . . ] [It is] in his reciprocal right to be assisted and con-
sequently in his reciprocal obligation to help the others in their needs.”27
In turn, inter-personal relationality at the metaphysical and an-
thropological level translates into an emphasis on shared, communal 
happiness and the mutual enjoyment of “relational” goods at the civil 
and economic level. In the Lectures, Genovesi argues that 
even among people that are corrupted by the luxury and bad 
custom there is no one, a chief of family or whatever person, who 
does not feel an inner pleasure in doing good things to other 
people, in making others happy [ . . . ] It is a characteristic of man 
of not being able to enjoy a given good without sharing it with 
somebody else. Some say that it is self-love or pride [superbia] to 
show our happiness to others. I do not think so: it seems to me 
that there is in us an inner need to communicate to each other 
our happiness.28
25. Coluccio Salutati, quoted in Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 47.
26. Genovesi, Della diceosina, 42.
27. Genovesi, Lezioni di commercio, part I, ch. 1, §17, 14.
28. Ibid., part I, ch. 16, §2, footnote.
Part III: Civil and Political Economy186
In this manner, Genovesi links happiness to goodness and conceives 
both in terms that outwit in advance the modern, liberal separation of 
private happiness and individual commodities from public welfare and 
public, “relational” goods. .e civil economy tradition combines an 
Aristotelian-Ciceronian emphasis on happiness and a Neo-Platonist-
Epicurean insistence on the good.
.ird, Genovesi’s accentuation of metaphysical and anthropologi-
cal relationality is neither naïve nor utopian but acknowledges the real-
ity of human vice and sinfulness. Precisely because his account of civil 
economy is explicitly grounded in a conception of human nature, he rec-
ognizes that there are natural instincts (such as self-preservation, seek-
ing comfort or distinguishing oneself)29 that can direct us away from the 
quest for the common good towards the pursuit of self-interested wealth 
and utility. In this process, human vice that leads to practices such as 
usury “converts friendship and humanity into merchandise,” and utility 
is divorced from the natural outlook towards the supernatural good.30 
.us, the institutions and practices of civil society governed by both 
higher and lower virtues are required to correct human deviation from 
the natural law of seeking happiness that is itself relational: “[i]t is a uni-
versal law that we cannot make ourselves happy without making others 
happy as well.”31
Fourth, Genovesi argues against the ontological atomism of 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville that neither the economy 
nor society can function properly without cooperation and trust and 
that in turn these require more than either egoism or altruism. Beyond 
this false divide, what is needed is a network of practices and institutions 
that blend the strive for utility with the quest for happiness and thereby 
direct man’s ambivalent nature (virtue and vice, unsociability and social-
ity, etc.) to the pursuit of the common good in which all can participate. 
It is precisely the civic relations of civil society that constitute the nexus 
of relationships where individual interest and public welfare coincide 
without ever being fully identical.
.is link between personal and public goods and happiness in the 
civil economy tradition can be traced to the Italian philosopher and 
29. Ibid., II, ch. 13, §5, 195.
30. Ibid., II, ch. 13, §5, 196.
31. Genovesi, Autobiagra"a e Lettere, 449. Here Genovesi echoes Doria’s 1710 book 
On Civil Life which begins with the following words: “without any doubt, the 8rst object 
of our desire is human happiness.”
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historian Ludovico Antonio Muratori, another key 8gure of the Italian 
Enlightenment. Long before the discourse on happiness bequeathed to 
us by the American and French Revolutions, he wrote in 1749 that
. . . the master desire in us, and father of many others, is our 
own private good, or our particular happiness [ . . . ]. Of a more 
sublime sphere, and more noble origin, is another Desire, that of 
the Good of Society, of the Public Good that is Public Happiness. 
.e 8rst is born of nature, the second has virtue for a mother.32
Once more, it is clear from such and similar texts that the patristic 
and medieval Neo-Platonist emphasis on man’s natural desire for hap-
piness and the supernatural infusion of virtue, which directs us to the 
common good, is at the heart of the civil economy tradition.
Fi6h, Genovesi looks to early Renaissance civic humanism and also 
the legacy of Giambattista Vico, Celestino Galiani, and Paolo Mattia 
Doria in order to make the case that intentional human actions do in-
deed have unintentional consequences thanks to divine providence and 
grace, rather than fate and fortune as for Machiavelli and Mandeville. 
Here Vico and Galiani are particularly important, with the latter speak-
ing of the “Supreme Hand” and the former writing that “Man has free 
will, though it be weak, to turn passions into virtue; but is helped by 
God with divine Providence and supernaturally with divine grace.”33 In 
this context, we are reminded of Augustine’s City of God, notably the 
fusion of coercive and persuasive elements in the operation of public 
institutions. For the Neapolitans as for the Bishop of Hippo, state law, 
education, and civil life constraint self-interest and direct it towards the 
common good which is always more than the collective sum of its in-
dividual parts (pace Bentham) because it is eminently qualitative rather 
than merely quantitative—enhancing as it does the capacity of each 
individual and of the whole of society to actualize our potential to do 
good. .e twin accentuation of virtuous practices and civil institutions 
provides the “civic” nexus between (private and public) happiness and 
the economy. .is aspect is wholly absent from Smith’s conception of 
the “invisible hand” metaphor that fuses a questionable understanding 
of theodicy with a similarly questionable account of human cooperation 
32. Quoted in Bruni and Zamagni, Civil Economy, 73.
33. Giambattista Vico, Scienza Nuova, II, §7, quoted in Bruni and Zamagni, Civil 
Economy, p. 84.
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with divine providence.34 In part, this explains why Smith is suspicious 
of the intermediary institutions of civil society with which he associates 
cartel-like collusion and price-8xing.
Sixth, by contrast with Smith’s more Calvinist separation of hu-
man contract from divine gi6, Genovesi and the other members of the 
Neapolitan School view the institutions and practices of civic life as a su-
pernatural dynamic that seeks to perfect the natural, created order and 
calls for human cooperative participation. Linked to this is the insistence 
upon public trust or faith (fede pubblica) as an indispensable condition 
for socio-economic and political development within the framework of 
civil life and cognate notions such as honor and “the mutual con8dence 
between persons, families, orders, founded on the opinion of the virtues 
and religion of the contracting parties.”35 In this manner, Genovesi em-
phasizes the importance of social sympathy and reciprocity in economic 
contract, such that mutuality binds together contractual, proprietary re-
lations, and gi6-exchange. From its inception, the tradition of civil econ-
omy rejects any separation of the market mechanism from civic virtues 
and moral sentiments. .at is why in Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict 
argues that the genuine Bourishing of each person involves the foster-
ing of human, social, economic, and political bonds as exempli8ed by 
practices of gi6-exchange, mutual help, and reciprocal giving. As such, 
economics is entirely recon8gured, away from the demand- and supply-
driven market production of individually consumed goods and services 
or the paternalistic state provision of uniform bene8ts and entitlements 
towards the co-production and co-ownership of relational goods and 
civil welfare (a key aspect of the encyclical to which I shall return).
Seventh (and 8nally), the Christian Neo-Platonist vision is not 
merely abstract and conceptual but on the contrary translates into real, 
concrete practices which we can also trace back to the Dominicans 
rather than the Franciscans. For example, the idea of a “just price” which 
reBects the true value and not simply the prevailing market equilibrium 
of demand and supply. .is has a wide variety of possible applications 
today, from the practice of paying workers a “living wage” (as opposed to 
merely a minimum wage) to anti-usury legislation and limits on inter-
est rates and also the introduction of asset-based welfare and employ-
ee-ownership. Coupled with Benedict’s appeal to the ecclesial corpus 
34. See my “From Civil to Political Economy.”
35. Genovesi, Lezioni di commercio o sia di economia civile, II, ch. 10, §5, 132.
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mysticum as the most universal human community and in some sense 
the condition for sociality, the emphasis in the Christian tradition of 
Neo-Platonism on relationality ties together the sacramentally ordered 
universal community of the Church with the network of overlapping 
intermediary institutions, businesses, and the so-called “third sector” 
which operate on the basis of reciprocity and mutuality. Ultimately, this 
shows just how arti8cial the old barriers between or across state, market 
and civil society really are.
As such, the Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality is closely 
correlated with the civil economy tradition of Genovesi’s civic human-
ism. Taken together, they have the potential to transform the state, the 
market and civil society in such way that state regulation and govern-
mental welfare no longer play a merely compensatory role within the 
anarchism of “free-market” capitalism. Instead, state and market are 
re-embedded in a civil compact. .e idea is to foster civic participation 
based on self-organization, social enterprise, reciprocity, and mutual-
ity which help produce a sense of shared ownership around “relational” 
goods. .is approach seeks to balance liberty and responsibility as well 
as rights and duties in a spirit of individual and communal “charism” 
where the talents and particular vocations of each person are mutually 
augmenting and bene8cial to society as a whole. .at is what Caritas in 
Veritate seeks to articulate.
Benedict’s Call for a Civil Economy
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Benedict’s social encyclical is the 
clarity with which it links Christian Catholic social teaching to the on-
going worldwide debate on economy, ethics, technology, and ecology. By 
calling for economic and political arrangements that are re-embedded in 
civil society and sustain both human and natural life, the Pope proposes 
a model of economic democracy that transcend the old dichotomies of 
state versus market and le6 versus right. Against the secular settlement 
that has been dominant since the French Revolution, Benedict shi6s the 
emphasis away from the complicit collusion of the sovereign individual 
and the sovereign state towards practices of mutuality and reciprocity at 
all levels of human relation and association—from the family, the neigh-
borhood, and the local community to regions, nations, and the world. In 
line with the principle of subsidiarity, the Pope argues for coordination 
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and cooperation in a spirit of sympathy and benevolence at the most 
appropriate level. To reconnect global 8nance to the real economy, ac-
tion is required at the transnational level without however justifying a 
quasi-Suárezian unitary world government.
Following the civil economy tradition, Caritas in Veritate suggests 
that the commonly held belief that the le6 protects the state against 
the market while the right privileges the market over the state is eco-
nomically false and ideologically naïve. Just as the le6 now views the 
market as the most eCcient delivery mechanism for private wealth and 
public welfare, so the right has always relied on the state to secure the 
property rights of the aJuent and to turn small proprietors into cheap 
wage laborers by stripping them of their land and traditional networks 
of support. .is ambivalence of le6 and right masks a more fundamental 
collusion of state and market. .e state enforces and polices the cen-
tralized and standardized legal framework that enables the market to 
extend contractual and monetary relations into virtually all areas and 
aspects of life, notably education, the family, and sex. In so doing, both 
state and market reduce nature, human labor, and social ties to com-
modities whose value is priced exclusively by the iron law of demand 
and supply. However, the commodi8cation of each person and all things 
violates a universal ethical principle that has governed most cultures in 
the past: nature and human life have almost always been recognized as 
having a sacred dimension. Like other world faiths, orthodox catholic 
Christianity defends the sanctity of life and land against the subordina-
tion by the “market-state” of everything and everyone to mere material 
meaning and quanti8able economic utility.
.e Pope repudiates equally the le6-wing adulation of the state 
and the right-wing fetishization of the market because ultimately both 
collude at the expense of alternative forms of economic and political 
organization, legitimacy and authority. .is is why the Pope writes that 
“the exclusively binary model of market-plus-State is corrosive of soci-
ety, while economic forms based on solidarity, which 8nd their natural 
home in civil society without being restricted to it, build up society” 
(Caritas, 39). Notably, Benedict does not simply endorse civil society 
in its present con8guration precisely because the actors and institutions 
of civil society are currently subject to the administrative and symbolic 
order of the secular “market-state.”
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His call for “a true world political authority” (Caritas, 67) cannot be 
taken as an argument in favor of a unitary global government that would 
echo Suárez’s primacy of the political community over and against the 
mystical body of the Church. Instead, the Pope argues for a new kind of 
settlement whereby both the centralized bureaucratic state and the un-
fettered global free-market are transformed in order to serve the genu-
ine needs and interests of persons, communities, and the environment. 
According to Benedict, more global coordination and cooperation is 
required in order to address worldwide issues such as capital Bows and 
climate change. Far from generating greater centralization and concen-
tration of power and wealth in the hands of the most powerful nations, 
the Pope invokes the twin principles of subsidiarity and solidarity that 
are among the core tenets of Catholic social teaching.36 Since subsidiar-
ity concerns action at the appropriate level to uphold human dignity 
and reciprocal relations, Benedict’s insistence on greater transnational 
political authority is fully consonant with the imperative to re-localize 
global 8nance that is increasingly abstracted from the real economy but 
at the same time pervades all sectors and links them to the volatility of 
worldwide capital movements.
Indeed, the world economy moves in upward and downward spirals, 
a series of speculative booms and spectacular busts whereby a new and 
accelerating bubble cycle has supplanted the older, more “regular” busi-
ness cycle. Since 1973, successive waves of neo-liberal reforms abolished 
regulation and control, expanding capital mobility on an unprecedented 
scale. New complex instruments such as derivative-trading inBated the 
overall volume of capital in search of lucrative opportunities. With de-
clining pro8t margins in industry and manufacturing, money switched 
to 8nance, insurance and real estate (or FIRE). .us the new economy 
was born. Reinforced by easy credit, the U.S., the UK and other coun-
tries that emulated Anglo-Saxon capitalism (such as Ireland, the Baltic 
States, and Ukraine) went on a collective, reckless speculation drive and 
consumption binge 8nanced by a growing mountain of personal, corpo-
rate, and public debt. All of which led to arti8cially inBated and grossly 
overvalued asset prices: in the U.S. alone, the “dot.com” bubble in the 
1990s built up 7 trillion dollars in 8ctitious value, while the total housing 
bubble in the 2000s amounted to a staggering 12 trillion dollars.
36. Ponti8cal Council, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 93–101. 
Dorr, Option for the Poor.
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Paradoxically, the sheer size of the virtual economy makes state 
regulation and intervention more, not less, necessary, as markets looks 
to states in order to enforce property rights and thereby validate the pe-
rennial process of “primitive accumulation” through expropriation and 
dispossession.37 Here we can go further and suggest that self-regulating 
markets are inherently transnational and nevertheless require state au-
thority. For just as unfettered markets descend into “panic, manias and 
chaos,”38 so ballooning public debt during economic downturns exposes 
national states to global 8nancial markets. Faced with sovereign debt 
crises (like the eurozone’s current predicament), stability necessitates 
determined, large-scale intervention by a single sovereign—the kind of 
power that self-regulating markets themselves can never have. Lockean 
“market relations” amongst free, self-governing individuals requires a 
Hobbesian Leviathan a6er all. Once again, this underscores the com-
plicit collusion of the strong state and the free market.39 If the political 
framework of the eurozone does not suCce, how can the loose, dispa-
rate grouping of the G20 possibly ful8ll such a role? So against the pre-
eminence of 8nance and the primacy of economic over politics, Benedict 
is surely right to argue for a new world political institution that
 . . . would have to have the authority to ensure compliance with 
its decisions from all parties, and also with the coordinated 
measures adopted in various international forums. Without this, 
despite the great progress accomplished in various sectors, in-
ternational law would risk being conditioned by the balance of 
power among the strongest nations. .e integral development of 
peoples and international cooperation require the establishment 
of a greater degree of international ordering, marked by subsid-
iarity, for the management of globalization. (Caritas, 67)
To achieve a civil economy at the global and local levels, the Pope 
argues that state and market must be re-embedded within a wider net-
work of social relations and governed by virtues and universal principles 
such as justice, solidarity, fraternity and responsibility. .roughout 
Caritas in Veritate, the pontiA blends the civil economy tradition with 
Catholic social teaching.
37. Perelman, Invention of Capitalism.
38. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes; Reinhart and RogoA, !is Time Is 
Di$erent.
39. See my “Crisis of Capitalist Democracy,” 44–67.
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Concretely, Benedict encourages the creation of enterprises that 
operate on the basis of mutualist principles like cooperatives or employ-
ee-owned businesses. .ese businesses pursue not just private pro8t but 
also social ends by reinvesting their pro8t in the company and in the com-
munity instead of simply enriching the top management or institutional 
shareholders. Benedict also supports professional associations and other 
intermediary institutions wherein workers and owners can jointly deter-
mine just wages and fair prices. Against the free-market concentration 
of wealth and state-controlled redistribution of income, the Pope pro-
poses a more radical program: labor receives assets (in the form of stake-
holdings) and hires capital (not vice-versa), while capital itself comes in 
part from worker- and community-supported credit unions rather than 
exclusively from shareholder-driven retail banks (Caritas, 38). Tangible 
examples includes, 8rst of all, the Basque cooperative Mondragon which 
employs over 100,000 workers who produce manufactured goods, with 
an annual turnover of around 3 billion dollars; secondly, Crédit Mutuel, 
a mutualized bank which operates in several EU countries; thirdly, the 
employee-owned partnership of John Lewis in the UK.
Moreover, Benedict urges us to view pro8t and technological in-
novation no longer as ends in themselves but as means to secure the 
stability of businesses, their employees, and the communities hosting 
them. Like the “market-state,” money and science must be re-embedded 
within social relations and support rather than destroy mankind’s or-
ganic ties with nature. For example, the world economy needs to switch 
from short-term 8nancial speculation to long-term investment in the 
real economy, social development and environmental sustainability.
Taken together, these and others ideas developed in the encyclical 
go beyond piecemeal reform and amount to a wholesale transformation 
of the secular logic underpinning the “market-state.” Alongside private 
contracts and public provisions, the Pope seeks to introduce the logic of 
gi6-exchange—giving, receiving, and returning gi6s—into the economic 
process. Benedict’s key argument is that market exchange of goods and 
services cannot properly work without the free, gratuitous gi6 of mutual 
trust and reciprocity so badly undermined by the global credit crunch. 
.at’s why he writes that “the principle of gratuitousness and the logic 
of gi6 as an expression of fraternity can and must 8nd their place within 
normal economic activity” (Caritas, 36). Unlike the Smithian tradi-
tion, Benedict retrieves and extends the civil economy tradition of the 
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Neapolitan School by accentuating gratuitous gi6-exchange and linking 
contract to gi6. For all contracts involve trust among the contracting par-
ties and trust (pistis or faith since Greek Antiquity) in the reasonableness 
of exchange (and the reality of products and services which exchange 
implies). Without the giving and receiving of trust, contractual relations 
require an ever-greater scope and intensity of control and enforcement, 
thus empowering the state and its agencies to the detriment of autono-
mous civil society. .at’s why the extension of commercial exchange into 
areas previously governed by (a higher degree of) gi6 exchange always 
already entails the expansion of central state powers.
Nor is Benedict’s vision of gratuitous gi6-exchange reactionary or 
nostalgic. To the contrary, he retrieves and extends the notion of “in-
tegral human development” 8rst proposed by Pope Paul VI forty years 
ago. Socio-economic development can only be humane if it promotes 
relationships of reciprocal self-giving in love, which is “the principle not 
only of micro-relationships (with friends, with family members or with-
in small groups) but also of macro-relationships (social, economic and 
political ones)” (Caritas, 2). .e concrete experience of love alerts us to 
the truth that life itself is God’s loving gi6. Benedict, referring to Deus est 
Caritas, writes that “everything has its origin in God’s love, everything is 
shaped by it, everything is directed towards it. Love is God’s greatest gi6 
to humanity, it is his promise and our hope” (Caritas, 2).
By placing charity and truth at the heart of the moral and ecologi-
cal economy, the Pope argues that Christianity avoids the irreducible 
modern dualisms that dominate contemporary culture, politics and the 
economy. .e hypostatic union of the human and divine in Jesus Christ 
alerts us to the divine intention and promise of a restoration of the cre-
ated order in and through an ever-closer union with God. Knowledge of 
God’s providence is neither con8ned to faith in scriptural revelation nor a 
reliance on natural reason alone. By contrast with the modern separation 
of reason and faith, catholic orthodox Christianity always viewed reason 
itself as a gi6 of God which is elevated by revelation and faith. As Pope 
Benedict suggested in his Regensburg address, faith habituates reason to 
see the eAects of God in all things, just as reasoning helps faith seeking 
understanding by relating the natural desire for the supernatural Good 
in God to the whole of creation which reBects the Creator in diverse ways 
that no 8nite mind can ever be equal to. As such, faith upholds reason 
and broadens its scope while reason binds faith to cognition and thereby 
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ties together perception and imagination (or “lower reason”) with intel-
lectual vision (or “higher reason”). Knowledge of the world (scientia) and 
knowledge of God (sapientia) converge and prepare man for the beati8c 
vision in the life to come, so that “we evermore dwell in him and he in 
us” (1 John 4:12–13)—“for of him, and by him, and in him, are all things” 
(Rom 11:36). To love in truth is to encounter the relational Good that 
comes from God and infuses all things with goodness—the self-diAusive 
Good or bonum di$usivum sui in Christian theology from Boethius via 
Aquinas to the Cambridge Platonists.
.us, Caritas in Veritate is a complex and thoughtful document 
that resists the misleading categorization of le6- or right-wing and stat-
ist or free-market. Benedict’s call for a civil economy that curtails the 
power of the centralized state and the unfettered global market in favor 
of persons, communities, and associations is in fact a quest for a way that 
cannot be charted on our current conceptual map. By broadening the 
idea of “integral development” centered on universal human aspiration 
such as interpersonal relationships and organic links with nature, the 
Pope proposes a vision centered on relationality, mutuality, and sympa-
thy that rede8nes links between the religious and the secular and thereby 
transcends their violent separation since the French Revolution.
Fostering Civil Economies
.e civil economy tradition which Pope Benedict draws upon to develop 
Catholic social teaching can be applied and extended in the following 
ways:
Dealing with the Debt Crisis
First of all, across the world governments and the private sector must 
consider the option of debt forgiveness for heavily indebted individuals, 
households, small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) as well as certain 
8nancial institutions such as mutualized banks or regional credit unions. 
Led by religious groups and civil society actors, the Jubilee 2000 cam-
paign in favor of debt relief for the world’s poorest economies provides 
an important precedent and template. .e combined disaster of personal 
bankruptcy, home foreclosures, the mass death of SME, and soaring un-
employment matters far more than arguments about “moral hazard” or 
“rewarding bad behavior.” Debt forgiveness is ethically imperative and 
Part III: Civil and Political Economy196
economically egalitarian, as it breaks the vicious cycle of debt-deBation 
and puts a Boor under the value of real assets like personal saving funds, 
homes as well as the human, social, and physical capital embodied in SME 
and other businesses. Ontologically, debt cancellation rejects the secular 
capitalist subordination of social relations, life, and land to the sacrality 
of market commodi8cation. By tying money to real assets and binding 
material things to their symbolic meaning, it helps restore the primacy 
of real worth over abstract, nominal monetary valuation. Coupled with a 
cap on usurious interest rates, a jubilee can reconnect capital to the value 
of actual assets and interrupt the destructive spiral of exponential debt.
Second, the public and the private sector must enact debt conver-
sion whereby the most short-term, high interest government bonds, 
mortgages, and consumer loans are converted into longer-term, lower, 
and (in some cases) 8xed-interest credit. Of course, some creditors will 
eAectively forfeit some of their investment, but they stand much more to 
lose in the event of mass bankruptcy and a second debt crisis with mass 
foreclosure, which threatens countries as varied as the U.S.A. and Spain. 
Governments should urgently consider proposals to oAer mortgage 
holders the option of replacing a share of their mortgage (20–50 percent) 
with a low-interest loan from the state, subject to a maximum amount. 
In the U.S.A. or Europe, for example, this could be up to 125,000 U.S. 
dollars and 100,000 euros respectively. .e annual interest rate could be 
as low as 1–1.5 percent, and the loan would be amortized over a period of 
20–30 years. Such a scheme would almost certainly help minimize home 
repossessions and stabilize the property market in which more than 60 
percent of the UK’s wealth is tied up (around 4 trillion pounds out of 
a total of approximately 7 trillion). .is sort of state assistance should 
be made available not just to individual borrowers but also to housing 
associations, especially those that have formed joint ventures with build-
ing companies and are now facing an acute funding shortage—caused in 
large part by the scandalous refusal of commercial banks to increase their 
lending while still paying their top management big bonuses. Similar 
debt conversion programs could be extended to other sectors that are 
crippled by debt, including commercial real estate and consumer loans.
By contrast with the current credit squeeze where the risk of bank-
ruptcy becomes a self-ful8lling prophecy, debt conversion alleviates the 
immediate debt burden. In addition to reducing private and corporate 
bankruptcy, the restructuring of debt can establish a Boor under asset 
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prices, thereby interrupting the vicious circle of debt-deBation and re-
ducing the risk of a double-dip recession. Moreover, lending will only 
be properly restored when assets stop falling, and assets will only stop 
falling when debt is brought under control through forgiveness and 
conversion. .is would reconnect debt to assets and re-localize 8nance, 
something which Pope Benedict XVI, the new Patriarch of Moscow and 
All Russia Kirill I and the Anglican Archbishops of Canterbury and York 
Rowan Williams and John Sentamu already called for in the autumn of 
2008. Indeed, reconnecting debt to assets would prevent the destructive 
bubble cycle whereby unrestrained, debt-8nanced speculation leads to 
a huge hike in asset and commodity prices and creates trillions of dol-
lars in fake wealth, with devastating consequences for the real economy 
once the arti8cial bubble bursts and the edi8ce built on cheap credit 
collapses—exactly what the global credit crunch brought about in 2008. 
By enacting debt cancellation and conversion, governments and the 
8nancial sector can address the problem of debt-deBation and put the 
economy on a more balanced footing.
Monetary and Financial Reform
As the history of 8nancial crises suggests,40 an international 8nancial 
meltdown like the 2007–09 global credit crunch tends to be accompa-
nied by the twin risk of debt-deBation and double-dip recessions. In 
conditions of 8scal contraction in response to sovereign debt problems, 
monetary policy expansion is one of the few tools to counteract deBa-
tionist pressure. However, with interest rates close to 0 percent (as is 
currently the case), the only instrument at the disposal of central banks 
is large-scale quantitative easing (QE), i.e. injecting liquidity through 
mass purchase of securities and the creation of electronic money. But its 
systemic risks are unknown and there is a clear possibility that attempt-
ing to cure deBation leads to the opposite disease of hyperinBation. As 
such, the use of QE could perpetuate and even exacerbate the bubble 
cycle of boom and bust that has subverted the more “natural” business 
cycle. At the same time, QE seems to be one of the few policy options to 
deal with the debt burden that aAects the public and corporate sectors. 
Extended to government bonds, QE has the potential to monetize the 
public de8cit and avoid any 8nancial crowding out.
40. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes; Reinhart and RogoA, !is Time Is 
Di$erent.
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Reigning in debt in itself is only one precondition for re-localizing 
global 8nance and transforming the world economy. In order to gener-
ate sustainable growth that bene8ts society as a whole, the world’s lead-
ing economies must abandon the doctrine of monetarism—a key pillar 
of the neo-liberal orthodoxy built on liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization.
Monetarism stipulates the pursuit of price stability by focusing ex-
clusively on monetary policy instruments such as interest rates in order 
to control the money supply. Such a policy stance is reinforced by the 
neo-classical view that expansionary 8scal policy merely generates inBa-
tion and should therefore be aimed at balanced budgets and low levels 
of public debt.
Taken together, the preferred monetary and 8scal policy mix of 
monetarism amounts to an economic straightjacket with an inbuilt 
contractionary, deBationist bias that can trigger a double-dip recession. 
Historical precedents abound: in U.S. in 1936–37 or Japan in 1990, pub-
lic spending was slashed before the recovery of private sector investment 
and consumption was sustained, thus strangling the economy and caus-
ing a death spiral of debt-deBation that ended only when the world went 
to war. European history oAers particularly important lessons. .e new 
British coalition government’s commitment to public spending cuts risks 
repeating the same mistake as the Conservative-Liberal coalition in 1931, 
whose emergency budget was described by Keynes as “replete with folly 
and injustice.” Likewise, Germany’s austerity package of 80 billion euros 
over 8ve years seems to replicate the same erroneous policy as Heinrich 
Brüning, the 8nance minister from 1930 to 1932, whose devotion to 8s-
cal orthodoxy plunged the Weimar Republic into mass discontent that 
fuelled the Bames of National-Socialism. As such, monetarism risks 
transmitting internationally a policy of national contraction that could 
plunge the world economy into a double-dip recession. By contributing 
to mass unemployment and social dislocation, monetarism also under-
mines the social cohesion on which free, truly democratic societies rely.
In addition to monetary policy reform, civil economies won’t emerge 
and Bourish unless international 8nance is transformed. Current eAorts 
by the G20 merely aim to regulate global 8nance at the margins, with 
new minimum capital requirements, bank liquidity standards and limits 
on leveraging. Besides important technical details about how to de8ne 
and measure such and similar new conditions, there are questions about 
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eAective implementation and political authority. Rather than aiming for 
a global regulatory regime that risks being too rigid and could be evaded 
(given the scope of the oAshore economy),41 it seems preferable to cre-
ate pan-national arrangements within existing economic zones like the 
EU, ASEAN or new blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC). But it’s far from clear whether the series of proposed regula-
tions could prevent a repeat of 2007–08 or avoid a new bubble cycle of 
boom and bust fuelled by corporate and private debt.
Instead of merely reforming 8nancial services, the imperative is to 
re-localize global 8nance and tie money to real assets—contrary to dubi-
ous instruments such as credit default options (CDO) or credit default 
swaps (CDS) that make money with money but are nevertheless secured 
ultimately against material resources (such as primary commodities) 
which are thereby destabilized. Beyond reforms, new restrictions and 
incentives must be introduced. .is could include an on certain specula-
tive practices and an anti-usury cap on interest rates (whether voluntary 
or statutory will depend in large part on the sector). In addition to the 
separation of retail from investment banking, what is needed is a set of 
new regulations that help limit systemic risk and put an end to the neo-
liberal privatization of pro8ts and the nationalization of losses. 
Here religious ideas and practices are directly relevant, especially 
mutuality and trust and an emphasis on reinvesting pro8ts for investive 
purposes at the service of the common good in which all can share. .e 
prohibition of usury and certain forms of speculation like large-scale 
short-selling must be reinstated as ethical limits and economic prin-
ciples. In terms of incentives, it is worth mentioning both Muslim and 
Christian ideas of ethical banking and social investment that emphasize 
the transfer of ownership (as in the case of Muslim mortgage schemes) 
and the link between assets and charity (as in the case of Christian invest-
ment funds where charitable activity is tied not just optionally to pro8t 
but integrally to assets themselves). .is is directly linked to new invest-
ment and growth models that are discussed in the following section.
Alternative Investment and Growth Models
Christian visions for an alternative economy that is re-embedded in 
politics and social relations oAer a refreshing alternative to the residual 
41. Brittain-Catlin, O$shore.
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market liberalism of both le6 and right (for example, the work of Karl 
Polanyi or G. D. H. Cole). In practice, an embedded model means that 
elected governments restrict the free Bow of capital and create the civic 
space in which workers, businesses and communities can regulate eco-
nomic activity. Instead of free-market self-interest or central state pater-
nalism, it is the individual and corporate members of civil society who 
collectively determine the norms and institutions governing production 
and exchange. Speci8c measures include, 8rst of all, extending fair-trade 
prices and standards from agriculture and the food industry to other 
parts of the economy, including 8nance, manufacturing. .is could be 
done by strengthening the associative framework and giving diAerent 
sectors more autonomy in determining how to implement a set of de-
sirable goals debated and voted upon by national parliament, regional 
assemblies or city halls.
Second, replacing the minimum wage with a just, “living wage” that 
reBects the true value of labor. Here the example of London Citizens 
is very instructive—a network of diAerent local communities and faith 
groups which are joint together in action by the principles and practices 
of Catholic social teaching and which have persuaded both City Hall and 
a growing number of corporate businesses to sign up voluntarily and pay 
their staA the “living wage.”42 By extension, groups of trading guilds with 
overlapping membership, in cooperation with local councils or regional 
governments, must be empowered to negotiate just wages for workers. 
Employee co-ownership, savings, and pension scheme could also be linked 
more closely to 8rms that self-organize as part of professional guilds.
.ird, at the level of the G20 and pan-national blocs like the EU 
pushing for global capital controls in the form of the Tobin tax and bank 
levies (including voluntary caps on interest rates), coupled with new in-
centives to reconnect 8nance to the real economy, by promoting invest-
ment in productive, human, and social investment. More speci8cally, the 
8nancial industry must eschew the dichotomy of public, nationalized 
and private, corporate models in favor of social sector solutions such 
as social investment banks, social grants or social impact bonds. .e 
latter could encompass a wide range of areas such as projects devoted to 
restorative justice, local socio-economic regeneration, the environment, 
education or culture.
42. Ivereigh, Faithful Citizens.
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In order to diversify the nature and range of 8nancial services, gov-
ernments and parliaments could put in place a series of positive incen-
tives to promote cooperation between non-pro8t organizations, social 
entrepreneurs and government agencies. Beyond currents attempts to 
channel 8nancial into social capital, the key is to link investment to 
charity (and thereby bind contract to gi6), such that charitable activities 
and social action are not just added on and play a compensatory role 
for 8nancial capitalism. Instead, each new 8nancial investment would 
always already involve new assets for social activities, and a share of the 
pro8ts would automatically be reinvested in social enterprise. Such an 
organic connection between investment and charity would transform 
the very way global 8nance operates. .e trillions of pounds which the 
now retiring generation of baby boomers have to invest can be tapped 
into as a source of capital. .e overriding aim must be to preserve the 
sanctity of natural and human life and to promote human relationships 
and associations that nurture the social bonds of trust and reciprocal 
help on which both democracy and markets depend.
Welfare Reforms
In terms of social policy, there is now a unique opportunity not just to re-
build the economy but also to transform the welfare state away from state 
paternalism or private contract delivery towards civic participation and 
community organizing in conjunction with national collective activity and 
state investment. Centralized statist welfare plays at best a compensatory 
role in relation to laissez-faire economics and at worst is secretly complicit 
with the extension of the market into hitherto largely self-regulating areas 
of the economy and society. Indeed, the centralized and corporatized wel-
fare state merely regulates the conBict between capital owners and wage 
laborers without fundamentally altering relations between capital and 
labor. Whilst it does provide some much-needed minimum standards, 
statist-managerial welfare subsidizes the aJuent middle classes and un-
dermines (traditional or new) networks of mutual assistance and recipro-
cal help amongst workers and within local economies. Today, by contrast, 
a renewed emphasis on the principles of reciprocity and mutuality can 
translate into policies that incentivize the creation of mutualized banks, 
local credit unions, and community-based investment trusts.
Indeed, Christian socialists like Karl Polanyi warn against the fallacy 
of appealing to a welfare model that traps the poor in dependency and 
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redistributes income to the wealthy. At the hands of former Conservative 
Prime Minister Margaret .atcher and the New Labour party of Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown, the welfare state was 8rst rationalized and then 
deployed to fashion “the freely-choosing reBexive and risking individual 
removed from the relational constraints of nature, family, and tradition”, 
as John Milbank has rightly remarked in the present volume. At a time 
of 8scal austerity, ageing populations and the ballooning de8cits of so-
cial security and pension systems, the social-democratic le6 must look 
beyond redistributive policies to asset-based welfare and decentralized 
models that foster human relationships of communal care and mutual 
help—rather than state paternalism or private contract delivery.
For example, Christians could advocate a system that combines 
universal entitlement with localized and personalized provision, e.g. 
by fostering and extending grassroots’ initiatives like “Get Together” or 
“Southwark Circle” in London that blend individual, group and state ac-
tion. Both initiatives reject old schemes such as “befriending” or uniform 
bene8ts in favor of citizens’ activity and community-organizing sup-
ported by local council—instead of being determined by central target 
and standards. .e link between diAerent actors and levels is neither ab-
stract, formal rights and entitlements nor monetarized, market relations 
but instead human relationships of mutuality and reciprocity. Citizens 
join welfare schemes like social care as active members who shape the 
service they become part of rather than being reduced to merely pas-
sive recipients of a “one-size-8ts-all,” top-down model. Southwark Circle 
works on the principle that people’s knowledge of their neighborhood, 
community, and locality is key to designing the provision and delivery 
of welfare. Services are delivered involving civic participation, social en-
terprise (like the company Participle), and the local council.
By contrast, state paternalism or private contract delivery cost more 
to deliver less, and they lock people either into demoralizing dependency 
on the state or 8nancially unaAordable dependency on outsourced, pri-
vate contractors. .e reason why civic participation and mutualism costs 
less and delivers more is because it cuts out the “middle man”—the grow-
ing layers of gate-keepers such as doctors, social workers, and bureaucrats 
who assess people’s eligibility and enforce centrally determined standards 
and targets instead of providing services that assist genuine individual 
needs and foster human relationships. But since such models require up-
front state investment and continuous involvement of the local council, 
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the state is neither eliminated nor simply retrenched. Rather, the vision of 
civic participation and mutualism is inextricably linked to the decentral-
ization of the state in accordance with the twin Catholic Christian prin-
ciples of solidarity and subsidiarity (action at most appropriate level to 
protect and promote human dignity and Bourishing). A genuine alterna-
tive to the prevailing options must eschew both conservative paternalism 
and liberal laissez-faire in favor of something like an organic pluralism 
and a radical communitarian virtue ethics that blends a hierarchy of val-
ues with an equality of participation in the common good.
Speci8cally, diAerent countries and economic regions could move 
towards a system of welfare that fuses subsidiarity with solidarity and 
universal provision with local delivery. As is well known, the principle of 
subsidiarity in Catholic social teaching does not entail the decentraliza-
tion of public policy towards the lowest level but rather the most appro-
priate level for speci8c functions and services to promote the well-being 
of persons in relationship with other persons. Put diAerently, subsid-
iarity shi6s the emphasis from the centralization of power to a proper 
balance between diAerent levels of decision-making. Applied to cases 
as diAerent as the U.S. or the European Union, subsidiarity involves the 
devolution of power to regions, localities, and neighborhoods as well as 
the delegation and pooling of sovereignty at the supra-national level. A 
proper European social policy, for example, does not imply a single, uni-
formized model or a supranational welfare state but instead a diversity 
of policies with some common, pan-European elements such as fully 
portable contributions and entitlements across the Union and a Europe-
wide pension fund (in order to diversify risk and raise the rate of return 
for individual contributors). Likewise, the principle of solidarity does 
not imply the unilateral help for the needy but instead a complex web 
of mutuality and reciprocal relations which involves not just individual 
rights and abstract entitlements but communal responsibility, mutual 
duties, and a shared concern for the common good.
In this light, the task for pan-national economic zones is not to en-
gage in piecemeal social engineering which results in a greater legislative 
and bureaucratic burden on member-states and their constituents but 
to provide a framework which ensures the universal provision of wel-
fare for all citizens and residents and the decentralization of delivery to 
regional, local, and neighborhood levels—involving not just state agen-
cies or market actors but also cooperatives and non-for-pro8t organiza-
tions from the voluntary sector, a I have already indicated.
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Here we can go further and say that, 8rst of all, welfare can no 
longer be fragmented and divided along arti8cial lines. On the con-
trary, institutions, governments, and socio-economic actors at all levels 
must 8nd a governing concept that binds together all aspects of welfare 
aid, including unemployment, social security, health, housing, educa-
tion, and training. Second, this requires abandoning the separation of 
economic from social policy in favor of a more integrated approach 
centered on the consequences of public policy for human development 
and Bourishing. A 8rst step is to complement GDP-based statistics with 
measures of well-being (e.g., the UN’s human development index and 
General Well-Being or GWP instead of GDP). .e next step must be to 
combine universal, objective ends or 8nalities with particular, personal-
ized means or measures.
.ird, welfare and social policy must put individual and communal 
capabilities at the center of attempts to eradicate absolute poverty and 
reduce income and asset inequality. .is will have to involve supple-
menting individual property and other rights with a communal sharing 
of common resources such as land, real estate, and other proprietary 
forms. Here the unrealized potential of the Catholic tradition of dis-
tributism is perhaps most evident. As the work of the Catholic moral 
philosopher John Ryan and others shows, distributism is not just con-
cerned with a wider spread of ownership or property but also extends to 
the crucial question of fair prices and just wages.43
Let me illustrate some of the preceding arguments in relation to 
the problem of pensions. Public pay-as-you-go schemes oAer universal 
coverage but they are 8nancially unsustainable and socially unaccept-
able because in the absence of permanently higher labor productivity 
an ageing population will either have to raise pension contributions or 
lower pension bene8ts. Likewise, private pension funds involve high 
transaction costs and managements fees (even a small annual fee can 
add up to over 20 percent over the lifetime of a private fund). By de8ni-
tion, a private scheme is not and can never be universal. As a result, the 
alternative is to have a universal, publicly funded scheme with an annual 
rate of return of up to 5 percent, via an “interest swap” which is secured 
by indexed government bonds. Such a scheme could be composed of 
two pillars, with a mandated de8ned bene8ts (DB) part and a voluntary 
43. In addition to the works of G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, see Ryan, Living 
Wage, and Ryan, Distributive Justice.
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de8ned contributions (DC) part. Since a pension scheme with a DB el-
ement involve risk-sharing, pan-national economic zones like the EU 
or, in future, EurAsEC oAer greater potential for risk-pooling than the 
national level (especially in the case of smaller, poorer nations where 
there is a strong incentive to save money privately for old age rather than 
to contribute to a public scheme).44
So based on the twin principle of subsidiarity and solidarity, a 
pan-national pension system would be most appropriate. Among other 
things, this would require the introduction of two new types of assets: 
8rst of all, bonds indexed on consumer price index (CPI) of member 
states and, secondly, assets indexed on aggregate nominal income of 
all participant countries. An active market for these two assets would 
provide a guideline for expected returns on such assets and an instru-
ment for investment for funded pension schemes. In the absence of pan-
national taxation, each member state could create bonds indexed on its 
own national income. One could then bring these bonds together into a 
fund that would thus be based on aggregate transnational income. .ese 
bonds would pool risks at the pan-national level, a possibility that is not 
available to each and every individual country. 
.e macroeconomic dimension is that additional savings and 
investment are required to facilitate the transition to a funded system 
and to smooth out the demographic hump as a result of the retirement 
of the “baby boomer” generation and the constraints it will impose on 
pay-as-you-go schemes. As long as more savings translate into more 
investment (with the appropriate tax and regulatory incentives), the 
pan-national economic area as a whole and all the participant countries 
would avoid Keynes’ “paradox of thri6” whereby more savings stiBe ag-
gregate demand due to the negative income eAect, thereby reducing em-
ployment, output and investment, and so on. Crucially, a pan-national 
socio-economic compact that includes a pension system along these 
lines requires more physical investment and thus creates the conditions 
for the sort of strong economic growth that neo-liberal 8nance capital-
ism has over the last thirty years precluded.
In addition to property distribution and a pan-national pension 
fund, the third element of a new welfare system is to establish asset-
based welfare such as “baby bonds,” i.e. a capital sum given to each child 
44. Interestingly this is also true for a country as vast and populous as China where 
the absence of a welfare system explains the extremely high household savings rate—a 
phenomenon that unwittingly contributes to the scope of current global imbalances.
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at birth which bearers would be free to draw from the age of 18 in order 
to pay for their tertiary education, vocational training or to help buy a 
house. As the economist and Financial Times columnist Samuel Brittan 
has argued, the crucial diAerence of asset-based welfare is that it changes 
the whole life-cycle income and assets of individuals and households. 
By contrast, welfare based on income (e.g. bene8ts) has a much more 
limited impact on peoples’ perceived and real wealth. And in contrast 
to home ownership and pensions, asset-based welfare sets in at precisely 
the age where people would otherwise start running up debts.
Pan-national economic zones must urgently identify ways of creat-
ing mechanism that extend the bene8ts of asset-based welfare to their 
populations. In the current situation where soaring budget de8cits and 
exponentially growing levels of public debt make any ambitious scheme 
based on unfunded expenditure a 8nancial folly, one way of introduc-
ing asset-based welfare would be to use capital receipts from the sale of 
new licenses, for example in connection with carbon-trading or other 
green technology. What must govern all future attempts to recon8gure 
the welfare system are the twin principles of subsidiarity and solidarity 
and the twin imperative of universal entitlement and local provision.
Conclusion
Since the origins of the dominant ideology and politics can be traced to 
the convergence of state and market and the collusion of le6 and right, 
what is required is a new politics that recovers earlier traditions and 
blends the best of Romantic conservatism with Christian guild social-
ism. .is will have to pursued elsewhere,45 but this chapter has suggested 
a variety of ways in which the ideas of Caritas in Veritate and the civil 
economy tradition can be applied and extended in the direction of a new 
civil compact wherein the relations between individuals, the state, and 
the market are re-embedded in the overlapping networks of reciprocal 
human relationships of mutuality and sympathy.
45. I am currently writing !e Politics of Paradox, a book on alternatives to capitalist 
democracy.
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The Anthropological Unity  
of Caritas in Veritate
Life, Family, and Development
David L. Schindler
Introduction
“.e truth of development consists in its completeness: if it does not in-
volve the whole man and every man, it is not true development.”1 .is, 
says Pope Benedict in his new encyclical, is “the central message of [Paul 
VI’s] Populorum Progressio, valid for today and for all time” (Caritas, 18). 
“Integral human development on the natural plane, as a response to a vo-
cation from God the Creator, demands self-ful8llment in a ‘transcendent 
1. Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 18. Further references to this encyclical will be 
given parenthetically in the text.
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humanism which gives [to man] his greatest possible perfection: this is 
the highest goal of personal development’” (Caritas, 18).2
According to Benedict, God-centered charity in truth is the key to 
“integral human development.” “Everything has its origin in God’s love, 
everything is shaped by it, everything is directed towards it” (Caritas, 1). 
Love is thus “the principle not only of micro-relationships (with friends, 
with family members or within small groups) but also of macro-rela-
tionships (social, economic and political ones)” (Caritas, 1). .e call to 
love, in other words, stirs in the heart of every man. “.e interior im-
pulse to love” is “the vocation planted by God in the heart and mind of 
every human person,” even as this love is “puri8ed and liberated by Jesus 
Christ,” who reveals to us its fullness (Caritas, 1). “In Christ, charity in 
truth becomes the Face of his Person” (Caritas, 1; emphasis original). 
.e Church’s social teaching thus, in a word, is “caritas in veritate in re 
sociali: the proclamation of the truth of Christ’s love in society” (Caritas, 
5). My purpose is to discuss the anthropological unity of the Catholic 
Church’s social teaching suggested here, as manifest in the link between 
development, family, and life issues.
On the Contribution of Caritas in Veritate  
to Catholic Social Teaching
First of all, it is important to see that the Church’s social teaching does 
not claim to oAer technical solutions with respect to economics and de-
velopment (Caritas, 9). At the same time, by virtue of her sacramental 
embodiment of the truth of Christ as Creator and Redeemer, the Church 
does become an “expert in humanity,”3 in the sense that she has “a mis-
sion of truth to accomplish, in every time and circumstance, for a society 
that is attuned to man, to his dignity, to his vocation” (Caritas, 9). Her so-
cial doctrine draws from the truth as found in all branches of knowledge, 
o6en in fragmented form, and assembles that truth into a unity.
On the one hand, then, the purpose of the Church is not to suggest 
a distinct economic system as an economic system. On the other hand, it 
is to propose principles that aAect all human activities from the inside, 
including activities in politics and the public realm (Caritas, 56) and every 
2. Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, 16.
3. Paul VI, Discourse to the General Assembly, 3.
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phase of economic activity (Caritas, 37). In this connection, Benedict 
recalls the teaching of John Paul II, who, following the collapse of the 
economic and political systems of the Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe, said that a comprehensive new plan of development was called 
for, not only in these countries but also in the West; and Benedict states 
that this is “still a real duty that needs to be discharged” (Caritas, 23).
Regarding tendencies in the West, Caritas in Veritate rejects the 
reading of Centesimus Annus that would understand the three “subjects” 
of the social system—the state, the economy, and civil society—each to 
have an exclusive logic of its own, only extrinsically related to the others 
(Caritas, 38–40). As Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone states in an address to the 
Italian Senate: “.is conceptualization, which [for example] confuses the 
market economy that is the genus with its own particular species which 
is the capitalist system, has led to identifying the economy with the place 
where wealth or income is generated, and society with the place of soli-
darity for its fair distribution.”4 Caritas in Veritate rejects this dichotomy 
between “subjects,” which would undermine the call to love as integrative 
of every human activity and all development: of the whole man and every 
man. To paraphrase Cardinal Bertone, we must supersede the dominant 
view that expects the Church’s social teaching, involving the centrality 
of the person, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the common good, to be con-
8ned, as it were, to social activities, while “experts in eCciency” would be 
charged with running the economy.5 .is of course does not mean that 
expertise and eCciency are unnecessary, but only that the integration 
of these is necessary for the functioning of the economy already in its 
wealth-producing activity, rightly conceived. In a word, “without internal 
forms of solidarity and mutual trust, the market cannot completely ful8ll 
its proper economic function” (Caritas, 35).
Secondly, the main presupposition undergirding the argument of 
Caritas in Veritate is the universality of the vocation to love. We all know 
that we “are not self-generated” (Caritas, 68). .is implies a sense of 
the Creator which Cardinal Ratzinger/Benedict describes in other writ-
ings in terms of anamnesis, the memory of God that is “identical with 
the foundations of our being.”6 .is memory of God can be ignored or 
4. Bertone, “Address of Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, Secretary of State, During His 
Visit to the Senate of the Italian Republic,” 3 (typescript).
5. Ibid., 4 (typescript).
6. Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 92.
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denied but it is never absent from any human consciousness.7 In a word, 
a dynamic tendency toward communion with God, and with other 
creatures in relation to God, lies in the inmost depths of every human 
being, and not only Christians. .e encyclical’s call for a new trajectory 
of thinking informed by the principles of gratuitousness and relational-
ity, metaphysically and theologically conceived, takes its beginning from 
this universal anamnesis of love and God (cf. Caritas, 53, 55).
.irdly, the integrated human development described in the encyc-
lical involves a “broadening [of] our concept of reason and its application” 
(Caritas, 31). “Charity is not an added extra, like an appendix to work 
already concluded in each of the various disciplines: it engages them in 
dialogue from the very beginning” (Caritas, 30). .is does not mean 
that one can legitimately bypass reason and its proper conclusions. .e 
point is simply that “intelligence and love are not in separate compart-
ments: love is rich in intelligence and intelligence is full of love” (Caritas, 
30; emphasis original), and that love must animate the disciplines in a 
whole marked by unity and distinction (Caritas, 31). .e problem today 
is an “excessive segmentation of knowledge” that results in an inability 
to “see the integral good of man in its various dimensions” (31). .us, 
a recovery of the place of metaphysics and theology, especially in their 
integrative capacities in the realization of wisdom and as themselves 
integrated by love, “is indispensable if we are to succeed in adequately 
weighing all the elements involved in the question of development and 
in the solution of socio-economic problems” (Caritas, 31).
Fourth, Caritas in Veritate strongly re-aCrms the idea of the com-
mon good. “To desire the common good and strive towards it,” says 
Benedict, “is a requirement of justice and charity” (Caritas, 7; empha-
sis original). Concern for the common good involves the “complex of 
institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, 
politically, and culturally, making it the polis, or ‘city’ . . . ” (Caritas, 7). 
Commitment to the common good shapes “the earthly city in unity and 
peace, rendering it to some degree an anticipation and a pre8guration 
of the undivided city of God” (Caritas, 7; emphasis original). Regarding 
economic activity, the Pope thus insists that it cannot resolve social prob-
lems simply through the application of commercial logic, but “needs to 
be directed towards the pursuit of the common good, for which the politi-
cal community in particular must also take responsibility” (Caritas, 36; 
7. Catechism, 31–38. See also Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 109.
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emphasis original). “.e principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gi6 
as an expression of fraternity can and must "nd their place within normal 
economic activity,” as expressed in commercial relationships (Caritas, 36; 
emphasis original).
Benedict’s emphasis on the common good bears two especially im-
portant implications. On the one hand, it entails rejection of the dualism 
between the temporal and the eternal that is a hallmark of liberal societ-
ies. Contrary to the view of John Locke, for example, Benedict insists 
that public, economic activity is not a matter exclusively of the temporal 
order, as though the eternal order, or the heavenly city, arrives only a#er 
life on earth, or in any case remains in this life something purely “private.” 
Locke, for his part, recognizes that religion is important for morality and 
thus useful for the functioning of the earthly city, but he does so, in con-
trast to the view of Benedict, only as a means of maintaining external pub-
lic order, and not as an intrinsic good for the civil community as such.
Caritas in Veritate thus also makes clear that the Church aCrms 
the notion of the common good, rather than that of public order, as the 
proper purpose of political-economic activity. .e encyclical, in other 
words, rejects the “juridical” idea of political and economic institutions 
that has been a prevalent reading, for example, of the Council’s Dignitatis 
Humanae, as well as of John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus: the idea, that is, 
which holds that these institutions are concerned with justice as proce-
dural fairness (Rawls), in abstraction from justice as a matter also of the 
naturally given order and end of man.8
Development, Family, and Life
.e idea of humanity as a single family and of marriage and family, as 
well as life issues, play an important role in providing a foundation for, 
and in giving original form to, the principles of gratuitousness and rela-
tion, and indeed the logic of freedom and rights, that is implied by the 
common good, as outlined here.
First, and strikingly, Benedict says that “the development of peoples 
depends, above all, on a recognition that the human race is a single family 
. . .” (Caritas, 53; emphasis original), and that “the Christian revelation 
of the unity of the human race presupposes a metaphysical interpretation 
8. On the common good as the end of the state, see Catechism, 1910. On the state’s 
implication of a vision of man, see Catechism, 2244.
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of the ‘humanum’ in which relationality is an essential element” (Caritas, 
55; emphasis original). Here several points can be made: 
(i) .e idea that all human beings make up a single family derives 
from the common origin of each in the Creator. .e unity implied in 
this idea does not submerge the identity of each person, but rather ren-
ders each transparent to the other within their legitimate diversity. .e 
two persons becoming “one Besh” in marriage gives us a sense of how 
this may be so, as does Christian revelation itself, with its understand-
ing of God as a Trinity of Persons in the unity of one divine Substance 
(Caritas, 54).
.e idea of a single uni8ed family deriving from a common rela-
tion to the Creator invites further reBections drawn from the theological 
anthropology of Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict and Pope John Paul II, 
notably regarding the idea of sonship and 8liality, in the former, and 
regarding the “original solitude” of man, in the latter. Caritas in Veritate 
emphasizes that love is 8rst received by us, not generated by us. Already 
in his commentary on the anthropology of Gaudium et Spes, Ratzinger 
stresses the capacity for worship as the primary content of man’s imag-
ing of God. .is is so because human beings are most basically “sons 
in the Son:” they are images of God in and through Jesus Christ who 
is God precisely as the Logos who is from-and-for the Father (cf. Col. 
1:15–18).As Ratzinger puts it succinctly elsewhere, “the center of the 
Person of Jesus is prayer.”9 Likewise, John Paul II aCrms the primacy of 
man in his “original solitude,” by which he means that man’s relational-
ity begins most radically in his “aloneness” before God. .e point is thus 
not that man is originally without relation, but that man’s relationality, 
his original being-with, is a being-with God before it is a being-with 
other human beings. Or better: man’s being-with God, as creaturely, is 
8rst a being-from, in the manner of a child who participates in being 
only as the fruit of the radical generosity of the One Who Is.
Here, in what we may call the 8lial relation associated with the 
family, we 8nd the root meaning of the encyclical’s central category of 
relation as gi#. Indeed, once we see the radicality of this relation, which 
originates in God as the Creator, we see that it must include not only all 
human beings, though especially and most properly these, but all crea-
tures and thus also all of the natural, physical-biological entities of the 
cosmos. .us Benedict says that 
9. Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 25.
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nature expresses a design of love and truth. It is prior to us . . . and 
speaks to us of the Creator (cf. Rom 1:20) and his love for hu-
manity. It is destined to be “recapitulated” in Christ at the end of 
time (cf. Eph 1:9–10; Col 1:19–20). .us it too is a “vocation.”10 
Nature is given to us . . . as a gi6 of the Creator who has given it 
an inbuilt order, enabling man to draw from it the principles 
needed in order “to till and keep it.” (Gen 2:15) (Caritas, 48; 
emphasis original)
Indeed, we could say that, in its own analogical way, and with the help of 
man, nature thus participates in the prayer constitutive of the creature in 
its inmost 8lial movement toward the Creator.
A further implication regarding 8liality: we teach our children to 
say “please” and “thank you.” But, rightly understood, this is not a matter 
merely of manners. On the contrary, it is a matter of teaching them who 
and what they are in their deepest reality: gi6s from God who are thus 
meant to be grateful, to act in gratuitous wonder, in response to what 
is 8rst given, as gi#. Here is the origin of that recognition of being as 
true and good and, indeed, beautiful—qua given and not simply quia 
factum or as a function of human making—which must lie at the basis 
of any healthy human society. Here is the root of the encyclical’s call for 
new life-styles centered around the quest for truth, beauty, goodness and 
communion with others (cf. Caritas, 51).
(ii) Of course, children are sons and daughters of God only through 
a human father and mother, and the child is born as itself apt for either 
fatherhood or motherhood. Further, the fruitfulness of the union of the 
father and the mother is a continuing sign and expression of the creative 
generosity of God. Ratzinger in his commentary on Gaudium et Spes 
refers to this spousal communion between a man and a woman as the 
immediate consequence (Folge) of the content (Inhalt) of man’s imaging 
of God that lies 8rst in man’s “unitary” being as child of God.11 John Paul 
II refers to this constitutive aptness for spousal union-fruitfulness as 
the “original unity” of man and woman. .is aptness for spousal union, 
established 8rst in man’s and woman’s common 8lial relation to God, is 
constitutive of the human being.12 Each human being is a member of 
the single family of creatures under God, in and through membership 
10. John Paul II, Message for the 1990 World Day of Peace, 6.
11. Ratzinger, “Commentary on the Introduction and Chapter 1,” 122.
12. Compendium, 37, 110, and 147.
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in a particular familial genealogy of his own. .is is the ground for the 
encyclical’s calling on the state to promote “the centrality and the integ-
rity of the family founded on marriage between a man and a woman, 
the primary cell of society, and to assume responsibility for its economic 
and 8scal needs, while respecting its essentially relational character” 
(Caritas, 44).
(iii) .e implications of the constitutive relationality aCrmed in 
Caritas in Veritate are stunning: no relations taken up by human beings 
in the course of their lives are purely contractual, or simply the fruit of 
an originally indiAerent act of choice (cf. liberal “contractualism”). Man 
is never, at root, “lonely,” which is to say, in the language of Caritas in 
Veritate, never poor in the sense of “isolated” (Caritas, 53). On the con-
trary, his being is always a being-with.
Hence, regarding human freedom: freedom is an act of choice only 
as already embedded in an order of naturally given relations to God, 
family, others, and nature (cf. Caritas, 68). And regarding human rights: 
just as the juridical idea of rights presupposes a contractualist idea of 
freedom, so does a truthful order-bearing idea of rights presuppose a 
relational idea of the self. Just as the contractualist idea entails a priority 
of rights over duties, so does the relational idea entail a priority of duties 
over rights, though of course rights remain unconditionally coincident 
with this anterior responsibility (see Caritas, 43).13 Rights, in a word, are 
properly invested in every man, but no man is a solitary agent who can 
be abstracted from relations. On the contrary, man as he exists, always 
and everywhere, is innerly ordained to God and others, is a child born 
into a family, is sexually diAerentiated and apt for fatherhood or mother-
hood, and is intrinsically related to the whole of humanity and of nature. 
An adequate idea of rights must take intrinsically into account this order 
of relations that is constitutive of each man.
.e second main argument of this section is as follows: Caritas in 
Veritate says that Paul VI’s encyclical, Humanae Vitae, is “highly im-
portant for delineating the fully human meaning of the development the 
Church proposes” (Caritas, 15; emphasis original). Humanae Vitae makes 
clear “the strong links between life ethics and social ethics, thus ushering in 
a new area of magisterial teaching that has gradually been articulated in 
13. To be sure, “duties” are aCrmed here in terms of a responsibility to love, hence 
in a sense quite diAerent from the Kantian sense of duty that prevails in modern discus-
sions of duties and rights.
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a series of documents, most recently John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium 
Vitae” (Caritas, 15; emphasis original).
Once more, a number of points can be made:
(i) .e Pope notes in this connection Humanae Vitae’s emphasis 
on the unitive and procreative meaning of sexuality, thereby locating 
“at the foundation of society the married couple [who] are open to life” 
(Caritas, 15). He suggests that the tendency to make human conception 
and gestation arti8cial contributes to the loss of “the concept of human 
ecology and, along with it, that of environmental ecology” (Caritas, 51). 
.e point here, though not explicitly developed in Caritas in Veritate, is 
that Humanae Vitae, in its aCrmation of the unity of the personal and the 
procreative meaning of sexuality, implies a “new” understanding of the 
body as a bearer of the objective order of love, in a way consistent with and 
instructive for Caritas in Veritate’s view that the nature of the physical-
biological cosmos as a whole “expresses a design of love” (Caritas, 48).
(ii) Relative to the relation between life ethics and social ethics, the 
pope notes the inconsistency of societies which, aCrming the dignity 
of the person and justice and peace, tolerate the violation of human life 
when it is at its weakest and most marginalized (Caritas, 15). He thus 
insists that “openness to life is at the center of true development” (Caritas, 
28; emphasis original), and that we need to broaden our concept of pov-
erty and underdevelopment to take account of this question of openness 
to life. It is precisely in its increasing mastery over the origin of human 
life manifest, for example, in in vitro fertilization, the harvesting of hu-
man embryos for research, and the possibility of manufacturing clones 
and human hybrids, that we see “the clearest expression” of a supremacy 
of technology in contemporary society (Caritas, 75).
Caritas in Veritate takes up the complicated question of technol-
ogy in its last chapter. “Technology enables us to exercise dominion 
over matter” and “improve our conditions of life,” and thus goes to “the 
heart of the vocation of human labor” (Caritas, 69). .e relevant point, 
however, is that “technology is never merely technology” (Caritas, 69). 
It always invokes some sense of the order of man’s naturally given rela-
tions to God and others. Technology thus, rightly conceived, must be 
integrated into the call, indeed the covenant, implied in this order of 
relations (cf. Caritas, 69): integrated into the idea of creation as some-
thing 8rst given to man, as gi#, “not something self-generated” (Caritas, 
68) or produced by man.
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Here again we see the importance of the family. It is inside the fam-
ily that we 8rst learn a “technology” that respects the dignity of the truly 
weak and vulnerable—for example, the just-conceived and the termi-
nally ill—for their own sake. It is inside the family, indeed the family as 
ordered to worship, that we 8rst learn the habits of patient interiority 
necessary for genuine relationships: for the relations that enable us to 
see the truth, goodness, and beauty of others as given, and also to main-
tain awareness of “the human soul’s ontological depths, as probed by 
the saints” (Caritas, 76). It is inside the family that we can thus learn the 
limits of the dominant social media of communication bequeathed to us 
by technology, which promote surface movements of consciousness and 
gathering of technical information, and foster inattention to man in his 
depths and his transcendence as created by God. It is in the family that 
we 8rst become open to the meaning of communication in its ultimate 
and deepest reality as a dia-logos of love revealed by God in the life, and 
thus including also the suAering, of Jesus Christ (cf. Caritas, 4).
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, we can see, in sum, why Caritas in Veritate insists 
that the social question today “has become a radically anthropological ques-
tion” (Caritas, 75; emphasis original); why “the question of development 
is closely bound up with our understanding of the human soul” (Caritas, 
75; emphasis original); and why “only a humanism open to the Absolute 
can guide us in the promotion and building of forms of social and civic 
life—structures, institutions, culture and ethos . . . ” (Caritas, 78).
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Integralism and Gift Exchange in the 
Anglican Social Tradition, or Avoiding 
Niebuhr in Ecclesiastical Drag
John Hughes
Introduction
In this chapter I would like to begin by asking what, from an Anglican perspective, is particularly interesting about Caritas in Veritate, before 
exploring what resonances its key theological ideas of “integral develop-
ment” and charity as reciprocal gi6 exchange have within the Anglican 
Social Tradition(s). My argument will be that, 8rst, Anglicans have been 
at the forefront of the recovery of Augustinian notions of charity as re-
ciprocal gi6 exchange and the associationist application of such ideas to 
the social and economic sphere; and secondly, that, despite some recent 
evidence to the contrary, Anglicanism has particular ecclesiologico-
political reasons to be sympathetic to this integralist social agenda and 
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indeed may have some of its own resources to oAer in understanding 
this position in the modern world.
A Conservative Encyclical? Development,  
Sex, and Religion
First, what is signi8cant in Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in Veritate? 
In terms of the international development agenda, this encyclical may 
well receive a negative reception in liberal Western circles. If one wishes 
to paint Benedict as a social conservative, undoing all the “advances” of 
Vatican II and pulling up the ecclesiastical drawbridges, then it is easy 
to focus on the way the encyclical introduces a signi8cant new element 
upon the work of its predecessor, Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio, whose 
anniversary it marks, by linking social and economic development with 
what in liberal society are usually seen as more private concerns such 
as sexual ethics, questions concerning reproduction and the beginning 
and end of life (contraception, abortion and euthanasia) and even with 
explicit Christian belief.
On this interpretation, the encyclical marks a withdrawal of the 
collaboration begun in the 1960s between the Roman Catholic Church 
and other development and aid organizations on the grounds that such 
organizations are now pursuing more aggressively secular agendas which 
are incompatible with Catholic moral teaching. Claims such as “open-
ness to life is at the centre of true development,” or “.e Church force-
fully maintains this link between life ethics and social ethics” may seem 
reasonably uncontroversial in themselves.1 But when this is followed by 
appeals to Humanae Vitae, with its rejection of arti8cial contraception, 
and Evangelium Vitae’s analysis of the contemporary “culture of death” 
(supposedly evident in IVF therapies, embryo research and euthanasia), 
alongside renewed papal condemnation of “the spread of an anti-birth 
mentality” (Caritas, 28) by certain development agendas through the 
promotion of contraception and abortion as forms of demographic con-
trol, liberal alarm bells start to ring.
Similarly, few should be surprised by Caritas in Veritate’s ground-
ing of the Church’s social teaching in Christian faith and doctrine, as in 
claims such as “God is the guarantor of man’s true development” (Caritas, 
1. Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 28, 15 (emphasis original). Further references 
to this encyclical will be given parenthetically in the text.
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29; emphasis original). But when this is accompanied by the claim that 
the Church’s social teaching and commitment to development is part of 
evangelization, or by the renewed rejection of religious indiAerentism, 
syncretism or “practical atheism,” it may seem to some that Benedict is 
allowing the question of development to be subordinated to his more 
usual concerns about the rise of relativism and its erosion of the unique-
ness of Christian claims (cf. Caritas, 15, 55, 29). More explicitly, when 
the Pope refuses the “exclusion of religion from the public square,” cites 
John 15:5 (“Apart from me you can do nothing”) and insists that “A hu-
manism which excludes God is an inhuman humanism” (Caritas, 78), 
it sounds to many liberals as if he has abandoned the Second Vatican 
Council’s willingness to collaborate with all people of good will, regard-
less of their beliefs.
While some Anglican ethicists have been sympathetic to the pa-
pal analysis of the culture of death and contemporary relativism and 
secularism,2 it would be true to say that many Anglican commentators, 
perhaps inBuenced in this respect as much by the recent ecumenical 
froideur between Anglicans and Roman Catholics as by substantive 
diAerences such as the question of contraception, share a broadly lib-
eral, unsympathetic reading of Caritas in Veritate. At best, such lib-
eral Anglicans may see it as an unhelpful muddying of the waters of 
Christian social teaching, by dragging in a number of highly divisive and 
not necessarily relevant questions of life-ethics or religious confession. 
At worst, it may be seen as the return to an authoritarian, isolationist, 
and exclusivist social agenda, which is founded upon the belief that it is 
the Catholic Church’s job to rule the world, and which promotes policies 
that oppress the reproductive rights of women and encourage a danger-
ously irresponsible neglect of contraception, worsening both the AIDS 
epidemic and the approaching demographic crisis.3
Charity Beyond Justice: The Radical Agenda
But, if, to many European liberals (including many Anglicans), Caritas 
in Veritate looks like a typical piece of conservative Catholic carping 
2. For Anglicans sympathetic to the Papal encyclical tradition, we could think of 
Oliver O’Donovan, Michael Banner and John Milbank.
3. See Tina Beattie’s well-argued piece on the gender blind-spots of the encyclical: 
“Church’s idealisation of sexuality may be root of abuse.”
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about sex and religion when it should be talking about poverty, this is 
not the whole story. For, across the Atlantic, to many neo-liberal and 
neo-conservative Roman Catholics, this encyclical looks like a confused 
muddle, a papal sell-out to le6ist European social democratic ideals.4 
It is important not to overlook this social and economic radicalism in 
Caritas in Veritate, which arguably goes further than any previous papal 
encyclical in this direction.
Markets, Ethics and the Environment
Caritas in Veritate starts from the (traditional Christian) presupposi-
tion that the economic sphere is not a neutral realm unconnected with 
theology and morality. “.e economic sphere,” we are told, “is neither 
ethically neutral, nor inherently inhuman and opposed to society” 
(Caritas, 36). .is insistence that “every economic decision has a moral 
consequence” (Caritas, 37; emphasis original) may seem uncontroversial 
in Christian social teaching, but it is of course in direct opposition to 
neo-Liberal free market ideas of the market as a morally neutral, self-
regulating force for good (Caritas, 37). Pro8t, according to the Pope, 
cannot be an absolute end in itself, but must serve the common good, 
without which it “risks destroying wealth and creating poverty” (Caritas, 
21). If the market must not be allowed to become “the place where the 
strong subdue the weak,” then the “economy needs ethics in order to 
function correctly” and examples of socially responsible businesses, 
“fair-trade,” consumer co-operatives, and “ethical” banking and 8nance 
are commended (Caritas, 36, 66, 45). 
Traditional policies of Catholic social teaching are reiterated: the 
encouragement of unionization to protect the dignity of workers, the de-
sire for stable employment for all, the insistence upon “food and access 
to water as universal rights of all human beings, without distinction or 
discrimination” (Caritas, 24 & 64, 32 & 63, 27). .e Pope endorses the 
need to care for the world’s resources and to recognize our “responsibil-
ity towards creation” to ensure that our natural environment can sustain 
life into the future (Caritas, 48-51). .e political principle of subsidiar-
ity, or encouraging responsible decision making at the most local level, is 
reasserted against bureaucratic state centralism in welfare provision and 
neo-Colonial models of aid and development, which are both accused 
4. See e.g. Novak, “Pope Benedict XVI’s Caritas,” and Weigel, “Caritas in Veritate in 
Gold and Red.”
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of encouraging disempowering dependency; while at the same time col-
laboration is encouraged at every level, right up to the establishment of 
a new international global consensus (Caritas, 58, 67).
Beyond these traditional planks of Catholic social thought, the en-
cyclical seeks to bring up to date the agenda of Populorum Progressio by 
responding to contemporary crises, environmental and economic, and it 
is here that Caritas in Veritate is particularly radical. On the question of 
ecological concerns, particularly in relation to energy consumption and 
the damaging eAects of this upon our planet, the Pope moves beyond sim-
ple platitudes about the need to care for God’s creation. Philosophically, 
he rejects both the technocratic optimism which characterized much of 
the domination of nature in the last two centuries and the more recent 
neo-pagan rejection of humanity’s unique position as the crown of cre-
ation (Caritas, 68-71). Practically, he insists (to the horror of American 
neo-conservatives!) that the “technologically advanced societies can and 
must lower their domestic energy consumption” and that we also need “a 
worldwide redistribution of energy resources, so that countries lacking 
those resources can have access to them” (Caritas, 49).
Globalization and the International Regulation  
and Redistribution of Capital
In response to the international 8nancial crisis, the Pope condemns 
“badly managed and largely speculative 8nancial dealing” and economic 
short-termism, and looks for the “regulation of the 8nancial sector, so 
as to safeguard weaker parties and discourage scandalous speculation, 
and experimentation with new forms of 8nance, designed to support 
development projects” (Caritas, 21, 32, 65). He recognizes that many of 
the problems of the recent crises have arisen out of the new situation of 
globalization with the deregulation and rapid international movements 
of capital and labor. .e analysis of globalization is balanced, acknowl-
edging that “globalization, a priori, is neither good nor bad. It will be 
what people make of it,” while also recognizing that “inequalities are 
on the increase” (Caritas, 42, 22). .e task, therefore, as the encyclical 
sees it, is the moral ordering of the ever increasing international Bows 
of trade, capital and labor “to promote a person-based and community-
oriented cultural process of world-wide integration that is open to tran-
scendence” (Caritas, 42). While some have seen globalization as the end 
of the role of the state, the Pope argues instead that “in terms of the 
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resolution of the current crisis, the State’s role seems destined to grow” 
(Caritas, 41) and that greater international co-operation is needed.
Here the Pope is reviving one of the more radical proposals of his 
predecessor John XXIII (again to the horror of American neo-conser-
vatives): the “urgent need for a true world political authority,” beyond 
merely the reform of the United Nations and international 8nancial 
organizations, so that “the concept of the family of nations can acquire 
real teeth” (Caritas, 67). Here the Pope speaks also of the need for “dis-
armament, food security and peace” (Caritas, 67). In terms of global 
inequalities, the Pope raises the question of the waste of international 
aid through corruption and excessive bureaucracy and, in keeping with 
much post-colonial development thinking in the past thirty years, calls 
for aid which encourages the recipients to be able to participate them-
selves in the international economy, rather than simply to become per-
manently dependent upon aid (Caritas, 58, cf. 60, 47).
It is in this context however, that the Pope raises again one of his 
most challenging calls to the wealthy nations of the world: “.e pro-
cesses of globalization, suitably understood and directed, open up the 
unprecedented possibility of large-scale redistribution of wealth on a 
world scale” (Caritas, 42, cf. 37, 49). .is will involve opening up the 
protectionism by which the rich nations maintain their dominance over 
the poorer ones, such as high tariAs and “an excessive zeal for protecting 
knowledge through an unduly rigid assertion of the right to intellectual 
property, especially in the 8eld of health care” (Caritas, 33, 22).
New Forms of Social Enterprise and Civilizing the Economy
As if talk of local and international regulation of 8nance, protection of 
the environment and even large-scale redistribution of wealth were not 
quite upsetting enough for the neo-conservatives, the encyclical goes on 
to speak sympathetically of new models and forms of business enterprise. 
.ese new models are based upon fraternal solidarity and the gratuity 
of reciprocal giving, and belong neither purely to the realm of the mar-
ket and the logic of pure pro8t alone, nor to the sphere of state control 
and public duty (Caritas, 38-40). .ese new models o6en seem most 
at home in civil society, but they are not con8ned to it. .ey are o6en 
“based upon mutualist principles” and can encourage forms of greater 
“economic democracy,” such as co-operativist stakeholder ownership, 
rather than purely shareholder ownership (38). Here the traditional 
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distinction of pro8t and non-pro8t organizations seems to be breaking 
down. In an important passage, the encyclical notes the emergence in 
recent decades of an intermediate area which is not just a third sector 
but is having an impact upon the two traditional models of public and 
private enterprise:
It is made up of traditional companies which nonetheless sub-
scribe to social aid agreements in support of underdeveloped 
countries, charitable foundations associated with individual 
companies, groups of companies oriented towards social welfare, 
and the diversi8ed world of the so-called “civil economy” and the 
“economy of communion.” (Caritas, 46)
.e Pope endorses these “hybrid forms of commercial behavior,” 
with their renewal of responsibility and ethics, fraternal solidarity and 
reciprocal gratuity in commerce and industry as “civilising the economy” 
(Caritas, 38). .is stress on mutualism and new forms of social economy 
rooted in solidarity and reciprocal gi6 exchange is not without some 
precedent in Catholic social thought, but the renewed emphasis on them 
in Caritas in Veritate is quite striking. In the light of this radical social 
and economic agenda, it simply will not do to continue to paint Benedict 
XVI as an economic conservative on the basis of his past conBicts with 
Liberation .eologians.
Charity as Gift-Exchange and Integral  
Human Development: The Theological Heart  
of Caritas in Veritate
While some have argued that Caritas in Veritate is just a hopeless mix-
ture of conservative and radical views (thus Weigel’s ridiculous claim 
that one can separate all the “gold” bits written by Benedict, which of 
course he likes, from those written by the supposedly dreadful “red” lib-
erals at the Ponti8cal Council for Justice and Peace), it is my claim that 
the “conservative” and “radical” elements of the encyclical are part of a 
thoroughly consistent outworking of a theological perspective, which, 
while building upon much of the tradition of Catholic social teaching, 
also develops a distinctly Augustinian theological voice which is very 
much Benedict’s own. We can summarize this as the belief in charity as 
gi6 exchange and integral human development.
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Charity as Gi#-Exchange
Benedict XVI has already laid out his views on Christian charity in what 
we might think of as his manifesto encyclical Deus Caritas est, to which 
he refers repeatedly in Caritas in Veritate. Benedict’s view of charity is 
thoroughly Augustinian and Johannine in stressing the social, public and 
reciprocal nature of charity as a supernatural participation in the divine 
Trinitarian life, against more modern and Protestant individualistic no-
tions of charity as unilateral, private, interiorized and sentimentalized. 
“Charity,” he tells us, “is love received and given” and “has its origin in 
God” (Caritas, 5, 1). It cannot be con8ned to “subjective emotions and 
opinions” but is “gi6, acceptance and communion” and therefore con-
cerns the “macro-relationships (social, economic and political ones)” 
just as much as the personal (Caritas, 3, 2).
As gi6, charity goes beyond the opposition of obligation and 
self-interest: “Gi6 by its nature goes beyond merit, its rule is that of 
superabundance” (Caritas, 34). “Love—caritas—is,” according to the 
encyclical, “an extraordinary force which leads people to opt for coura-
geous and generous engagement in the 8eld of justice and peace” and 
“the principle driving force behind the authentic development of every 
person and of all humanity” (Caritas, 2, 1). From all this it follows that 
“Charity is at the heart of the Church’s social doctrine,” but this is the 
8rst time Benedict has spelt out what this means in concrete political 
and particularly economic terms (Caritas, 2). .is vision of charity as 
reciprocal gi6 exchange is the basis of the encyclical’s rejection of de-
pendency models of welfare and aid, but also of its support for radical 
sharing and redistribution of international resources and wealth. .is 
is not just a private matter for individual believers: “in commercial 
relationships the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gi6 as an 
expression of fraternity can and must 8nd their place within normal 
economic activity” (Caritas, 36).
Generosity and communion, the gratuitous actual sharing of real 
goods, is at the heart of the Gospel message about economics and devel-
opment and this is a central theme of Caritas in Veritate. Here, “charity 
goes beyond justice, because to love is to give, to oAer what is “mine” 
to the other” (Caritas, 6). Yet at the same time it “never lacks justice;” 
rather, “charity demands justice” which is the “minimum measure” of 
charity (Caritas, 6). More precisely, we can say “charity transcends jus-
tice and completes it in the logic of giving and forgiving” (Caritas, 6). In 
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this account of the supercession of justice by the gi6 of charity, Benedict 
is making a particular argument which brings us onto the question of 
his “integralism.”
Integral Human Development
When Benedict writes that “the logic of gi6 does not exclude justice, nor 
does it merely sit alongside it as a second element added from without,” 
he is manifesting his Augustinian “integralism,” against the dualism of 
what has been called the “distinction of planes” model of Christian so-
cial thought (Caritas, 34).5 In doing this he is also subtly developing the 
tradition of his predecessors John Paul II and Paul VI. While he does 
not of course accuse them of this, it is certainly possible to see a slightly 
diAerent tendency in the social teaching of these earlier popes.
Acting perhaps out of an admirable desire to 8nd common ground 
with non-believers, but also building upon the neo-scholastic distinc-
tions of reason and faith, nature and grace, previous encyclicals had of-
ten spoken with two voices: 8rstly setting forth the demands of natural 
justice which should be evident to all reasonable people regardless of 
their faith, and secondly describing the supererogatory works of charity 
to which Christians might be particularly called over and above these 
minimal demands of justice. We can certainly see the attraction of this 
“distinction of planes” strategy in seeming to enable a minimal consen-
sus for international collaboration across religious and cultural divides 
upon questions of poverty and development.
Yet at the same time such a model, with its naïve optimism about the 
ease of global consensus and its relegation of the heart of the Christian 
faith to an optional supplement, now seems dated at best. .is is not 
least in response to a more militant secularism which seeks to exclude 
religious viewpoints from the task of development altogether, while at 
the same time being le6 with a minimal account of justice incapable of 
negotiating the complexities of contemporary problems.
.is is what leads the Pope to make the following claim: “.e shar-
ing of goods and resources, from which authentic development proceeds, 
5. .e phrase “distinction of planes” comes from Gustavo Gutiérrez. See !eology of 
Liberation, 88–100, for his discussion of the development of this model by Maritain and 
others as a response to the collapse of Christendom, and his critique of this in favour of 
the more radical integralism of de Lubac and de Montcheuil. For an excellent summary 
of what is meant by “integral humanism,” see de Lubac, Catholicism, 353–56.
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is not guaranteed by merely technical progress and relationships of util-
ity, but by the potential of love that overcomes evil with good” (9). Once 
again, we can see that it is the same integralist theological reasoning which 
leads the Pope to insist both that faith is indispensable for development 
and that leads to the most radical distributivist and mutualist elements of 
his economic vision.
Integralism and Charity as Gift-Exchange  
in the Anglican Social Tradition 
We turn now to see how this distinctive theological agenda of Benedict, 
driving his social and economic thinking, compares with Anglican so-
cial thought. Here we have to speak of “thought” or “tradition/s” rather 
than capitalized “Teaching,” because, signi8cantly, there is no one voice 
which could claim to speak authoritatively and 8nally on social matters 
for the Church of England, let alone the Anglican Communion, in the 
way that the Roman Magisterium does for the Roman Catholic Church. 
Yet this is not to say that Anglicanism has no social thought. On the 
contrary, it has a substantial body of writings, some from representative 
or authoritative bodies, such as Synodical reports or oCcial statements 
by Church leaders, and some from respected Anglican thinkers, whose 
authority is more organic than formal. .is polyphonic tradition cer-
tainly contains diAerent voices, but we can also discern commonalities 
and developments, and in this we might note that our earlier analysis 
has suggested that such diversity and development can be detected even 
within the Roman magisterial tradition.
To focus our attention on the last half century or so of British 
Anglican social thought, we might well come to the conclusion that the 
dominant strand was closer to the “distinction of planes” model than 
to Benedict’s integralism. We can call this strand of Anglican social 
thought “conservative liberalism” and its hey-day was the period from 
the 1960s to the 1980s.6 .e most signi8cant 8gure for this tradition 
is William Temple (1881–1944) who was successively Archbishop of 
York and of Canterbury and whose book Christianity and Social Order 
was enormously inBuential, although it is unclear whether Temple him-
self should be completely situated within this tradition which claims 
6. Sedgwick, “.eology and Society,” 290.
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him.7 .e William Temple Foundation, based in Manchester, has been 
one of the strongholds of this tradition, particularly through the work of 
Ronald Preston, Professor at Manchester University, and John Atherton, 
at Manchester Cathedral.8 We could also however include the work of 
John Habgood, Archbishop of York, David Jenkins, Bishop of Durham, 
Peter Selby, Bishop of Worcester, Peter Sedgwick, Principal of St Michael’s 
College, CardiA, and Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford, as well as many 
of the publications of the national Board for Social Responsibility in this 
“conservative liberalism” category.9
All these authors are characterized by a basically liberal (Kantian-
Weberian) analysis of modernity, with its increasing secularization and 
pluralism, while at the same time, in varying degrees, wanting to hold 
on to something of the Church of England’s historic claim to be the 
conscience of the nation. As a result all tend to oAer comment on con-
temporary politics and economics which seeks to speak in the categories 
of “natural reason,” independent of speci8cally Christian claims, and 
therefore supposedly acceptable to all, regardless of their beliefs; while 
at the same time they end up oAering at most only very modest critiques 
of the status quo. .e appeal is to a certain form of English common 
sense, against what is seen as the pietism and absolutism of more inte-
gralist alternatives such as Catholic liberation theology or Evangelical 
communitarian thought.
It is diCcult to miss the episcopal, establishment nature of this strand 
of Anglican social thought, and it has o6en been expressed through re-
sponses to government reports and interventions in the House of Lords. 
Amongst the many theological inBuences, the principle 8gure seems to be 
Reinhold Niebuhr and his “Christian realism.” It is not diCcult therefore 
7. It is striking for example, that Temple does not shy away from the Christian na-
ture of his economic and social vision, and also has an account of the co-inherence of 
justice and love, and of guild models of association, which is not so far removed from 
Caritas in Veritate. See Temple, Christianity and Social Order, 93, 76–77, and 106.
8. E.g. Preston, Religion and the Ambiguities of Capitalism; Atherton, Christianity 
and the Market.
9. E.g. Habgood, Confessions of a Conservative Liberal; Jenkins, Market Whys and 
Human Wherefores; Harries, Is there a Gospel for the Rich?; Sedgwick, Market Economy 
and Christian Ethics. In fairness we should note that there are of course shades of diAer-
ence in this tradition: so, for example, the report Faith in the City, Selby and Jenkins all 
stand at the more radical end politically and economically, and, as we have indicated, 
Temple retains more of an explicitly Christian integralist agenda than many of his heirs 
would claim.
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to see why Stanley Hauerwas has nicknamed this strand of Anglican 
social thought “Reinhold Niebuhr in ecclesiastical drag.”10
“Conservative liberalism” was not however the only show in town. 
We can trace a second strand of thought with more in common with 
the radical integralism of Benedict XVI, more at home in the academy 
than on the episcopal bench, which has perhaps risen to ascendancy in 
recent times and, I will argue, can trace its roots back to earlier strands 
of Anglican social thought. For want of a more precise label, I will call 
this loose grouping the Catholic Socialists. .ey share a sense that the 
Christian faith does not need to be translated into middle axioms to 
contribute to political debate in a pluralist society, but rather is its own 
social, political and economic vision. .ey also share a commitment to 
radical critique of the status quo on this basis and to more mutualist, 
co-operativist, communitarian forms of socialism rather than to stat-
ist solutions. .is tradition might include such diverse 8gures as Ken 
Leech, community theologian in East London, Tim Gorringe, profes-
sor at Exeter University, Michael Northcott, professor at Edinburgh, 
John Milbank, professor at Nottingham, Graham Ward, professor at 
Manchester and, arguably, Rowan Williams, the current Archbishop of 
Canterbury.
In diAering ways, they have expressed a wariness towards liberal-
ism and its alliance with free market capitalism, a strongly international-
ist and environmentalist concern, along with a recognition that what 
is required is not simply state interventions on the basis of justice, but 
more fundamentally new forms of business and commercial practice to 
achieve transformation at the level of the economic base. .is certainly 
sounds closer to the integralist thinking of Caritas in Veritate. .is per-
spective has gained a new ascendancy through the inBuence of more 
post-liberal and communitarian thinkers, such as Stanley Hauerwas and 
Alasdair MacIntyre in recent years. Meanwhile their inBuence in turn 
can be connected with broader cultural shi6s, such as the breakdown 
of a liberal consensus in the face of more extreme pluralism and the 
marginalization of religion through a more vigorous secularism, which 
has curiously led to a revival of theological self-con8dence.
Furthermore, this integralist Anglican tradition can be seen as not 
just a recent maverick departure from the dominant “conservative liberal” 
10. From a response to a question at the conference “A Particular Place,” at Westcott 
House, Cambridge, September 16–18, 2009.
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perspective, but in fact a return to elements of an earlier tradition of 
Anglican social thought. We can certainly trace direct precursors of the 
more communitarian, con8dently Christian, politically radical analysis 
we have been describing in the Anglo-Catholic “Christendom group” 
in the early twentieth century, and slightly earlier in the work of Henry 
Scott Holland and the Lux Mundi school, including R. C. Moberly and 
Charles Gore. .is latter group stand slightly closer to the “conserva-
tive liberals,” and we might group with them the important writings of 
the Anglican economist R. H. Tawney, Michael Ramsey, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, and in fact certain aspects of Temple’s own work (his more 
idealist and unapologetically Christian moments).
More broadly, we can see something which at the least is quite 
diAerent from the “distinction of planes” model in the thought of the 
grandfather of Christian socialism, F. D. Maurice.11 In particular, his ec-
clesiology, with its universal reach and refusal of clericalist distinctions 
of laity from clergy, his theology of communion, for which the Church 
is itself a social reality, and his theology of creation, with its sense of all 
creation as graced and his refusal of any notions of pure nature, seems 
remarkably close to the integralist position set forth in the mid-twentieth 
century by Henri de Lubac (which stands behind Ratzinger’s theology 
and Caritas in Veritate).12 .is should not come as such a surprise when 
we recall that both were in diAering ways inBuenced by patristic, Platonic 
philosophies (in Maurice’s case, with a Coleridgean Bavor; while for de 
Lubac in a more Augustinian mode) rather than the Aristotelianism 
which had inBuenced neo-scholastic ways of thinking.13
We can also suggest that Anglican ecclesiology and soteriology, 
from Maurice, back to Hooker and even in proto-form in someone like 
Tyndale, preserved, in common with the Orthodox churches, an earlier 
Carolinian/Byzantine model of Church and society, and a more dei8cation 
model of grace and nature, unaAected by the Hildebrandine, Tridentine, 
neo-scholastic, and Vatican I developments which had made the distinc-
tion of planes model seem so appropriate to Roman Catholicism.14
11. See Morris, F. D. Maurice, 158–60. 
12. Ibid., 128 n.149, 135, 149, 169, 173, 203.
13. Ibid., 37–43, 46–49.
14. See Ramsey, Gospel and the Catholic Church, chs. 11 and 13; Williams, Anglican 
Identities, chs. 1 and 3; Hooker Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book V, chs. 1, 2, 55 
and 56.
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Such a lineage might make integralism seem a hopelessly old-fash-
ioned Constantinian model unsuited to the challenge of the present day. 
However, we should not forget that Maurice and de Lubac were each 
already responding to the challenge of secularism and even the rise of 
atheism in ways which were not just about reasserting control, but in the 
con8dence that nothing is beyond the limits of grace. Likewise we have 
seen how it is ultimately such an integralist position which in fact oAers 
a more radical analysis and response to our contemporary situation. If 
this argument is correct, then it is the case that not only are there impor-
tant similarities between the message of Caritas in Veritate and recent 
Anglican social thought, but also an Anglican perspective can help to 
rescue the encyclical from the stale conservative/liberal debate and re-
veal its radical theological heart. On the other hand, this reading of the 
encyclical can encourage Anglicans in moving on from the “Niebuhr in 
ecclesiastical drag” model of social thinking, towards something that it 
at once more Christian and more radical.
Beyond this, we can make an even more bold or perhaps just mis-
chievous claim: that some of the key ideas of Caritas in Veritate have 
received their most fulsome treatments and indeed may even have par-
tially originated within Anglican thought. We can note, for example, that 
John Burnaby, Oliver O’Donovan, and John Milbank have been amongst 
the most important defendants of the Augustinian notion of charity as 
reciprocal gi6 exchange, and in the latter case has applied this to the 
economic sphere.15 We can also recall that mutualism, co-operatives 
and association were much discussed by Maurice, the Anglican legal 
and economic historians J. N. Figgis, and R. H. Tawney, and the British 
Christian “guild socialists”.16 Also that one of the key Roman Catholic 
exponents of distributivist ideas was the convert from the Church of 
England, G. K. Chesterton. Finally, that many of the basic ideas of the 
ressourcement movement which contributed to de Lubac’s integralism 
and the position of Caritas in Veritate, such as the concern with histori-
cal development, or the return to the Fathers instead of neo-scholasti-
cism, had some of their roots in another famous convert, John Henry 
15. Burnaby, Amor Dei; O’Donovan, Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine; Milbank, 
Being Reconciled and Future of Love.
16. Morris, F. D. Maurice, 143, Tawney, Acquisitive Society; see also Milbank, Future 
of Love, ch. 4.
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Newman.17 .ese converts may well have brought some of their intel-
lectual “patrimony” with them, so that both traditions are already more 
ecumenically interdependent than they might realize. It seems then as 
if Anglicans may have more sympathy for this encyclical and more of a 
contribution to make concerning its interpretation and reception than 
many would think.
17. de Lubac, Catholicism, 431–33.
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Jon Cruddas MP and Jonathan Rutherford
An economy needs ethics in order to function correctly.
—Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate
Introduction
The buildings of Canary Wharf in east London are huge factories of information and communications that have grown out of the old 
industrial structure of the Docklands. .ere are no longer any cranes on 
West India Dock li6ing heavy goods from the holds of ships, very few 
workers engaged in physical toil, and no trade routes from the workshop 
of the world to the four corners of empire. .e hard lives this industrial 
economy sustained have been made redundant. .e new engines of 
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Western capitalism are companies like Credit Suisse, HSBC, Citigroup 
and Morgan Stanley. .e new trade routes are digital and they no longer 
need the labor of the old working class. Instead they o6en rely on cheap 
labor for cleaning and servicing. If you follow the A13 from Canary 
Wharf along the river you reach Dagenham, home to many of the low 
paid, migrant workers who service the 8nancial elite.
Dagenham was once the cornerstone of London’s manufacturing 
industry, dominated by the giant Ford plant. In the 1950s Ford was 
employing over forty thousand men and women, and turning out four 
thousand cars a week. But de-industrialization and growing competition 
from Asia caused a dramatic fall in production and pro8ts. Barely 8ve 
thousand now work across the whole Ford estate. Keith Dover worked on 
the assembly lines for 86een years: “Going in there at the start of a shi6, 
we were like the living dead. It was over and over, the same thing, eight 
hours a day.” Harry Coleman is ninety years old and spent his working 
life in the plant: “I wouldn’t know the place now,” he says. “What’s le6 
today? Only the ghosts.”1 View Britain through the prism of Dagenham 
and you will 8nd a de8ning story about our country.
Despite its proximity to the City, Dagenham has seen none of the 
opulent wealth it generated. .irty years of globalization have ripped 
through its communities with the destructive force of a tornado. .e ex-
traordinary speed of its industrial collapse has le6 behind unemployment 
and the disorientating loss of a way of life. .ere followed demographic 
change so rapid that it defeats the ability of the census to measure it. 
Under-resourced public services buckle under the pressure of incom-
ing migrants. .ere is deep, intractable poverty and a chronic shortage 
of homes. A disorganized, insecure class of low paid immigrants, single 
mothers, pensioners, bene8t claimants, and casual workers, struggle to 
get by on a daily basis. Fear and racial tension resonates with the insecu-
rities of large numbers of people who feel that they have been abandoned 
to live as strangers without a community.
Britain has become a country we do not yet know. In the last three 
decades, despite increasing wealth, our class divisions have become 
more entrenched. Inequality de8nes our society. Growing diAerences in 
culture and lifestyles and the breaking up of the UK into our constitu-
ent nations have dislocated our sense of identity and belonging. Private 
consumption is valued more highly than the consumption of public 
1. Quotes from Dennis Ellam, “Ford’s Dagenham Car Plant.”
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goods, and this is manifest in the absence of a public discussion of the 
common good. .ere exists an unresolved dilemma about what is the 
right balance between a collective sense of security and the pursuit of 
individual freedom. We have been governed in the manner of Mosaic 
UK, the marketing system which breaks people down into one hundred 
and 86y-8ve types of individuals, sixty-seven diAerent households and 
86een groups. Politics has been reduced to a form of management with 
battles between “suburban mindsets” and “elderly needs.” .e erosion 
of civic culture and social bonds has led to a loss of trust and a sense 
of disenfranchisement amongst the electorate. Many people want more 
authentic, self-ful8lling lives but this searching exposes us to what can 
feel like an unanchored and lonely existence, full of personal risk. .e 
8nancial crisis has brought to an end an economic era, and we have now 
entered a period of transition.
The Age of Excess
In the last three decades Britain has been experiencing a transition from 
an economy organized around industrial mass production to one orga-
nized around the new information and communication technologies. 
Radical innovations in the generation, processing and transmission of 
information, backed by 8nancial capital are modernizing the whole 
productive structure. Ford is an example of the fate of the old industrial 
leviathans in this new economic age. It had become an automobile man-
ufacturer dependent on its credit vehicle 8nancing arm. Pro8t no longer 
lay in producing cars, but in selling credit to customers to buy them. .e 
lease and loan payments of Ford Credit could be securitized and sold on 
to raise money on the capital markets. Its business model felt the strain 
in the 8nancial crash of 2008, and it le6 Ford with 25.8 billion dollars of 
debt. .e British economy suAers a similar predicament. Once a manu-
facturing nation we have become indebted consumers over-reliant on 
8nancial speculation for growth. An economy of excess, driven by greed, 
has brought us to the brink of 8nancial collapse.
.e historic crisis of Britain’s old model of mass industrial pro-
duction and the systemic failure of capital accumulation in the 1960s 
provided an opportunity for the right to establish a new hegemony. .e 
1979 Conservative government of Margaret .atcher broke the power of 
organized labor, deregulated and restructured the economy, and opened 
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it up to global market forces. Chancellor GeoArey Howe’s 1981 “austerity 
budget” of public spending cuts and tax increases destroyed the post-war 
consensus of welfare capitalism. But it was the 1980 Housing Act and the 
“right to buy” your council house that helped to win popular support for 
the Conservative Government and secured the thirty year hegemony of 
neo-liberalism.
In the name of a property-owning democracy, a new kind of popu-
lar compact between the individual and the market took shape. Home 
ownership aligned the modest economic interests of individuals with 
the interests of 8nancial capital. .is relationship between the individual 
and the market began to displace the old social welfare contract with the 
state and provided a foundational structure for the development of a new 
liberal market society of consumers. Commodi8cation and market rela-
tions were extended into society. .e public sector and civic institutions 
began to recon8gure their organizations into proxy and quasi- markets 
governed by cost eCciency and targets. Individual social relationships 
incorporated a larger element of the rational calculation of the market. 
.is ideological transformation of culture and society was driven by a 
state that was itself being privatized, outsourced, and marketized. Where 
the nation state had taken a moral responsibility for the welfare of its 
citizens, the new kind of market state promised them instead the eco-
nomic opportunity to consume.
Economic growth depended on this compact. .e housing market 
became the epicenter of a casino economy that turned homes into as-
sets for leveraging ever-increasing levels of borrowing. .e lives of mil-
lions were integrated into the global 8nancial markets as their savings, 
pensions, and personal and mortgage-backed debt were expropriated 
by 8nancial capital. In three decades GDP doubled, but it was a false 
prosperity disguising deep structural problems in the economy. Britain’s 
boom was dependent on the imbalance between the huge trade surpluses 
of emergent economies and the de8cits of the rich countries. .e reloca-
tion of manufacturing to low wage economies was creating a new global 
division of labor and destroying working class jobs in Britain. In 1978, 
7.1 million were employed in manufacturing, by 2008 this had fallen 
to 3 million.2 .e boom years brought replacement jobs in the public 
sector, retailing, restaurants and hotels, and in 8nance and business 
2. ONS, “Workforce Jobs by Industry.”
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services.3 But the City had little appetite for investing in economic devel-
opment, and it was government that created jobs in former manufactur-
ing regions. Despite the extraordinary growth of the 8nancial sector, its 
business model did not spread wealth and nor did it create a signi8cant 
number of jobs. Between 2005 and 2006 the 8nancial sector’s share of 
UK GDP increased from 8.8 percent to 9.4 percent, in the same period 
income poverty began to rise again.4
.e process of de-industrialization undermined the income base 
of the working class. .e share of national wealth going to wages peaked 
at 65 percent in 1973, by 2008 it had dropped to 53 percent.5 To sustain 
living standards, low and middle earning households increased their 
dependence on capital markets and borrowed. In 1997 the debt to in-
come ratio was 91:1, by 2007 it had risen to 157:4.6 .e boom years of 
the neo-liberal economic order, both globally and nationally, transferred 
wealth and resources from labor to capital on a massive scale. Millions 
have been le6 economically inactive or working in casual, low paid and 
insecure employment. In contrast, the compact established a banking 
oligarchy which captured both the 8nancial regulatory system and the 
political class. .e business model of shareholder value aligned the in-
terests of a business elite with the market value of their companies.
While business productivity failed to grow, the pay of company 
directors and the senior workforce of the 8nancial houses soared. .e 
credit they sold to middle earners fueled the highly lucrative market 
in debt securitization that generated bank bonuses. In 2007 these to-
taled 14 billion pounds Gordon Brown, in his Mansion House speech 
that year, hailed, “the beginning of a new golden age for the City of 
London.” .e following year house prices in Britain lost 13.3 percent 
of their value, HBoS bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland faced im-
manent bankruptcy and money markets froze. .e neo-liberal compact 
worked in favor of the rich who were able to establish themselves as 
an oligopoly. .e banking elite captured both the 8nancial regulatory 
system and the political class.
3. Ibid.
4. See online: http://www.cpag.org.uk/povertyfacts/index.htm.
5. Lansley, Unfair to Middling, 7.
6. Ibid., 8.
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Britain entered recession in September 2008 with levels of per-
sonal debt at 1.4 trillion pounds, of which 223 billion was unsecured.7 
In the 8ve years between 2002 and 2007, during its period of maximum 
pro8teering, the 8nancial industries contributed 203 billion pounds in 
taxes.8 Against this the IMF calculates that the direct cost to the taxpayer 
of the banking crash is 289 billion pounds. If the loans and guarantees 
are added in, the potential exposure to the taxpayer has been 1183 bil-
lion pounds.9 .e economy faces an uncertain future. .e unchecked 
power of 8nancial capital has le6 Britain with some of the highest levels 
of poverty and inequality in Europe. In 1976 the bottom 50 percent of 
the population owned 8 percent of the nation’s wealth, by 2001 it had 
fallen to 5 percent.10 In contrast, 1 percent of the population earn an 
average annual income of 220,000 pounds and own approximately 25 
percent of marketable wealth. Within this group, a super rich elite of 0.1 
percent earns an average of 780,000 pounds.11 .e neo-liberal compact 
provided unprecedented levels of consumer choice for millions, but it 
functioned to transmit money into the 8nancial sector rather than cre-
ate durable economic security. It provided a social structure for enabling 
new forms of capital accumulation and so helped in the resurgence of 
creative destruction.
Outside, Looking In
.e middle earners of Middle Britain lost out to the wealthy who grew 
tax light and dynastically rich, but millions were excluded from the 
compact of cheap credit, consumerism and home ownership. As the 
economic boom came to an end in 2007–08, 13.5 million people, or 22 
percent of the population were living in households on or below the 
poverty line of 60 percent of the median household income.12 Of these, 
5 million are surviving on 40 percent of median income, around 10,000 
7. See online: http://www.creditaction.org.uk/september-2008.html.
8. CRESC, Alternative Report on UK banking Reform, 31.
9. Ibid., 32. For details, see IMF, State of Public Finances.
10. See National Statistics, available online: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget 
.asp?id=1005.
11. Brewer, Sibieta, and Wren-Lewis, Racing Away?
12. See .e Poverty Site, http://www.poverty.org.uk. For information about the 
median income, see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=285.
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pounds a year—a little over two weeks income for the top one percent. 
.e numbers in deep poverty are at the highest level since records be-
gan in 1979.13 .e “right to buy” has enriched many peoples’ lives, but 
the failure to invest in housing for the next generation has le6 millions 
without a decent home.
In a society of consumers, inequality has created a new kind of 
cultural domination around lifestyle and the conspicuous consumption 
of status-enhancing goods. Consumer culture became a mass symbolic 
practice of individual social recognition distributing humiliation to 
those lower down the hierarchy. .e shame of failing in education, of 
being a loser in the race to success, of being invisible to those above, cuts 
a deep wound in the psyche. Invidious comparisons between one’s self 
and others and between one group and another creates feelings of infe-
riority and chronic anxiety. Richard Wilkinson has shown how this kind 
of anxiety dramatically increases vulnerability to disease and premature 
death. Drawing on the 8ndings of neuroscience he argues that, “the va-
riety of physiological processes aAected by chronic anxiety mean that its 
health eAects are in many respects analogous to more rapid ageing.”14 As 
he points out, violence is more common where there is more inequality 
because people are deprived of the markers of status and so are more 
vulnerable to the anxieties of being judged by others.
Inequality not only destroys the well-being and damages the life 
chances of people living in poverty, it increases levels of mental illness 
across society, undermining trust, and creating fear and intolerance. 
Despite the injustices of inequality, those who gained the least from the 
economic boom—the poor, welfare recipients, single mothers, immi-
grants, and young people—have all been made scapegoats for anxieties 
about social disorder and incivility. Economic deprivation has precipi-
tated inter-generational self-destructive behavior, addictions, depres-
sion and mental illness, criminality and “conduct disorder,” but these are 
symptoms of incivility, not its root causes. Recipients of welfare bene8ts 
have been subjected to a punitive rhetoric that recalls the harshness of 
the Poor Laws. .e New Labour government revived a disciplinary ap-
proach to welfare concerned with controlling individuals rather than 
supporting them. Poverty became an issue about personal behavior and 
13. See online: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=285.
14. Wilkinson, “Health, hierarchy and social anxiety”; Wilkinson, “Impact of 
Inequality”; Wilkinson and Pickett, Spirit Level.
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dependency rather than about economic inequality and justice.15 .e 
problem was not structure or environment but individual failing and 
dysfunction.
.e compact and its ideology of self reliance and individual market 
choice, not only undermined the welfare ethos, it eroded social ties and 
public civic culture, contributing to the break down in trust, an increas-
ing fear of crime. Many people have become disaAected with representa-
tive democracy. .ey have lost con8dence in political parties and have 
disengaged from the public realm. .e institutions which have in the 
past given people access to political ideas and civic activity, such as trade 
unions, churches and political parties face steep membership-decline. 
.e 2009 Ipsos Mori Annual Survey of Public Trust in Professions re-
veals the depth of this crisis of political representation. Only 13 percent 
trust politicians, down from 21 percent in 2008, and only 16 percent 
trust government down from 24 percent.
Social Recession
In the 8rst decade of the new century, there were growing anxieties 
about the condition of society. In September 2006, !e Daily Telegraph 
published a letter signed by over one hundred professionals and academ-
ics. “We are,” they wrote, “deeply concerned at the escalating incidence 
of childhood depression and children’s behavioural and developmental 
conditions.” .eir letter was prescient of a Unicef report, An overview of 
child well-being in rich countries, published the following February.16 It 
paints a bleak picture of British childhood. .e summary of six dimen-
sions of child well-being places the UK at the bottom of the league.
In 2004, the NuCeld Foundation published a study, Time Trends 
in Adolescent Mental Health.17 It looked at three generations of 86een 
year olds in 1974, 1986 and 1999 and identi8ed a sharp decline in their 
mental health. Behavioral problems have more than doubled over the 
15. For an example of Lawrence Mead’s work, see his 1996 paper, “Poverty and 
Political .eory.” See also the work of Charles Murray, e.g., Bell Curve Intelligence. Murray 
was invited to Britain by !e Sunday Times and his ideas were taken up by the Institute of 
Economic A$airs Unit run by Digby Anderson. It has since been renamed Civitas.
16. UNICEF, Overview of Child Well-being in Rich Countries.
17. Collishaw, Maughan, Goodman, and Pickles, “Time trends in adolescent mental 
health,” 1350–62; .e NuCeld Foundation, 2004 Seminars on Children and Families.
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last twenty-8ve years. Emotional problems such as depression, anxiety, 
and hyperactivity have increased by 70 percent. What the study could 
not explain was the cause of this trend. It did note however that ris-
ing levels of adolescent mental illness coincided with improvements in 
economic conditions. Further studies suggested that these levels have 
reached a plateau. Causal explanations have ruled out family size. Nor 
can it be fully accounted for by the increases in single parent families 
and levels of poverty.18 One study, by Stephan Collishaw et al., ends 
inconclusively with the statement that “trends in mental health might 
also be conceived of as a product of both “bene8cial” and potentially 
“harmful” societal changes.”19
Children and adolescents are an acutely sensitive measure of the 
well being of a society. As they grow, the fabric of conscious and uncon-
scious communications of their families, and more widely of culture and 
class, race and social relations are precipitated in them. .ey internalize 
these social relations that come to form the innermost being of individ-
ual personality. Problems we associate with individuals—stress, depres-
sion, bullying, violence—are dysfunctions that originate in their families 
and wider social networks. As John T. Cacioppo and William Patrick 
describe it: “.e social environment aAects neural and hormonal signals 
that govern our behaviour, and our behaviour in turn, creates changes in 
the social environment that eAect our neural and hormonal processes.”20 
Research in neuroscience has demonstrated how poor parenting impacts 
on the biochemistry of children’s bodies, determining their capacity in 
adulthood to cope with life’s stresses.21 .ere is now a wealth of evidence 
that poor attachment or emotional trauma in childhood eAects long-
term health and life chances.22 Similarly feeling excluded and socially 
18. Maughan, Collishaw, Meltzer, and Goodman, “Recent Trends in UK Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health.”
19. Collishaw, Goodman, Pickles, and Maughan, “Modelling the Contribution of 
Changes in Family Life to Time Trends in Adolescent Conduct Problems.”
20. Cacioppo and Patrick, Loneliness, Human Nature and the Need for Social 
Connections, 11.
21. For an excellent introduction see Gerhardt, Why Love Matters.
22. Caserta, O’Connor, Wyman, Wang, Moynihan, Cross, Tuc and Jin, “Associations 
between Psychosocial Stress and the Frequency of Illness”; see also the article “Stressed 
Parents Equals Sick Kids.” .ere are also two reports from the Sainsbury Centre for 
Mental Health: Childhood Mental Health and Life Chances in Post-war Britain (2009), 
and Chance of a Lifetime (2009).
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isolated undermines people’s resilience, optimism and self-esteem and 
increases their levels of fear, anxiety and hostility.
In recent years the importance of social and relational life has been 
recognized in government and policy-making circles. However, the oC-
cial perception of the problem has been framed by the concept of “social 
capital” which tends to reproduce a neo-liberal understanding of the 
individual and social experience. .e exemplary and o6 quoted work 
in this 8eld is Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone. Putnam seeks to 
understand the trends in civic disengagement in U.S. society in the last 
third of the twentieth century. But he does not develop an account of the 
relations of subordination and domination that structure the social rela-
tions of a capitalist economy, and his methodology neutralizes diAerenc-
es of power in gender, race, and class relations. As a consequence, it fails 
to fully grasp the social and economic causes of civic disengagement.
Putnam, like Collishaw et al., is le6 with an enigma. He oAers lists 
by way of explaining the slump in social capital and civic engagement: 
busyness, time pressure, 8nancial pressure, 8nancial anxiety, urban 
sprawl, mobility. In the end he can only surmise that the cause is genera-
tional and intensi8ed by new communication technologies: “television 
and its electronic cousins are willing accomplices in the civic mystery.”23 
.e problem with the concept of social capital is its ideological aCnity 
with the neo-liberal status quo. As a consequence the overall tendency of 
oCcial policy-making has been to ignore the structural determinations 
of class and the changing means of production and consumption and 
their impact on human relationships, family life, and culture. Instead 
the focus has been local, encouraging networks and associations in 
neighborhoods to develop thick, bonding, and bridging capital. It is an 
approach which reproduces existing relations of power by transferring 
risk to those the policies claim to be helping. .e causes of poverty and 
deprivation are shi6ed downward and relocated in the behaviors and 
values of the poor themselves. In the name of “self-empowerment,” re-
sponsibility for change can be invested with them. .e realities of power 
and subordination and the issue of redistributing wealth and resources 
are le6 unquestioned.
.e theoretical failings of the social capital concept is symptom-
atic of the wider crisis of governance in the post-8nancial crash period. 
.e role of the social—social relationships, association, mutualism—in 
23. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 246.
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economic development was addressed by separating it out from politi-
cal economy. .e “social” was treated as if it were a discrete, internally 
undiAerentiated category, unconnected to class relations and to the capi-
talist reorganization of consumption and production. It oAered an un-
derstanding of society which focused on a few trees separated out from 
the wood. Looking through the prism of Dagenham, we need a radically 
new approach to understanding the kind of society we are living in and 
the place of individuals within the complex ensemble of political, eco-
nomic and cultural forces.
Common Life 
In the wake of the 8nancial crash, the neo-liberal contract that prom-
ised freedom through individual market choice no longer commands 
popular con8dence. .e sense of a shared national cultural life has been 
losing its hold over the popular imagination for several generations. .e 
old nation state’s social welfare contract is in tatters, its safety net gravely 
damaged. What now is the ethical relationship of individuals to one an-
other and to society? .e current political and technocratic elites have 
no answers. .eir intellectual capital was informed by the neo-classical 
tradition of economics. Social experiences and occurrences are account-
ed for in terms of what individuals think, choose and do. Individuals are 
treated as maximum utility-seekers governed by economic self-interest. 
.is idealized model of human interaction suited the governance model 
of market choice. But it is devoid of reciprocity and it leaves individu-
als with no meaningful relationship to one another. In its depoliticized 
world, history is silent, and the dynamics of oppression are absent. A 
range of disciplines—sociology, psychoanalysis, epigenetics, complex-
ity theory, and neuroscience—all show us how this understanding of 
human nature undermines well-being, destroys social connections, and 
impoverishes human potential.
.e problem is not simply about mistakes in social policy, it is about 
the fundamental issues of political economy and philosophical principle. 
We need to create a politics that values the social goods that give mean-
ing to people’s lives: home, family, friendships, good work, locality, and 
imaginary communities of belonging. In our aCrmation of ordinary, ev-
eryday life we will discover an ethics of the common good. .is politics 
would begin with us as individuals relating to others and producing in 
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society. Marx criticized classical economists like Ricardo and Mill who 
saw the individual as history’s point of departure rather than its historic 
result. .e modern epoch that produces the isolated individual is also 
the epoch of the most developed social relations. In the Introduction to 
Grundrisse, he argues that human beings can only individuate themselves 
in “the midst of society.”24 .e sociologist Norbert Elias, in his 1939 essay 
“.e Society of Individuals,” provides a sociology of this individuality and 
dismisses the view that individuals are self-contained, “closed personali-
ties.” .e pursuit of independence as an individualistic project, subject 
only to rules of just conduct, is an illusion. Human beings are social and 
emotional beings who are dependent upon other people throughout 
their lives. As Elias remarks, what shapes, binds and gives meaning to 
an individual’s belonging is “the ineradicable connection between his 
desires and behaviours and those of other people, of the living, the dead, 
and even in a certain sense the unborn.”25
Hannah Arendt provides some philosophical substance to Elias’s 
sociology. She is interested in the fate of our common world. “To live 
together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between 
those who have it in common.” She likens the “world of things” to a 
table around which people sit and which orders their relationships with 
one another. In the same way a common life both relates people to one 
another and separates them: “.e public realm, as the common world, 
gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to 
speak. .e loss of this realm means that individuals no longer share a 
concern with the same ‘world of things.’” Rather than leading to a diver-
sity of identities and experiences, the consequence is the loss of “things 
essential to a truly human life.” “Men have become entirely private, that 
is, they have been deprived of seeing and hearing others, of being seen 
and heard by them. .ey are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their 
own singular experience.”26 .e problems created by the neo-liberal eco-
nomic order confront us with the need to remake a common life.
.is understanding of the interdependency of individuals was an-
ticipated by the New Liberals of the late nineteenth century. Leonard 
Hobhouse wrote: “Society exists in individuals. When all the genera-
tions through which its unity subsists are counted in, its life is their life, 
24. Marx “Introduction,” in Grundrisse.
25. Elias, Society of Individuals.
26. Arendt, Human Condition, 52, 58.
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and nothing outside their life.”27 Like Marx , for whom the individual 
was a category of relations, Hobhouse described “man [as . . . ] the meet-
ing point of a great number of social relations.” In his 1898 essay, “.e 
Ethical Basis of Collectivism,” he argues that a progressive movement 
must have an ethical ideal and it must be abstract in that it is not yet 
realized and embodied in social institutions. One element of this ideal 
must be liberty but it must 8nd a synthesis with equality, “since it stands 
for the truth that there is a common humanity deeper than all our super-
8cial distinctions.”28 For Hobhouse, social progress is the development 
of a society in which, “the best life of each man is and is felt to be bound 
up with the best life of his fellow-citizens.”
Hobhouse’s social liberalism 8nds modern day counterparts in 
the ethical socialism of Paul Ricouer and Charles Taylor. For Hobhouse 
politics is “rightfully subordinate to ethics,” it exists for the sake of hu-
man life. For Ricoeur there must be an “ethical intention” central to a 
politics of socialism. It is: “the desire to live well with and for others 
in just institutions.” By living well he means for each person to follow 
their “good life” or their “true life” which he describes in terms simi-
lar to those of Charles Taylor, as “the nebulous of ideals and dreams 
of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less 
ful8lled or unful8lled.”29 Charles Taylor argues that the ethical value of 
self-ful8llment has entered deep into modern Western consciousness, 
but the conditions for its realization do not yet exist. It is, he says, a 
new phenomenon: “.ere is a certain way of being human that is my 
way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of 
anyone else’s. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. 
If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for 
me.”30 .e concern for one’s own identity and self-esteem is social rather 
than individualistic. It involves the right of everyone to achieve their 
own unique way of being human. To dispute this right in others is to fail 
to live within its own terms.
Ethical socialism does not subordinate the individual to the com-
munity, nor does it fabricate community where it does not exist. It is 
about the structure of relations between individuals, which shape both 
27. Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political !eory, 85.
28. Hobhouse, “Ethical Basis of Collectivism,” 141, 145.
29. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 172, 179–80.
30. Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 28–29.
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our psyche and our place in the order of things. It does not pitch the 
individual against society, but sees individuals as constituted in society. 
Society has its own kind of regularity, but it is nothing more than the 
relationships of individuals. .ere is no “I” without 8rst a “we” that is 
historical and forged out of culture and society. .e anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict writes: “Society is never an entity separable from the individu-
als who compose it. No individual can arrive even at the threshold of his 
potentialities without a culture in which he participates.”31 A people sub-
jected to cultural destruction lose their defense against more dominant 
cultures that seek to re-describe them. .e image of “the chav” and the 
concept of “an underclass” are both examples of how a dominant class 
culture imposes its meanings on another.
Ethical socialism addresses the material conditions which give 
form to individual being. It is a politics of equality founded in the belief 
that individuals are of equal worth and it is governed by an ethic of reci-
procity: “do not do to others what you would not like to be done to you.” 
It recognizes that the task of living necessitates interdependency with 
others and that this interdependency leads to the question of equality 
and justice. Equality is the precondition for freedom. Not simply the 
negative freedom from the compulsion of others, but a positive freedom 
toward self-ful8llment. Paul Ricoeur describes equality as the ethical 
core of justice. “.e unjust man is the one who takes too much in terms 
of advantages or not enough in terms of burdens.” Justice requires not 
just a singular equality, but the pursuit of equalities around relations of 
class, sexuality, race and gender. .ere is no barrier between the indi-
vidual and society that prevents the transition of ethics from interper-
sonal life to the social and political realm. Ethical socialism originates 
in the sphere of interpersonal relationships and extends upward into 
the wider social realm and into the political community that governs 
the distribution of resources. Ricoeur argues that equality “is to life in 
institutions what solicitude is to interpersonal relations.” Justice holds 
persons to be irreplaceable and so adds to the solicitude of living with 
and for others, “to the extent that the 8eld of application of equality is 
all of humanity.”32
31. Benedict, Patterns of Culture, 182.
32. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 202.
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A New Political Economy
Ethical socialism alone is not suCcient to realize a new society. Its must 
animate radical change in the organization of the economy and its rela-
tions of control and ownership. We need an ethical economy which is 
people centered. .e 8nancial crisis should herald a progressive moment 
for the le6. But it has struggled to confront its historical defeat in the 1980s 
and it has been Boundering in the ideological vacuum le6 in the wake of 
New Labour. It has neither the alliances across civil society, nor the col-
lective political agency to secure a new electoral agenda. It lacks a story 
that de8nes what it stand for. .e ideology of liberal market capitalism 
might have lost its credibility, but it remains the only story of economic 
life on oAer. We must apply our principles to developing an analysis of 
contemporary capitalism and a new political economy. Nowhere is the 
intellectual failing of the centre le6 more acute than in the realm of po-
litical economy. .e 8nancial crisis and the discrediting of neoclassical 
economics has le6 an intellectual void in policy-making.
Renewal of the le6 must begin with a new ethical political econo-
my. Britain has to make the transition from casino capitalism to a low-
carbon, more equitable, and balanced form of economic development. 
.e transition demands an economics whose principles are ecologically 
sustainable wealth creation, durability, recycling, cultural inventiveness, 
equality, and human Bourishing. .e fundamental logic of this new 
economy must be ecological sustainability. Climate change, peak oil, the 
need for energy, and food security are all core green issues at its heart. 
Social movements, single issues campaigns, and civil society organiza-
tions will be essential to this developmental process, but they are not 
enough. A plural politics of alliances capable of achieving transformative 
economic and political change and of countering the destructive forces 
of capitalism requires a systemic theoretical and philosophical ground-
ing and organizational coherence. Only by developing our traditions of 
socialism will we be able to create a new hegemonic politics.
In the decade ahead new forms of production and consumption 
will continue to reshape society and social relationships. Technology 
is facilitating new cultural practices and at the same time opening up 
opportunities for capital to commodify them. New kinds of property 
and property relations are being created. Just as early industrial capital-
ism enclosed the commons of land and labor, so the ICT driven post-
industrial capitalism of today is enclosing the cultural and intellectual 
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commons (both real and virtual), the commons of the human mind and 
body, and the commons of biological life. Government must take on 
a new strategic authority and act as the dynamic builder of the green 
industrial economy of the future, facilitating a new techno-economic 
paradigm across markets and sectors.
We need to develop a democratized, redistributive, social activist, 
intra-nation state capable of setting limits to the scope of capital accu-
mulation, regulating markets, and asserting the public interest in the 
wider economy. It will need to be decentralized and responsive to indi-
vidual citizens and small businesses. .e advocacy roles of civil society 
organizations, including the trade unions, need to be strengthened. We 
must make capitalism accountable to workers and citizens through regu-
lation, economic democracy and forms of common ownership. Markets 
need re-embedding in society and the ethic of reciprocity reestablished 
within their contractual aAairs. .e economy must work for the com-
mon good. It needs an epochal shi6 from 8nancial capital to production 
capital in order to spread wealth more evenly across the country. Banks 
as public utilities will need to play a major role in building homes and in 
the coming green industrial revolution by directing investment into new 
markets and into technological innovation and employment. In place 
of unfettered shareholder value, we must establish new relationships 
between 8nance and industry that foster long-term investment and real 
improvements in productivity. Regulation should discourage short-term 
8nancial gain. .e privileging of 8nance capital has led to the country 
becoming dangerously exposed to its speculative activities. In the event 
of another 8nancial crisis, the sheer scale of bank assets and liabilities 
will put the British state and economy in jeopardy. We literally can’t af-
ford the City to operate as a law unto itself. .e 8rst task of building 
a new economy is the wholesale reform of the banking sector and its 
business model of shareholder value.
In the future the eAervescent quality of wealth creation will de-
mand secure social foundations. .e welfare system will have to re-
spond to a Bexible and fragmented employment market. .ere must be 
a non-punitive, publicly funded welfare system run in partnership with 
local, non-pro8t making agencies that puts claimants at its center. We 
have to recover the principle of universal bene8ts and social insurance 
in the form of a citizens’ pension, part of which can be accessed at dif-
ferent stages of life. In the longer term this can be connected up to child 
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bene8t and the child trust fund and developed into a citizens’ income 
payable to each individual as a right of citizenship. .is would be an 
unconditional, non-withdrawable income that guarantees access to the 
necessities of life.33
Alongside the productive economy we need to develop the care 
economy. A public service of childcare and support for parents, centered 
on the emotional development of children, and working to reduce child 
poverty is essential for both children and for greater social equality. 
Older people need a care system that aAords them the same substantive 
freedoms as others in society. Careers need proper 8nancial support. 
.ere are new emerging markets and needs around the third age, well-
being and health, social care and education. On current trends this so-
cial economy will become the biggest sector by value and employment. 
We will need to develop novel ways of linking the formal and informal 
economy. .e state needs to be capable of interacting with the complex-
ity and values of social and community organizations, and devolving 
real power and decision making to workers and users.34 Democratizing 
public services can avoid the problems of the market and bureaucracy 
and create new spaces of innovation and social development. Achieving 
a balance between freedom and security, eCciency and conviviality for 
both workers and users will be diCcult, but essential.
A new political economy grounded in human welfare needs a re-
vival of democracy in order to bring vested interests and elites to ac-
count. .e introduction of proportional representation in local and 
national elections is essential in order to reBect the plural nature of 
Britain. A new system of party funding will remove the inBuence of rich 
individuals and interests. We need an elected House of Lords and the 
revival of local government tax raising powers in order to deepen and 
extend democracy through society. .ese changes will be met by 8erce 
resistance, not only from the vested interests of 8nance capital and big 
business, but also from sections of society who fear they might lose out 
in a more egalitarian society. Our strength will lie in making deep and 
enduring alliances and building broad popular movements for change. 
Despite the disillusionment with political parties, there is an extraor-
dinary level of political, cultural and community activism in our soci-
ety. Politics has become more individualized, ethical, and rooted in a 
33. See the work of the Citizen’s Income Trust at www.citizensincome.org.
34. Murray, Danger and Opportunity.
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diversity of beliefs, lifestyles, and localities. .is is stimulating a search 
for new kinds of democratic political structures and cultures that will 
re-connect institutions of political power with social movements and 
political constituencies.
.e birth of a real political alternative will require radical open 
thinking, insightfulness and inventive forms of organization. Nothing 
is guaranteed, the Right will seek to maintain the power of capital over 
labor, and the political elite will strive for a return to business as usual. 
Areas of the country like Dagenham might face dark times ahead. But the 
opportunities for a more ethical and radical politics of the common good 
and social justice are real. .e goal of centre le6 politics is a strong and 
responsive democracy, a restoration of trust and reciprocity in public life, 
and an ethical and ecologically sustainable economy for human welfare 








The premise of this collection is that “there is a ‘middle’ position between an exclusively religious and a strictly secular perspective” 
on economics. But it seems to me that a “middle position” must, by de8-
nition, compromise the truths of both religion and economics. Indeed, 
such a premise accepts what is one of the primary problems with mod-
ern economics, namely, the belief in the so-called “equity/eCciency” 
trade-oA. .at is, the belief that an economic system can be equitable or 
it can be eCcient, but it cannot be both.
What we should seek, I believe, is not a compromise, but a connec-
tion. What we must show is that not only is there no conBict between 
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equity and eCciency, but, on the contrary, the latter is dependent on 
the former, and that if one reaches the opposite conclusion, then one 
has misunderstood either justice, or economics, or both. And I believe 
that at the root of this confusion is a misunderstanding about what kind 
of science economic science is. However, it is not enough merely to as-
sert the connection; the connection must be demonstrated in terms that 
even the most rigorous economist could accept. Without this, ethics ap-
pear as mere platitudes, to be rightly rejected by the man of science. For 
as (then) Cardinal Ratzinger observed: “A morality that believes itself 
able to dispense with the technical knowledge of economic laws is not 
morality but moralism. As such it is the antithesis of morality. A scien-
ti8c approach that believes itself capable of managing without an ethos 
misunderstands the reality of man. .erefore it is not scienti8c.”
What is implied by this statement is that there is a dialogic rela-
tionship between theology, the Queen of the Sciences, and economics, 
or indeed with every other science. However, since each science is the 
master of its own methods, theology must speak to each science in terms 
intelligible to that science. .is places a double burden on the theolo-
gian to learn his own language and to be able to translate it into another 
tongue. However, it is a burden that theology cannot refuse; She must 
comment on the mundane aAairs of the world in terms intelligible to the 
world, or She must abdicate her responsibilities and lose her social util-
ity. .eology must, on the one hand, exercise sovereignty over the other 
sciences, and on the other hand, humbly learn from every other science. 
.is sovereign humility is a burden theology cannot refuse without mak-
ing the gospel of no eAect in the world, without reducing it to a mere 
academic curiosity.
What I will attempt to show is that economic order—that is, the 
rough balance between supply and demand known as equilibrium—is 
dependent upon equity. Indeed, it is the very lack of equity that makes 
equilibrium impossible and ineCciency inevitable, and the failure to 
recognize this makes economic science impossible. .ree things are 
necessary for a scienti8c and ethical economics: 8rst of all, to situate 
economics, or rather, political economy, in its proper place in the sci-
enti8c hierarchy; secondly, to show why distributive justice is neces-
sary to economic order; thirdly, to show that property, the most basic 
of economic relationships, lies at the root of distributive justice. Taken 
together, these three points add up to the economic philosophy known 
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as “distributism.” However, I wish to point out that this “distributism” is 
not some new theory of economic order, not another ideology, not an 
alternative “ism” in a marketplace of “isms,” but rather an historic reality 
that occurs over and over again, and occurs today. Our task is not one 
of invention, but of discovery; it is not to invent new systems, but rather 
to discover the roots of economic order that are always operative, and to 
apply them to new situations. Our originality comes not from invention, 
but from application. Indeed, political economy is the practical science 
par excellence and is hence governed by the practical reason, which has 
as its 8rst principle that “the good is to be done and evil avoided.” And 
since it is a practical science, our 8rst task is to locate political economy 
within the scienti8c hierarchy.
Science, Normative and Positive
Some wag somewhere has remarked that economists suAer from “phys-
ics envy.” Sciences like physics have no need for concepts like “justice.” 
Hence, if one attempts to model the movement of markets in the same 
way as the movement of molecules, then terms like “justice” can only be 
an embarrassment that can only compromise the purity of the science, 
while equity could only compromise the eCciency of markets. Since 
economists are human, they are o6en willing to allow such compro-
mises, to allow the trade-oA of some eCciency against a certain degree 
of equity. But equity in such cases will always be an interloper in good 
economic order, and any concessions to it will be made grudgingly.
Underlying such a discussion is the so-called “positive-normative” 
duality, but this duality poses a false dichotomy. Every science, insofar 
as it is a science, must be both positive and normative. Every science, 
insofar as it is a science, must be “normalized” to some criteria of truth. 
.ese truths will arise from two sources, an internal and an external 
source. .e internal criteria involve the proper subject matter and meth-
odology of a science. But these criteria are insuCcient to found any sci-
ence qua science. In addition, there must be external criteria of truth, 
and these truths can only come from one or more of the higher sciences. 
In the absence of such an “external” check, the “science” will merely be 
circular, dependent on nothing but its own axioms and unconnected 
to the hierarchy of truth. .us, for example, biology is responsible to 
chemistry and chemistry to physics. No biologist can violate the laws of 
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chemistry, and no chemist can reach a conclusion contrary to physics. 
.us every science is responsible to its own methodology (and therefore 
“positive”) and to the higher sciences (and therefore “normative”). Every 
science has, therefore, both its own proper autonomy, based on its sub-
ject matter and methodology, and its own proper connection to the near 
sciences, based on the hierarchy of truth.
Without submitting itself to this hierarchy of truth, no truth can 
be called a “scienti8c” truth. Without this proper scienti"c humility, no 
study can 8nd its proper place in the hierarchy. Merely being mathemati-
cal, or empirical, or axiomatic is not enough—no matter how precise the 
mathematics, how careful the observations, or how certain the axioms. 
An astrologer, for example, will make observations as precise as you like, 
will draw charts as complex as you like, and make predictions as speci8c 
as you like. And all of it will be consistent with astrology’s own axioms. 
However, these axioms are never subject to the judgment of any other 
science; lacking the requisite scienti8c humility, astrology cannot be sci-
ence. It may be, for all I know, God’s own truth; it can never be man’s 
own knowledge. It must be accepted or rejected sola "de; no scienti8c 
judgment can ever be made because it can never be science.
So the proper question is not whether economics is positive or nor-
mative; since it is a science it is both. .e question is: “To which of the 
higher sciences is it subject?” .e physical sciences normally terminate 
in physics, but the humane sciences—the sciences of human relations—
terminate in some view of man and particularly in some view of justice. 
It is justice that regulates human relationships, not only in the moral 
sense, but in the practical sense as well. .at is, an economics that has no 
sense of justice will make no sense at all; it simply will not work. Justice 
is not some arbitrary “value” imposed on the science, but a principle of 
practical reason that keeps things reasonable. .erefore, some theology 
must be the ultimate source of truth for economics with some interme-
diate stops at psychology and sociology. It would seem to be self-evident 
that a complete view of man would involve the sources of knowledge 
about man, yet this view is not at all universally (or even generally) ac-
cepted by economists.
How is it possible that a humane science can cut itself oA from 
these indispensable sources of knowledge about humans? .e answer 
is: it can’t. It is not possible to theorize about human actions without 
some theory of humans. .e selection of an economic system is also 
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the selection of an underlying ethical system. .e task is not to bury 
the ethical assumptions under the pretense of “objectivity,” but to make 
those assumptions explicit—where they can be examined by all. What 
actually happens is that neoclassical and Austrian economists accept 
as a purely economic truth that which is, in fact, a purely philosophic 
stance, namely that of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, and its various 
descendents. .is philosophic assertion has become a pseudo-scienti8c 
dogmatism, placed beyond all question and critique and hence the sci-
ence has become less scienti8c and more dogmatic.
Having said that, it is now incumbent on me to make plain my own 
ethical assumptions, at least those that lie nearest to the economic ques-
tion. My primary ethical assumption concerns distributive justice, and 
by that I mean something very speci8c with a very speci8c economic 
signature. .e speci8c meaning is that the output of production is di-
vided proportionally to the contribution to production; that is, one takes 
no more than what one contributes. And the speci8c signature of dis-
tributive justice is that the returns to wages and capital are normalized to 
each other, that is to say, one cannot earn much more by investing than 
one could by working, which implies that there will not be great diAer-
ences of wealth and poverty, that the income gradient will be relatively 
Bat. .is is the technical requirement for the condition of equity. But 
a further question immediately arises: why should this condition, this 
distributive arrangement, be vital to economic equilibrium?
Equity and Economics
Equity and Equilibrium
When people come together in families or 8rms to produce things, they 
add wealth to the economy; in fact, this is the only economic way to add 
wealth. If they and others also get an equitable share of the output, or the 
wealth they create, there will be enough purchasing power in the econ-
omy to buy all the things the 8rms produce. .is is the much-maligned 
“Say’s law of markets,” which states that “supply creates its own demand.” 
Say’s Law is much criticized because if you examine it closely, it says 
that recessions are impossible; there will always be enough purchasing 
power to clear the markets. Clearly, we purchase things in terms of other 
things. .e total number of things created equals the total number of 
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things that can be used for purchasing the other things. And yet, reces-
sions do happen, quite obviously. Long ones. Deep ones. Serious ones. 
And they happened more so in Say’s day, the heyday of the laissez-faire 
economy, than in ours. So, what is wrong with Say’s “Law”?
To understand the problem, we have to look at the sources of 
demand in a money economy: wages and pro8t. Wages are, of course, 
the rewards of labor and pro8t the reward of capital. In another sense, 
however, these are the same rewards, since capital is merely “stored-up” 
labor, or things produced in one period to be used to continue produc-
tion in the next period. For example, if a farmer wishes to have a crop 
next year, he must save some seed-corn from this year’s crop. Now, the 
corn he consumes and the corn he saves are the same corn from the 
same crop. But by saving some corn for seed, it becomes “capital.” Hence, 
the return on this capital is really a return on his prior-period labor, just 
as his wages are a return to current-period labor. Clearly the returns to 
capital and labor, pro8t and wages, spring from the same source (labor). 
Capital, then, ought to have roughly the same rewards as labor, plus 
some premium for saving.
If wages and pro8ts are normalized to each other, economic re-
cessions are unlikely to be protracted or serious. .ere will be enough 
purchasing power distributed equitably to clear the markets. In capitalist 
economies, the vast majority of men are not capitalists; that is, they do 
not have suCcient capital to make their own livings, either alone or in 
cooperation with their neighbors, but must work for wages in order to 
live. And since the vast majority of men and women work for wages, then 
the vast majority of goods will have to be distributed through wages. In 
conditions of equity, this will not be a problem; so long as there is equity, 
there is likely to be equilibrium, and periods of disequilibrium are likely 
to be brief. But it may happen, and quite o6en does, that pro8t and wages 
are not normalized to each other. Usually, this means that capital gets an 
inordinate share of the rewards of production. .is, in turn, means that 
the vast majority of men and women will not have suCcient purchasing 
power to clear the markets, and the result will be a disequilibrium condi-
tion, that is, a recession.
At this point, the neo-classical economist might object that the di-
vision of rewards doesn’t matter, since there will still be the same amount 
of purchasing power in the economy; even if capital gets more and labor 
less, there will still be the same amount of money, and hence of purchas-
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ing power. Alas this is not true. .e CEO or Managing Director may get 
8ve hundred times what the line worker gets, but he cannot wear 8ve 
hundred times the shoes, eat 8ve hundred times the food, or live in a 8ve 
hundred-bedroom manor. Nor can he productively invest the excess, 
because the very fact of receiving the excess narrows the market, which 
is always measured by the number of solvent consumers in that mar-
ket. Hence, instead of productive investment, the investor 8nds no use 
for his money and he turns to speculative instruments like the CDOs, 
MBSs, CDSs, and the whole alphabet soup of 8nancial gambling instru-
ments with which we have become all too familiar. .us, both purchas-
ing power and investment funds leach out of the economy to produce 
structural shortfalls. When this happens, societies look to non-economic 
ways of restoring equilibrium.
Non-Economic Equilibrium
.e major non-economic means of restoring equilibrium are charity, 
government spending, and consumer credit (that is, usury). Each of 
these methods transfers purchasing power from one group, which has 
an excess, to another, which has a de8cit. .e 8rst method, charity, will 
always be necessary to some degree because even in the most equitable 
economies, there will always be people who are incapable of making a 
decent living, perhaps because of mental impairment, moral de8ciency, 
or physical handicap. One hopes that there is enough generosity and 
benevolence in society to voluntarily cover these needs. However, when 
low wages become widespread, and when self interest becomes the dom-
inant motivation in society, it is likely that charity will be insuCcient, 
and other means must be used.
.e second non-economic method is government spending, by 
which the government seeks to re-establish equilibrium conditions ei-
ther by supplementing the income of some portion of the population, 
or simply by increasing its spending to create more jobs and thus add 
more purchasing power to the economy. .is strategy is at the heart of 
Keynesian economics. Despite the fact that Keynesian transfers now 
consume a huge portion of the public expenditures, these transfers 
have been, for some years now, insuCcient to balance supply and de-
mand, and for some time now the economy has depended chieBy on 
the third method, usury or consumer credit. .is is the plastic economy, 
an economy based on credit cards. And to the extent that an economy 
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depends on consumer credit, it is, quite literally, a house of cards, and 
will be as unstable as those structures usually are. In fact, usury is the 
most destructive way of increasing demand, since a borrowed dollar 
used to increase demand today must be paid back tomorrow and hence 
decrease demand in a future period by that same dollar—plus interest. 
.is requires more borrowing, which of course only makes the problem 
worse. Eventually, the system falls of its own weight, as credit is extended 
to an increasingly weakened consumer, and a credit crisis results.
Power, Property, and Justice
!e “Standard” Model
If the relationship between equity and equilibrium is so obvious, why 
have most economists missed it entirely? .e truth is, they haven’t missed 
it, but they use a diAerent model of “fairness” in wages. Without going 
too deeply into this model, we can note that it states that in a perfectly 
competitive, free-market environment, wages would tend to reBect ac-
curately the productivity of both labor and capital, and that each side 
would get the wealth it actually produced, and so equilibrium would be 
reached. .e most famous proponent of this theory, called “marginal 
productivity,” was J. B. Clark, who put it this way: “Where natural laws 
have their way, the share of income that attaches to any productive func-
tion is gauged by the actual product of [that function]. In other words, 
free competition tends to give labor what labor creates, to capitalists 
what capitalists create, and to entrepreneurs what the coordinating func-
tion creates.”1
Another way to state this theory is to say that wages determined by 
free-market bargaining will be “just wages,” and equilibrium conditions 
will be satis8ed. While time does not permit a complete critique of this 
theory, we can note that it depends on treating all things as commodi-
ties manufactured for the market with a supply regulated by the price. 
But labor (that is, human beings) is not a “commodity” whose supply 
is regulated by price—pace .omas Malthus. However, the theory of 
marginal productivity is very easy to test empirically. According to the 
theory, wages should rise with productivity. And occasionally, this actu-
ally happens. But not always, and not even generally.
1. Clark, Distribution of Wealth, 3 (emphasis original).
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For example, over the last thirty years in the United States, pro-
ductivity has exploded in all categories of labor, but the median wage 
has not changed since 1973. Hence, the marginal productivity theory is 
falsi8ed in practice. Clearly, workers are producing more, but they are 
not getting any of the bene8ts; the rewards of increased productivity are 
going to a few people at the top, while the mass of men have seen no im-
provement. However, it is obvious that if people are producing more but 
earning the same, they cannot from their earnings consume all that they 
produce, and hence the economy will have to rely on the non-economic 
sources of demand; usury and welfare will replace economic justice as 
the means to equilibrium.
Why doesn’t free bargaining produce equitable wages? Adam Smith 
gave the answer a century before Clark proposed the theory. Concerning 
any dispute over wages, Smith writes that “It is not, however, diCcult 
to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, 
have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compli-
ance with their terms. .e masters, being fewer in number, can combine 
much more easily . . . In all such disputes, the masters can hold out much 
longer . . . Many workman could not subsist a week, few could subsist a 
month, and scarce any a year without employment.”2
In other words, Smith recognized that it was power, and not pro-
ductivity, that determines the outcome of wage negotiations, and power 
will generally favor “the masters.” But if it is power that is arbitrated in 
a wage contract, then the solution is to redress the balance of power 
between the parties. To do this, we must look at the primary source of 
economic power, namely property.
Property: !e Source of Economic Power
Property relations are the most basic economic relations, and all other 
economic outcomes will depend in large measure on the nature of the 
basic property relations. As Daniel Webster noted, “Power follows prop-
erty,” and this is a simple truism that cannot be denied. We tend to take 
the modern form of property for granted, but in fact it is a relatively 
recent innovation, dating back to 1535 and the seizure of the monaster-
ies, an act that created a new form of property. .is modern form of 
property was not codi8ed in law until 1667 in the Statute of Frauds, and 
2. Smith, Wealth of Nations, 70.
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the dominant form of modern property, the limited-liability corpora-
tion, did not gain its current status and powers until 1886, in a bit of 
U.S. Supreme Court legislation known to history as Southern Paci"c v. 
Santa Clara County, a decision which made the corporations practically 
independent and sovereign nations.
Before the reign of Henry VIII, property tended to be a widespread 
condition throughout society. Technically, only the king was a property-
holder, in our sense of the term, while everyone else was a tenant, either 
a tenant-in-chief (a duke or other great lord) or a sub-tenant. We associ-
ate “tenants” with “renters,” people who normally have only thin, con-
tractual, and precarious rights to the property they occupy, and who pay 
for these limited privileges the highest amount that the market will bear, 
an amount called “economic rent.” But this was not so then. Rights in 
tenancy were nearly as strong as outright ownership is today, and rents 
were not “economic,” but customary. .at is, they were not related to 
the economic value of the land, but to the value of the services provided 
to the land, defense, improvements, courts, etc. .ey were more like a 
tax than a rent, and did not vary from year to year. We tend to think of 
a 86eenth-century peasant as powerless and perhaps starving, a mere 
serf (or even a slave). But that was not the case. Wages were, in fact, 
quite high. An artisan could provision his family with ten weeks of work, 
while a common laborer could do so in 86een—wage levels that were 
not seen again until the late nineteenth century.3
However, a6er the seizure of the monasteries, wages collapsed so 
that, at the close of the sixteenth century, it took an artisan thirty-8ve 
weeks and a laborer forty-two weeks to provision his family.4 .e seizure 
of the monastic lands and the enclosure of commons had dispossessed 
most of the peasantry of their traditional lands and rights. .ey became 
landless proletarians crowding into cities, which o6en could not provide 
them with suCcient work, or brigands on the highway, stealing to sup-
port their families. Rents became economic, with landlords squeezing 
out the last penny of value from the now weakened renters. .is brief 
history shows the power of property to completely change wage relation-
ships. Men who have property—that is, the means of production—are 
free to negotiate a wage contract, or not, as they wish. But a man with no 
other means of support must accept the terms oAered. In this latter case, 
3. Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages, 390.
4. Ibid., 390.
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the wage contract becomes leonine, that is, based on the inequality of the 
parties, and leonine contracts are always about power.5
We should be careful to note here that the issue is not about private 
property per se, but about the form and extent of that property. Property 
is natural to man, we might even say it is proper to him. It is as natural 
for a man to say, “.is is my house” or “.is is my land,” as it is for him 
to breathe. Indeed, when a man cannot say, “.is is mine,” then he really 
is less of a man; he might even 8nd it diCcult to breathe, or at least draw 
a free breath; his rights and freedoms have been truly compromised. .e 
socialists correctly analyzed the problem in terms of property, but they 
analyzed it in the wrong direction. Having ascertained that there were 
too few owners, they tried to ensure that there would henceforth be no 
owners. But the distributist takes the problem in the other direction; he 
wishes to make the mass of men more properly human by giving them 
what is proper to a man, namely property.
Restoring Distributive Justice
.e primary justi8cation for private property is that it ensures that each 
man gets what he produces. As R. H. Tawney put it, “Property was to 
be an aid to creative work, not an alternative to it.”6 But when property 
becomes aggregated into a relatively few hands, when only a few control 
the means of production, property loses its proper function, and “owner-
ship” becomes divorced from use. In our day, “ownership” is frequently in 
the form of a corporate share, which loses most of the qualities of actual 
ownership to become attenuated to a mere lien on a certain portion of 
the pro8ts, or not, as the managers decide.7 Oddly enough, this puts not 
only the worker, but the investor at a disadvantage, as power passes to 
a new group, the über-managers, who sit on each other’s boards and set 
each other’s salaries. As John Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard invest-
ment funds, notes: the managers take an increasing share of the pro8ts, 
leaving scraps for those who actually put their money at risk.8 .e result 
is that the returns to both kinds of labor, actual labor and the stored-up 
labor of capital, are reduced, while “management” and speculation get 
the lion’s share of the pro8ts.
5. Belloc, Servile State, 111.
6. Tawney, Acquisitive Society, 59.
7. Ibid., 62.
8. Bogle, Battle for the Soul of Capitalism.
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.e whole point of distributism is the restoration of distributive 
justice to its proper place in economic science, and this means, at the 
practical level, the wider distribution of property. Only a man who has 
his own property—the land, tools, and training to make his own way in 
the world—only such a man can fairly negotiate a wage contract. If he 
has alternatives to what is being oAered, then the resulting contract is 
likely to be fair, that is, to fairly represent his contribution to the produc-
tive process. Nor is this conclusion really at odds with standard neo-
classical economic theory, if only the economists would take their own 
theory seriously. For at the base of all the standard economic theory 
stands the “vast number of 8rms” assumption, which presumes that the 
production of any commodity is spread over a vast number of 8rms such 
that none of them has any pricing power. .ey should all be price-takers 
and not price-makers. But the precondition of the “vast number of 8rms” 
assumption is that property be widely dispersed throughout society; 
without the latter you cannot have the former. If economists took their 
own assumptions seriously, they would be the 8rst to protest in front of 
8rms like Wal-Mart or Exxon. But they do not take their own theories 
seriously, because if they did they would become distributists or some-
thing very like it. Indeed, they would note the obvious: that the modern 
corporation has collectivized production beyond the wildest dreams of 
any Stalinist bureaucrat.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to situate economics in its proper place 
in the hierarchy of knowledge, a place that subordinates it to the other 
humane sciences, and ultimately to some theological vision of man. .e 
question here is not, I believe, whether this happens, but how it happens. 
.e predominant economic orthodoxy depends on a very speci8c view 
of man, but rather than explicitly examining that view, hides its theologi-
cal and philosophical roots under the rubric of “science,” thereby placing 
it beyond any actual examination or veri8cation. In other words, the 
science becomes unscienti8c at its very core, just as Cardinal Ratzinger 
said it would.
I have attempted to show the connection between justice and eco-
nomics, and speci8cally to show that justice is not some external re-
straint, but rather the practical principle which makes political economy 
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possible, which gives it a standard of action and enables it to be a ra-
tional discipline and overcome the absurdity of the “equity/eCciency” 
trade-oA. And I have attempted to show that the question of justice 
cannot be divorced from the question of property, and that distributive 
justice, as a purely practical matter, rests upon a proper understanding 
and division of property.
But my over-riding point concerns not so much the practice of 
economics as it does the practice of theology. For the Queen of the 
Sciences cannot remain a prisoner in her own palace. Rather, she must 
make a progress through her provinces, and speak to her people as both 
their sovereign and their subject. .eology, to properly ful8ll her role, 
must be out in the world, even in its most mundane corners. And the 
theologian must accept this burden of learning both his own language 
and someone else’s. .is requirement of learning the language of her 
subjects I call the sovereign humility of theology. .is sovereign humility 
encounters scienti8c humility to form the two poles of a dialog under-
taken in perfect con8dence, for science is the master of its own meth-
ods, while theology is the mistress of the practical reason. .eology 
cannot resign its sovereignty, any more than science can abandon its 
proper methods. But the sovereign listens to the judgment of the meth-
ods, while the methods are subject to the sovereign, not as to some 
outside conqueror or interloper, but as the force which guarantees the 
very validity and meaning of the science.
Finally, there is an old platitude that says: “If you wish for peace, 
you must work for justice.” .e economic equivalent is: “If you wish 
for equilibrium, you must work for equity,” for equilibrium is economic 
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